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First Lady of the Oceans
remembering Elisabeth Mann Borgese
Committed as she was to all the right things,
she gave dazzling speeches
with a brilliant turn of a phrase, but
I remember her best standing on her head
and smiling upside down.
It was the oceans she loved, those salty seas
where life began and over time emerged onto land.
She believed a new set of laws would do as life
had done: emerge from the seas onto land. She gave
her own life to this grand possibility.
She lived at the water’s edge and took her dogs
for long walks on the sandy shores.
In her quiet moments she taught her dogs,
proper English setters, to play piano, to type
and even to write Columbian school poetry.
I learned from her the art of vision, of looking
into the depths and finding a future worth fighting for.
She was only fifty when I saw her standing
on her head, well past youth and on her way
to venerability.
She grew older with grace, never slowing
her tempo or showing the accumulating years.
They called her the queen of the seas,
the first lady of the oceans. It was the mountains
that took her away, the snow covered mountains.
david krieger, February 2011
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Born in 1918 as World War i was receding, Elisabeth Mann Borgese learned to 
make her own way in a man’s world as an independent, self-taught author, pro-
fessor, and oceans activist. Elisabeth possessed an unwavering commitment to 
improving ocean governance so that all countries could benefit from exploit-
ing and conserving the wealth of the world’s marine resources. Her practical 
and conceptual work contained the seeds of many ocean governance develop-
ments addressed in this volume, whether training marine management experts 
or conceiving institutions for strengthening international ocean cooperation. 
The concept of treating ocean resources as common heritage, for example, was 
new and untested when she first expanded upon it in the 1960s and 1970s, as 
preparations for what would become the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea took shape. Almost half a century later the concept still challenges the 
slow-moving institutions of international law, which eventually acknowledged 
that seabed and subsoil resources beyond national jurisdiction are common 
heritage, but wrestles still with expanding that protection to living marine 
resources. Elisabeth’s commitment to international solutions to persistent 
problems were the product of a life lived across continents and countries, and 
across eight decades. She witnessed the naïve belief of her parents’ generation 
in the power of international institutions and its slow transformation into a 
more practical understanding that national and international interests are bet-
ter pursued through regional and topical approaches to managing common 
resources.
Elisabeth charted her own course in many arenas, each shaping her work 
on nationality, internationality, and ocean governance. As a German-European 
transplant to North America, she claimed four different national affiliations in 
her 83 years: German, Czechoslovak, American, and Canadian. Leaving Hit-
ler’s Germany for Switzerland in 1933 with her family at age 15, five years later 
they moved again, to Princeton, New Jersey. There her family’s circle included 
fellow exiles Albert Einstein and Giuseppe Antonio Borgese, whom she later 
married. Moving with him in the wake of World War ii to the University of 
Chicago, Elisabeth became secretary to the all-male Committee to Frame a 
World Constitution. Establishing her own credentials as a scholar of compara-
tive constitutions she worked with another German émigré, Max Rheinstein, 
who founded the discipline of comparative law in the United States. Returning 
with her husband to Italy in the early 1950s, she soon found herself a young 
widow with two small daughters.
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Making ends meet by teaching German, editing Ford Foundation journals, 
and writing reviews, she published her first novel, The Ascent of Woman, in 1963. 
She returned to the United States to become the sole female fellow at the Ford 
Foundation Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa  Barbara 
(1964–1978), where she pursued her own research on comparative constitu-
tionalism and ocean governance. Her first four decades of life are emblematic 
of an entire class of young women displaced by World War ii, each of whom 
made their way in foreign lands as wives, daughters, or on their own. Elisabeth’s 
last move to a new country came in 1978 when she joined Dalhousie University 
in Halifax, Canada. As a political science professor, she built on her work in 
community decision-making, constitutional processes, and common heritage 
until her death in 2002. Key to founding the International Ocean Institute was 
what colleagues recognized as one of her “most significant accomplishments[:] 
bridging the gap between the Euro-American elites amongst whom she was 
raised and the emerging elites of the Third World. This is a highly personal 
 accomplishment, based on the respect and trust of both sides.”1
Elisabeth earned that trust and respect as a woman making her way in a 
male-dominated intellectual world, as a university professor with no formal 
academic training, and as a woman without a country advocating for countries 
without a voice to ensure fair access to marine resources. In these myriad roles, 
Elisabeth pointed us toward “The Future of Ocean Governance and Capacity 
Development” by engaging in both of those activities in concrete ways. The 
essays in this volume pay tribute to her pursuit of collaborative and practical 
solutions to better use of the world’s oceans.
Betsy Baker
Anchorage, Alaska, United States
February 2018
1 This foreword is adapted from the author’s essay “Elisabeth Mann Borgese: Making her Way,” 
in Elisabeth Mann Borgese and das Drama der Meere, eds., H. Pils and K. Kühn (Mare Verlag, 
2013), 88–97. The quotation is from a Draft letter to H. Hicks, President, Dalhousie  University, 




It is hard to believe that Elisabeth Mann Borgese would have been 100 years 
old in 2018. That is because it seems like it was only yesterday that my friend, 
Professor Edgar Gold, introduced me to Elisabeth in 1974 in Caracas, Venezu-
ela, at the opening of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea. All I knew about her at first was that she was the youngest daughter of the 
great German Nobel Prize-winning novelist, Thomas Mann, and that she was 
a close friend of Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta, the person who set the law 
of the sea initiative in motion at the United Nations. Little did any of us know 
then that the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) 
would become the second-most important multilateral treaty since the Second 
World War, surpassed only by the United Nations Charter, or how important 
Elisabeth would be in promoting the principles of the Convention  over the 
remainder of her life! She, and I, believed the peace the Convention brought 
to the world’s oceans was one of the greatest diplomatic achievements of the 
twentieth century.
Everyone who knew Elisabeth was astonished when she decided to spend 
the last third of her life in Nova Scotia, with her amazing dogs, in Sambro 
Head, a tiny fishing village outside Halifax. In her time in Canada, she left 
many legacies. The one that is most successful and that endures to this day 
is the Training Program on Ocean Governance—organized by the Interna-
tional Ocean Institute-Canada—that will enter its thirty-eighth year in 2018. 
This Program has trained nearly 700 alumni from more than 100 countries 
around the world. The former participants of the Program have been extraor-
dinarily influential in ensuring that their countries dealt responsibly with 
their ocean assets, the ones granted to them by unclos. Important aspects 
of the Convention are reflected in the Program’s ocean governance curricu-
lum and, from there, have found their way onto the pages of this book. Go-
ing forward, the essays are bound to provide useful orientation and guidance 
for the next generation of ioi alumni, ocean management practitioners, and 
policy-makers.
More than a decade after her death, those of us who were fortunate enough 
to have worked with Elisabeth still miss her explosive energy, her inherent 
kindness to all around her, and access to her incredible network of contacts 
worldwide. The “First Lady of the Oceans” was a life force the likes of which 
we will not soon see again in a world that is always in need of many Elisa-
beths. Her famous father, if alive today, would be proud of his favorite child and 
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her crucial contributions to peace in the oceans of the world. Elisabeth would 
be delighted by this collection of essays inspired by her humanist ideals and 
 lifelong advocacy for the ocean.
Brian Flemming, CM, QC
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
February 2018
<UN>
Editors’ Preface and Acknowledgments
Following a decade-long global diplomatic effort of negotiations, the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (unclos) was adopted in 1982.1 Hailed 
as a constitution for the ocean, it contains many rules and regulations for 
all ocean areas, all uses of the sea, and all of its resources. The Convention 
also outlines the need for developing capacity to achieve the basic objectives 
concerning ocean governance. Provisions in Part xiv indicate an obligation 
of states and international organizations to promote the development of hu-
man resources by way of training and education, especially for nationals in 
less developed countries. As a forceful participant in the unclos negotiations 
and trusted advocate of the rights of those countries, Elisabeth Mann Borgese 
(1918–2002) took an active role to ensure that such training and education op-
portunities were made available. She was instrumental in establishing a train-
ing program at the International Ocean Institute (ioi), which she had founded 
in Malta, and fostered vigorously as part of her tenure at Dalhousie University 
in Canada during the last quarter of the past century.
Elisabeth’s humanist concepts, spirited discussions, and insightful publi-
cations on the ocean, ocean governance, and common heritage have not lost 
any of their relevance.2 They have gained significance in light of the enor-
mous challenges that humanity and the ocean are facing today, for example, 
 economic and demographic pressures, technological transformation and 
globalization, and the repercussions of environmental pollution and climate 
change.  Addressing these challenges requires more than adaptation; in fact, 
they call for sharpened attention to reach out to practitioners and concerned 
1 Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 u.n.t.s. 3.
2 Important works of Elisabeth Mann Borgese include The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas 
as a Global Resource (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1998), The Future of the Oceans: 
Report to the Club of Rome (Montreal: Harvest House, 1986), and The Drama of the Oceans 
(New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1975). The Elisabeth Mann Borgese fonds at the Dalhousie Uni-
versity Archives, Halifax, Canada, contain an extensive collection of research and personal 
papers at http://findingaids.library.dal.ca/index.php/elisabeth-mann-borgese-fonds. In 2018, 
Karolina Kühn prepared a tribute “Der Meeresraum ist eine neue Welt—Elisabeth Mann 
Borgese zum 100. Geburtstag,” in Neue Rundschau 2018/1 (Frankfurt: Fischer Verlage). In 2012, 
Holger Pils and Karolina Kühn edited a multi-faceted portrait Elisabeth Mann Borgese und 
das Drama der Meere (Hamburg: Mareverlag) which includes an extensive bibliography of 
her work (pp. 245–255). In 2004, Aldo Chircop and Moira L. McConnell edited a series of trib-
utes to Elisabeth Mann Borgese in Volume 18 of the Ocean Yearbook (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2004), which also contained emb’s autobiographical 1999 Nexus Lecture “The 
Years of My Life.”
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citizens and increased action to advance ocean governance and capacity de-
velopment for the future.
The year 2018 is an auspicious occasion to focus attention on the oceans 
and ocean governance. The annual IOI-Canada training program is approach-
ing its fifth decade, its ‘ocean ambassadors’ the world over are commemorat-
ing the 100th anniversary of the birth of its initiator, and Dalhousie University, 
IOI-Canada’s host, is celebrating 200 years of excellence in education and re-
search. If here today, Elisabeth would likely demand that we focus attention on 
recurrent environmental and social justice problems and add emerging chal-
lenges to the continuously expanding ocean governance agenda.
To address these interconnected and multi-faceted issues in a positive and 
forward-looking way, this collection of more than 80 invited essays offers state-
of-the-art views on key ocean governance-related themes, specifically, capacity 
development, law of the sea, ocean science, integrated ocean and coastal man-
agement, fisheries and aquaculture, ocean energy, maritime safety and secu-
rity, maritime transportation, as well as communication, public engagement, 
and negotiation. These themes are rooted in IOI-Canada’s long-standing and 
continuously evolving course curriculum on “Ocean Governance—Policy, Law 
and Management.”3 They complement the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, in particular Sustainable Development Goal 14 “to 
conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources.”4
A large roster of experienced academics, practitioners, writers, and admin-
istrators has contributed these brief essays as thought-provoking orientation 
for government, the private sector, researchers, non-governmental organiza-
tions, philanthropic organizations and the interested public. Without excep-
tion, all of the contributors followed eagerly and with generosity our invitation 
to honor the work and memory of Elisabeth. Quite a number of authors count 
themselves fortunate of their personal and professional connections with her, 
either as research associates, students, members of staff, or ocean advocates. 
Others drew inspiration and gained expertise from her commitment and her 
extensive body of work on ocean affairs. The common goal of these contri-
butions remains as apropos as unclos itself—developing better capacity to 
foster fair and well-informed ocean governance regimes that support environ-
mental sustainability and human well-being.
3 See “Training at IOI-Canada,” International Ocean Institute-Canada, http://international-
oceaninstitute.dal.ca/training.html; “Welcome to the ioi,” International Ocean Institute, 
https://www.ioinst.org/.
4 “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” United Nations, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld.
xxiiiEditors’ Preface and Acknowledgments
<UN>
As members of the editorial team we are closely associated with the Inter-
national Ocean Institute-Canada and the ocean governance training program. 
Our motivation to help advance its curriculum and to publish important con-
tributions is reflected, in large part, on these pages and in our introduction and 
conclusion. We thank the authors for contributing their essays and appreciate 
the work of our professional reviewers. IOI-Canada gratefully acknowledges 
financial support through the ioi headquarters in Malta for this publication. 
The management and production team at Brill Nijhoff in the United States 
provided expert guidance and support to see the project through to comple-
tion. Numerous individuals have contributed to this volume. While many are 
closely affiliated with particular institutions, we note that the views expressed 
in these essays are those of the authors.
The Editors, International Ocean Institute-Canada
Dirk Werle, Paul R. Boudreau, Mary R. Brooks, Michael J.A. Butler, 
 Anthony Charles, Scott Coffen-Smout, David Griffiths, Ian McAllister, 
Moira L. McConnell, Ian Porter, Susan J. Rolston, and Peter G. Wells
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
April 2018
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About the International Ocean Institute
Founded in 1972 by Elisabeth Mann Borgese, the International Ocean Institute 
is an independent, non-profit organization working globally to promote sus-
tainable ocean governance. For decades it has contributed to capacity build-
ing through training and publications, with an emphasis on ethical and legal 
values and peaceful uses of the ocean. Its interdisciplinary course at Dalhousie 
University in Canada has provided training in key aspects of coastal and ocean 
management each year since 1981 and has built an influential network of lead-
ers and practitioners equipped with the knowledge and skills to help advance 




Mr. Boudreau, B.Sc (1977), M.Sc. (1989), is an ecologist and environmental man-
ager (retired) who worked for 32 years with the Canadian federal Department 
of Fisheries and Oceans. A three-year posting to the Land-Ocean Interaction 
in the Coastal Zone (loicz) was significant in his perception of the variety of 
human reliance on the world coasts. Ongoing interests include the adequate 
representation of public views in the often very technical processes of respon-
sible coastal and ocean management. In 2012, he became a Senior Research 
Fellow with the International Ocean Institute-Canada.
Mary R. Brooks
Dr. Brooks is Professor Emerita at Dalhousie University’s Rowe School of Busi-
ness, Halifax, Canada. In 2016, she was appointed Chair of the Marine Board 
of the US National Academy of Sciences. Her research focuses on competition 
policy in liner shipping, port strategic management and short sea shipping. In 
addition to providing advice to governments and industry, Dr. Brooks has pub-
lished more than 25 books and technical reports, more than 25 book chapters, 
and more than 75 articles in peer-reviewed scholarly journals since joining 
Dalhousie University in 1979.
Michael J.A. Butler
Mr. Butler was educated at London University (UK), Memorial University and 
McGill University (Canada) with a focus on the marine sciences. His career in 
Atlantic Canada has included the roles of Fishery Oceanographer at the then 
Marine and Fishery Training Centre in Summerside; Coordinator of Training at 
the former Huntsman Marine Laboratory in St Andrews; Director of Research 
at the Council of Maritime Premiers’ Maritime Resource Management Service 
in Amherst; and, in Halifax, Director of the Secretariat for the Atlantic Coastal 
Zone Information Steering Committee; President of the Oceans Institute of 
Canada; and, since 2005, Director of IOI-Canada.
Anthony Charles
Dr. Charles is a professor at Saint Mary’s University in Halifax, Canada. His re-
search on fisheries, oceans and coasts focuses on integrated management, eco-
system-based management, community-based management, climate change, 
sustainability and resilience, and marine protected areas. He has authored and 
edited several major books, including Sustainable Fishery Systems, Governance 
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of Marine Fisheries and Biodiversity Conservation, and Governing the Coastal 
Commons. He leads the Community Conservation Research Network, explor-
ing linkages of environmental conservation and local economies. Dr. Charles 
is a Pew Fellow in Marine Conservation, a member of iucn’s Fisheries Expert 
Group, and a longtime contributor to the International Ocean Institute.
Scott Coffen-Smout
Mr. Coffen-Smout, B.Sc., dma, M.Sc., is an oceans management biologist with 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (dfo), Bedford Institute of Oceanography, Hal-
ifax, Canada. He studied biology and marine affairs at Dalhousie University 
and marine environmental science at Bangor University, Wales. He previously 
consulted in Somalia and Niue, South Pacific. Affiliations include: research as-
sociate at the Marine & Environmental Law Institute, Dalhousie University, 
 co- editor of Ocean Yearbook (Brill Nijhoff), alumnus of IOI-Canada’s training 
program, and senior research fellow at IOI-Canada. Areas of practice at dfo 
include marine spatial planning, spatial data and information management, 
sustainable fisheries certifications, oceans management, and area response 
planning.
David Griffiths
Mr. Griffiths is an independent researcher and former Canadian naval officer 
holding  research fellowships with the International Ocean Institute–Canada, 
the Centre for the Study of Security and Development at Dalhousie Univer-
sity in Halifax, Canada, and Pakistan’s National Centre for Maritime Policy Re-
search at Bahria University in Karachi. He also serves as Chair of the Board of 
Governors of the Atlantic School of Theology, Nova Scotia’s smallest university. 
He is a graduate of the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College and holds 
a  Master’s degree in Marine Management.
Ian McAllister
Dr. McAllister, long time economics professor at Dalhousie University, Hali-
fax, Canada, has served on two Royal Commissions and advised Canadian 
and overseas governments. He headed the Development Department of the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in Geneva. 
Among books he has authored are: Projects for Relief and Development (1991), 
Sustaining Relief with Development: Strategic Issues for the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent (1993), Working with Neighbours: University Partnerships for Inter-
national Development (1996), Through a Glass Darkly: From Disaster Relief to 





Dr. McConnell is a Professor of Law Emerita and Honorary Fellow of the Ma-
rine & Environmental Law Institute at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Can-
ada. Dr. McConnell’s research interests are in the fields of public and private 
international law and domestic law. She has over 100 publications in a wide 
range of topics in these fields, including law of the sea, maritime law and pol-
icy, environmental law and governance systems. She is co-editor of the Ocean 
Yearbook, associate editor of the Yearbook of International Environmental Law, 
and member of the editorial board of the wmu Journal of Maritime Affairs.
Ian Porter
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INTRODUCTION
The Future of Ocean Governance and Capacity 
Development
Dirk Werle, Paul R. Boudreau, Mary R. Brooks, Michael J.A. Butler, 
 Anthony Charles, Scott Coffen-Smout, David Griffiths, Ian McAllister, 
Moira L. McConnell, Ian Porter, Susan J. Rolston, and Peter G. Wells
International Ocean Institute-Canada, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
We live by a global ocean that washes on many shores, supports the activi-
ties of many different peoples, and exacts our respect in many forms. At the 
height of her career Elisabeth Mann Borgese advocated that this ocean is our 
common heritage. She worked to promote a sharing of skills and knowledge 
to enable people of all countries to benefit more equally from its bounty. The 
knowledge and facilities have spread, but so too has a recognition of the criti-
cal state of ocean conditions and of unmet challenges to ocean and coastal 
governance. This book is about the evolution of our understanding of both the 
conditions and the challenges.
Ocean governance and training are deeply rooted in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos),1 the 1982 international  agreement 
often described as the “constitution of the oceans.” As an active participant in 
the process of negotiation and ratification of the Convention, Professor Mann 
Borgese was determined that it incorporated the principle of equity among 
nations. More than that, she insisted that it must provide for training to enable 
small, developing and poor countries to implement the agreement for their 
own benefit. As she wrote later about the creation of exclusive economic zones 
(eezs) under the Convention: “The acquisition of vast areas of ocean space 
and resources by itself meant nothing if coastal states lacked the resources 
needed for rational management.”2
The foundation of the International Ocean Institute (ioi) in 1972 was a 
 response to this need. During her tenure in the 1980s at Dalhousie Univer-
sity in Halifax, Canada, Professor Mann Borgese led the development and 
 implementation of the IOI-Canada Training Program. Now well into its fourth 
1 Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 u.n.t.s. 3. Available at http://www.un.org/depts/los 
/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.
2 E. Mann Borgese, “The Training Programme of the International Ocean Institute,” Ocean & 
Coastal Management 40, no. 1 (1998): 93–97, 93.
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 decade, the annual program brings participants from around the world to 
meet at  Dalhousie University with experienced academics, practitioners, and 
administrators for lectures and discussion on current aspects of ocean and 
coastal  governance. More than 700 mid-level professionals from more than 100 
 countries have taken part.
This compendium of over eighty essays is an outgrowth of IOI-Canada’s 
flagship training course on ocean governance. It does not offer an in-depth 
review of any single aspect of ocean governance, but the diversity of themes 
and topics reflects the wide scope of ioi’s training initiatives. Despite their 
brevity, most of the essays share a common denominator and analytical qual-
ity: consideration of the current state of ocean governance-related affairs and 
a critical look at the challenges and prospects ahead. The latter aspect is the 
subject of our essay at the end of the book looking at a number of significant 
crosscutting issues that emerge through this process. They include concerns 
about institutional arrangements and co-operation, environmental problems 
and pressures, technological advancements, challenges and opportunities, and 
matters concerning civil society.
As this collection attests, ocean governance spans an extraordinary range of 
issues and disciplines.3 Its remit extends from matters as local as who gets to 
put a lobster pot where, to international disputes over control of ocean space. It 
relies on both formal and informal structures and fact-based evidence support-
ed by science to maintain the health of the ocean and the well-being of coastal 
peoples. unclos provided a framework of laws, institutions, and practices 
within which states might co-operate in the management of many different 
activities in, on and about the ocean and the sharing of its resources. An array 
of international agencies now exists to regulate everything from international 
maritime transport to tuna fisheries.
An emerging ethos of ocean governance found expression at the 1992 UN 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. Agenda 21 
declared that “the marine environment—including the oceans and all seas 
and adjacent coastal areas—forms an integrated whole that is an essential 
component of the global life-support system and a positive asset that presents 
opportunities for sustainable development.”4
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 called for new approaches to marine and  coastal 
area management and development. It urged States to undertake integrated 
3 Although there is no general and widely accepted definition of ocean governance we can 
point to specific legal, institutional and implementation-related elements that, when com-
bined in a holistic and inclusive way, form the basis for effective ocean governance regimes at 
local, regional, national and international levels, with the ultimate aim to sustain the health 
of the ocean and the well-being of humankind.
4 Available at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/outcomedocuments/agenda21.
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 management and sustainable development of coastal areas and to apply pre-
ventive and precautionary approaches in project planning and implementation. 
Coastal States should increase consultation with academic and private sectors, 
community and resource groups, and indigenous people. The capacity of de-
veloping countries to act on the recommendations ultimately would depend 
“on the technology transfer and financial resources required and made avail-
able to them.”5
Equity and sustainability remain as core principles but, in this century, is-
sues of ocean governance often concern shared exigencies. Climate change, 
population pressures, economic globalization, and unsustainable exploitation 
of marine resources challenge our ability to co-operate nationally, regionally, 
and internationally. The scale of these challenges is as vast as the ocean itself, 
but at least two considerations complicate our response to them all. None are 
resolvable by nations acting alone because so much of the ocean is beyond the 
legal jurisdiction of any one of them. Neither can any one branch of scientific 
inquiry or technology provide solutions. Only through interdisciplinary ex-
change can we hope to comprehend the complex relationships the ocean rep-
resents. Only through negotiation and compromise among nations can there 
be a possibility of effective action.
Such would have been the perceptions motivating the generation that pro-
duced unclos and Agenda 21. Who could question that fish ignore maritime 
boundaries, urban sewage and agricultural runoff degrade coastal waters, or 
ballast water from bulk carriers is a source of invasive species. What may have 
been more difficult to foresee was the rapidity of the escalation of threats to 
ocean health. Late in the last century, for example, the consequences of cli-
mate change to the ocean received much less media attention than worry 
about the ozone layer. The plastic bags that now clog mid-ocean gyres only 
started to appear at grocery checkouts around 1980.6 Meanwhile, the trends 
in such long-recognized indicators as levels of acidification, eutrophication of 
coastal waters, and fishery stocks have grown more ominous.
What also could not have been fully anticipated was the impact of digitized 
communication systems that made possible not only the Internet and social 
media, but also the accumulation and instant transmission of great volumes 
of data about the ocean environment, circulation patterns, and the movement 
of vessels. Shared with skilled associates, such data can enhance the capacity of 
5 Supra 4.
6 S. Laskow, “How the Plastic Bag Became so Popular,” The Atlantic, 10 October 2014, https://www 
.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/10/how-the-plastic-bag-became-so 
-popular/381065/.
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developing states to manage ocean activity and resources; withheld, existing 
disparities can only deepen. Similarly, the spread of the Internet led to the 
so-called digital divide between those with easy online access and those with 
limited or none. Yet the web serves as a virtual classroom for individuals seek-
ing up-to-date credentials in science and technology and enables the exchange 
of significant findings between colleagues on opposite sides of the world. The 
intensity of current debates over cybersecurity and Internet governance is a 
good measure of its importance for the future of ocean governance.7
The hyper-charged pace of change in the early years of this century has had 
unequal consequences for people in developed and developing states. Whole 
communities in the South Pacific are looking afar for new islands to which they 
might move, and in the developed world rising flood insurance premiums are a 
concern for people along North American coastlines. Spreading drought brings 
bans on water-sprinklers in upscale communities in some countries, while for 
subsistence farmers it means desperation and mass migration. Just as unequal 
can be the distribution of benefits from advances in research, knowledge, and 
technological change. The cost of maintaining a large scientific establishment 
and acquiring the technology it demands is well beyond the financial capacity 
of most developing States. The knowledge base from which developed nations 
around the North Atlantic manage fisheries, maritime transport, and weather 
forecasting and so on, is vastly more detailed than that for developing States 
globally.
For Professor Mann Borgese, the gap in knowledge and capacity between 
developed and developing states reflected a power relationship in which the 
well-to-do will always advance faster and further than those with less. This 
was for her, and is for a large part of the world, no longer acceptable. What is 
also now more apparent than ever is that—like weak links in a chain—gaps in 
overall ocean governance expose all of us to the consequences of a breakdown 
in the sustainability of ocean ecosystems. This possibility weighs heavily on a 
generation of young people around the world in an era where human activity 
has a decisive impact on the environment. The foresight and commitment of 
Elisabeth Mann Borgese speaks to this generation as surely as at any time dur-
ing her life. We have only one ocean to care for, she reminded us, and it is a 
responsibility and an interest we share with people on all its shores.
7 “Debates on Global Governance and Cybersecurity,” Internet Governance Project, Georgia 
Tech, School of Public Policy, 3 April 2017, https://www.internetgovernance.org/2017/04/03/
debates-on-global-governance-and-cybersecurity/.
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Perspectives on Ocean Governance
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 Ocean governance means the way in which ocean a�fairs are governed, not only by 
governments, but also by local communities, industries and other ‘stakeholders’. 
It includes national and international law, public and private law as well as 
custom, tradition and culture and the institutions and processes created by them. 
 Elisabeth Mann Borgese* 
 * Ocean Governance: Legal, Institutional and Implementation Considerations , Ocean Policy 
 Research Institute Report No. 5 (The Nippon Foundation, 2002). 
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Introduction
Editor: Michael J.A. Butler
This part is focused on ocean governance per se and the contribution that 
Elisabeth Mann Borgese and her organization, the International Ocean Insti-
tute, have made to its development. There are numerous definitions of ocean 
governance that endeavor to explain the complexity and breadth of this topic. 
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 refers to ocean governance in terms of sustainable de-
velopment and integrated management, essential components of a global life 
support system. The Ocean Yearbook, Volume 18, which is dedicated to Elisa-
beth Mann Borgese, provides an exhaustive review of ocean governance and 
its importance,1 the raison d’être for this volume.
The essays here continue the reviews and analyses documented in the 
Ocean Yearbook and contribute timely thoughts on the future governance of 
73 percent of the earth’s surface. The topics are as insightful as they are varied. 
They range from personal reminiscence of Elisabeth Mann Borgese and her 
ability to engage world leaders in her global quest to preserve the ocean for the 
benefit of humankind, to a critique of the current system of ocean governance 
that is fragmented and lacking unity. The complexities of ocean ecosystems 
and the difficulties of their governance are described as a ‘wicked’ problem, an 
innovative term in this context. The increasingly vital concept of ethics and its 
application to all aspects of ocean governance are reviewed and, in a similar 
vein, the importance of shared values in partnerships is stressed in terms of 
meaningful ocean governance. Reduced government involvement and an en-
hanced stakeholder engagement are posited for ocean governance in  Canada. 
A following essay highlights the significance of the Peace and Friendship 
 Treaty of 1760 with the First Nations and its relevance to ocean governance 
today. A ‘two-eyed seeking’ philosophy, aptly named by two Mi’kmaq Elders 
from Eskasoni (Cape Breton Island), pays respect to both Western science and 
Mi’kmaq traditional knowledge, to arrive at the best possible science. The for-
mulation of ocean governance policy and its implementation is then explored 
from the perspective of environmental non-governmental organizations, their 
role and impact. The final essay describes the enduring relationship of the In-
ternational Ocean Institute with China on oceans and that country’s long-term 
vision of creating an ‘ecological civilization’ where people and nature can co-
exist in harmony.
1 A. Chircop and M.L. McConnell (eds.), Ocean Yearbook, Volume 18 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2004).
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In 1987, Elisabeth Mann Borgese expressed regret at not living long enough 
to see the evolution of ocean governance. That progress is surely well docu-
mented in the essays in this part, and as the subsequent parts will further at-
test. Her modest words make a fitting prelude to these essays:
Our generation can take pride in having contributed, no matter how 
fumbling and bunglingly, to the making of a new order for the seas and 
oceans, to opening of new ways of thinking about world order and the 
hammering-out of a platform from which, in the future, a great many 
new initiatives can be launched.2
2 “Foreword,” San Diego Law Review 24, no. 3 (1987), 601.
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Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s Invisible Hand in Ocean 
Governance: Past, Present, and Future
Awni Behnam*
Honorary President, International Ocean Institute, Malta
In the history of Planet Ocean (after all 75 percent of it is covered by ocean) 
three human beings as no others have defined its destiny through the genius 
of thought, passion, and craft: Hugo Grotius, Arvid Pardo, and Elisabeth Mann 
Borgese. For centuries, the Grotius principle of freedom of the seas was unas-
sailable. Then came that virtuous day when Pardo, the then Ambassador of 
Malta at the United Nations, made his marathon speech to the United Nations 
General Assembly (unga) on 1 November 1967 advocating a new principle for 
a new law of the sea. That principle was destined to be that of the common 
heritage of mankind, which transcends both concepts of sovereignty and free-
dom in human relations with the ocean and its governance.1
That speech in its totality galvanized Elisabeth, who at that time was a fel-
low of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. She saw Pardo’s 
ideals aligning with those of the Center and her own beliefs, in particular Par-
do’s emphasis on the peaceful use of the ocean and its living and non-living 
resources. This was to lead to several narratives that impacted the convening 
and processes of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(unclos iii). She grafted Pardo’s ideas on the framework of Pope John xxxiii 
Pacem in Terris, thereby creating Pacem in Maribus. As Pardo’s intellectual part-
ner, and with the support of the Maltese government, she convened the 1970 
Pacem in Maribus conference to discuss the broad issues of the use of ocean 
services and resources into internationally agreed law.2 In 1972 she established 
the International Ocean Institute (ioi) in Malta as the think tank for the evolv-
ing negations at unclos iii. She wrote:
1 United Nations General Assembly (unga), 22nd Session, Official Records, First Committee 
1515th Meeting, 1 November 1967, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/
texts/pardo_ga1967.pdf.
2 E. Mann Borgese, “The Years of My Life,” Ocean Yearbook 18 (2004): 1–21, 12–14.
* Former President, International Ocean Institute; former United Nations Assistant Secretary- 
General, Affiliate Professor, University of Malta.
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We followed unclos iii very closely, analysed its emerging results, pro-
posed new approaches and solutions. All major actors participated in 
unclos iii participated in Pacem in Maribus, coincidently the President 
of unclos iii, Shirley Amersighe, was also the President of the Interna-
tional Ocean Institute.3
Elisabeth had both the personality and the opportunity to influence the 
 decision-making process to a large extent. As the ultimate friendly persuader, 
she also used ioi and Pacem in Maribus as the ‘bully pulpit’; she was both the 
antagonist and the pragmatist in the crafting of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (unclos).
As negotiations continued at unclos iii, developing countries were in-
creasingly gaining their political independence and were in search of their 
economic independence. Development was at the center of the United 
 Nations agenda. An atmosphere of euphoria prevailed. The negotiations for 
the New International Economic Order (nieo) were also underway in several 
UN fora, and an optimistic commitment to global management including the 
ocean through the institutions of the United Nations predominated.4 Elisa-
beth sought to combine both the principles of the nieo and the objectives of 
unclos. In contrast, Pardo was never happy about the way in which the nieo 
was being promoted by the newly independent developing countries and 
feared for the dilution of the concept of the common heritage at the negotiat-
ing table.5 unclos, after some ten years of politically charged negotiations, 
was finally adopted in 1983 as the ‘constitution of the ocean’.
After praising the achievements of unclos in letter and spirit, Elisabeth 
stated in her 1999 Nexus lecture:
This is not to say the convention is perfect. Nothing human ever is perfect; 
and this convention is riddled by political compromises, concessions to 
greed and power and vested interests, … so much so that Arvid Pardo, … 
was bitterly disappointed by what he thought was a dilution, even be-
trayal of his ideas. I, on the contrary, was surprised to see how much of 
his original design had survived the wrangling of the political arena from 
3 Id., 13.
4 A. Behnam, “Developing Countries in the Group of 77: A Journey in Multilateral Diplomacy, 
1964 to 2004,” in Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World 
Community, eds., R. St. J. Macdonald and D.M. Johnston (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), 
355–380.
5 P.S. Inglott, “Elisabeth Mann Borgese: Metaphysician by Birth,” Ocean Yearbook 18 (2004), 
22–74.
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which no concept can emerge in its virginal purity! Arvid Pardo said, the 
glass is half empty. I said, the glass is half full.6
However, as early as 1996, Elisabeth, then Honorary President of ioi, was at the 
center of new and emerging international dialogue of globalization. She was 
frustrated at the way that the ocean and the principle of the common heritage 
of humankind within unclos was being denied at international fora in prefer-
ence to market solutions to ocean challenges, promoted in the rush to embrace 
globalization. In fact, by the beginning of the 1990s, the ocean was no longer on 
the sustainable development agenda. At the 1992 United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (the Rio Conference), the ocean did not 
figure specifically in the adopted text; nevertheless, and perhaps cynically, the 
language of unclos was used very liberally in areas of conservation and the 
environment.
The neglect of the ocean and the threats to its health and the sustainability 
of its resources weighed heavily on Elisabeth’s conscience. She strongly be-
lieved in the critical need for a new institutional focus through a forum that 
would motivate the international community to address ocean challenges and 
threats under unclos, including capacity building for developing countries 
and countries in transition. She also criticized the manner in which individual 
international organizations addressed sectoral issues of the ocean, mainly the 
lack of an interdisciplinary and horizontal approach and the failure to inte-
grate ocean challenges and uses under one common roof. She became increas-
ingly committed to change the status quo, advocating for a forum at the United 
Nations that integrates ocean challenges, threats, and opportunities and brings 
them to the attention of the unga specifically.
Elisabeth decided to launch a new initiative in 1998, the Year of the Ocean. 
She sought the support of Ambassador Neroni Slade of Samoa, Chair of Small 
Island Developing States, and the Maltese government, with the strong backing 
of Ambassador Saviour Borg and Minister George W. Vella, to create a unique 
forum to address ocean issues and bring that to the attention of the unga.7
President Guido De Marco of Malta, in the plenary of the fifty-third ses-
sion of the unga (1998), called for the creation of a forum to consider the 
closely interrelated problems of ocean space as whole. Elisabeth, who knew 
so well how the bureaucracy and culture of the UN system as whole functions, 
6 Mann Borgese, supra note 2, 14.
7 See E. Mann Borgese, “unicpolos: The First Session,” Ocean Yearbook 16 (2002), 1–21; see 
also iconic video interview with Noel Brown, Halifax, Canada, 2001, ioi Archives Malta; 
S.F. Borg, 50 Years (1964–2014) Malta’s Foreign Policy with Dedication and Commitment (2015).
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pointed out that the proposal was not aimed at creating a new institution, but 
a mechanism to enable the General Assembly to make better informed deci-
sions on ocean affairs and the law of the sea. Thus, the United Nations Informal 
Open-ended Consultative Process on the Law of the Sea (unicpolos) was 
born.
This turned out to be a milestone in the history of the ocean. unicpolos 
was not designed to replace unclos, but rather to protect it as the consti-
tution of the ocean. Elisabeth envisaged the General Assembly engaging in a 
universal informal consultative process regarding the law of the sea. Such a 
process would bring together member states, civil society, business communi-
ties, and institutions and organizations concerned within the remit of unclos 
to facilitate an annual review on developments in ocean affairs by the unga 
in an effective and constructive manner. unicpolos would suggest particular 
issues to be considered by the Assembly, with an emphasis on identifying areas 
where international co-operation should be enhanced. Elisabeth, celebrating 
its first meeting in 2000, wrote:
The establishment of unicpolos by the General Assembly must be 
considered a breakthrough in the process of building a global system of 
ocean governance. It is the only body of the United Nations system with 
a membership comprising the whole membership of the General Assem-
bly and intergovernmental and regional organisations as well as major 
groups of civil society, and with a mandate to consider the closely related 
problems of ocean space as a whole. … The International Ocean Institute 
(ioi) has been deeply involved with the establishment of unicpolos 
and will follow and support its activities in every possible way.8
Due to Elisabeth’s persistent will and the traditional support of the Govern-
ment of Malta, the ocean was back again on the international development 
agenda in the new millennium. She then lobbied for a focus on the protection 
of marine biodiversity, especially as it related to the area of common heritage 
under unclos and the manner in which the International Sea Bed Authority 
(isa) would conduct deep sea bed mining. She felt that the institutional archi-
tecture of the isa was as outdated as its capacity to deliver its responsibilities. 
The enormous developments since 1973 in science and technology had made 
the deepest parts of the ocean accessible to exploitation. She was also aware 
that marine genetic resources were of increasing relevance, but were not ad-
dressed in unclos.
8 Id., 1.
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Also, for the first time, the nature of the interdependence of climate change 
and health of the ocean were being discussed. unicpolos opened the door 
for civil society institutions and stakeholders to enrich the debate with ex-
perts and science for policy-makers and to understand and comprehend the 
need for ocean governance in certain areas. The first issue on the unicpolos 
agenda was illegal, unreported, and unregulated (iuu) fishing, a neutral sub-
ject that brought all on board. The discussion consolidated the need for such 
an open ended informal consultative process and attracted the attention of 
decision-makers at the una.
Elisabeth Mann Borgese died in 2002. In 2004, unicpolos addressed the 
subject of new sustainable uses of the oceans, including the conservation and 
management of the biological diversity of the sea bed beyond national juris-
diction. I can still remember the large number of delegates at that meeting 
recalling Elisabeth in their statements and paying tribute to what she started 
as a peaceful revolution in human international management of the ocean.
In 2004, on the recommendation of unicpolos (now commonly referred to 
as the Informal Consultative Process), the unga established an Ad Hoc Open-
Ended Informal Working Group to study issues relating to the conservation 
and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national ju-
risdiction, or the Working Group on bbnj for short. This was not an easy deci-
sion; the United States, Canada, Russia, Republic of Korea, and Japan strongly 
objected to any such agreement. ioi has continued on the path of Elisabeth’s 
mission by engaging in the process and delivering statements. Naturally, the 
ioi took the position to support a call for the elaboration of an implemen-
tation agreement under unclos, thus backing-up the position taken by the 
European Union, developing countries, and China.
A turning point came at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable 
 Development (Rio+20) in 2012. One of the Conference outcomes was support 
for the move towards an implementation instrument under unclos and help 
in defining the areas of coverage. Consequently, the Working Group completed 
its task with a recommendation to the unga on 19 June 2015. unga resolution 
69/292 approved the development of an internationally legally binding instru-
ment under unclos on the conservation and sustainable use of marine bio-
logical diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction, together and as a whole, 
marine genetic resources, including questions on the sharing of benefits, mea-
sures such as area-based management tools, including marine protected areas, 
environmental impact assessments and capacity-building and the transfer of 
marine technology. The negotiating conference will be convened in 2018 af-
ter the preparatory committee made its substantive recommendations to the 
General Assembly in 2017.
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It took ten years for the Working Group on bbnj to conclude its delibera-
tions and to make its recommendation to the unga. The major stumbling 
blocks were the nature of the international instrument and its scope of ap-
plication. From the early days, developing countries in the Group of 77 and 
China, and later the European Union supported the call for elaboration of an 
internationally legally binding instrument.
The High Seas Alliance brilliantly submitted ten governance principles for 
the prospective international legally binding instrument on marine biodiver-
sity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.9 Those principles reflect already 
existing international obligations under unclos and other international in-
struments, as well as global norms relevant to the subject of the proposed in-
strument on which nations will begin negotiations in 2018. Those principles 
refer to protection and preservation of the marine environment, co-operation, 
science, stewardship, the precautionary principle, ecosystem-based manage-
ment, sustainability and equity, good governance, polluter pays, and respect 
for the law of the sea. Incidentally, these are also principles necessary and ap-
plicable to achieving the goals of Sustainable Development Goal 14 adopted at 
Rio+20.
Unless the ocean community promotes a culture of responsibility, policies 
of reason, and benefit sharing in the peaceful exploitation of ocean services 
and resources through science-based policy-making, there is no doubt that 
traditional negotiators will continue to resist changing the status quo, and the 
ocean will continue to deteriorate. It is time to stop this culture of procrastina-
tion and the pursuit of gains in one ocean sector at the expense of another. 
This requires a change of the current narrative to one of benefit sharing that is 
both equitable and sustainable.
More than a decade since Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s departure, her legacy 
lives on. The forthcoming negotiations, which may take as long as unclos it-
self took to complete, will open new opportunities to all countries, particularly 
small island developing states. The ioi must now step forward once more and 
be available to assist developing countries and countries in transition, particu-
larly through building and developing human capacity, to be able to influence 
negotiations for the best outcome and to prepare their human resources for 
the prospective implementation international legally binding instrument on 
marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
9 “Ten Governance Principles for International Legally Binding Instrument on Marine Biodi-
versity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction,” High Seas Alliance, http://highseasalliance 
.org/ten-governance-principles-international-legally-binding-instrument-marine-biodiver 
sity-areas-beyond, last accessed 16 February 2018.
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Perhaps it is relevant to conclude this essay remembering words of wisdom 
that Elisabeth loved to quote from T.S. Eliot:
Time present and time past
Are both perhaps present in time future
And time future contained in time past
<UN>
Fragmented Governance of Our One Global Ocean
Wendy Watson-Wright
Ocean Frontier Institute, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
J. Luis Valdés
Instituto Español de Oceanografía, Centro Ocenográfico de  
Santander, Spain
How inappropriate to call this planet Earth, when clearly it is Ocean.
arthur c. clarke, British author, inventor and futurist
⸪
In her 1998 publication, The Oceanic Circle, Elisabeth Mann Borgese, articu-
lates the conundrum that challenges the world when it comes to managing 
ocean activities. She notes that
[t]he ocean is a medium different from the earth: so different, in fact, that 
it forces us to think differently. The medium itself, where everything flows 
and everything is interconnected, forces us to “unfocus,” to shed our old 
concepts and paradigms, to “refocus” on a new paradigm.1
Unfortunately, this most necessary ‘refocusing’ remains very much a work in 
progress.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) states in 
its Preamble that “problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need 
to be addressed as a whole.”2 And yet paradoxically, the global governance re-
gime is essentially sectoral in nature, based around management and regula-
tory stovepipes aimed largely at individual industries and activities with rules 
and regulations emanating from innumerable oversight entities. Much has 
been written about the failures of this sectoral approach to ocean governance.3
1 E. Mann Borgese, The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource (Tokyo: United 
Nations University Press, 1998), 5–6.
2 Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 u.n.t.s. 3.
3 “Towards a New Governance of the Ocean,” in Ocean Atlas, ed., U. Bähr (Kiel: Bonifatius 
GmbH Druck-Buch-Verlag, 2017), 44–45.
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But first it is important to underscore Mme. Mann Borgese’s assertion that 
the ocean is different from the earth—with its inhabitants knowing no bor-
ders, and its various ecosystems being part of an interconnected whole. There 
is but one global ocean, and the conventional reference to ocean(s) in the 
plural is inaccurate and damaging to the cause of those trying to ensure its 
sustainability. It is vital to make this distinction, and when and where we can, 
correct the misuse of the terminology, if for no other reason than for the sake 
of accuracy and improving public understanding of the ocean’s significance.
Many have made the case for the use of the singular. First, regarding accu-
racy, as noted by Patricio Bernal among others, the ocean should be considered 
as one, simply due to the nature of fluids.4 For its part, the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration of the United States points out that there is 
only one global ocean, but for convenience and ease of reference, it has been 
geographically divided into distinct named regions.5 And according to the US 
National Marine Educators Association in their Essential Principles and Funda-
mental Concepts of Ocean Sciences for Learners of All Ages, the very first prin-
ciple is that “the Earth has one big ocean with many features.”6
But the much more pragmatic reason for all of us to use the singular is that 
we humans, as part of our nature, tend to be much more defensive and caring 
about items if we know we have only one of them. We regard them as more 
precious and worthy of our care and protection. As long as we define the ocean 
in the plural with names that suggest separate and distinct locations—for ex-
ample, the Atlantic versus the Pacific—it is easy to dismiss a pollution or other 
negative event that may be very far from where we live, and therefore not im-
pacting us directly.
So the question remains. How can we properly convey that it is up to all of 
us, whether in coastal or land-locked nations, to look after our global ocean? 
That what we do in one part of the ocean will ultimately affect others? And 
that if we desecrate the one and only ocean on this planet, there is no replace-
ment? Both accuracy and pragmatism should drive us all to reference the one 
global ocean, and to urge others to do the same.
Unfortunately, on another front, our system of governance is not help-
ing matters. When it comes to ocean sustainability we have a regime that is 
4 P. Bernal, “For the Ocean,” in Troubled Waters: Ocean Science and Governance, eds., G. Holland 
and D. Pugh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 13–27, 14.
5 US Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (noaa), 
“How Many Oceans Are There?” noaa, https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/howmany-
oceans.html, last accessed 21 February 2018.
6 Ocean Literacy Network, Ocean Literacy: The Essential Principles of Ocean Sciences for Learn-
ers of All Ages, Version 2 (March 2013), http://oceanliteracy.wp2.coexploration.org/brochure/.
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 fragmented, some would say fractured, lacking unity, cohesion and overall 
direction. To illustrate, unclos, which is meant to be the overarching gov-
ernance framework or ‘constitution of the ocean’, establishes different ocean 
areas. They include territorial seas extending 12 nautical miles from a coun-
try’s coast, and exclusive economic zones up to 200 nautical miles, with the 
possibility of extension to 350 nautical miles provided a country can scientifi-
cally prove its continental shelf is geologically connected to the mainland.7 In 
addition, the international ocean space is regulated by close to 600 bilateral 
and multilateral environment agreements,8 while within a given country al-
most every ministry/department touches some aspect of ocean management 
and regulation. Add those countries with multiple governing jurisdictions and 
coastlines, such as Canada, and one can easily understand that complexities 
multiply rapidly. On top of that, there are regional organizations, such as re-
gional fisheries management organizations, focused on one particular topic or 
activity in a given geographic area.
Within the UN system, numerous agencies and programmes are involved in 
ocean affairs, as shown in Figure 1. Only three UN organizations are involved 
exclusively with ocean issues: the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commis-
sion of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(ioc-unesco) for science, the International Maritime Organization (imo) 
for shipping, and the International Seabed Authority (isa) for marine mining. 
Other entities have broad mandates that include aspects of ocean affairs, such 
as unesco for underwater and marine cultural heritage as well as education 
for sustainable development, the Food and Agriculture Organization (fao) for 
fishing and aquaculture, and United Nations Environment (formerly unep) 
for regional seas and marine environment. Additional UN organizations in-
volved in their areas of expertise include the World Meteorological Organiza-
tion (wmo), the World Health Organization (who), the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (iaea), the UN Industrial Development Organization (unido), 
the International Labour Organization (ilo), and increasingly, the UN World 
Tourism Organization (unwto). The UN Development Programme (undp), 
and the World Bank, including its Global Environment Facility (gef), have be-
come more heavily involved in ocean issues over the past number of years, 
while some divisions of the UN Secretariat, most notably the Division of Social 
7 unclos, supra note 2.
8 ioc/unesco, imo, fao, undp, A Blueprint for Ocean and Coastal Sustainability: An Inter-
agency Report on the Preparation for the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Paris: 




and Economic Affairs (un-desa) and the Division on Ocean Affairs and Law 
of the Sea (un-doalos), have played key roles in ocean issues for decades.
As a result of the myriad UN agencies, programs, and divisions that play a 
role in ocean affairs, a co-ordination mechanism known as UN Ocean(s!) was 
created in 2003 to provide an effective interagency mechanism for sharing in-
formation as well as workload. This mechanism was reviewed by the UN Joint 
Inspection Unit in 2011, with the result that the UN General Assembly in 2013 
approved revised terms of reference which recognized “the need to strengthen 
the central role of the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea and the 
need to enhance transparency and reporting of the activities of UN-Oceans to 
Member States.”9
Europe presents an especially interesting case study for ocean manage-
ment. In a recent consultation, it was found that there is broad agreement that 
the current framework for ocean governance is not effective enough to ensure 
sustainable management of the ocean, not because the framework itself is 
9 “About UN Oceans,” UN-Oceans, last updated 23 May 2017, http://www.unoceans.org/about/
en/.
Figure 1 International governance structures for the ocean.
Source: Ocean Atlas, supra note 3, after Global Ocean Commission 
(goc), From Decline to Recovery: A Rescue Package for the Global 
Ocean (Oxford: goc, 2014), 7.
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wrong, but because signed agreements are often not implemented, and there 
is a lack of co-ordination.10 Perhaps the most elegant and striking depiction 
of the complex system of ocean organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions in 
the European Union can be seen here in one of the authors’ ‘Periodic Table of 
 European Marine and Maritime Elements in Support of Ocean Science’  (Figure 
2). This periodic table summarizes and illustrates in a simple, comprehensive, 
and understandable manner the complexity of ocean governance at the Euro-
pean level alone. In fact, the number of ocean-related intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organizations has exploded over the past century,11 stimu-
lated by the fact that these organizations increasingly participate in interna-
tional political processes. Most of these organizations have developed in North 
America and Europe, which demonstrates the aspirational vision of the West-
ern world to be influential to policy leaders of most developed countries.12
10 European Commission, Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Summa-
ry of the Results of the Public Consultation on International Ocean Governance (Brussels: 
European Commission, 2015), 2, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/consultation 
-ocean-governance-summary_en_0.pdf.
11 E.A. Turner, “Why Has the Number of International Non-governmental Organizations 
 Exploded since 1960?” Cliodynamics 1, no. 1 (2010), 81–91.
12 L. Valdés, J. Mees and H. Enevoldsen, “International Organizations Supporting Ocean 
 Science,” in ioc-unesco, Global Ocean Science Report: The Current Status of Ocean  Science 
Around the World, eds., L. Valdés et al. (Paris: unesco, 2017), 146–169.
Figure 2 Periodic table of European marine and maritime elements in support of ocean 
science (L. Valdés 2013).
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So, what is the solution to this ‘fragmented ocean governance’? Is there one? 
Should there be one big organization for the global ocean that covers every-
thing? How do we create more order out of the apparent chaos? How do we 
more effectively bring together the economic, environmental, and social pil-
lars of sustainability in our pursuit of a blue economy? We offer two examples 
where attempts are being made to address the inefficient stovepiped approach 
to ocean issues.
First, beginning in 2010, a series of workshops took place in Monaco to ad-
dress the issue of the economic impacts of ocean acidification.13 Sponsored 
by several organizations and spearheaded by the iaea’s Ocean Acidification 
International Coordination Centre, the organizers put together “the first real 
multidisciplinary meeting on ocean acidification” in an effort to produce viable 
recommendations to policy-makers for minimizing both the human and bio-
diversity costs of ocean acidification. All four workshops held to date brought 
 together the worlds of natural sciences and economics to examine ocean 
acidification impacts on ecosystems, fisheries and aquaculture, coastal com-
munities, and most recently, tropical coral reefs. This has been an extremely 
interesting experiment, since for the most part economists and natural scien-
tists speak two different languages. Yet, over time, the language gap has been 
narrowing and several cohesive policy-relevant publications have resulted. The 
world is beginning to take notice of ocean acidification, and the terminology is 
now part of public parlance.
A second example involves a smaller geographic focus but an expanded 
list of participants. The Ocean Frontier Institute (ofi), headquartered at Dal-
housie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, and co-led with  Memorial 
 University of Newfoundland and Labrador and the University of Prince 
 Edward Island, is a new international hub for ocean research. It brings to-
gether elite researchers and institutes from both sides of the Atlantic to un-
derstand the changing ocean—specifically the North Atlantic and Canadian 
Arctic  Gateway—and to create safe, sustainable solutions for ocean develop-
ment. ofi is truly interdisciplinary. It brings together oceanographers, marine 
biologists, lawyers, social scientists, management specialists, computer scien-
tists, and engineers to focus on both ocean changes and ocean solutions. It 
is also transnational, representing an historic partnership among the flagship 
universities of three Atlantic Canadian provinces along with eight organiza-
tions from France (LabexMER), Germany (geomar, Alfred Wegener Institute, 
13 “Economics of Ocean Acidification: Bridging the Gap between Ocean Acidification Im-
pacts and Economic Valuation,” International Atomic Energy Agency, https://www.iaea 
.org/ocean-acidification/page.php?page=2237, last accessed 21 February 2018.
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 CAU-Kiel), Ireland (Marine Institute), Norway (Institute of Marine Research), 
and the United States (Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Lamont-
Doherty Earth Observatory of Columbia University). And it is cross-sectoral, 
involving academia, federal government scientists, managers, regulators and 
policy-makers, provincial governments, and more than twenty private sector 
companies, all aimed at collaborating to ensure the safe and sustainable devel-
opment of the ocean frontier. It is as yet early days, but many agree that this 
inclusive approach holds great promise for success.
Will initiatives such as these instantly cure all the governance fragmenta-
tion realities noted above? Of course not. But they will help us refocus our 
efforts in saving the most important ecosystem we have—our global ocean. 
Mme. Mann Borgese would surely approve.
<UN>
Transdisciplinary Perspectives on Ocean 
Governance
Ratana Chuenpagdee
Memorial University of Newfoundland,  
St. John’s, Newfoundland and  Labrador, Canada
 Ocean Governance as a Wicked Problem
Oceans are probably one of the most challenging ecosystems to govern.1 
Oceans are diverse, complex, and dynamic ecosystems that provide numerous 
functions and services to life below and above the water. Humanity, in particu-
lar, has relied on the oceans for food, livelihoods, transportation, recreation, 
and most recently, on other extractive resources, including oil, gas and miner-
als, among other things. Demands on the oceans have been rising with the 
continued growth in population, industrial development on land and sea, and 
many other pressures, which together make ocean sustainability an increas-
ingly impossible goal to attain. As suggested in the United Nations Sustain-
able Development Goal on Oceans (sdg 142), about 40 percent of the world’s 
oceans are heavily affected by human activities and concerted actions from all 
nations are required in order to deal with multitude of problems in the oceans, 
such as pollution, resource overexploitation, and habitat loss.
Many characteristics of the oceans make governance a wicked problem.3 
For instance, oceans are full of ‘unknown’ and the ‘unknowable’. As the say-
ing goes, we know more about space than we know about the oceans. But like 
space, knowledge about the oceans is centralized around scientific exploration 
and research, which, while important, contributes little to addressing the com-
plex problems of human–ocean interactions. Ocean governance, in this case, 
is not about doing more science in order to convert the unknown to known, 
but about recognizing the unknown as well as the unknowable as part of the 
wicked ‘social’ problems and dealing with them accordingly. This also means 
that while it may not be possible to precisely determine whether human use 
1 U.R. Sumaila, “Seas, Oceans and Fisheries: A Challenge for Good Governance,” The Round 
Table 101, no. 2 (2012): 157–166.
2 “Sustainable Development Goals: 14 Life Below Water,” United Nations, http://www.un.org/
sustainabledevelopment/oceans/, last accessed 19 February 2018.
3 H.W.J. Rittel and M.M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 
4 (1973): 155–169.
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of the ocean resources has exceeded the carrying capacity, there is still no rea-
son to drive the system to the edge. Oceans are fragile ecosystems, physically 
less stable than terrestrial, are susceptible to disruption, and are vulnerable to 
change. A precautionary principle is therefore highly applicable in any effort 
to govern the oceans.
As wicked problems go, insufficient information and uncertainty about the 
oceans are one of the factors leading to difficulties in defining what the prob-
lems really are, what they are caused by, and how to go about solving them. 
 Scientists, policy-makers, industrial users, and coastal communities are likely 
to differ in their opinion about why oceans are not healthy. Their perception 
and understanding of the problems are based on knowledge and experienc-
es that come from various sources and are expressed in many forms. One of 
the most classic examples was the Northern cod fishery, which, 25 years after 
the moratorium, still finds no consensus about what caused the collapse. Yet, 
having an agreement about the nature and the causes of the problem is not 
a guarantee that the proposed solutions will be broadly accepted, especially 
when they involve high costs or impose major losses to certain stakeholder 
groups. As in other resource sectors, ocean stakeholders are numerous and 
vary in terms of their urgency, legitimacy, and power to influence governance. 
Decisions about the oceans, especially those related to uses and access to re-
sources, like where to place marine protected areas, are always contentious as 
they normally result in restrictions for some stakeholders. In this case, funda-
mental principles such as social justice, equality and equity, and human rights, 
have to be considered along with others. This is precisely what the Voluntary 
Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of 
Food Security and Poverty Eradication (ssf Guidelines4) aim to promote in 
order to address food security, poverty and sustainability concerns in small-
scale fisheries around the world. Providing small-scale fisheries with access to 
marine resources (and markets) is also one of the SDG14 targets.
Another key characteristic about the oceans that creates challenges in gov-
ernance is related to scale and boundaries. As an open system, ocean gover-
nance has to deal with spatial and institutional mismatches due to overlapping 
jurisdiction and other transboundary issues.5 Formulating rules and regula-
tions that correspond with the size and scale of the activities, and that take 
into consideration the flows of some resources and polluted substances, is a 
4 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (fao), Voluntary Guidelines for 
 Securing Sustainable Small-scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradica-
tion (Rome: fao, 2015).
5 A.M. Song et al., “Transboundary Research in Fisheries,” Marine Policy 76 (2017): 8–18.
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daunting task that requires co-operation in various levels of governance. This 
also means that it might not be possible to isolate one problem in the ocean 
from the others, neither in the understanding of the problem nor in the way 
to address it. In the interconnected and transboundary system like the ocean, 
fixing one problem in one location may lead to a new problem in other areas.
 Ocean Governance as a Transdisciplinary Process
Different thinking about governance is required to deal with the diversity, com-
plexity, dynamics, and the scale issues in the oceans. Holistic and integrated 
approaches have long been promoted for ocean sustainability.6 Among them 
is the ‘interactive governance’ theory,7 which focuses specifically on the un-
derstanding of interactions both within the systems, i.e., the governing system 
and the natural and social systems that are being governed, and between them. 
 According to Kooiman, these interactions are not only where the majority of 
the problems are situated but also where solutions can be found and opportu-
nities created. Through a careful analysis of the systems and the understanding 
of their interactions, appropriate institutions can be designed, in accord with 
the underlying principles, values, and images that inform them.
Interactive governance encourages an elevation of the understanding of the 
problems through governance orders. Illegal fishing, for instance, could be seen 
as a violation of law and thus can be dealt with by issuing fines and strengthen-
ing monitoring, control, and surveillance. Here, illegal fishing problem is treat-
ed at the first-order of governance. However, illegal fishing could be a symptom 
of something more fundamental, including the incongruity between the rules 
and regulations and the characteristics of the fisheries (second-order), and the 
lack of agreement about why certain activities are considered illegal (meta-
order). In effect, interactive governance requires a ‘transdisciplinary’ process 
of problem identification and of creative solution-making, one that relies on 
diverse expertise and knowledge from natural, social, and political scientists, 
among others, as well as from practitioners, resource users, and community 
stakeholders in an ‘open’ transdisciplinary process.8
6 See, e.g., A. Charles, Sustainable Fishery Systems (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2001).
7 J. Kooiman, Governing as Governance (London: Sage, 2003).
8 V.A. Brown et al., “Towards a Just and Sustainable Future,” in Tackling Wicked Problems: 
Through the Transdisciplinary Imagination (eds.), V.A. Brown, J.A. Harris and J.Y. Russell 
 (London & Washington, DC, Earthscan, 2010), 3–15.
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The main differences between transdisciplinary approach and others like 
multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches are the process and the 
expectation. Similar to multidisciplinarity, a transdisciplinary approach is a 
team-based effort. A transdisciplinary process goes beyond what a group of 
researchers from various disciplines do when working in a multidisciplinary 
project. The focus of a transdisciplinary approach is the deliberative and con-
certed effort in understanding and identifying what the problems are, in the 
exploration about what the possible pathways may be, and in the develop-
ment, and, in some cases, the co-implementation, of agreed-upon solutions or 
ways forward. Scientists and other stakeholders in the open transdisciplinary 
practice are expected to work closely in a collaborative manner, contributing 
their expertise to the understanding of the problem, and iteratively building 
on each other’s knowledge and ideas in a respectful and considered man-
ner. Through that process, they will be able to reveal certain aspects of the 
problems that they do not see on their own, broaden their perspectives about 
the issues, and together come up with ideas and innovation that they would 
not have done otherwise. Thus, unlike interdisciplinarity, one should not ex-
pect to see a transdisciplinary researcher working alone on a problem. This 
also implies that there is no expectation that researchers involved in a trans-
disciplinary project need to have multiple skillsets the way interdisciplinary 
scientists do. Knowledge integration is not necessarily the aim. Instead, the 
co-creation of knowledge and co-learning is expected. While researchers in 
the transdisciplinary team will eventually gain new knowledge and addition-
al skillsets, the most important contribution to the process is still their own 
 expertise and experience.
Because of the wicked problems in ocean governance, and considering 
that decisions about the oceans have different consequences for stakeholders, 
a transdisciplinary process is required to understand the ocean natural and 
social systems and their interactions, assess the capability of the governing 
 system in dealing with ocean issues, and determine the overall level of govern-
ability. The same process follows in framing the questions and in the explora-
tion of the policy options and governance solutions to address them.
 Transdisciplinarity as a ‘Slow’ Science
Given the above, transdisciplinary process cannot be anything but slow. Simi-
lar to the tenet of slow movement,9 building of a transdisciplinary research 
9 Including ‘slow fish’ as part of ‘slow food’ movement or ‘slow fish for sustainability’, see 
R. Chuenpagdee and D. Pauly, “Slow Fish: Creating New Metaphors for Sustainability,” in 
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team and the production of a transdisciplinary outcome requires engage-
ment, commitment, and perseverance. The making of the book Fish for Life 
is a good example of such an effort.10 Even though it is an edited volume, the 
contributors engaged in an intense process of deliberation and negotiation in 
the  writing of all chapters. Contributors were academics from a broad range 
of disciplines, from sociology, anthropology, political science, economics, phi-
losophy to biology and ecology. Interdisciplinary scientists and practitioners 
were also part of the team. Many meetings were held throughout the five-year 
project period, which enabled the team to co-develop the content of the book 
and collaborate in the writing of the chapters. An internal review process was 
used as a mechanism to foster cross-fertilization, streamline concepts, and 
standardize language.
Fish for Life is one of the first volumes that applies the interactive gover-
nance perspective to examine fisheries systems. Except for the senior editor, 
Professor Jan Kooiman, all authors were new to interactive governance, and 
thus went together through a long journey of dissecting the theory and the 
philosophy behind it. The book took much longer to produce than if it were 
written by a small number of authors. This slow process lead to a unique book 
that went ‘between, across and beyond’ disciplines in offering a novel way of 
looking at fisheries and a new approach to govern them. Wicked ocean gover-
nance problems can be addressed through theoretical and conceptual frame-
works that include interactive governance and transdisciplinary processes to 
assess the level of overall governability.
 Overcoming Factors of Unsustainability and Overexploitation in Fisheries: Selected Papers 
on Issues and Approaches. International Workshop on the Implementation of International 
Fisheries Instruments and Factors of Unsustainability and Overexploitation in Fisheries, 
Siem Reap, Cambodia, 13–16 September 2004 (eds.) J. Swan and D. Gréboval, fao Fisheries 
Report No. 782 (Rome: fao, 2005), 69–82.
10 J. Kooiman et al. (eds.), Fish for Life: Interactive Governance for Fisheries (Amsterdam: Uni-
versity of Amsterdam Press, 2005).
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 Introduction
I once thought of ocean governance as primarily a matter of institutions and 
processes. The ultimate description of ocean governance within such a per-
spective is through decision-making flowcharts and organizational charts. But 
if ocean governance is treated as a ‘functional’ matter of institutions and pro-
cesses, it may be missing the key underlying ingredient. Values. Values tell us 
what kind of ocean, and what kind of ocean users, to be favoring. Values drive 
our individual and community choices. It is odd, then, that governance often 
focuses on institutions and processes, without explicit attention to the crucial 
underlying values. In reality, however, in such cases, governance still reflects 
implicit values—but not necessarily values that reflect what is truly desired. 
Surely, there is a strong case, then, for values being explicit, and accordingly, 
receiving greater attention in ocean governance.
There is a parallel with partnerships. I once thought of partnerships as 
largely a ‘functional’ vehicle of governance, within the context of institutions 
and processes. But underlying every partnership is the matter of who choos-
es the partners. If the choice is made by government, then that determines 
who has a seat at the governance table. A values-based view requires looking 
carefully at whether the choice of participants reflects underlying values. For 
example, does the partnership involve a diversity of ocean users and coastal 
communities, or does government choose as partners a few large companies 
controlling access to marine resources? These alternatives would reflect very 
different values.
 Co-Management Partnerships
While ocean governance conventionally took place in a top-down manner, the 
more modern approach focuses on participatory decision-making, through 
co-management (‘co-operative’ or participatory management) that brings 
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stakeholders into the institutions and the processes of decision-making. 
 Co-management invariably involves a partnership of some form, with a certain 
set of ocean users or other stakeholders—those with ‘management rights’1 and 
thus entitled to be engaged in participatory decision-making on ocean man-
agement, whether sectoral (e.g., fisheries) management or multi-sectoral (as 
in multi-stakeholder integrated management).
The rationale for such co-management partnerships is typically based on 
several arguments:2 (1) better decisions come from as full a knowledge base as 
possible, and incorporating the experience of those regularly using the ocean 
and its resources, (2) management decisions are better supported, and com-
plied with, when those being managed have helped to design the rules and 
regulations, and (3) such participatory practices match the principles of good 
governance, which have been widely adopted internationally. These three ar-
guments in favor of co-management partnerships have a strong logic to them, 
reflecting the achievement of ‘functional’ goals: better decisions, better com-
pliance, and better governance.
I once thought that, based on those persuasive arguments, co- management 
was invariably a good thing, and that the corresponding partnerships must 
also be positive. But that view was naïve in neglecting the key matter of values. 
A lack of attention to values can manifest itself, notably, in a co- management 
system developed without considering who exactly is involved in the decision-
making. For example, in Canada, some government choices on co- management 
partnerships in fisheries reflected preferences for a top-down approach, and 
are also present in the same government’s moves to shift resource access away 
from small-scale ocean users to fewer, bigger players. It is not clear that these 
actions actually reflected societal values.
Concern over the values underlying who holds the power, who gets ocean 
access, and who is involved in management decision-making arise with gov-
ernments engaging in partnerships all along the co-management spectrum3—
from science and research, to policy and planning, to managing ocean use 
(i.e., co-management), to enforcement and compliance. Thus, values underlie 
1 A. Charles, “Rights-based Fisheries Management: The Role of Use Rights in Managing  Access 
and Harvesting,” in A Fishery Manager’s Guidebook, eds., K.L. Cochrane and S.M. Garcia 
 (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 253–282.
2 A. Charles, Sustainable Fishery Systems (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2001); J. Kearney et al., “The 
Role of Participatory Governance and Community-based Management in Integrated Coastal 
and Ocean Management in Canada,” Coastal Management 35, no. 1 (2007): 79–104.
3 M. Puley, “Dissecting Co-management: An Examination of Fishermen Involvement in Fisher-
ies Management in Nova Scotia, Canada,” Thesis, Master of Environmental Studies, Dalhou-
sie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada (2017).
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which partners are chosen for co-operative research projects, for management 
of fishing decisions, or for policy development. Partnerships can be challeng-
ing in all these situations, but increasingly so, the more they involve significant 
decision-making, the greater the number of stakeholders affected, and thus 
the more sensitive is the interaction of values and the partnerships themselves.
 Science Partnerships
In the case of science, partnerships increasingly involve government scientists 
working with fishers, on board their fishing vessels, or with other ocean use 
sectors. The partnership, in such cases, may be merely the ocean users provid-
ing scientists with access to the ocean, or it may involve a true participatory 
approach in which stakeholders carry out data collection themselves, and per-
haps even engage in analysis of the data.
Such activities have a positive aura to them, given their participatory na-
ture, and the contrast with past top-down approaches.4 However, values arise 
in terms of which stakeholders can engage with government in research and 
science. For example, one factor influencing the Canadian cod fishery col-
lapse5 was a disconnect between small-scale fishers and government scien-
tists. While scientists partnered with the large-scale fishing fleet and used its 
data, the corresponding knowledge in the small-scale sector received much 
less attention.6 Following the cod collapse, a new partnership, the Fishermen 
and Scientists Research Society, sought to rectify this imbalance, by engaging 
small-scale fishers and scientists directly. That approach is also to be found 
in many other locations, now reflecting an important values-based scientific 
partnership model.
 Research Partnerships
Knowledge-focused partnerships with ocean-use stakeholders also arise out-
side government, notably with academic researchers. This shifts away from 
the conventional role of the academic (collect data, analyze, publish results, 
4 A.C. Finlayson, Fishing for Truth: A Sociological Analysis of Northern Cod Stock Assessments 
from 1977–1990 (St. John’s: Institute of Social and Economic Research Books, 1994).
5 A. Charles, “The Atlantic Canadian Groundfishery: Roots of a Collapse,” Dalhousie Law 
 Journal 18 (1995): 65–83.
6 Finlayson, supra note 4, 176.
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 typically in a professional journal) with stakeholders not engaged directly in 
the process (apart from being a source for the academic’s data). That approach, 
which led to literally thousands of journal articles, has been much criticized by 
communities and ocean user groups, who are frequently asked by researchers 
for access to their territory, resources, and vessels, but who often never see the 
research results.
The old model also misses the insights and knowledge that come through 
participatory research, which brings together full-time researchers with ocean 
users, to jointly address key knowledge needs.7 A fully participatory approach 
requires involvement in the multiple steps of the research process: with ocean 
users not only ‘helping’ with data collection, but also being involved in de-
signing the research in the first place, and then in analyzing and interpreting 
the results. An ongoing challenge here is that the goals of the research can be 
quite diverse. While some in the partnership may aim for a professional jour-
nal article, the goal for others may be quite different—often more focused on 
meeting tangible social and economic needs (e.g., better knowledge of where 
a resource is located, or its sustainability, or better means to ensure local liveli-
hoods and cultural aims).
 ngo Partnerships
Around the world, non-governmental organizations (ngos) often play a ma-
jor role in environmental, social and/or economic aspects, whether locally, 
nationally, regionally, or globally. It seems that the more global the ngo, the 
greater tends to be the focus on just one of the three pillars of sustainable 
development—environmental, social, or economic. Thus, for example, some 
global ocean-focused ngos focus solely on environmental aspects, particu-
larly neglecting social considerations (contrary to wide acceptance that these 
are integral to sustainable development). On the other hand, locally-oriented 
ngos often seem to better understand the crucial linkages of social, economic, 
and environmental concerns. This tendency seems to be true in both develop-
ing and more developed countries.
ngos may partner with governments and multilateral global institutions 
(e.g., the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, fao) or 
more locally, with ocean user groups and coastal communities. In all these 
cases, and as with other partnerships, values are key to ngo partnerships. 
7 M. Wiber et al., “Enhancing Community Empowerment Through Participatory Fisheries 
 Research,” Marine Policy 33 (2009): 172–179.
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In particular, each ngo brings its own values, notably reflected in its choices of 
how and where to spend its funds, and the priorities it is advocating. No ngo 
is merely a neutral funding body. Thus the crucial question facing a coastal 
community or an ocean user group, or indeed a government or a UN agency, 
is whether its own values and priorities are compatible with those of the ngo. 
That will not always be the case.
 National and International Partnerships
At a larger scale, partnerships can be important both within a nation and at 
the international level. As with all other partnerships, these types are rooted 
in values, whether explicit or implicit. Two examples will be used here to il-
lustrate this.
Following the passing of Canada’s Oceans Act,8 the government recognized 
a need to draw on expertise across the country in ocean and coastal manage-
ment, as well as in social sciences connected with ocean use and sustainabil-
ity. The government funded a new academic-based cross-country entity, the 
Ocean Management Research Network (omrn), to bring together all those 
with an interest in research and knowledge on ocean use and management. 
This included not only academics, but also government staff, Indigenous orga-
nizations, industry bodies, coastal community organizations, ngos, and many 
others. The omrn operated throughout the decade 2000–2010, with its mem-
bership growing to over 800 participants. As a national-level partnership to 
support ocean governance, the omrn generated many knowledge syntheses9 
and considerable networking and multi-sectoral interaction. The values un-
derlying this initiative, though quite basic—a shared sense of the importance 
of oceans to that country—led to high levels of contributed energy and time, 
maximizing outcomes achieved from fairly modest funding.
An international example of a successful partnership arose from a grow-
ing recognition of the importance of small-scale fisheries globally, and a 
 corresponding recognition of a lack of a formal international instrument to 
support those fisheries. Global fishery associations—notably the World Forum 
of Fisher Peoples, the World Forum of Fish Harvesters and Fish Workers, and 
the International Collective in Support of Fishworkers—collaborated with a 
wide range of civil society organizations to move an international governance 
8 Oceans Act, S.C. 1996, c. 31.
9 A. Charles et al., “Canada’s Coasts and Oceans: Identifying the Issues,” Discussion Paper 
 (Ottawa: Ocean Management Research Network, 2005).
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agenda forward. The partnership was supported by the fao and by many na-
tional governments. There was a very impressive display of consensus on core 
people-centered values within the process, rooted in human rights perspec-
tives. Ultimately, in 2014, nations formally agreed to the Voluntary Guidelines 
for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food  Security 
and Poverty Eradication.10 The momentum of the partnership has contin-
ued since then, in implementing the values, goals, and approaches in the 
Guidelines.
 Conclusion
Meaningful partnerships are inspiring. They can also be very effective in 
achieving key goals. But being inspiring is more important, because an inspir-
ing partnership leads to a kind of enduring, fundamental effectiveness that 
transcends the ‘functional’ effectiveness we tend to focus on first. The reason is 
rooted in values. An inspiring partnership generates energy, momentum, good 
will—which brings along other people and other organizations, with shared 
values. So fundamentally, partnerships should be meaningful, inspiring, and 
rooted in values. The effectiveness follows as a result, leading in turn to mean-
ingful ocean governance.
10 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (fao), Voluntary Guidelines 
for Securing Sustainable Small-scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty 
Eradication (Rome: fao, 2015).
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 Some Initial Ideas
Exploring the ethical dimensions of ocean governance represents a challenge 
that has to be addressed with care, especially for those like us, who are not 
professional philosophers. When Elisabeth Mann Borgese, Ambassador Arvid 
Pardo, and others used the concept of ‘common heritage of mankind’1 to ad-
vocate for the approval of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea2 (unclos), the ethical background was not explicitly analyzed in detail al-
though it is evident that the core of the concept is absolutely linked with moral 
philosophy. We briefly examine the core concept of the common heritage in 
relation to the general understanding of ethics.
According to unesco,
Governance has been defined to refer to structures and processes that are 
designed to ensure accountability, transparency, responsiveness, rule of 
law, stability, equity and inclusiveness, empowerment, and broad-based 
participation. Governance also represents the norms, values and rules of 
the game through which public affairs are managed in a manner that is 
transparent, participatory, inclusive and responsive. Governance there-
fore can be subtle and may not be easily observable. In a broad sense, 
governance is about the culture and institutional environment in which 
citizens and stakeholders interact among themselves and participate in 
public affairs.3
1 E.M. Borgese, Pacem in Maribus (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1973).
2 Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 u.n.t.s. 3.
3 “Concept of Governance,” unesco, Education, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/
themes/strengthening-education-systems/quality-framework/technical-notes/concept 
-of-governance/, last accessed 19 February 2018.
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It is the way the rules, norms and actions are structured, sustained, regulated 
and held accountable to keep a system going in a good shape and for all. But 
underlying the concepts of ‘good shape and for all’ is a notion of what is ethi-
cal, for what benefit, and for whom?
Ethics is a branch of philosophy having as many definitions as there are phi-
losophers. It deals with the question of what is good and bad and to define our 
moral duties and obligations. Subtle differences exist between moral behav-
ior, which is primarily about making the correct choices, and ethical conduct, 
which is about the proper reasoning for decision-making. The latter is what 
interests us in regards to the important concept of the ‘common heritage of 
mankind’.
 Behind the Common Heritage of Mankind Concept
The ancient approach of ‘virtue ethics’ focuses on the virtuosity of the acting 
person. A good action has to be judged by the intention not the consequence, 
as in the Good Samaritan principle for example.4 In this way, recognized al-
truistic people, such as Elisabeth Mann Borgese, Ambassador Arvid Pardo, 
and many others promoting unclos, acted on the grounds of classical ethical 
behavior.
Following from Aristotle’s thought, Spinoza proposed that human beings 
are part of nature and thus derive happiness from other living organisms and 
the systems that support them.5 Such thoughts strongly relate to the common 
heritage of mankind that involves the full ocean system, its living and non- 
living resources. Hume argues that natural benevolence accounts, in great 
part, for what he calls the origin of morality, in opposition to utilitarianism.6 
He accepts the need for the rules of justice, which are normative human con-
ventions that promote public utility, because humans are motivated by a vari-
ety of passions, both generous and ungenerous. But these rules of justice will 
promote the necessary framework to benefit most of the people and even all 
of humankind, in opposition to a selfish utilitarianism. Kant indicated that the 
moral law is a purely formal principle that commands us to act only on maxims 
4 D. Frede, “Plato’s Ethics: An Overview,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive (Winter 
2016 edition) (last revision 18 July 2013), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/
plato-ethics/.
5 “Baruch Spinoza,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (last revision 4 July 2016), https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/.
6 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Stephen Buckle, ed.) 
 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
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that have what he calls lawgiving form.8 A core concept of Kant’s ethics is that 
a maxim has morally permissible form only if it could be willed as a universal 
law, i.e. willing to be applicable to all people without contradiction. We can see 
the common heritage of mankind foreseen in Kant’s claim that the expansion 
of hospitality with regard to “use of the right to the earth’s surface which be-
longs to the human race in common” would “finally bring the human race ever 
closer to a cosmopolitan constitution.”7 Although he was not the first to pro-
pose a global idea of commonality, he was probably one of the most influential 
philosophers in the pursuit of the greater common good. The Kantian idea is 
a condition that will be reached by unclos only when it becomes universally 
accepted.
The phrase ‘common heritage of mankind’ was first mentioned in an inter-
national law-giving form in the preamble of the 1954 Hague Convention for 
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.8 Then, it 
followed a path to unclos, and into other conventions and rules. The concept 
follows the mandatory awareness of the results of any actions. It is consistent 
therefore with consequentialism, which holds that whether an act is morally 
right depends only on the consequences of the act or of something related 
to that act.9 In addition, the explicit words ‘for the benefit of future genera-
tions’, refer us to the Golden Rule: “One should not treat others in ways that one 
would not like to be treated.”10
Following Bunge:
Far from preaching the joyless life, we repeat the slogan Enjoy life and 
help live, and add the following unavoidable platitudes: (a) at present 
most people do not have the means to enjoy life, and many of those who 
do have them mistake the good life for the ability to buy whatever they 
fancy; (b) unless we alter some of our values and learn to administer 
wisely our resources, we shall rob our offspring of their inheritance.11
7 Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (Ted Humphrey, trans.) (India-
napolis: Hackett Publishing, 2003), 16.
8 The Hague, 14 May 1954, 3511 u.n.t.s. 216.
9 N. Heinzelmann, G. Ugazio and P.N. Tobler, “Practical Implications of Empirically Study-
ing Moral Decision-making,” Frontiers in Neurosciences 6 (2012): 94, doi.org/10.3389/
fnins.2012.00094.
10 J. Finnis, “Natural Law Theories,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 
edition) (last revision 4 November 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/
entries/natural-law-theories/.
11 M. Bunge, Treatise on Basic Philosophy. Ethics: The Good and The Right, Vol. 8 (Dordrecht: 
Reidel Publishing, Dordrecht, 1989), 361.
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Recognizing that individual consciousness does not have the same altruistic or 
egoistic levels for all personalities, Kohlberg,12 inspired by Piaget,13 proposed 
that moral development has different levels, and postulated six stages of hu-
man moral development (Table 1). Kohlberg’s theory holds that moral reason-
ing, the basis for ethical behavior, has six identifiable developmental stages, 
each of them more able to respond to ethical dilemmas than its predecessors.
Before unclos, governance rules on oceans mostly fitted stages 1 to 3. At 
the pre-Convention levels, the main social drivers were the silent acceptance 
of the rules imposed by the dominant powers. Stage 3 was mostly the case 
of conformity with the governing status quo, maintaining some relationships 
convenient to both, the ones holding the power and those conforming to that 
power. The mere proposal of unclos in support of ocean governance cannot 
be just classified as a Conventional level 4 but, as established as a social con-
tract, it matches the Post-Conventional level 5.
At stage 6, action is an aim in itself; the individual acts because it is right and 
not to avoid punishment or to comply with social laws. He/she acts in the right 
way because it is mainly in his/her own interest. Although it is not easy to find 
individuals always acting according to the highest ethical stage, which may be 
considered somewhat utopian, we can consider this highest stage as a spur to 
push ourselves in that direction.
Ideally, any individual, organization, or nation must climb the six stages to 
the top, in order to elevate the ethical quality of their behavior. Most people 
rely on stage 5, assuming that following a given social contract, for example, a 
professional code of ethics/conduct, would be enough; others remain at stage 
4, following the rules because they are in force, not by any deep conviction. The 
ultimate Stage 6 fits individuals with impeccable ethical credentials, because 
of their deep conviction and consciousness that their ethical values are the 
right ones.
Contemporarily to the quixotic fight of Borgese, Pardo and others advo-
cating the need for unclos in the mid-1960s, an article of great impact was 
published in the journal Science in 1968 by the ecologist Hardin, entitled “The 
Tragedy of the Commons.”14 He was inspired by the 1833 work of Lloyd, which 
mentioned a hypothetical dilemma of over-use of a common resource.15  Hardin 
12 L. Kohlberg, Essays in Moral Development, Volumes 1: The Philosophy of Moral Development 
(San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981).
13 H.E. Gruber and J.J. Vonèche, eds., The Essential Piaget (New York: Basic Books, 1964).
14 G. Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162, no. 3859 (1968): 1243–1248, doi.
org/10.1126/science.162.3859.1243.
15 W.F. Lloyd, Two Lectures on the Checks to Population (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1833), http://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/articles/lloyd_commons.pdf.
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extended the concept and pointed out the problem of individuals acting ratio-
nally in self-interest; if all people in a group used common resources for their 
own benefit and with no concern for others, all resources would still, sooner 
or later, be depleted. Hardin argued against relying on people’s conscience or 
the  potential benevolence of people as a means of governing the commons. 
He suggested that this favors selfish individuals (egoistic utilitarianism), over 
those who are more altruistic, thus promoting—explicitly or  implicitly—
the development of some kind of social contract or rules of  justice. unclos 
 follows Hardin’s warning.
 The Application of Scientific Knowledge Assumes  
Ethical Correctness
Kant proposed that the human understanding is the source of the general laws 
of nature and that human reason gives itself the moral law.16 This point of view 
is controversial.
16 Kant, supra note 7, 64.
Table 1 Kohlberg’s levels and stages of moral adequacy (adapted from Kohlberga)
Level Stage Social driver
Pre-Conventional
(actions are judged by their 
direct consequences)
1 Obedience and punishment  
Blind egoism
2 Self-interest orientation  
Individualism, Instrumental egoism
Conventional
(actions are judged by compar-
ing them to society’s views and 
expectations)
3 Interpersonal accord and  
conformity  
Others approval, Social relationships
4 Law and order  
Blind compliance, Social systems
Post-Conventional
(individuals’ taking precedence 
over society’s principles; inclu-
sion of basic human rights such 
as life, liberty, and justice)
5 Social contract orientation  
Agrees on common regulations
6
Universal ethical principles 
 Principled self-conscience and 
 mutual respect
a Kohlberg, supra note 12.
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Scientific knowledge, although not perfect, portrays how nature works, and 
it builds and organizes our rational understanding in the form of testable ex-
planations, giving us logical tools to make predictions. Thus, if we have to reap 
benefits from nature in the form of environmental products and services, it 
is imperative to know how the system works. As a natural complex system, 
the ocean challenges society from the scientific point of view, not just in or-
der to understand its functioning, but also to set the proper rules to benefit 
from its many services. Thus, proper governance has to be based on the best 
scientific available knowledge. However, scientific knowledge is equally nec-
essary for an egoistic exploitation of the oceans as well as for an altruistic 
one and, if we agree that the tragedy of the commons has to be avoided, the 
 altruistic  approach has to be the rule. Thus, science is necessary, but not suf-
ficient. Ethics is the essential tool for the conduct of decision-making, target-
ing the  greater good, supported by the highest standards of moral behavior, 
rational thinking, and the best scientific knowledge. Proper moral behavior is 
necessary to make the correct choices, while ethical conduct helps the proper 
 reasoning for  decision-making, differentiating between what we have the right 
to do and what is the right thing to do. This is the key question for responsible 
ocean governance.
Both, science and ethics are therefore necessary conditions for good ocean 
governance. As asserted by Simeroth: “Science brings society to the next level, 
while ethics keeps us there.”17 Nothing expresses it better than the concepts 
presented by Pardo in his speech before the United Nations in 1967, as quoted 
by Elisabeth: “the world’s oceans and seabeds should become the common 
heritage of mankind, and, in the interest of present and future generations, 
should be fostered and administered exclusively to peaceful ends.”18 To do so, 
not just the well-being of humankind has to be pursued, but also the wealth of 
all life forms and the systems that sustain them in good shape, in order to give 
future generations, and us, the opportunity to “enjoy life and help live.”19
17 P. Mayer, Bankbook Bodies: The Billion Dollar Business with Organ Trade—The Develop-
ment of International Legal Measures and the Effectiveness in Curtailing the Black Market, 
Saar Blueprints, Saar Blueprints, 12/2016 EN, http://jean-monnet-saar.eu/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/12/Bankbook-Bodies_FINAL.pdf, 44.
18 Borgese, supra note 1.
19 Bunge, supra note 11.
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 Introduction
Oceans are comprised of finite marine resources available to the global com-
munity. Each of us is not responsible for the oceans, yet the oceans are a col-
lective responsibility of all of us as individuals. We recognize these truisms, yet 
the execution of joint stewardship responsibilities on oceans is fundamentally 
challenging and largely insufficient. This essay addresses the characteristics of 
ocean governance and posits a reduced role of governments, and an enhanced 
decentralized and authoritative participation of ocean stakeholders and the 
public toward realizing shared responsibilities for ocean sustainability.
 The Evolution of Ocean Governance
Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s passion and expertise were critical to modern ocean 
governance. Mann Borgese, the only female founding member of the Club of 
Rome (since 1968), encouraged world leaders to improve our understanding 
of the oceans and management of marine resources for the betterment of 
humankind.1
In its report, Our Common Future, the Brundtland Commission reiterated 
the urgent call for participation broader than government alone in its mandate 
for a ‘global agenda for change’:
[W]e appeal to “citizens” groups, to nongovernmental organizations, to 
educational institutions, and to the scientific community… In the final 
analysis, this is what it amounts to: furthering the common understand-
ing and common spirit of responsibility so clearly needed in a divided 
world.2
1 In the Club of Rome report, The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource (Unit-
ed Nations University Press, 1998), Elisabeth Mann Borgese wrote: “the governance of the 
oceans … is nonhierarchical, participatory, and multidisciplinary, and includes the private 
sector as well as governments.”
2 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), xiv–xv.
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In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(unced), the Rio Earth Summit, adopted Agenda 21, a comprehensive action 
plan applied to all areas of human impacts on the environment including the 
oceans.3 Agenda 21 argues for (i) revamping prevailing systems of governmen-
tal decision-making, (ii) significant changes in existing institutional structures, 
(iii) new forms of dialogue for achieving better integration among national 
and local governments, industry, science, environmental groups and the public 
in a participatory process, and (iv) improving education and technical train-
ing through interdisciplinary approaches. Agenda 21 was reaffirmed in the 2012 
Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development, which recognized the 
‘full participation of civil society’ to “renew our commitment to sustainable 
development and to ensuring the promotion of an economically, socially and 
environmentally sustainable future for our planet and for present and future 
generations.”4
Participation by all groups on assessing environmental ocean impacts and 
in the decision-making process is seen as a fundamental and significant char-
acteristic of ocean governance. The assignment of global responsibility for the 
oceans through institutions that would enable participatory ocean governance 
is clearly recognized as the means to that desired end.
 Ocean Governance in Canada
Ocean governance initiatives in Canada have sought to increase communica-
tion between ocean stakeholders to facilitate a more participatory decision-
making process. Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the ministry responsible for 
Canadian freshwater and marine habitats, delivers ocean governance at the 
federal level under the Fisheries Act5 and the Oceans Act.6 Under the Fisher-
ies Act, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans has full discretionary power in 
all matters pertaining to the conservation of marine resources. The Minister’s 
decisions on fisheries management and habitat measures, sector allocation 
and access issues, and how managers will implement integrated management 
plans, and monitor and enforce regulatory measures are made on the advice 
of the Minister’s Science Branch. The Oceans Act directs the Science Branch to 
provide scientific advice, including collecting data, basic and applied research, 
3 Available at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf.
4 United Nations General Assembly, Res. 66/288, “The future we want” (2012), para. 1.
5 Fisheries Act, r.s.c. 1985, c. F-14.
6 Oceans Act, S.C. 1996, c. 31.
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surveying, and publication of maps. Canada’s Ocean Strategy provides the pol-
icy and operational framework for delivering ‘integrated ocean management’.7 
In contrast to the regulatory function of the Fisheries Act, the Oceans Act is 
recognized as an enabling act that seeks to assemble Canadians to speak up, 
and to raise public awareness and improve our understanding of the country’s 
vast ocean environment.
Since the implementation of United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea and the establishment of Canada’s exclusive economic zone (eez) 
after 1977, Fisheries and Oceans Canada has enhanced its scientific capabili-
ties and management resources under the regulatory powers of the Fisheries 
Act. During the ensuing decades, however, the Ministry has been subject to 
(i) ongoing criticism of top-down regulatory control or ‘paternalism’, (ii) an 
evident lack of transparency of decision-making with respect to the inclusion 
of its clients and stakeholders in the ocean sector, commercial fisheries, and 
coastal communities, and (iii) increasingly difficult management decisions as-
sociated with conflicting interests such as the poorly defined requirement for 
First  Nations to a moderate livelihood and the oil or the gas industry’s desire to 
 access coastal waters.
In response, the Ministry has attempted to apply integrated coastal zone 
management;8 put in place joint co-management agreements among com-
mercial fisheries and within larger land claim agreements with Aboriginal 
peoples;9 created consultative bodies, such as the Fisheries Resource Conser-
vation Council;10 and established large ocean management areas (lomas) and 
associated integrated ocean management plans under the enabling terms of 
the Oceans Act. However, in general, these initiatives have failed to implement 
participatory decision-making. This is primarily due to degrading marine re-
sources, declining fish stocks, and changing ecosystem conditions (recruit-
ment, climate, and species interactions) and legislative difficulties stemming 
from the confounding co-existence of regulatory responsibilities under the 
Fisheries Act and the enabling perspectives of the Oceans Act.
The Ministry’s historical regulatory authority, coupled with its broader in-
tention to enable—with participation, but without authority—are  conflicting. 
7 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2005–2010 Strategic Plan: Our Waters, Our Future (2008), 
http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/dfo-mpo/plan-eng.htm.
8 P. Ricketts and L. Hildebrand, “Coastal and Ocean Management in Canada: Progress or 
 Paralysis?” Coastal Management 39, no. 1 (2011): 4–19.
9 A. Dale and D. Armitage, “Marine Mammal Co-management in Canada’s Arctic: Knowl-
edge Co-production for Learning and Adaptive Capacity,” Marine Policy 35 (2011): 440–449.
10 D. Lane and R. Stephenson, “Institutional Arrangements for Fisheries: Alternative Struc-
tures and Impediments to Change,” Marine Policy 24, no. 5 (2000): 385–393.
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Fisheries and Oceans Canada continues to be characterized by (i) the regu-
latory authority of the Minister as defined in the Fisheries Act; (ii) a lack of 
co-ordination between science and management and a lack of a systemic ap-
proach to dealing with ecosystem problems; (iii) minimal engagement with 
and feedback to coastal communities and commercial entities; and (iv) a lack 
of transparency in the decision-making process, which negates participation 
by the wider public.11
The case of the Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management (essim) ini-
tiative is illustrative of these issues. essim was a collaborative ocean planning 
process that was formed under the Oceans Act as part of the Eastern Scotian 
Shelf loma.12 The essim Plan was the product of an extensive collaborative 
and inclusive planning process from 2004 to 2007 among federal and provincial 
ocean scientists and managers, and the full spectrum of ocean  stakeholders 
from fisheries, tourism, oil and gas, coastal communities, and environmen-
tal non-governmental organizations (engos). The aim of the initiative was 
to develop a participatory integrated ocean management plan to guide the 
sustainable use, conservation, and management of the Eastern Scotian Shelf. 
The essim review concluded that the Plan was never officially endorsed and 
the Plan’s call for action regarding establishing indicators, the evaluation of 
ocean strategies versus objectives, and the declaration of a mandate for essim, 
was never confirmed or implemented.13 Fisheries and Oceans Canada effec-
tively abandoned lomas and the concept of integrated ocean management 
planning following the Ministry’s redesign after 2011 and the removal of the 
‘Oceans’ line from the Ministry’s organization chart.
 Barriers and Solutions to Participatory Ocean Governance
Barriers to implementation of participatory ocean governance typically arise 
from the historic role of governments supported by outdated, centralized leg-
islation. To deliver participatory ocean governance in practice, governments 
11 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Report of the Commissioner of the Environment 
and Sustainable Development (2011), Chapter 4, A Study of Managing Fisheries for Sustain-
ability, http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_cesd_201112_04_e_36032.html.
12 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Oceans and Habitat Branch, Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrat-
ed Management Plan (Fs23-512/1-2007E, 2007).
13 J. McCuaig and G. Herbert, eds., “Review and Evaluation of the Eastern Scotian Shelf Inte-
grated Management (essim) Initiative,” (2013), Canadian Technical Report of Fisheries and 
Aquatic Sciences 3025.
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need to become auditors.14 Government auditors evaluate the achievement of 
objectives of integrated ocean management plans. The role as auditor provides 
a level of realistic control for governments managing a distributed system driv-
en by effective and efficient regional users.
One possible approach that has been proposed is the establishment of in-
dependent ‘regional ecosystem review boards’ that would be assigned regional 
authority mandates to make decisions for licensing, access, and allocation of 
ocean resources. Boards would receive applications for marine access that 
would include clearly defined and specified triple bottom line objectives (eco-
nomic, social, and ecological). Marine users would be obligated to report to 
the boards and to provide feedback for their renewal on condition of meeting 
economic, social, and ecological targets as indicated in their contracts. If per-
formance is judged to be insufficient by the board, then the contract is not re-
newed but made available by tender to new suppliers. The Fisheries Act would 
need to be revised in order to release the authority of the Minister to distribute 
and devolve responsibility and decision-making power to ecosystem-linked re-
gional ecosystem review boards.
The complexity of ocean governance confounds disciplinary scientific 
knowledge and regulatory authority upon which many national oceans 
 institutions are built. A pragmatic problem-solving approach to ocean gover-
nance via a participatory ‘bottom-up’ decision-making perspective is required. 
 Decision theory provides a framework through which complex problems can 
be analyzed: (i) clear problem definition; (ii) strategic planning and objectives 
setting; (iii) relevant data collection; (iv) interdisciplinary systems modeling; 
and (v) ongoing validation and monitoring of decisions. The following charac-
teristics define institutional arrangements for participatory ocean governance 
based on the problem-solving approach:
1. Co-management—define regional partnerships with scientists, manag-
ers, communities, and engos having legislated responsibility and au-
thority to act at the ecosystem level.
2. Cost recovery—empowering participants recognizes the value of deci-
sion support and administrative functions for access, licensing, data 
 collection, marine resource assessment, monitoring and enforcement. 
The costs of these activities should be shared by sector participants.
3. Rights-based characteristics—participatory decision-making explicitly 
assigns rights and privileges to the participants. Allocative rights-based 
14 D. Lane, “Canada’s Commercial Fisheries: Share the Wealth or Create Prosperity?” Opti-
mum Online 42, no. 2 (2012), http://www.optimumonline.ca/article.phtml?id=412&page=1.
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systems indicate a shift toward community or private ownership and 
away from notions of ‘common property’.
4. Interdisciplinary systems teams—marine activities must be managed 
with regard for the whole ecosystem and with the consideration of 
economic, social, administrative, and ecological impacts of alternative 
decisions.
5. Management by objectives and continuous improvement—effective, 
 dynamic, multidisciplinary management requires movement toward cor-
porate and institutional targets emerging from ecological, economic, and 
social objectives.
6. Precautionary approach—in complex marine ecosystems, scientists 
determine impacts with uncertainty. To adopt a precautious approach 
 acknowledges this and indicates preference for recommendations that 
are more conservative.
7. Transparency—as a prerequisite for participatory ocean governance, 
adaptive management approaches require that information is rapidly, 
freely, and openly accessible to all participants, to the public, and to 
policy-makers.
8. Mechanisms for conflict response—conflict response mechanisms are 
necessary to reconcile the diverse interests of participating users.15
Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s vision to develop a truly participatory system of gov-
erning our oceans remains as a work in progress that will be realized when the 
oceans sector and governments agree to revise their respective roles toward 
greater shared responsibility.
15 World Ocean Review, Sustainable Use of Our Oceans—Making Ideas Work, 4th edition 
(Hamburg: Maribus, 2015).
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First Nations, Oceans Governance and Indigenous 
Knowledge Systems
Ken Paul
Maliseet First Nation at Tobique, New Brunswick, Canada  
(wolastoqew neqotkuk)
 Pacem in Maribus 1998
I met Elisabeth Mann Borgese only once, early in my career. It was during the 
Pacem in Maribus International Conference hosted in Halifax in 1998.1 I was an 
employee of the Canadian federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans (dfo) 
and was invited by a colleague to attend the oceans sector papers. I was un-
aware of the profile of the international event and felt out of place amongst 
the world elites of the ocean sector at the week-long meeting. The respect that 
Professor Mann Borgese was given became apparent and I learned about the 
impact she had made towards oceans governance and its role on humanity.
The other person whom I met was Charlie Labrador, a Mi’kmaq Elder from a 
small community in Nova Scotia. Once we were introduced, I was able to spend 
the majority of my three days at the conference as his companion. He was very 
soft-spoken and humble, similar to many Elders I have met over my lifetime. 
Being Maliseet from a native community called Tobique in New Brunswick 
(wolastoqkew neqotkuk), he immediately felt comfortable with me; we were 
able to openly share our thoughts and feelings on this major event filled with 
scientists, business leaders, diplomats, and others with great responsibilities 
and influence over how international ocean laws, policies, and regulations 
were developed and enacted.
The conference chair had approached Charlie the morning of the last day 
and asked if he would be able to speak at the closing. Charlie was a man who 
understood the importance of responsibility and given that the conference 
was being conducted on unceded Mi’kmaq traditional lands, he obliged. I re-
member him coming to the microphone in front of several hundred delegates. 
He held an eagle feather as he spoke. Because he was so soft spoken, the crowd 
had quieted to allow his words to be carried by the microphone. I watched him 
physically shaking with the feather in hand and heard a slight tremble in his 
1 “Pacem in Maribus (pim) Conferences,” International Ocean Institute, accessed 5 November 
2017, https://www.ioinst.org/about-1/ioi-story/pacem-in-maribus-pim-conferences/.
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voice. He addressed the crowd by saying, “I’ve been watching you all this week 
and listening to your presentations. What I have learned is that you really don’t 
know how to fish.” I was shocked when he said this. He went on to say that he 
is a simple Mi’kmaw man from a small community a couple of hours away and 
that he has spent his life fishing, hunting, and gathering plants for medicine. 
He said that the key to his existence was to respect the natural resources and 
only take what was needed. He followed this with a closing prayer.
The words that he spoke were delivered with humility and respect; they left 
me with two significant teachings which were pivotal to my young career. The 
first was in his courage to speak truth to power. Although he was an under-
employed Mi’kmaq Elder with a simple vision and message, he brought in the 
courage of the ancestors to deliver a message to high-powered world leaders 
in a respectful manner. The second lesson was in the way we had heard about 
all the challenges of balancing the many interests for ocean resources, such 
as oil and gas extraction, coastal erosion, threatened fish stocks, and interna-
tional boundary disputes. His message was simple (as opposed to simplistic, 
which eliminates relevant factors). His message of only using what you need 
and respecting the natural world as you would a relative is a deep rooted value 
amongst all Indigenous tribes that I have encountered over my lifetime. It is 
clouded by the complexities of economics and governance but it is still a fun-
damental basis which has guided my thinking throughout my adult life.
 The Marshall Decision and the Elders of Unama’ki
On 17 September 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada found Donald Marshall 
Jr. not guilty of commercial fishing for eels, on the strength of the Peace and 
Friendship Treaty of 1760.2 This decision produced a fundamental change in 
Canadian law with respect to Treaty rights, commercial fisheries, aboriginal 
relations, and governance. At the time, I was a Hydrographer-in-Charge with 
the Canadian Hydrographic Service, a branch of dfo Science in Dartmouth, 
Nova Scotia. I had not paid much attention to court cases and had only a gen-
eral knowledge of First Nations rights in Canada. My ambition at the time was 
to become the Dominion Hydrographer in Canada, and I had worked hard to 
attain knowledge and respect in the field of ocean mapping.
The Marshall decision caught everyone off guard. Both the federal dfo 
and Atlantic First Nation leadership were unprepared for the breadth of the 
decision and the chaos that followed. A number of First Nation community 
2 R. v. Marshall [1999] 3 scr 456; Case number 26014.
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 members took to the water to exercise their rights. There was a brutal response 
from the Canadian authorities, who sent in the Royal Canadian Mounted 
 Police, dfo officers, and eventually the Canadian military to suppress Native 
fishers. This was a national and international embarrassment for Canada, as 
pictures and videos were broadcast almost nightly on the national news.
My world had changed significantly as well. I went from being an engineer 
with the Hydrographic Service to the Indian who works for dfo, literally over-
night. I was only one of two Native people working for the federal department 
at the time, which led to my colleagues challenging me for answers on the 
Treaty at the water fountain, the cafeteria, or any other common area within 
the Bedford Institute of Oceanography where my office was located. It became 
obvious that none of my colleagues had any knowledge of Native peoples in 
Atlantic Canada and saw me as a target for expressing their frustrations and 
curiosities. The choice I had was either to educate myself to prepare for ques-
tioning that came from many different places or to leave the department. An 
Elder that I became close to, Gwen Bear, advised me to stay with my current 
employer saying, “The Creator had put me here for a specific purpose. You will 
be able to influence and help non-Natives understand our people.”
To that end, I had a few supportive colleagues in dfo Science. One thing 
they asked me to do was to figure out a way to share the dfo science with our 
communities. I had worked with Charlie Dennis of the Eskasoni Fish and Wild-
life Commission in Unama’ki (the Mi’kmaq name for Cape Breton Island) to 
set up a talking circle with community Elders and senior dfo scientists. There 
were approximately 15 Elders from the five Unama’ki communities who par-
ticipated along with 17 dfo scientists. With such a large circle, I knew that we 
would only have a chance to do one round where each participant, in a clock-
wise order (to follow the path of the sun, moon and stars across our skies), 
would be permitted to talk about themselves and anything else that they felt 
necessary to share. To my surprise, every single scientist identified themselves 
by their job title and then followed with explaining their area of responsibility. 
Each Elder, without exception, identified themselves by the community where 
they were from. A few of them gave their talk in Mi’kmaq without translation 
into English. I received criticism for not providing translation in a follow-up 
meeting with my fisheries colleagues. The message I received from Charlie was 
that the Elders felt the scientists were not speaking to them in language they 
could understand, so they decided they would do the same. Although this was 
a first meeting of its kind, it stressed the importance of communication and 
also reminded me that the stories and knowledge of our Elders are rooted in 
place.
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 Fisheries Management and Traditional Knowledge Systems
Following a 20-year career with the Canadian public service, I accepted a posi-
tion with an Atlantic Chiefs’ organization responsible for fisheries policy, re-
search and advocacy. During my three months, I met with senior dfo officials 
in New Brunswick who were responsible for managing the commercial snow 
crab (Chionoecetes opilio) fishery. Most of our Atlantic First Nations communi-
ties have entered into interim agreements to fish under dfo rules, in order to 
gain access to economic opportunities and to allow Canada and the Atlantic 
First Nations time to fully implement the 1760 Treaty right to fish commercially.
The dfo regional manager asked me to look at the fisheries management 
plan for snow crab.3 It has a number of sections regarding the science assess-
ment, fishing gear type, delineated areas, and numerous other directives on 
the health of the stock and how it should be fished. In the science assessment 
area, there was a section called ‘Aboriginal Traditional Knowledge’ that had an 
empty box beneath it. The manager asked if I could help the department fill in 
this box as a way to include First Nations in the fisheries management regime.
I had to decline this offer. While I appreciated that the department was 
open to including Aboriginal Knowledge into this science assessment, I knew 
instinctively that there are many pitfalls to going down this path. If there were 
holes in the information, there could be legal claims by Canada that First 
 Nations had no claim to ocean resources. Also, contributing to federal man-
agement plans without legal oversight could be misconstrued as endorsement. 
However, this also forced me to think deeply about what people are seeking 
when they talk about Aboriginal Traditional Knowledge.
 Traditional Knowledge and Oceans Governance
The idea of traditional knowledge brings out the image of respectful learning 
from Elders. Our Elders are indeed our knowledge keepers and are amongst 
our most respected persons in Mi’kmaq, Maliseet, and Passamaquoddy society. 
It is understandable that many policy-makers and Western scientists are enam-
ored with the idea of gaining deep Elder knowledge to enhance their own un-
derstanding. It is also envisioned that this would be an enriching  interaction, 
3 “Integrated Fisheries Management Plan: Snow Crab in the Southern Gulf of Saint Lawrence,” 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada, last modified September 2014, http://www.glf.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/
Gulf/FAM/IMFP/2014-Snow-Crab-Gulf-Region#2.
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as Elders are viewed by mainstream society to be wise, soft-spoken individuals 
with a link to a more natural and ancient wisdom.
While this may be true in many cases, there is little appreciation for the 
process of traditional knowledge. There is an emphasis in Western society to 
value knowledge over other attributes, and that attaining knowledge is an ob-
jective pursuit. However, Aboriginal (or Indigenous) Traditional Knowledge is 
something attained through a process. It takes a lifetime of observation and 
spending time on the land to understand how our plant and animal relatives 
interact with us and each other. Observing weather patterns and landscapes 
allows for planning for individual and community activities. Additionally, First 
Nations spirituality comes from having ceremonies to honor the Earth and the 
ancestors and allows for a deepened connection to the land.
Albert Marshall and Murdena Marshall are two Mi’kmaq Elders from Es-
kasoni, located in Unama’ki (Cape Breton Island). They have forwarded the 
concept of ‘two-eyed seeking’ which pays respect to both Mi’kmaw Traditional 
Knowledge and Western science as two ways of knowing.4 By bringing both 
knowledge systems together, one will arrive at the best possible science. This 
concept elevates traditional knowledge of the natural world as a vital system 
of learning, independent of a Western scientific (deductive, inductive) meth-
odology, while simultaneously acknowledging that the two approaches could 
and should work together.
When acknowledged as a knowledge ‘system’, traditional knowledge must 
then be supported with the modern tools necessary to gathering and shar-
ing information for learning and interpretation. Because the acquisition and 
 sharing of traditional knowledge is a process, First Nations are now training 
and investing in the latest technologies such as geographic information sys-
tems (gis) databases, video equipment, social media, scientific laboratories, 
satellite imagery and drones, and any number of new innovations. The Atlantic 
First Nations have been able to bridge the gap, keeping traditional approaches 
to knowing, while utilizing Western science and tools to understand  traditional 
lands and resources in order to help all peoples living in our territories.
Another important understanding is embedded in traditional values within 
the process of acquiring and sharing traditional knowledge. I have concluded 
that the reason why I had an immediate negative reaction to the invitation to 
4 Advisory Panel for the Review of Federal Support for Fundamental Science, Investing in Can-
ada’s Future: Strengthening the Foundations of Canadian Research (Government of Canada, 
2017), 98–99, http://www.sciencereview.ca/eic/site/059.nsf/vwapj/ScienceReview_April2017 
-rv.pdf/$file/ScienceReview_April2017-rv.pdf.
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fill in the empty box in the snow crab management plan was that it would have 
been irresponsible to gather information that could have been used out of 
context. Instead, traditional knowledge systems would be better understood if 
First Nations were able to infuse traditional values throughout the entire fish-
eries management plan. This would be applicable to the basics of any plan by 
asking questions such as: What are we fishing? How are we doing this sustain-
ably? When and where do we fish? Who is allowed to fish and who is receiving 
it for the food and monetary benefits? Which other species are affected by the 
fishing activity? These traditional values relate to governance. Again, through 
my understanding from the time I spent with Elders, I believe deeply that if 
First Nations were given any voice in the management of ocean resources, 
there would be much healthier fish stocks and less destructive impacts on the 
ocean from human activity.
 Oceans Governance and Atlantic First Nations
While in Canada we have a number of historic treaties between First Nations 
and the Crown that allowed for the peaceful coexistence of visitors to our lands 
and waters, Mi’kmaq, Maliseet, and Passamaquoddy peoples have not been 
given any voice or position of influence in Canadian or international gover-
nance. Our treaties have enshrined the right to fish, but Canada has not ac-
knowledged inherent Indigenous rights to self-governance or the management 
of ocean resources. As the negotiations between Atlantic First Nations and the 
Crown continue to try to determine how to bring a modern interpretation to 
treaties from the 1700s, many of our First Nations Chiefs are asserting them-
selves or working towards having jurisdiction over natural resources, including 
those in the oceans. These approaches will include using all the tools available 
in modern Western society but also will embrace and be rooted in traditional 
knowledge and traditional values.
Ideally, we will see openness by Canada and Canadians to allow First 
 Nations to co-govern ocean resources. Up to now, any gains made by First Na-
tions in Canada have been achieved through the court systems. Co-governance 
will demonstrate action towards Canada’s commitment to reconciliation and 
a true Nation-to-Nation relationship.5 Regardless, the demographics of First 
Nations (a growing population), the awareness shared by social media, and 
5 “Reconciliation,” Department of Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, last modified 
 February 2017, https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1400782178444/1400782270488.
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the strength of our communities will see a dramatic change in the capabilities, 
ambitions, and performance of our next generation of First Nations Elders and 
leaders. This hope gives me optimism that Aboriginal (or Indigenous) Tradi-
tional Knowledge will continue to adapt and contribute to resolving the chal-
lenges facing our relationship with the oceans.
<UN>
Non-Governmental Organization Roles in Shaping 
Future Ocean Governance and Management
Alexandra Vance and Robert Rangeley
Oceana Canada, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
 Introduction
The future of the ocean rests on the effectiveness of good governance, holistic 
management, and most importantly, urgent and sustained action to address 
complex marine issues. Conservation practitioners and resource managers 
struggle to keep pace with the growing threats to marine ecosystems, such 
as climate change, ocean acidification, overfishing, habitat loss, and marine 
plastics. In response to these ecological crises and insufficient management 
actions, the number and diversity (as well as total memberships and rev-
enues) of environmental non-governmental organizations (engos) focused 
on ocean health has grown rapidly since the beginning of the environmental 
movement in the early 1960s.1 Arguably more active than ever before, engos 
have expanded their participation in ocean governance processes in recent 
decades, alongside many other key rights-holders (i.e., Indigenous commu-
nities) and stakeholders (e.g., industry, coastal communities, various levels 
of government), and have adopted a greater breadth of roles and responsi-
bilities.2 These roles may include influencing policy development and imple-
mentation, promoting community engagement and marine stewardship, and 
directly or indirectly contributing to scientific knowledge acquisition and dis-
semination.3 An important  consideration is how engos will respond to the 
1 B. Straughan and T. Pollak, The Broader Movement: Nonprofit Environmental and Conserva-
tion Organizations, 1989–2005 (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2008), 1, https://www 
.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/32186/411797-The-Broader-Movement-Nonprofit 
-Environmental-and-Conservation-Organizations---.PDF.
2 Straughan and Pollak, id.; S.D. Fuller et al., “Informing and Improving Fisheries Management 
Outcomes: An Atlantic Canadian Large Pelagics Case Study by the Ecology Action Centre,” 
in Science, Information, and Policy Interface for Effective Coastal and Ocean Management, eds., 
B.H. MacDonald et al. (Boca Raton: crc Press, 2016), 419–443, doi.org/10.1201/b21483-24.
3 R. Blasiak et al., “The Role of ngos in Negotiating the Use of Biodiversity in Marine Areas Be-
yond National Jurisdiction,” Marine Policy 81 (2017), 1–8, doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2017.03.004; 
S. Oberthür et al., Participation of Non-Governmental Organisations in International Environ-
mental Governance: Legal Basis and Practical Experience (Berlin: Ecoscript, 2013), 20, https://
www.ecologic.eu/sites/files/publication/2013/ngo_participation_brief.pdf.
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 increasingly  complex challenges in coastal and ocean environments and how 
to best achieve meaningful conservation throughout the science-policy-public 
interface. Throughout this essay, we will highlight some key engo roles, re-
sponsibilities, and achievements in shaping the future of ocean governance, 
by drawing on several examples and recent experiences in Canada. The discus-
sion is not intended as a comprehensive list.
 Key Management Approaches
Increasingly complex marine conservation and management challenges have 
necessitated broader engagement from a range of stakeholders, disciplines, 
and experiences. engos catalyze participation by convening a diversity of ex-
pertise and promoting the development of professional skill sets.4 Rather than 
adopting a single species or sectoral approach, as is often the case in fisheries, 
engos have emphasized a more holistic and ecosystem-based management 
approach through marine spatial planning (msp) and integrated coastal and 
ocean management (icom).5 Together, msp and icom are intended to address 
the many competing uses and actors in the ocean sector, which requires en-
gaging multiple disciplines to sustainably manage a marine ecosystem and its 
resources.6 Given the number and sheer complexity of marine issues today, 
these interdisciplinary approaches will continue to gain momentum and rel-
evance in the future of ocean governance.
 Training Marine Managers
Some engos support academic programs and research projects that are 
aligned with the principles of icom, msp, and other holistic and interdisci-
plinary management approaches. In these cases, engos may partner with 
institutions to help train and hire the next generation of marine managers. 
While the total number of employment opportunities remains minor rela-
tive to  government and industry sectors, engos continue to employ skilled 
4 Oberthür et al., id.; A. Chircop, “Teaching Integrated Coastal Management: Lessons from the 
Learning Arena,” Ocean & Coastal Management 43 (2000): 343–359.
5 M. Bailey et al., “Canada at a Crossroad: The Imperative for Realigning Ocean Policy with 
Ocean Science,” Marine Policy 63 (January 2016), 53–60, doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2015.10.002; 
S. Heileman (ed.), A Handbook for Measuring the Progress and Outcomes of Integrated Coast-
al and Ocean Management, ioc Manuals and Guides No. 46; icam Dossier No. 2 (Paris: 
unesco, 2006), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001473/147313e.pdf.
6 Heileman, id.
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 professionals from a wealth of disciplines. For example, the Canadian Revenue 
Agency lists revenues close to CA$1 billion in 2011 for 300 charitable organiza-
tions with significant environmental programs, including those with marine 
programs.7 In the same fiscal year (2011–2012), the top 32 Canadian engos em-
ployed 1,486 full-time staff.8
As a greater number of job opportunities in marine management have be-
come available, especially in the field of icom, academic institutions have 
responded to this growing demand for skilled professionals by developing 
specialized training programs and courses.9 In addition, engos often provide 
direct training opportunities in partnership with these academic programs 
through internships and job placements, in turn making students more em-
ployable, given their recent and relevant experiences and skills.10 For example, 
the Master of Marine Management program at Dalhousie University in  Halifax, 
Canada, was established in response to an international call for interdisciplin-
ary graduates, with an emphasis on enrolling students from developing na-
tions. Between 2008 and 2015, 94 percent of graduates (88 of 94 graduates) 
were employed within their discipline, and 12.5 percent (11 of 88 graduates) 
were employed by engos.11
 Policy Influence
engos have pushed for increasing transparency, accountability, and inclusiv-
ity through local, national, and international governance delegations and by 
engaging media and the public.12 For example, the number of ngos that have 
successfully obtained observer or consultative status with the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (ecosoc) has increased by more than 500 per-
cent over the last three decades.13 Nationally, there is no shortage of examples 
of engos making significant marine conservation and policy contributions in 
7 Straughan and Pollak, supra note 1 above.
8 J. Grady, “Environmental Charities in Canada,” Charity Intelligence Canada, June 2013, 
https://www.charityintelligence.ca/images/environmental_charities_in_canada.pdf.
9 Id.
10 Chircop, supra note 4 above.
11 B. Field, Marine Affairs Program, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada, personal 
communication.
12 Oberthür, supra note 3 above; Chircop, supra note 4 above; M. Winfield, “Six Functions 
of Non-governmental Organizations in a Democratic Society,” York University, last 
 modified 12 February 2014, http://marksw.blog.yorku.ca/2014/02/11/five-functions-of-non 
-governmental-organizations-in-a-democratic-society/.
13 Oberthür, id.
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Canada. From leading local stewardship initiatives (e.g., the Great Canadian 
Shoreline Cleanup), to informing local government policies that steer industry 
or institutional operations (e.g., influencing Montreal City Council to pass a 
ban on single-use plastic bags) and helping the federal government achieve 
national and international mandates (e.g., ‘pushing’ the Canadian government 
to commit to protecting 10 percent of its marine areas by 2020), engos are of-
ten on the front line of positive policy change in Canada and around the world.
 Science and Data Accessibility
By fostering meaningful collaborations with various stakeholders and other 
organizations, engos can facilitate and strengthen important linkages across 
sectors and disciplines. They can act as the creators and compilers of science, 
policy, and economic knowledge, while being an objective source of informa-
tion for governance and management decisions.14 engos also have a crucial 
responsibility to act as third-party watchdogs regarding information published 
by agencies, including those of the government, to ensure accuracy and trans-
parency.15 Providing access to the most comprehensive and timely informa-
tion, regardless of whether the engo is itself the producer or reviewer, is an 
essential component and role for bridging the science–policy–public inter-
face.16 engos are proven to be skilled at accessing such information, as well as 
translating important (and often complex) scientific data and policies to make 
them accessible for general audiences.17 This is turn promotes better dialogue, 
compliance, and stewardship among decision-makers, resource users, media, 
and the public alike, while providing a fundamental step toward shared con-
servation objectives, actions, and trust.18
14 Blasiak et al., supra note 3 above; Winfield, supra note 12 above; E.M. De Santo et al., “Does 
Information Matter in icom? Critical Issues and the Path Forward,” in MacDonald et al. 
(eds.), supra note 2, 447–463.
15 Heilman, supra note 5 above; De Santo, id.; S.S. Soomai, “The Science–Policy Interface 
in Fisheries Management: Insights about the Influence of Organizational Structure 
and Culture on Information Pathways,” Marine Policy 81 (2017): 53–63, doi.org/10.1016/j.
marpol.2017.03.016.
16 Soomai, id.
17 De Santo, supra note 14 above; A. Agarwal, “Role of ngos in the Protection of Environ-
ment,” Journal of Environmental Research and Development 2 (2008): 933–938.
18 Agarwal, id.; S.S. Soomai, “Understanding the Science–Policy Interface: Case Studies on 
the Role of Information in Fisheries Management,” Environmental Science & Policy 72 
(2017): 65–75, doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2017.03.004.
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 Public Outreach
Unsustainable human activity and resource use is the ultimate cause of the 
global environmental degradation we are now witnessing. How we communi-
cate, manage and mitigate these activities will determine the future health of 
the ocean. Recent studies have pointed out that public awareness and percep-
tion of marine issues will govern the way individuals and the public will take ac-
tion. It is therefore imperative that engos due diligence includes engaging the 
public with marine issues so as to promote conservation-focused solutions.19
Many engos have already invested in developing creative and compelling 
communication strategies to connect with people using digital and social me-
dia channels. These are an essential tool for engos, as they allow informa-
tion to be disseminated widely and cost-effectively, target specific or broad 
audiences, build a sense of community (even globally), and provide a forum 
to participate in and influence conservation actions and decisions that were 
traditionally left to government and industry.20
Recent statistics put the number of social media users worldwide at 2.46 bil-
lion people in 2017. This represents a 153 percent increase from 970 million us-
ers in 2010.21 Communications strategies driven by public demand, particularly 
through the use of digital and social media channels, will continue to drive 
engos to tell a compelling, and often visual, story that resonates with engaged 
audiences and promotes public support for marine conservation and ocean 
governance.
 Industry Development
engos’ capacity to affect the development of sustainable industry products, 
standards, and practices has established an important and recent trend. By 
communicating science and encouraging the public to make more informed 
decisions, engos have helped increase the demand for more sustainable 
19 H.K. Lotze et al., “Public Perceptions of Marine Threats and Protection from around the 
World,” Ocean and Coastal Management 152 (2018), 14–22, doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman 
.2017.11.004.
20 S. Dosemagen, “Can Social Media Help to Save the Environment?” Huffington Post, last 
updated 28 January 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/shannon-dosemagen-/social 
-media-and-saving-t_b_9100362.html.
21 Statista, “Number of Social Media Users Worldwide from 2010 to 2021 (in billions),” 
Statista (2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics/278414/number-of-worldwide-social 
-network-users/.
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 products. This provides new market niches in which industry has already 
begun to respond by developing and supplying environmentally responsible 
products. For example, engos have been a significant driver of sustainable 
seafood campaigns (e.g., the Ocean Wise Seafood Program) that encourage 
industry, retailers, and consumers to purchase products that have minimized 
the risk of overfishing and habitat degradation, among other conservation 
concerns.
Compelling, fact-based messaging that discourages harmful fishing methods 
have led to a diversity of engo-based seafood eco-labelling programs. These 
in turn provide management transparency and promote fishery sustainability. 
While the effectiveness of eco-labels and the merits of their standards may 
be controversial for some fisheries, the fact remains that engos have helped 
improve awareness and empowered the public to make informed choices and 
actions that have resulted in an industry shift towards sustainable fisheries 
management and marine conservation considerations.
 Parting Thoughts
Scientists agree that the marine environment is deteriorating at a greater rate 
than ever before.22 Fortunately there is now an unprecedented level of local 
to international attention and resources focused on the health of the ocean 
and its sustainable use. Among the myriad of stakeholders and users involved, 
there are significant increases in both the number and scope of engos that 
play a principal role throughout the science-policy-public interface, and in-
creasingly, this interface is inclusive of industry as well.
By helping develop and influence good management practices, creating and 
disseminating scientific knowledge, and connecting with the public to help 
make more informed and sustainable choices, engos will remain not only rel-
evant in the future but will continue to shape the next steps in ocean gover-
nance and management. Good marine governance will undoubtedly require 
all hands on deck for the benefit of a healthy ocean for our common future.
22 S.J. Gilbert, “The Value of Environmental Activists,” Harvard Business School Working 
Knowledge, 8 September 2008, https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/the-value-of-environmental 
-activists.
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* International Chief Advisor and Member of the China Council for International Cooperation 
on Environment and Development (cciced) and former President, International Institute 
for Sustainable Development.
The Ocean and China’s Drive for an Ecological 
Civilization
Arthur J. Hanson*
Victoria, British Columbia, Canada
I first met Elisabeth Mann Borgese after joining Dalhousie University in the 
late 1970s, and we were colleagues and friends until her untimely passing. We 
shared many common interests concerning oceans, environment, and inter-
national development. Often I participated in International Ocean Institute-
Canada (IOI-Canada) programs. Like so many others I felt challenged by her 
remarkable range of interests, her passion for pacem in maribus, and her pre-
science regarding many aspects of ocean governance and uses such as mari-
culture. I certainly agreed with her deep commitment to developing nations, 
 especially for peaceful and sustainable ocean use. She brought integrative 
views and understanding about the law of the sea, and how its full application 
could link people from all parts of the world in common cause. But in 1982 the 
ocean situation was very different from today.
Nowadays we talk about a technologically sophisticated and vastly ex-
panded global ‘Blue Economy’, with hopes that it may be doubled in the years 
ahead. However, there is a level of crisis in ocean use that worsens decade by 
decade. Threats are now regional and global. I am sure that Elisabeth would 
agree that the future health of the ocean will require much more attention to 
green development, environmental protection, and innovation in global gov-
ernance. Indeed, for problems such as ocean acidification, impacts of plastics 
and other wastes, and from intensive coastal development, there is no single 
framework for addressing sustainable use. Chapter 14 of the UN 2030 Sustain-
able Development Goals provides a helpful start, but the legal framework for 
integrated approaches to marine sustainable use is not fully provided by the 
current law of the sea, or even by the combination of the many accords that in 
one way or another affect ocean use.
I have had the good fortune to work closely with environment and devel-
opment authorities and scientists in three major ocean countries, namely, 
Canada, Indonesia, and China, plus carrying out ocean-related activities in a 
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number of others. I often think of Elisabeth and her innate sense of optimism 
about what could be accomplished if behavior and circumstances are altered. 
The network of ioi Centers, the Pacem in Maribus Conferences and the string 
of Ocean Yearbooks, plus her own books and other activities, have contributed 
to her transformative legacy, and her strong belief—that we can shape the 
 Future We Want. In this short essay, I will examine only China and its evolving 
perspectives on global ocean use and governance.
Elisabeth built an enduring ioi relationship on the oceans with China over 
a long period. This has included two Pacem in Maribus Conferences held in 
China (1996 and 2010), the establishment of IOI-China, which has trained 
many people from China and other countries in the Western Pacific, and par-
ticipation by Chinese ocean specialists in other ioi activities. Especially in ear-
lier years (1980s–1990s) as China gradually built its ocean policy and scientific 
capacities, the ioi played a very important role.
My own involvement in China began in 1992 when the China Council for 
International Cooperation on Environment and Development (cciced) was 
initiated.1 This body directly advises China’s State Council on a wide range of 
environment and development matters. It is chaired by the Vice Premier of 
China and includes senior Chinese and international members. The cciced 
is currently in its sixth five-year phase. From 2002 to the present I have served 
as International Chief Advisor. cciced has addressed ocean policy matters 
at times, notably a 2010 study on sustainable development of China’s ocean 
and coasts and a current initiative on Global Ocean Governance and Ecologi-
cal Civilization. Over the 25-year span of cciced activities we have seen the 
emergence of many new problems and approaches to eco-environmental con-
cerns. Environment is now mainstreamed into China’s political, economic, and 
social policy framework. An unprecedented financial commitment has been 
made to initiatives such as a ‘war on pollution’.
Leaders in China have a long-term vision of creating an ecological civiliza-
tion where people and nature can co-exist in harmony.2 This view is similar 
to sustainable development, but is more integrative with attention to politi-
cal and cultural considerations. While the prime effort is directed to applica-
tions within China, the concept has already been discussed and endorsed by 
the United Nations Environment Programme and likely will influence initia-
tives that China has with other countries. Ecological civilization may become 
1 See the cciced website, http://www.cciced.net/cciceden/.
2 See United Nations Environment Programme, Green is Gold: The Strategy and Actions of 
China’s Ecological Civilization (2016), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/
greenisgold_en_20160519.pdf.
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 important in China’s efforts to address global governance concerns such as 
those related to major conventions, notably for climate change and for biologi-
cal diversity, as well as for governing ocean use nationally and globally.
Ecological civilization is an important component of China’s 13th Five Year 
Plan (2016–2020) and will likely be even more prominent in the future. China 
has now set out its key longer-term policy directions to build a modern society 
by 2035 and a more prosperous country (at the level of some Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development nations) by 2050. A very important 
policy shift is to selectively take on leadership roles globally and regionally. In 
the past, China has preferred to be seen as a participant for many international 
activities rather than take on leading roles. That situation is explicitly chang-
ing, and at quite a rapid pace. In the important 19th Communist Party Congress 
(held in October 2017) President Xi Jinping noted that
It will be an era that sees China moving closer to center stage and making 
greater contributions to mankind … play our part in ensuring global eco-
logical security … China has become an important participant, contribu-
tor, and torchbearer in the global endeavor for ecological civilization …3
More generally, China seeks “a community of shared future for mankind.” The 
idea is to work towards win–win outcomes.
How these Chinese ideals will play out for global and regional ocean issues 
is not yet very clear. There are hot issues between China and neighboring coun-
tries, in particular concerning the South China Sea, and between China and 
Japan. Elsewhere there have been gathering storm clouds over China’s distant 
water fisheries fleet in several locations. China has limited experience con-
cerning traceability of fish caught elsewhere but brought to China for process-
ing and export, or consumed domestically. In its own waters, China has serious 
overfishing concerns. Many reef fish such as groupers have been imported il-
legally, as have sea turtles whose shells are sold as tourist items, illegally caught 
sharks from the waters of countries such as Ecuador, and other species such 
as seahorses used in traditional medicine. Yet such matters, important as they 
are, are really only the tip of the iceberg for China’s new era in ocean use.
Marine and coastal biodiversity is under considerable threat globally, and 
China could play a helpful conservation role in many ways, for example, by 
participating actively in the creation of high seas and other marine protected 
areas. China will also be able to learn from some other countries regarding 
3 See “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th cpc National Congress,” China.org.cn (6 Novem-
ber 2017), http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2017-11/06/content_41852215.htm.
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coastal national parks, since its national park system is only beginning to be 
formed. The East Asian–Australasian migratory bird flyway depends very heav-
ily on Chinese wetland protected areas, such as those found along the shores of 
the Yellow Sea. This is a topic of great concern to many local administrations 
in China that must permanently set aside major land and marine spaces, thus 
limiting other uses. This is a prime topic for international co-operation, and 
the Chinese government at a national level is fully committed to maintaining 
such co-operation. Even so, it is a difficult task for local administrators who are 
also seeking local economic growth through port development, aquaculture, 
and space for factories, etc.
Another fast growth economic theme for China is offshore energy devel-
opment. The range of approaches goes well beyond the predictable, such as 
oil and conventional gas, and wind energy. There are active efforts to exploit 
ocean frozen methane deposits and significant investment in renewable en-
ergy in tidal, wave and ocean thermal energy conversion. As well, there are 
efforts underway to consider the potential for building nuclear power plants 
offshore, as well as solar panel arrays on the sea surface. Some of these efforts 
involve significant international co-operation, and also investments in other 
countries by ocean-related Chinese enterprises such as the China National 
 Offshore Oil Corporation.
China is now taking much greater interest in the deep trenches and other 
relatively underexplored ocean waters, wherever they might be located in the 
world. The information gained is meant to improve the country’s knowledge 
for economic, shipping, and naval uses. Starting as soon as 2019, China will be-
gin seabed mining in Papua New Guinea’s waters. However, these explorations 
also are important for better understanding of marine ecosystems, significant 
ocean and atmospheric ocean relations that are important in climate change, 
and for better understanding of marine biodiversity. Marine biodiversity is sig-
nificant for biotechnology advances in a number of fields, including fisheries 
and aquaculture as well as medicine, food, and environmental biotechnology. 
Over time, China’s commitment will likely position the country very well as a 
leader in understanding physics, chemistry, and biology of the oceans. Yet the 
existing global governance in these fields is not adequate. China can contrib-
ute not only to the science, but also to the technological innovation, manage-
ment, and governance innovation required.
China is a country where natural disasters have been commonplace for cen-
turies. The most important sources have been earthquakes, floods, droughts 
(sometimes with accompanying famines), and typhoons. In this age of climate 
change, weather is of increasing significance, with storms, rising sea levels, 
and the dangers of floods and droughts creating new levels of risk. The role 
63China’s Drive for an Ecological Civilization
<UN>
of ocean phenomena such as warming trends in the Arctic are even being 
blamed for the difficulty in reducing smog for cities such as Beijing! Fortu-
nately, in recent years, China has developed much improved disaster planning 
and management procedures that are helping to reduce the damage and loss 
of life found in the past. However, in the decades to come, there will need to 
be a tremendous investment, especially along China’s east coast and in major 
river basins so that cities and infrastructure can be protected from rapid sea 
level rise and the effects of storms. The impacts on mariculture and ecological 
services of coastal wetlands will be considerable. Fortunately, investment in 
ecological restoration of such areas is taking place, and steps are being taken 
to stop destruction through ill-advised land reclamation.
There are four particular topics that have become focal points for China’s 
growing influence on the world’s seas. First is the rising importance of its na-
val strength. While this is still very much a work in progress by comparison to 
other major naval forces, there are perceptions that in another 10 or 20 years, 
China will certainly be a strong power on the high seas, and for some countries 
that is a concern. The second matter is the dominant role China now plays in 
ocean commerce. It is now the leading shipping nation with large fleets such 
as those of companies such as cosco. There has been a remarkable rise in the 
number and scale of marine ports in China, and through port development in 
other countries (including Pakistan, Sri Lanka, various small island nations, 
and Greece), a global network. There is both a commercial and a rising naval 
superpower aspect to the network. The third element of concern has been the 
tension over China’s claims in the South China Sea, its rejection of a law of the 
sea tribunal jurisdiction and decision on the claim brought by the Philippines, 
and China’s infrastructure development on some of the reefs and islands. The 
conflicting claims are unlikely to be settled quickly. In some circles this tension 
is considered as one of the leading threats to ocean peace today.
The fourth focal point is quite remarkable. It is variously called China’s Belt 
and Road Initiative (bri), or the One Belt One Road (obor) initiative. These 
terms refer to the ancient land-based Silk Road across the deserts of China 
through other parts of Asia to the Middle East, plus the major ocean trading 
routes that existed from before Marco Polo’s time to East Africa as well as coast-
al parts of Asia and elsewhere. The Belt refers to the land-based routes. The 
name now given to the ocean routes is the Maritime Silk Road. Most recently, 
there are suggestions of an Arctic Maritime Silk Road that would involve Rus-
sia and possibly other nations as Arctic ice disappears through climate change.
Introduced in 2013, this blend of ancient and future trading routes has been 
expanded to more than 60 nations in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, and 
also countries in Eastern Europe. bri/obor is a ‘once in a generation’ revision 
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of world trading relationships, and along with it, a means for strengthening 
China’s international development efforts and co-operation with many devel-
oping countries. Both trade and investment will increase to a level that may 
significantly change transfer of wealth to developing nations. The initiative 
can help China strengthen political links and opens steady access to resources 
and markets. For developing nations there are hopes for rapid economic devel-
opment. However, environmental and social impacts may be considerable as 
many of the projects involve infrastructure, and certainly the whole endeavor 
depends on expanded use of the seas and coastal zones.
This brief introduction to China’s growing dependence on the global ocean 
and the country’s desire for a greater leadership role regarding global gover-
nance reform suggests major challenges and opportunities for the decades 
immediately ahead of us. China clearly is clearly well positioned to take bold 
steps in this direction, and has demonstrated in various ways that it has the 
will to do so. Examples include China’s proactive steps first in the Antarctic 
and now the Arctic to build scientific knowledge; some of its efforts through 
the newly established Belt and Road Initiative; and its very significant efforts at 
ecosystem restoration along its own coastline. In pursuing a domestic agenda 
where the country’s Blue Economy might double from today’s 10 percent of 
gross domestic product, China will have to greatly improve ocean environmen-
tal protection and green development. An advantage in doing so will be to put 
China in a leadership role for new technology development. This is already 
happening in some sectors, but not necessarily in an integrated way. For ex-
ample, to reduce wastes reaching the ocean from farms, factories, and urban 
cities requires a ‘mountain to sea’ perspective that is still not fully in place.
China takes action most swiftly when the country sees clear advantages in 
doing so. The concept of ecological civilization is at that point now, at least 
domestically. It is an effort to build new societal values consistent with global 
sustainable development goals. However, for such an inclusive idea to become 
operational, many inconsistencies must be addressed. These include China’s 
current global fisheries practices, the imbalances still present on other devel-
opment practices within China, the need to build credibility around the world 
about China’s peaceful intent even as it continues to build naval power glob-
ally, and, above all, further strengthening of international co-operation to help 
address a broad range of ocean use concerns. Despite these challenges, no 
other large country is so well positioned to bring about transformative change 
towards ocean sustainable development. China will indeed find many innova-
tive opportunities as it meets the challenges.
How different the situation is today compared to that time a half century 
ago, when Elisabeth Mann Borgese and her colleagues first made the case that 
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the ocean and seabed should become the common heritage of mankind, ad-
ministered exclusively for peaceful ends. Elisabeth was the pioneer in working 
with China. She helped make it possible for many of China’s ocean planners 
and leaders to find ways that incorporated international experience with nec-
essary Chinese characteristics. She would be proud to know that China is now 
in a position to help many other developing countries, and to have a global 
influence during the hard struggle for making ocean use sustainable, perhaps 
eventually even in the context of an ecological civilization.

Part 2




 The development of human resources, alias ‘Education,’ is an essential component 
of the emerging new system of ‘governance.’ More important than territory, 
natural resources or capital: more blatantly so in the ocean than anywhere else; 
for ocean management and conservation is based on science and technology, 
and science and technology, in our century and the next, are knowledge based. 
 Elisabeth  Mann Borgese * 
 *  Introduction for the unpublished manuscript for a planned alumni book project, “IOI Alumni 
and the Future of Ocean Governance,” Dalhousie University Archives, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 




Editors: Michael J.A. Butler, Scott Coffen-Smout and Dirk Werle
If scientific knowledge and technical know-how are two essential elements for 
ocean management and conservation in this century, then developing capacity 
for responsible governance by way of ocean education and training of human 
resources is bound to be a third prerequisite. As the quote opposite intimates, 
knowledge in its most holistic form and people in the most inclusive way were 
obviously regarded by Elisabeth Mann Borgese as a strategic element and prin-
cipal agents to achieve that goal. Following the successful conclusion of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea during the early 1980s, she 
proceeded with the implementation of an ocean governance training program 
that marks a cornerstone of the International Ocean Institute (ioi) to this day, 
with ambitious plans for the future.
The seven essays in this part concentrate almost exclusively on IOI- related 
capacity development activities. They cover programmatic components and 
implementation issues, retrospective and forward-looking assessments, as 
well as evolutionary aspects and strategic requirements. All of these under-
takings and related experiences are presented from the point-of-view of 
 individuals with professional connections to the program, its concept and 
legacy, and future direction. The ioi perspectives on ocean governance and 
capacity development highlight practical program delivery, featuring cur-
rent ioi course work in Canada as an example, and overall strategic plan-
ning considerations of ioi as a non-governmental actor headquartered in 
Malta.
At the outset, an essay on Elisabeth Mann Borgese's legacy, in conjunction 
with an overview of the long-standing IOI-Canada course on Ocean Gover-
nance: Policy, Law and Management, offers a unique window on this broad-
based training and capacity development initiative and its philosophical 
underpinnings. Two alumni of the course reflect on their personal and pro-
fessional experience as participants during the mid-1990s and in 2016, respec-
tively. The different vantage points in time focus on a career informed by the 
learning experience more than two decades ago and a career marked by ex-
pectations instilled by a recent course. An aspect of that course experience is 
the subject of an essay that examines simulation and scenario-based learning 
as part of the most recent ocean governance course offerings to hone practical 
management, foster interactive learning skills and facilitate knowledge inte-
gration. Two essays on future aspects of ioi ocean governance training and 
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capacity development conclude this part. They approach the topics in differ-
ent yet closely related ways. In the first  instance the emphasis is on urging the 
education of ocean leaders to take proactive planning decisions today in light 
of the emerging climate change realities. The second, and final, essay lays out 
in a more general fashion the overall strategic direction of ioi’s capacity devel-
opment plans for the near future.
<UN>
* Former Special Assistant to Elisabeth Mann Borgese. The opinions expressed in this essay are 
those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the United Nations.
The Capacity Development Imperative:  
Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s Legacy
François Bailet*
United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea,  
New York, United States
 Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s Vision
Elisabeth Mann Borgese often proposed that the development of a new inter-
national framework for the law of the sea offered a laboratory for humanity 
within which to develop new approaches to its relationship with nature, and 
with itself. This proposition was firmly rooted in the conviction that we should 
be courageous enough to step away from our traditional land-based approach-
es, and leave behind some of our old ways, which have often caused conflict 
and inequalities, all at the expense of humanity and nature.
The infectious beauty and humbleness of Mann Borgese’s positive intellect 
was clear to those who worked with her, or even casually conversed with her. 
However, she was sometimes taken very literally by her contemporaries, and 
her propositions provided some with the excuse to stay on land and encourage 
the dismissal of her vision as nothing more than naivety, or perhaps even geo-
political manipulations of the times. Unfortunately, the importance and tim-
ing of Elisabeth’s underlying ideas evaded them, as they could not see beyond 
the shores of their intellect.
But Elisabeth was not a pessimist, nor was she easily intimidated by com-
plexity. Quite to the contrary, such situations brought out the best in her, as 
well as those she so selflessly shared her life with. Armed with conviction, 
humble persistence, and fundamentally human propositions, she continued 
to explain. Many of her ideas were eventually understood in the context of the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, some even serving as 
elements of the nucleus of what has become the ‘constitution for the ocean’: 
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos). But 
Mann Borgese understood that this magnificent development could only be 
the beginning; hence she continued her mission within the law of the sea and 
the sustainable development intergovernmental processes. The  convergence 
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of ocean affairs and the sustainable development agendas became her focus. 
In parallel, she also redoubled her efforts in developing human and institu-
tional capacity in ocean affairs, as she was convinced the persistent lack of 
such capacity was detrimental to sustainability.
 A Time for Common Approaches
It is in this spirit that humanity must now understand the situation it faces 
with respect to the state of the ocean, and start to craft new approaches in 
this great laboratory so as to redefine its relationship. There has never been a 
more important time in our history to take on this challenge. The ocean is on 
the brink of a tipping point; we now understand that our cumulative impacts 
are starting to outpace our ability to mitigate the harm we are causing.1 The 
ocean, nature in all its complex processes, is reacting. Humanity, relatively 
speaking, is having difficulty to do so. Faced with complex and interrelated 
problems, the effort to understand, regulate, implement, and adapt must be 
significantly reinforced, as must the current lack of human and institutional 
capacity.
Our relationship with the ocean is complex. On the one hand, it is our life 
support system, and on the other, we have taken it for granted and made self-
ish use of it from time immemorial. Another paradox lies in that we know very 
little of what the ocean holds, let alone its physical, chemical, and biological 
characteristics and processes and how our activities affect these. From the 
beginning of our time, we have looked at that ocean as a medium for explo-
ration, commerce, leisure, opportunity, and more recently for such undertak-
ings as exploration of biotechnology and renewable energy, amongst the many 
emerging. While such pursuits have fueled the development of humanity and 
accompanied the ebb and flow of civilizations, this has often been done with 
little attention to, or understanding of, their effects on the ocean. In historical 
terms, until relatively recently, governance was by canon, and the ocean was 
limitless and plentiful. Today, this can no longer be the case, and we are bail-
ing with all our might, each to a different drumbeat, each pursuing different 
visions of how to best govern our relation with the ocean and adapt to the 
oncoming. While many of these approaches have merit in of themselves, the 
current calculus of our positive cumulative efforts does not suffice to halt, let 
alone reverse the alarming trends.
1 Group of Experts of the Regular Process, The First Global Integrated Marine Assessment: 
World Ocean Assessment i (United Nations, 2016).
73The Capacity Development Imperative
<UN>
In order to begin effectively addressing this situation, it is imperative to un-
derstand the system within which we are operating. It is only from this position 
of understanding that we may start to identify lacunae and strategic priorities, 
and examine new ways of structuring our actions and developing capacity to 
effectively implement these. Such a common mutual understanding will also 
provide opportunity to better coordinate our individual actions within a clear 
strategic and common framework, thereby providing opportunities for our col-
lective actions to yield meaningful positive cumulative impacts.
 The Relevance of Elisabeth’s Vision Today
There is no single approach to the governance of oceanic spaces, resources, and 
activities. It is not a Cartesian system that can be neatly unfolded. But ocean 
governance is not a ‘black box’ either, nor should it be elevated to such levels 
of complexity, or ‘alchemy’. Our lack of understanding of this system cannot 
be used as an excuse for inaction, more importantly, justifying ineffective ac-
tion. Elisabeth realized that decision-makers could not be allowed to hesitate 
when engaging in ocean affairs, nor could their decisions remain in the realm 
of the safe, floating above some of the most critical problems faced by human-
ity. She thus saw the importance of simplifying the complex, without losing 
meaning or substance while making progress. This led her to understand that 
governance structures are generally formed around political, legal, and insti-
tutional frameworks. These could also interact on various geographical scales, 
from the local to the national, and from the regional to the international. She 
also understood that a wide range of actors, or stakeholders, functioned within 
these frameworks, sometimes also across the geographic scales. Examining 
ocean sectors through these governance components provided insight into the 
structure and functioning of the system, and she firmly believed that this could 
also yield significant information regarding human and institutional capacity 
requirements for ocean governance.
 Capacity as the Centerpiece
This last point, human and institutional capacity, was already identified by 
Mann Borgese in the 1970s as a fundamental component of our ability to put 
in place effective ocean governance frameworks. This requirement has not 
changed to this day. In fact, many note that it has continuously increased in im-
portance over time as states have continued to develop legal and institutional 
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arrangements at all geographical scales to manage human interaction with the 
ocean. However, the expansion of arrangements has not been accompanied 
by the necessary development and strengthening of capacity-development 
structures. And when this has been considered, it has often been relegated to 
general objectives and rarely to obligations. This is also the case with the larger 
envelope of financing mechanisms for the implementation of agreements and 
institutional arrangements, at all levels.
Thus, if there is progress to be made in the sustainable management of oce-
anic spaces, resources, and activities, there is an immediate need to establish 
and sustain strategic capacity development structures. Additionally, priorities 
must be identified within the ocean governance system, at all scales and across 
the frameworks described above, to ensure that necessary capacity is built to 
address the most pressing ocean issues.
Furthermore, while the multidisciplinary nature of ocean issues was fa-
mously recognized in the Preamble of unclos, which codified the notion that 
all problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and must be considered as 
a whole, this imperative has not been widely or consistently treated in  capacity 
development initiatives. This condition is largely a symptom of the ongoing 
management of ocean affairs along independent legal and institutional ar-
rangements. A persistent use of a land-based approach, which Mann Borgese 
cautioned against, may be limiting in the context of ocean affairs.
Until fairly recently in history, this compartmentalization has also been a 
structural characteristic of education systems across the globe. While some 
academic programs are starting to address ocean affairs, including in a holistic 
manner, the number of programs are very few and certainly not enough to 
build the new generation of ocean professionals that is required. There is also 
much progress to be made in developing curricula that respond to the actual 
needs of ocean affairs, including the reinforcing of the science–policy inter-
face. Many gains could also be achieved through the establishment of a stan-
dardized academic accreditation in ocean affairs, which would be recognized 
globally as a pathway to a defined profession. In many academic disciplines, 
universities have worked very closely with industry to ensure relevance of their 
programs to the workplace. But this is a difficult undertaking within ocean af-
fairs, as the ‘industry’ is disparate and continues to be largely sectoral in its 
organization.
Elisabeth had also understood these challenges and the importance of over-
coming them. Through consultations with the stakeholders of the ocean  affairs 
frameworks, as well as with a myriad of relevant experts in academic disci-
plines, she proposed a comprehensive and relevant academic curriculum to 
be delivered through a virtual learning platform, leading to an  internationally 
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recognized degree. While this vision was too early for its time, it is now be-
ing successfully implemented by at least one university at the graduate level. 
Given the ocean issues humanity faces, it would seem that there is still much 
to be accomplished in academic education for ocean affairs.
The importance of resolving the academic bottleneck to sustainability can-
not be overstated, particularly with respect to the creation of a new generation 
of ocean professionals which is needed to understand and start implementing 
solutions. But Mann Borgese had also understood the importance of devel-
oping capacity within the existing field of practitioners. She initially focused 
her efforts within the framework of the unclos negotiations. She would often 
express the importance in ensuring that all those involved in this multilateral 
process seeking to develop a constitution for the ocean clearly understood the 
issues at hand as well as the process itself. She truly believed that the stakes 
could not be higher for humanity; active and meaningful participation by all 
was an imperative.
Once unclos took shape, and eventually entered into force, Mann Borgese 
also saw the importance of providing support for developing states in the im-
plementation of the new constitution. This vision was particularly important 
to her in respect to developing states, and it led her to establish training pro-
grams in ocean affairs. To this day, these training programs continue to assist in 
building human and institutional capacity in developing states.
Still today, almost four decades later, the importance of providing ocean- 
related professionals with opportunities to develop their capacities in a  holistic 
and relevant manner is critical to the achievement of a sustainable relation 
with the ocean. As with academic degrees, training programs are  growing, but 
collectively they are not sufficient. This, not only because their numbers re-
main small compared to the needs, but also because their curricula are often 
designed to only meet necessary sectoral technical needs. Also, and on the 
 opposite end of the spectrum, curricula can be based on sound academic and 
holistic principles, but these may not be grounded well enough in the immedi-
ate needs of the stakeholders. Few capacity development programs work in 
tandem with ocean affairs stakeholders to overcome these limitations and to 
ensure that they remain relevant with the evolving needs. Again, in the face of 
the severity and diversity of ocean issues, much work remains to be done to 
develop the capacity that is so immediately required.
Elisabeth’s vision recognized the importance of understanding the system 
being developed for the implementation of the new ocean order, including 
the need for a comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach firmly rooted 
in principles of sustainable development. She also recognized the imperative 
of ensuring that the necessary capacity was being built to accompany these 
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developments. She worked tirelessly throughout the negotiation of unclos 
and subsequently for some four decades in pursuit of this vision. Today, her vi-
sion still holds true, and perhaps it is worth recalling. This, as the international 
community has embarked on two major processes which speak directly to the 
vision: the development and implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustain-
able Development, and the elaboration of a new legal framework filling a lacu-
nae of unclos, namely, the development of an international legally binding 
instrument under unclos on the conservation and sustainable use of marine 
biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.
The importance of the success of both of these processes in relation to 
ocean sustainability, humanity’s well-being, is clear. There is also no doubt 
that both processes will require enormous human and institutional capacity 
to progress meaningfully. The question is: Will the capacity imperative remain 
unaddressed as these processes move forward? As we continue to develop the 
framework for the law of the sea for sustainability, will we take advantage of 
the laboratory to develop new approaches to our relationship with nature, and 
with ourselves?
<UN>
IOI-Canada’s Ocean Governance Training Program
Michael J.A. Butler
International Ocean Institute-Canada, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
 Genesis of the ioi Training Programs
To understand the rationale for the establishment of the IOI-Canada Training 
Program, one must consider and appreciate the early life of Elisabeth Mann 
Borgese (1918–2002), the founder of the International Ocean Institute (ioi). 
Her 1999 Nexus Institute lecture, “The Years of My Life,”1 provides an autobio-
graphical insight into her privileged upbringing among globally acknowledged 
intellectuals and the Mann family’s escape from Nazi Germany, prior to the 
Second World War, first to Switzerland and eventually to the United States. 
Her interests were eclectic, and even at a young age she could be passionately 
single-minded, for example, her life-long love of the ocean. She met Professor 
G.A. Borgese in Princeton, New Jersey in 1938 and married him in 1939.
In 1946 Chancellor Robert Hutchins of the University of Chicago launched a 
Committee to Frame a World Constitution as a response to the debacle of the 
Second World War. Elisabeth Mann Borgese became an active participant in 
the work of the Committee. In 1948 the Chicago Preliminary Draft of a World 
Constitution was published, and one of its provisions declared that earth, wa-
ter, air and energy were “the common property of the human race,”2 a foretaste 
of things to come! Later that decade, the Korean War and McCarthyism con-
tributed to the demise of world federalism and the ideals developed, perhaps 
naively, by the Chicago team. Consequently the Borgeses moved to Italy where 
Professor Borgese died in 1952 at age 70.
In 1964, Dr. Hutchins established the Center for the Study of Democratic 
Institutions (csdi), an antidote to McCarthyism, in Santa Barbara, California. 
In 1967, he invited Elisabeth Mann Borgese to become a Fellow of the Center 
and offered her a three-year project to draft a constitution for the oceans. Co-
incidently that same year, Arvid Pardo, Ambassador of Malta to the United 
Nations (UN), presented his seminal address to the UN entitled ‘The Common 
1 E. Mann Borgese, “The Years of My Life, The Nexus Lecture,” Ocean Yearbook 18 (2004): 1–21; 
see also H. Pils and K. Kühn, Elisabeth Mann und das Drama der Meere (Hamburg: marever-
lag, 2012).
2 See J.W. Boyer, “Drafting Salvation,” The University of Chicago Magazine 88, no. 2 (December 
1995), http://magazine.uchicago.edu/9512/9512Salvation.html.
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Heritage of Mankind’. The subsequent symbiosis of Arvid Pardo and Elisa-
beth Mann Borgese would have far-reaching effects. Her project at the csdi 
resulted in “The Ocean Regime,”3 a proposal that applied the basic  principles 
of the  Chicago Constitution to the oceans. The posited regime was the basis 
for the first of many conferences entitled Pacem in Maribus (Peace in the Sea). 
The first conference (pim i), in 1970, was appropriately held in Malta, the home 
of Arvid Pardo who became a friend and collaborator with Elisabeth Mann 
Borgese. The conference led to the establishment of the International Ocean 
Institute and ioi’s active involvement in the Third United Nations  Conference 
on the Law of the Sea (unclos iii). The ioi initially served as the  Secretariat 
and think tank for the pim conferences that were held annually and brought 
together representatives from all sectors of the marine  community. ioi later 
grew to a network of centers worldwide. To fully appreciate Elisabeth Mann 
Borgese’s prescient perspectives on ocean governance, involving environmen-
tal and cultural analyses, the reader is encouraged to read The Oceanic Circle: 
Governing the Seas as a Global Resource.4
 ioi Training Programs: Their Debut
The concept of the ioi training programs arose in the context of the law of the 
sea negotiations.5 Early drafts of the negotiation text indicated a high demand 
for qualified ocean experts. It was difficult for developing countries to meet 
this requirement, hence the loss of influence and opportunities. Accordingly, 
ioi introduced a 12-week Ocean Mining Course in Malta in 1980 with 19 partici-
pants from 11 developing countries. Scholarships were provided by the govern-
ments of Germany, the Netherlands, and Mexico and the European Economic 
Community (eec). The Canadian International Development Agency (cida) 
subsequently became a contributor for many years thereafter, facilitated by 
a review from the then International Centre for Ocean Development (icod) 
in Halifax. Three training programs were developed: Ocean Mining (Class A); 
3 E. Mann Borgese, “The Ocean Regime: A suggested statute for the peaceful uses of the high 
seas and the sea-bed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,” A Center Occasional Paper 
Vol. 1, No. 5 (Santa Barbara, CA: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1968).
4 E. Mann Borgese, The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource (Tokyo: United 
Nations University Press, 1998).
5 E. Mann Borgese, “Training Programme for the Management and Conservation of Marine 
Resources,” in Six International Development Projects, ed., Ian McAllister (Halifax: Dalhousie 
University, Centre for Development Projects, 1982), 85–91; see also E. Mann Borgese, “The 
Training Programme of the International Ocean Institute,” Ocean & Coastal Management 40, 
no. 1 (1998): 93–97.
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Economic Zone Management (Class B); and Regional Courses (Class C, which 
included elements of A and B).
According to Professor Mann Borgese, the first two years of the ioi train-
ing programs were considered to be ‘experimental’ and the next three years 
‘consolidation’.6 During this period two seminal events would profoundly 
 impact the evolution of ioi’s training initiatives. The United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea was adopted in 1982 and in 1994 entered into force; 
an event of profound importance, as cogently expressed by Professor Mann 
Borgese in her Nexus Lecture:
The emerging system of ocean governance, both structure and process, 
reaching from the local to the national to the regional subsystem, to 
the global system, comprehensive, consistent, participatory and non- 
hierarchical, in what Gandhi called “the majesty of the Oceanic Circle” 
will, I believe, respond to the requirements of the new Law of the Sea in 
conjunction with the new environmental international law as developed 
by [the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development].7
In 1986, the prestigious Club of Rome published an influential report, “The 
Future of the Oceans,” the first publication of its kind on the ocean by the 
Club, and prepared by Professor Mann Borgese, a Club member. The plethora 
of uses and complexity of the oceans were succinctly described by the Club’s 
co-founder, Aurelio Peccei, by the word ‘problématique’, i.e. “the tangle of prob-
lems and issues that are interconnected and interacting by obvious and ob-
scurely sensed mechanisms.”8
In the experimental and subsequent consolidation period of the ioi train-
ing programs, i.e., the early 1980s referred to by Professor Mann Borgese,9 a 
number of inevitable challenges were experienced and important criteria were 
established. They included the following: course location (economic zone 
management, to be delivered in Canada); process for selection of candidates 
(flexible); cultural differences (sensitivity required); length of course (psy-
chological considerations in favor of 10–12 weeks, needing real commitment); 
number of course participants (20–25); ideal age (25–35 years);  ideology of 
lecturers (progressive); character of program (interdisciplinary, foundation 
course); number of lecturers (6 for the duration of course and another 12–20 
6 Mann Borgese (1982), id.
7 Mann Borgese, supra note 1, 20.
8 E. Mann Borgese, The Future of the Oceans. A Report to the Club of Rome (Montreal: Harvest 
House, 1986), xi.
9 Mann Borgese (1982), supra note 5.
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for a day or two); follow-up options (alumni, newsletters, and regional refresh-
er courses). These criteria continue to be evaluated each year as the current 
IOI-Canada Training Program goes through its planning cycle.
 The ioi Training Program in Canada
Shortly before the first training program in Malta in 1980, Elisabeth Mann 
Borgese was appointed as a Senior Killam Fellow at Dalhousie University in 
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. This one-year appointment was followed by a 
position in the Department of Political Science as a full professor. To quote 
Professor Mann Borgese, she was “the guest who stayed forever.”
In 1981, the first ioi Training Program on Economic Zone Management, 
hosted by Dalhousie University, was sponsored by the then Centre for Foreign 
Policy Studies (now the Centre for the Study of Security and Development). 
Internationally recruited lecturers were joined by those from the former Dal-
housie Ocean Studies Program (dosp), the Bedford Institute of Oceanography, 
and local government and private sector organizations to deliver the Training 
Program. From the first training program in Halifax in 1981 to her death in 2002, 
Professor Mann Borgese chaired the Planning Council and retained a domi-
nant oversight of the planning and delivery of the ioi courses.
The organization of ioi training programs at Dalhousie University was for 
many years a collaborative process involving the Centre for Foreign Policy Stud-
ies and the ioi Headquarters in Malta. In 1985 the Lester Pearson Institute for 
International Development joined the collaborators, followed intermittently 
by the Marine Affairs Program (Dalhousie University), the Oceans Institute of 
Canada (the successor of dosp), and others. From 1993 onward, the organiza-
tion and delivery of the Training Program became the sole responsibility of 
IOI-Canada, as it is now known.
The rationale for the Training Program and its curriculum have been consis-
tent over the years: it remains intensive and interdisciplinary, while keeping a 
global perspective on ocean governance, and viewing the ocean as a complex 
system with varied users and multiple, often conflicting, uses (Figure 1). The 
course is primarily (but not exclusively) designed for mid-career professionals 
from developing countries who are prepared to step outside their area of spe-
cialization. Among other goals, the course challenges participants to deepen 
their understanding of complex ocean issues in sustainable development, to 
update their academic knowledge, and to assist countries to maximize benefits 
from the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. In recent years, IOI-Canada 
has been unable to accept the optimum number of course applicants due to 
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the challenge of securing sufficient scholarship funds. The actual number of 
participants accepted is determined by the balance of funds received from the 
ioi Headquarters in Malta and funds secured from numerous other sources 
through ongoing IOI-Canada efforts.
The title of the IOI-Canada Training Program was changed between 1981 
and 2002 to reflect evolving priorities. Initially it was entitled ‘Marine Resource 
Management: the Exclusive Economic Zone’. It then morphed into ‘The Entry 
Figure 1 A graphical representation of ocean governance.
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into Force of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, its Implementation 
and Agenda 21’. In 1996 it became ‘The unclos, Its Implementation and Agen-
da 21’, a title it retained until 2001. The following year the course title became 
the familiar one of ‘Ocean Governance: Policy, Law and Management’ that has 
been retained to this day.
The IOI-Canada Training Program is organized as a series of thematic mod-
ules that have varied over the years in number and content to reflect current 
 research and ocean priorities. Numerous resources, including issues of the 
Ocean Yearbook10 and World Ocean Review,11 both published in partnership 
with ioi, assist this process. The modules of the 2017 Training Program, for 
example, included the following: Orientation and Introduction to the Training 
Program; Ocean Sciences; Law of the Sea and Principled Ocean Governance; 
Maritime Security; Communication and Negotiation; Fisheries and Aquacul-
ture; Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management; Marine Transportation; and 
Energy.12 Examples of content update include the introduction of ethics and 
communication skills as subjects of increasing importance. Climate change 
and adaptation, sustainable development, the Blue Economy,13 and areas be-
yond national jurisdiction are other examples of issues given increasing expo-
sure. Material from a Massive Open Online Course (One Planet–One Ocean: 
From Science to Solutions), with which ioi is involved, will also be introduced 
in 2018. In addition to more than 240 classroom hours, a variety of field trips 
complement the Training Program. Halifax and the province of Nova Scotia, 
with its 13,300 kilometers of coastline, offer ideal venues for such experiential 
trips.
The importance of hands-on activities as an important pedagogical tool 
was clearly appreciated when a practical negotiation exercise was introduced 
in 1983. This activity was complemented by the introduction of a course-long 
simulation exercise in 2006. The simulation exercise has been significantly en-
hanced since that time. Its primary purpose is to facilitate the integration of 
the extensive information delivered to, and provided for, the course partici-
pants. A basic introduction to geographic information system (gis)  technology 
 allows participants to fully benefit from, and contribute to, this simulation. 
10 See the Ocean Yearbook (Brill Nijhoff) website, https://brill.com/view/serial/OCYB.
11 See the World Ocean Review website, http://worldoceanreview.com/en/.
12 See the IOI-Canada website, http://internationaloceaninstitute.dal.ca.
13 World Bank and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The Poten-
tial of the Blue Economy: Increasing Long-term Benefits of the Sustainable Use of  Marine 
Resources for Small Island Developing States and Coastal Least Developed Countries 
( Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017).
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 Additional benefits of the simulation exercise include the experience of work-
ing within multidisciplinary and multicultural teams, negotiation skills, lead-
ership development, and the enhancement of communication skills.14
The planning, preparation and management of the IOI-Canada Training 
Program is the collaborative effort and responsibility of the IOI-Canada staff. 
A course director is responsible for the day-to-day delivery of the Program, 
with the assistance of a course co-ordinator. The foundation of the Training 
Program continues to be a diverse and experienced team of lecturers who now 
number between 100 and 120 per course. The lecturers are subject specialists 
from academia, government, non-governmental organizations, First Nations, 
and the private sector. Module leaders, also subject specialists, have been ap-
pointed since 2007, and in most cases are IOI-Canada senior research fellows 
or alumni. The module leaders provide guidance when required and help to 
highlight the relationship between the topics presented in their respective 
module. The lecturers and the module leaders generously contribute their 
time and expertise on a pro bono basis.
Detailed evaluations are regularly prepared by the participants, in addition 
to an intensive half-day of course review on the final day with the participants 
and module leaders. The evaluations provide the IOI-Canada staff with valu-
able insights and guidance for the preparation of the following year’s Training 
Program. The compendium of current and anticipated ocean issues, docu-
mented in this publication, will also provide guidance. An external review is 
planned for 2018 to evaluate the structure, delivery, and validity of the Training 
Program.
In conclusion, the IOI-Canada alumni, now numbering 701 from 104 coun-
tries, represent a potentially dynamic and influential ‘resource’. Course partici-
pants are obligated to pass on their newly acquired knowledge, the multiplier 
effect, on return to their home country. The relationships, both professional 
and personal, developed over the two months of the Training Program, may 
continue for years, facilitated by ubiquitous social media, the IOI-Canada 
website,15 and the annual Alumni News. The future well-being of the ocean and 
its governance will surely benefit from this committed cadre of ocean practi-
tioners. As Professor Mann Borgese would have wished, they constitute a veri-
table ‘army’ of ‘ocean ambassadors’ (the ‘ocean mafia’, as she referred to them), 
a fitting legacy for her devotion to the ocean and its governance.
14 For details of the simulation exercise see the essay by Fournier and Griffiths in this 
volume.
15 Supra note 12.
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Alumni Reflections on the ioi Training Program
Igor Vio
Faculty of Maritime Studies, University of Rijeka, Croatia
During the mid-1990s, I had the opportunity to attend the training program of 
the International Ocean Institute (ioi) in Halifax as a young university lecturer 
from Croatia, along with 23 participants from Canada and every corner of the 
world from 19 countries. Looking back more than two decades later brings fond 
memories of a very interesting group of people and a genuine multinational 
and multicultural setting that provided a unique experience for all of us. Un-
like other students at Dalhousie University, ours was not a group of individuals 
in their twenties who had just emancipated themselves from their families and 
would have had no problem finding their way in their new campus environ-
ment. We were a very different selection of individuals, mostly in our thirties 
and forties, with well-established personalities, and a well-developed profes-
sional and family life in our distant home countries. It was amazing how those 
individuals, after some initial adaptation difficulties, forged an incredibly ho-
mogenous group of colleagues and friends. In retrospect, the ioi program gave 
us a possibility to develop a network of friendships, individuals with whom we 
would remain in contact, exchange ideas and expertise at conferences, and 
even meet again in person during our travels, because some of us participated 
in Pacem in Maribus conferences. As the Class of 1996, we had become part of 
a much wider global network of ioi alumni.
The main advantage of ioi’s ocean governance training program was its in-
terdisciplinary approach. It enabled all of us to gain a broader knowledge base 
that one needs when engaging in issues of the marine management and ocean 
governance. So, those of us who were experts in oceanography, marine biology 
or geology, had to focus on and learn about the background and procedure of 
codification of the international law of the sea; those of us who had completed 
their legal studies and had known in detail various provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) had the opportunity to 
become familiar with main developments in the natural sciences, which are 
indispensable for understanding various aspects of exploration and exploita-
tion of marine living and non-living resources. Hence, every participant of the 
ioi training program gained broad interdisciplinary knowledge and impor-
tant skills that remain important tools in our professional activities as scien-
tific researchers or as civil servants in government agencies or international 
organizations.
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During our time in Halifax, the participants were indeed immersed in an 
intensive academic program. We attended lectures of leading faculty members 
from Dalhousie and other Canadian and foreign universities, visiting lectur-
ers from various globally relevant research institutes, and experts from inter-
national organizations. Besides these academic pursuits, including research in 
the excellent university library, the most fantastic feature of the ioi program 
was a variety of field trips to various parts of Nova Scotia, including visits to 
the Bedford Institute of Oceanography where we met with marine scientists, 
to small coastal communities where we met with local fishermen, or to Cape 
Breton where we explored cultural and natural landscapes of the island. Ever 
since, it has always been a privilege to pass on details of those experiences in 
lectures to my own students. Our group really felt that Halifax had become our 
second home because of the friends we gained among Canadian participants 
and among the staff of the ioi and at Dalhousie. It was a great personal plea-
sure to return to the International Ocean Institute a decade later to meet some 
old friends and to speak about straits and international navigation as a visiting 
lecturer to participants of the 2004 Training Program.
It is impossible to think back at the time in Halifax and not remember the 
fascination shared unanimously among all the ioi training program partici-
pants with Professor Elisabeth Mann Borgese. She was continuously captur-
ing our imagination and interest during her inspiring lectures, challenging 
discussions in the short breaks, and visit to her fabulous home. She had a 
unique capability to establish a warm human interaction with every person 
she talked to, and to explain complex subjects in a very simple way. Her deep 
knowledge of the law of the sea was even more impressive. Her studies in 
music and political science probably gave her a broader perspective than legal 
studies alone. We came to appreciate that Professor Mann Borgese’s persona 
had many facets: being born into a famous family and growing up with her 
siblings as children of a father, one of the most well-known writers of the 
twentieth century, living in Germany at first, then in exile in Switzerland and 
the United States, then finally making her home in Canada. To us, she was a 
scholar with almost renaissance-like intellectual diversity and a cosmopolitan 
personality who had a clear grasp of global socio-economic and political de-
velopments. She often referred to the causes of the gap between developed 
and developing countries and was able to outline the problems and find solu-
tions. Her most impressive talent was to find ways to make her vision of ocean 
governance come closer to reality because she knew how to communicate 
her ideas, how to gain support and how to gently persuade politicians and 
diplomats to make just the right decisions that would enable her projects to 
become functional.
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Moving forward twenty years after I attended the ioi training program in 
Halifax, I contemplate what might be done to improve ocean governance in 
the twenty-first century. In 2018, we commemorate the centenary of the end 
of World War i; we ponder inevitably the efforts of the League of Nations as 
the first global organization with the goal of preserving world peace, a task 
that had not been accomplished. Twice in a lifetime of our grandparents “the 
scourge of war has brought untold sorrow to mankind,” as the Charter of the 
United Nations reminds us. After World War ii it was firmly decided that ev-
erything should be done to save succeeding generations from another global 
armed conflict. This mission, at least, has been so far successfully fulfilled by 
the United Nations. Other solemn goals written in the UN Charter still remain 
unfulfilled: to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and in na-
tions large and small; to establish conditions under which justice and respect 
for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law 
can be maintained; and to promote social progress and better standards of life 
in larger freedom.
In her bold and comprehensive revision of the Charter, entitled “The Unit-
ed Nations 2020” Elisabeth Mann Borgese proposed the introduction of the 
most important global concepts that emerged during the second half of the 
twentieth century: protection of the environment and sustainable develop-
ment, including them in all the relevant provisions.1 For years we have wit-
nessed discussions to reform the United Nations, one of the key demands 
 being the  redefinition of the Security Council. Professor Mann Borgese sug-
gested it should be renamed the Commission for Comprehensive Security and 
Sustainable Development, and this name itself provides the functions of this 
new ‘heart’ of the international organization, abandoning the obsolete notion 
of its permanent members with their veto powers to be replaced with the third 
millennium concepts of regional representation, sustainable development, 
and comprehensive security based on decisions adopted by consensus when-
ever possible or by qualified majority if necessary, as “the logical formula for a 
body that serves as the executive organ of the General Assembly.”2 Further, she 
proposed changes in the functioning of the General Assembly and proposed 
ground-breaking concepts with regard to regular “Ocean Assembly” sessions 
devoted to the seas and oceans. These sessions were to be attended by member 
1 E. Mann Borgese, Ocean Governance and the United Nations (Halifax: Centre for Foreign 
 Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Revised Edition, August 1995), 229–241.
2 Id., 239.
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states and heads of their ocean governance structures, as well as representa-
tives of specialized agencies and programs involved in maritime affairs, execu-
tives of the Regional Seas Programmes and non-governmental organizations. 
She also contributed significantly to the revision of regional maritime gover-
nance instruments like the Barcelona Convention and its related Protocols. 
These mechanisms should result in bringing more dialogue and mutual un-
derstanding to the shores of the three continents that surround the Mediter-
ranean Sea.
Back in 1993, I had an opportunity to be included in the work of the  Division 
for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, which is part of the United Nations 
Office of Legal Affairs. As a recipient of the Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe 
Fellowship on the Law of the Sea, I witnessed the efforts and energy of the 
international civil servants highly specialized in the law of the sea. It was 
the time of the UN Highly Migratory Species and Straddling Stocks Confer-
ence and  informal consultations organized by the Secretary-General to pro-
mote additional ratifications necessary for entry into force of unclos. When 
contemplating changes to global ocean governance, one might conceive of a 
permanent structure within the United Nations that would replace informal 
consultative processes regarding oceans and the law of the sea. In my thinking, 
we should support the idea of Elisabeth Mann Borgese that the Trusteeship 
Council, as a UN body that had completed its mission during the period of 
decolonization and emergence of a multitude of independent states, could be 
transformed into a Council with a mandate to “hold in sacred trust the prin-
ciple of common heritage of mankind,” not only with regard to the seabed area 
but encompassing the entire ocean space, outer space, the atmosphere and the 
Antarctica, acting as “the conscience of the United Nations and the guardian 
of future generations.”3
The charismatic personality of Elisabeth Mann Borgese has left a lasting im-
pact on many of us ioi alumni. It has been fifteen years since she left us, and 
we miss her tremendously today. We are facing global challenges involving the 
ocean in various ways, witness the tragedy of migrants at sea, threats of piracy, 
and growing risks of pollution of the marine environment not only from land-
based sources and shipping, but also from seabed activities. Furthermore, we 
are also experiencing political, economic, and social crises with ever-growing 
security dangers and military threats. In these times, I, and probably many of 
my ioi alumni, become aware of how much we lack people of wisdom, calm 
3 Id., 236–237.
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strength, knowledge and vision—people like Elisabeth Mann Borgese. In the 
year when we mark the centennial of her birth, our collective task is to take 
her ideas and develop practical methods to achieve the full potential of global 
and regional ocean governance, and to make it operational. This could be our 
contribution to the legacy of Elisabeth Mann Borgese.
<UN>
Alumni Reflections on the ioi Training Program
Amy Aai Sheau Ye
Centre for Ocean Law and Policy, Maritime Institute of Malaysia,  
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
 Introduction
I had the privilege to participate in the 2016 International Ocean Institute 
(ioi) Training Program for Ocean Governance: Policy, Law and Management 
in  Halifax, Canada. I am pleased to take this opportunity to reflect on the 
program and share some thoughts on the future of ocean governance in the 
 Malaysian context and the role of training for responsible ocean governance.
 Ocean Governance in Malaysia
Malaysia’s institutional and legal framework for ocean governance is sectoral. 
There are as many policies as there are agencies involved in various aspects of 
ocean governance, with each agency often working in isolation in decision-
making as well as in competing for federal funding and resources. As the 
 Malaysian constitution does not explicitly provide guarantees for a healthy and 
clean environment, the courts are hesitant to adopt a more robust approach 
in upholding environmental laws, facilitating public interest litigation, and 
clarifying the division of responsibility for environmental governance. Having 
environmental provisions in the constitution would lay the foundation for the 
development of environmental ethics in decision-making; however, there is 
insufficient push towards that direction from the people and the government, 
as in the case with many other countries, although some have begun to address 
the issue. This is where education comes into play in creating a deeper aware-
ness of and the need for ocean leadership and governance, and to initiate this 
important and necessary discourse.
 Training for Responsible Ocean Governance
The ioi Training Program offers more than just knowledge acquisition. Given 
its eight-week duration and the broad scope of coverage, much of what is taught 
understandably touches only the surface of ocean sciences and  environment, 
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legitimate uses of the sea, and the consequences of human–ocean interac-
tions. Nevertheless, most contemporary issues were discussed, thus providing 
material for important conversations pertaining to responsible ocean govern-
ance. It is the opportunity for and emphasis on such conversations among 
peers from different disciplines, cultural backgrounds, and motivations that 
make for a uniquely personalized learning experience.
From the ioi training program experience, it struck me that the key to re-
sponsible ocean governance lies with having frequent and continuous mean-
ingful conversations about our relationship with the ocean. Certainly, talking 
alone will not do, and must be followed through with actions and leadership 
that stresses having an ‘ocean mindset’. Those with the ocean mindset ask the 
right questions, are open to engaging in difficult conversations, and are guided 
by a strong moral responsibility towards the ocean in decision-making. The 
attributes of such a mindset are best exemplified by the acronym ocean: Op-
timistic, Collaborative, Encouraging, Audacious, and Noble. A champion of the 
oceans is optimistic that our ocean planet can and will be saved, understands 
that success is achieved through collaboration, encourages and inspires others 
to do the same, has the audacity to promote big ideas and engage in difficult 
conversations, and is steadfastly principled in a moral responsibility towards 
the ocean and environment in the choices and decisions made.
 Reimagining Training for Ocean Governance
Capacity development in relation to ocean governance in Malaysia has fo-
cused almost exclusively on knowledge acquisition and neglected the moral 
and ethical aspects in ocean leadership. As the ocean environment and its re-
sources continue to degrade one cannot help but conclude that there are still 
too few champions of the ocean, doing too little too late. Training for respon-
sible ocean governance needs to address the means to instill an ocean mindset 
and to sustain the momentum post-training, and how to train as many influ-
encers as quickly as possible, in the most cost-effective way.
How to organize people, content, and delivery to inculcate the ocean mind-
set and impact behaviors is a major challenge for any ocean governance train-
ing program. This is even more so the case for a developing nation such as 
 Malaysia where the environment agenda does not feature very highly on the 
list of priorities. This can be addressed through a different approach to ocean 
governance training and strong alumni networks.
Training for responsible ocean governance in Malaysia will need to 
evolve and go mainstream. Parallel to the ioi Training Program for mid-level 
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 professionals working in ocean-related fields, Malaysia will need a medium- to 
long-term ocean governance training agenda that will cast the net wider to 
include influencers from all levels and instill a deeper awareness of the impor-
tance of the ocean. This will allow Malaysia’s vision for “a healthy and produc-
tive ocean, rich in biodiversity and heritage, wisely managed, safe and secure, 
and economically developed for the equitable benefit of all, now and in the 
future” to become the guiding principle towards which the myriad agendas are 
aligned.1
Gamification is emerging as an effective tool for engaging learners and in-
fluencing behaviors. It uses game design elements to inform, create awareness, 
and change behaviors through story, feedback, and reward mechanisms and 
can be applied to the wide spectrum of ocean governance. The ioi Training 
Program already applies gamification by using simulation exercises to facilitate 
collaboration for ocean governance. To some extent, gamification is  applied in 
oil spill preparedness and response training in Malaysia. These exercises fo-
cus on familiarity with lines of communication and standard operating pro-
cedures. Whilst gamification has been applied in various contexts it has been 
limited to training for the job. It is suggested that ocean governance aware-
ness and training need to go mainstream to reach the younger generation, and 
gamification is the way to do it.
Mainstreaming of training for ocean leadership should target the younger 
generation of Malaysians and make use of the Internet and e-learning to en-
gage with them. This can be feasible for Malaysia considering its Internet pen-
etration rate is almost two-thirds of the population. A combination of serious 
and alternate reality games, such as ‘World Without Oil’, for the ocean could 
go a long way toward initiating conversations about future planning for and 
soliciting design solutions for a possible breakdown of the ocean ecosystem. 
This could be a worthwhile investment with numerous possible narratives and 
derivatives in the context of ocean governance.
 Alumni Networks in Promoting Ocean Leadership
A positive consequence of mainstreaming ocean leadership training through 
gamification is the creation of a community of ocean leader-gamers. In The 
Element: How Finding Your Passion Changes Everything, Sir Ken Robinson looks 
at the conditions that enable us to achieve our greatest potential. Among them 
1 National Oceanographic Directorate, Malaysia Ocean Policy 2011–2020 (Malaysia: Ministry of 
Science, Technology and Innovation, 2010).
Capacity Development for Responsible Ocean Governance92
<UN>
is ‘finding your tribe’ whereby a group of people is connected through a com-
mon commitment to the things they feel born to do.2
In many ways, the ioi alumni network reflects a tribe, playing a significant 
role in the development of the Institute through the provision of support in 
bringing together participants, past and present, and in embodying the ocean 
mindset to sustain the momentum after the training is over. The ioi has done 
much to engage with and encourage its alumni to reach out and connect with 
each other. The alumni have volunteered as ioi Training Program facilitators 
and subject matter experts and have contributed to numerous publications on 
the subject. Perhaps, soon, the alumni could find new ways to contribute, such 
as launching a crowd-funding platform to back the development of gamified 
learning for ocean governance or contributing their expertise towards creating 
realistic content for an ocean governance game.
Embracing digital technology to elevate ocean governance training could 
be a game changer in facilitating information flow, encouraging innovation, 
and promoting further ocean leadership through the inculcation of the ocean 
mindset. In the words of Dave Logan in Tribal Leadership: Leveraging Natural 
Groups to Build a Thriving Organization, the alumni could build ‘tribes that end 
up changing the world’.3
 Conclusion
Capacity building for ocean governance needs to go beyond enhancing knowl-
edge. It requires instilling a mindset and ethics necessary for effective ocean 
governance. Well-intentioned and well-designed policies will remain ineffec-
tive if decision-makers lack the ethics to do what is right for the environment. 
There is a need to rethink how digital technology can be harnessed in training 
for ocean leadership and ocean governance. Now, more than ever, there is an 
urgent need for ocean leadership, and for that we should leverage on the in-
fluence of strong alumni networks. The call to mobilize digital technology to 
elevate ocean governance training should complement conventional training 
programs.
The ioi Training Program has created a platform for like-minded persons 
to meet and exchange experiences. It has had a transformational effect on my 
2 K. Robinson, The Element: How Finding Your Passion Changes Everything (Penguin Books, 
2009), c. 5.
3 D. Logan, Tribal Leadership: Leveraging Natural Groups to Build a Thriving Organization 
(Harper Business, 2008).
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sense of identity and purpose because the meaningful conversations through-
out the program provided the opportunity for testing and validating ideas, 
inspired action, and demonstrated the power of synergy when people work 
together. In this tribute essay to Professor Elisabeth Mann Borgese, I would 
like to register my admiration and appreciation for her foresight, initiative, and 
commitment to the ocean as a common heritage of mankind.
<UN>
Simulation and Scenario-Based Learning
Mélanie Fournier
IT IS gis, Geneva, Switzerland
David Griffiths
International Ocean Institute-Canada, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
 Introduction
Every summer, during the first week of the International Ocean Institute- 
Canada’s (IOI-Canada) Ocean Governance Training Program, each participant 
is asked to select an unmarked envelope. Opening it introduces them to an 
imaginary world in which they become members of diverse organizations 
 creating an ocean and coastal policy for an imaginary country. For the next 
two months these mid-career professionals from a wide range of nations, cul-
tures, and languages will engage in an immersive experience that illustrates 
the benefits, challenges, and opportunities of simulation as a learning and 
skill- development tool.
 Origins
Techniques such as physical simulators, games, and practical learning exercis-
es are nothing new. When ancient Rome committed its army to challenging the 
maritime power of Carthage, it taught its soldiers basic rowing techniques on 
simulated ships ashore. That idea evolved through Second World War analog 
flight and aerial gunnery simulators to today’s digitally-powered, sophisticated 
mock-ups of ships’ bridges and engineering spaces. Even board games have 
had serious uses; chess being the best example. Evolving from a sixth century 
Indian game called chaturanga (Sanskrit for a particular battle formation), it 
became known in medieval Europe as the ‘royal game’ because it sharpened 
strategic thinking.
At a more complex level, ‘war games’ (Kriegsspiel in German) began in 1812 
with an ingenious tabletop game to train Prussian army officers. Navies soon 
adopted the idea, beginning with the United States in 1887. Today, 130 years 
later, its Naval War College employs approximately 40 full-time civilian and 
military professionals in its War Gaming Department, conducting an average 
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of 50 national and international games per year.1 The technique is useful not 
only for learning, but also for problem solving. Several navies incorporated 
gaming into campaign planning in the Second World War. In the United States,
the war with Japan had been re-enacted in the game rooms [at the Col-
lege] by so many people and in so many different ways that nothing that 
happened during the war was a surprise—absolutely nothing except the 
kamikaze tactics…2
 Maritime Governance Applications
Each of these techniques has evolved into today’s wide range of powerful and 
diverse uses. The sophisticated physical simulators at the Canadian Coast 
Guard College include a Joint Rescue Coordination Centre that not only trains 
search and rescue personnel but also contributed to international confidence-
building when Arabs and Israelis conducted exercises together during the 
 Middle East Peace Process and the subsequent Canadian-led Maritime  Safety 
Colloquium for the Middle East and North Africa in the late 1990s. Board games 
are used to practice for complex and challenging real-world situations. One 
example, Aftershock: A Humanitarian Crisis Game, has been used in  Canadian 
and American universities, as well as by Canadian, Chilean, and US military 
and police preparing for peacekeeping and humanitarian and disaster re-
sponse (hadr) missions.3
Despite its bellicose name, ‘war gaming’ has been adopted and adapted by 
disciplines ranging from health care to education, ranging in complexity from 
‘tabletop’ discussions to immersive role-play. In higher education, ‘reacting to 
the past’ exercises, produced by a consortium of forty universities and colleg-
es, immerse students in historical events in a way that mere lectures or mov-
ies never could.4 IOI-Canada’s exercise is another example, but with broader 
 functions and different objectives.
1 Naval War College, War Gaming (Newport, RI: Naval War College, n.d.), https://www.usnwc 
.edu/getattachment/e32b4fba-9daf-4462-9d32-d8a7875f2abb/War-Gaming-Brochure.aspx.
2 Chester W. Nimitz, quoted in War Gaming, id, p. 3.
3 “Aftershock: A Humanitarian Crisis Game,” PAXsims, https://paxsims.wordpress.com/after 
shock/.
4 “Reacting to the Past,” Barnard College, https://reacting.barnard.edu/reacting-home.
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 A Curriculum Integration Exercise
For the past 37 years, IOI-Canada has been conducting a training  program, 
‘Ocean Governance: Policy, Law and Management’, for mid-career  professionals. 
During eight intensive weeks, participants are exposed to all the themes re-
flected in this book through exercises, field trips, and over 100 lectures.5 How, 
then, to help them absorb, integrate, and retain all that fact and theory, espe-
cially those working in a second or third language?
What began as a simple addition to the program some years ago has evolved 
into something quite different. Rather than a supplement to the curriculum, it 
has become an ‘integration exercise’, a framework for exploring all ideas gener-
ated by the program and incorporating them into a coherent whole. Partici-
pants become members of a simulated task force creating an integrated ocean 
and coastal policy for political approval, playing roles as senior officials from 
all levels of government, the private sector, advocacy groups, and Indigenous 
peoples. Roles incorporate both complementary and competing policy objec-
tives and are assigned randomly to challenge individuals beyond their familiar 
experience. This approach even engages lecturers, who are no longer simply 
speakers but also players in the game—‘advisors’ to the task force.
The geography is entirely fictional for several reasons; primarily to avoid 
prejudice or political debate over real situations, but also to create a world in 
which anything can happen if required to make a point. In an imaginary world, 
ice floes can appear at the same latitude as tropical mangroves if necessary. 
The fictional region includes three countries (four counting a failed state over 
the horizon), which allows the flexibility of varying the scenario each year, or 
taking a regional approach if the number of participants increases.
As the exercise has evolved, lecturers have gradually drawn upon it for their 
individual uses. Communication specialists who expose participants to a vid-
eotaped interview by a real journalist now pose challenging questions based 
on the participant’s role. Maritime security professionals who conduct an 
 exercise on developing integrated maritime security policy include that as an 
integral part of the task force’s work.6 Speakers on topics including science, 
law, aquaculture, energy, fisheries, and marine transport, can all draw on the 
scenario’s geography and socio-economics for hypothetical examples.
The methodology is different from most educational simulations. First and 
foremost, it is a self-directed learning tool, not a teaching device. Players  receive 
5 “Training at IOI-Canada,” International Ocean Institute-Canada, http://internationalocean 
institute.dal.ca/training.html.
6 Bob Edwards, “We Need a Navy, Right?” Canadian Naval Review 13, no. 1 (Spring 2017): 31–32, 
http://www.navalreview.ca/volume13-issue1/.
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geopolitical facts and details of their role, and are then free to advance the pro-
cess wherever their collective deliberations take them. There is no director or 
umpire; only an exercise coordinator playing the role of ‘Cabinet  Secretary’, the 
senior bureaucratic advisor to government who knows nothing of maritime 
matters. He or she provides guidance on process, but for purposes of the game 
reminds task force members that they are the knowledgeable authorities and 
must rely on whatever they have learned from the curriculum, their colleagues, 
and their own experience. As mature professionals, they are encouraged to 
work out how to function as a multinational team and do whatever they would 
do if they were placed in the real-world situation. The deliverable of the exer-
cise is not a graded policy; it is the process itself. Success equals a diverse group 
of professionals working as a multicultural team to increase their knowledge, 
develop their personal and interpersonal skills, and master the challenges.
But if the product is the process, how can success be measured? Tradition-
ally, the annual two-day finale of the program invited guest commentators to 
 assess the policy produced by participants, but as the ‘integration exercise’ con-
cept evolved, so has that format. The first day is now a simulated conference, 
with participants, in their roles, playing panelists addressing topics that high-
light some of the conflicting issues encountered. Not only does this add to the 
participant’s skill set by being a ‘conference speaker’ it also enables the com-
mentators to observe the knowledge, abilities, and confidence that they have 
developed over eight weeks. The final day is for open, unstructured discussion.
 Digital Dimensions
Complex, scenario-based interactive learning exercises require creating, man-
aging and displaying a lot of data and information. Consequently, traditional 
paper-based approaches can be enhanced by incorporating the best of digital 
technology. That does not necessarily make things easier—using digital tools 
well requires training and time—but certainly makes the process far more 
 efficient, comprehensive, and effective.
IOI-Canada’s first step was using a geographic information system (gis) to 
present the geography (Figure 1).7 This is not just a matter of making cred-
ible simulated maps (although that is certainly an asset). Spatial planning is a 
fundamental tool for ocean and coastal governance, so leaders and managers 
should at least be familiar with the capabilities and limitations of gis, as well 
as the time and effort required to fulfill requests for gis products. Using gis to 
7 The IOI-Canada Training Program uses ArcGIS (https://www.arcgis.com/) for which Dalhou-
sie University has a license, although participants are advised that there are other options.
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establish a readily accessed, maintained, and adaptable geographical database 
was a first step, but much more is possible.
Increasingly sophisticated digital tools, many freely available, offer signifi-
cant opportunities for enhancing realism, versatility, visualization and collab-
orative learning. Vivid digital visualization, for example, harnesses the power 
of visual perception for understanding and discovery.8 Collaborative software 
not only helps participants work together, but also helps them gain confidence 
in advanced computer skills.9 A collaborative platform is also an excellent tool 
in developing complex scenarios.
 Developing Integration Exercises
Prominent educators have long understood that techniques for educating 
adults are different from educating children (the technical term is andragogy 
versus pedagogy).10 Adults learn differently, being more self-directed, drawing 
8 “The Digital Humanities: Digital Visualization,” University of Southern California Librar-
ies, last updated 11 December 2015, http://libguides.usc.edu/c.php?g=235247&p=1560835.
9 A good French language example is Framapad (https://framapad.org/).
10 The term originated in Europe in the 1830s and was popularized in the United States by 
Malcolm S. Knowles in the 1960s.
Figure 1 IOI-Canada’s simulated geography.
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on life experience, and preferring active, application-focused practical work. 
That is why ‘serious games’ are so useful in educating professionals. Engaging 
adults in a realistic, dynamic, interactive, yet risk-free environment lets them 
think creatively about complex issues, experiment with new concepts, prac-
tice skills, and learn from mistakes without judgment—often the most effec-
tive way of reinforcing lessons. Consequently, participants come away with a 
good understanding of managing the complex challenges, risks and opportu-
nities of, in this case, ocean and coastal governance, as well as the confidence 
to apply those lessons.
A curriculum integration exercise differs from many teaching simulations in 
several ways. No advance preparation is required because its purpose is to build 
on curriculum material as it unfolds. There are no limiting rules, algorithms or 
outcome definitions: the product is the process, and where that goes after roles 
are assigned is wherever participants choose to take it. There is no moderator, 
umpire or referee; only an unobtrusive guide to process, encouraging players to 
think critically, to do their own research, and to play the role as if it were real. 
This makes particular demands on the facilitator since each iteration will un-
fold differently depending on the makeup of the group and the issues, which 
mean most to them. The common feature with other complex simulations is 
that it must evolve continuously or lose relevance. Feedback from participants 
is essential, and a good facilitation team will always be adding improvements 
to keep up with curriculum developments and the benefit of experience. To 
that end, educators and trainers should seek opportunities to participate in 
other people’s simulations to stay abreast of new techniques and technologies, 
share ideas and, not least, experience what it feels like to be a participant.
 Summary
An integration exercise has proved to be an effective self-teaching and skill de-
velopment tool for adults learning a complex subject. The process can be sig-
nificantly enhanced with the increasingly sophisticated digital tools; not only 
to improve the learning process, but also to work with those used in reality. 
But, just as there is no ‘royal road to learning’, there is no easy road to creating a 
complex exercise scenario. Not only is a huge amount of work required to cre-
ate the geography, socio-economic detail, policy factors, and role descriptions, 
but all that must be checked and double-checked for consistency, credibility, 
and continuity. That effort is measured in person-months, not days. If done 
professionally, it is expensive: if by volunteers, it must be a labor of love. But 
the benefits are well worth it.
<UN>
Educating the Ocean Leaders of Today for the 
Ocean of Tomorrow
Lawrence P. Hildebrand
World Maritime University, Malmö, Sweden
 Introduction
The ocean and coastal areas of the world are changing, but we—as societies, 
economies, and individual decision-makers—for the most part, are not. We 
are learning that the social-ecological coastal and ocean system of the com-
ing decades will be significantly different from today—physically, energeti-
cally, chemically, and biologically. It will also be under rising pressure from 
social, economic, and technological developments brought about by hundreds 
of millions more people populating, further developing, and urbanizing these 
increasingly vulnerable areas. Present governance regimes that frame our laws, 
policies, and institutions at global and regional levels will have to adapt more 
quickly and in a more coordinated way than the piecemeal approach to adjust-
ing current regulations taken to date.
So it is imperative that the International Ocean Institute (ioi) develop the 
capacity of ocean leaders on the magnitude and significance of these changes 
in the coastal and ocean system itself, on the growing pressure being exerted 
on its living and non-living resources, and on the evolving approach to ocean 
governance. We must also emphasize that the next generation of ocean leaders 
will be equipped with a deep sense of appreciation to take proactive planning 
decisions today; we must prepare them for this emerging reality and offer the 
theoretical knowledge and the practical skills and tools that can be applied in 
coastal nations around the world.
 The ioi Training Portfolio
This is where the International Ocean Institute portfolio of training and capac-
ity development courses in ocean governance comes in. It is also where the 
ioi must enhance, and rigorously build into its strategy and teaching orienta-
tion, the steps necessary to ensure that the professionals trained are equipped 
with ocean-focused vision, knowledge, and skills that will allow them to un-
derstand and motivate them to act on the growing evidence and projections 
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on the changing ocean and coasts. They must also be fully prepared to take or 
actively promote practical steps now to adapt, protect, and sustain the coastal 
and ocean system in this near future of profound change. Carrying on as if 
these changes are minor or of debatable significance and require no changes 
on society’s part, does not seem like a rational plan.
The core of the ioi capacity development courses over the years has 
proven to be sound.1 They provide in-depth coverage of the legal, scientific, 
social, ethical, moral, economic, and ecological dimensions of ocean gover-
nance and address the holistic and interconnected nature of the ocean, coasts, 
and human well-being. The knowledge and skills imparted to participants— 
comprehension of the wider engagement in ocean governance beyond their 
areas of specialization; communication and negotiation skills; policy formula-
tion and rule-making; sustainable ocean governance practices; and identifying 
current and, now more than ever, future challenges to ocean governance— 
prepares these ocean leaders for the ocean challenges of today and tomorrow. 
This has worked well for decades. But as detailed below, the ocean and coastal 
system is changing rapidly and fundamentally, and the ioi training and capac-
ity development programs must similarly adapt and stay ahead of this curve.
 The Changing Coasts and Ocean
Coastal and ocean areas are under assault from both the land and the sea. 
From the land, we continue to discharge carbon, nitrogen, and other emissions 
into the atmosphere and inadequately treated effluents and their constitu-
ent chemicals from cities, industries, and farms into our coastal waters.2 We 
destroy critical coastal habitats such as beaches, mangroves, coral reefs, and 
seagrass beds for coastal development and economic growth3 in a process re-
ferred to as ocean sprawl.4 We continue to deplete fish stocks, both legally and 
illegally at an alarming rate.5 And now, many coastal nations are  expanding 
1 “The International Ocean Institute,” Ocean Yearbook 31 (2017): xvi–xxii.
2 A. Borja, et al., “Overview of Integrative Assessment of Marine Systems: The  Ecosystem 
Approach in Practice,” Frontiers in Marine Science 3, no. 20 (2016), doi.org/10.3389/fmars 
.2016.00020.
3 L.H. Pendleton, O. Thebaud, R.C. Mongruel, and H. Levrel, “Has the Value of Global Marine 
and Coastal Ecosystem Services Changed?” Marine Policy 64 (2016): 156–158.
4 E.C. Heery, et al., “Identifying the Consequences of Ocean Sprawl for Sedimentary Habitats,” 
Journal of Experimental Marine Biology and Ecology 492 (2017): 31–48.
5 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (fao), The State of the World Fisher-
ies and Aquaculture: Contributing to Food Security and Nutrition for All (Rome: fao, 2016).
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or pursuing new ocean uses under the banner of a Blue Economy,6 whether 
reasonable or not, sustainable or otherwise.
A seminal report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (oecd) on the ocean economy in 2030 highlights several im-
portant demographic, economic, social, environmental, technological, and 
governance trends, as well as major uncertainties and risks, that are influenc-
ing world developments and, by extension, the ocean economy and marine 
ecosystem health.7 The oecd reports that a wide range of global trends and 
macro- factors are set to influence the longer-term development of the ocean 
economy. We can expect that their combined effect will cut both ways. On the 
one hand, many of these developments hold out the promise of expanding 
economic, social, and health-related opportunities through ocean use; on the 
other, they point to a further increase in the pressures already weighing heav-
ily on the ocean’s capacity and health. At the heart of expansion in the ocean 
economy are population growth, urbanization, and migration to and devel-
opment of coastal areas. Rising incomes and the growing middle classes with 
higher-end dietary choices and consumer appetites are adding to the pressure. 
Ageing populations in developed countries will also continue to favor coastal 
areas for vacation and/or retirement homes and motivate the medical and 
pharmaceutical communities to accelerate marine biotechnological research 
into new drugs and treatments. All of this is bringing increased pressure on the 
coasts and the ocean. Indeed, our uses and abuses of the ocean to date have 
seriously compromised the very foundations of the ocean and coastal system 
and led to growing marine environmental degradation and the consequent 
costs of an under-performing ocean economy, loss of essential ecosystem 
goods and services (which largely sustain the former), increased use conflicts, 
and challenging legal questions.8
 An Existential Threat
The profound changes that are taking place on our coasts and in our ocean 
represent, quite frankly, an existential threat to our societies, economies, and 
ways of life. In addition to the traditional pressures discussed above, the ocean 
6 United Nations Environment Programme (unep), Blue Economy: Sharing Success Stories to 
Inspire Change. unep Regional Seas Report and Studies No. 195 (Nairobi: unep, 2015).
7 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (oecd), The Ocean Economy in 
2030 (Paris: oecd, 2016), doi.org/10.1787/9789264251724-en.
8 Global Ocean Commission (goc), The Future of Our Ocean: Next Steps and Priorities (New 
York: goc, 2016).
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is now warming, rising, deoxygenating, and acidifying,9 and filling with plastic 
at an alarming pace.10 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change high-
lights that storms are becoming more frequent and intense, and precipitation 
patterns and ocean currents are shifting. Coasts are also eroding at an accel-
erating pace, coastal aquifers are being inundated with salt water, fish stocks 
are overexploited and depleted, coral reefs are dying, and mangroves and sea-
grasses are being lost. We are also witnessing early-stage changes in the dis-
tribution, composition, and abundance of many living marine resources and 
system-changing regime shifts in several ocean ecosystems.11
Our most vulnerable coasts, particularly deltas, estuaries, and low-lying 
coasts and islands, already under considerable stress, are now receiving the 
majority of a growing global population (2.2 billion more people by 2050). 
Coastal settlements are growing rapidly and are increasingly urban with all 
that entails (consumption, energy use, waste disposal, and subsidence). We 
are also aggressively modifying, developing, and armoring the coast to accom-
modate our growing societies and economies.12 Yet we cling stubbornly to the 
view that we can continue to live safely and even more intensively at the wa-
ter’s edge, that we can develop and modify the coast and its social-ecological 
structure at will without consequences, and that the ocean will continue to 
provide the goods and services where and at levels we have traditionally relied 
upon them. These do not seem to be reasonable assumptions or sensible plan-
ning scenarios. Neither are they an acceptable status quo in the ioi capacity 
development syllabi.
Common sense would have societies initiate and undertake proactive 
steps today, including, inter alia, managed retreat from vulnerable coastal ar-
eas, protecting and restoring the coastal habitats that sustain and protect us, 
implementing future-oriented ecosystem-based fisheries management, devel-
oping alternative livelihoods, and preparing for climate migration.13 For the 
9 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc), Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Re-
port, Contribution to Working Groups i, ii and iii to the Fifth Assessment Report of the ipcc 
(Geneva: United Nations, 2014).
10 M. Eriksen, et al., “Plastic Pollution in the World’s Oceans: More than 5 Trillion Plastic 
Pieces Weighing over 250,000 Tons Afloat at Sea,” PLoS ONE 9, no. 12 (2014): e111913, doi.
org/10.1371/journal.pone.0111913.
11 United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, 
First Global Integrated Marine Assessment (New York: United Nations, 2016).
12 B. Neumann, A.T. Vafeidis, J. Zimmermann, and R.J. Nicholls, “Future Coastal Population 
Growth and Exposure to Sea-level Rise and Coastal Flooding—A Global Assessment,” 
PLoS ONE 10, no. 3(2015): e0118571, doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0118571.
13 L.P. Hildebrand and N.A. Bellefontaine, “Ocean Governance and Sustainability” in Ship-
ping Operations Management, eds. I.D. Visvikis and P.M. Panayides (New York: Springer 
International, 2017), 231–248.
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most part, unfortunately, we are moving in the opposite direction. What does 
this trajectory hold for our societies and economies, and what should be the 
 training and capacity development priorities the ioi must emphasize and 
impart?
 Future Orientation
Looking further into the future, the coasts will not be where or as they are to-
day (eroded and flooded), coastal cities, large and small, as well as some island 
nations will be lost, the fish and other living marine resources that so many of 
our societies are tied to spatially and dependent on today will not be available 
to us (overexploitation, redistribution and regime shifts), and climate condi-
tions will make many areas uninhabitable.14 How will society cope and how 
does the ioi prepare the ocean leaders for this future?
We do so by adding stronger emphasis in the ioi training curriculum on 
providing a more in-depth understanding of the conditions we will face in a 
future ocean. The curriculum must be updated and more future oriented to 
understand and present the profound changes the ocean system is undergoing 
and the steps we need to take today, to prepare for this new reality.
To test this approach, I posed a question in a course assignment in 2017 in 
the Master of Science specialization ocean sustainability, governance, and 
management at the World Maritime University, Sweden, a course inspired 
by the ioi capacity development course syllabi. The challenge posed and the 
question issued to the students was to research and document the projected 
changes to the coastal and ocean ecosystems of their country in 2050 and dis-
cuss what this will mean for the national economy, society, and communities. 
The second part of the assignment required them to develop a national plan 
of action that could respond to these projected changes and could be initiated 
today. The students found the future-orientation of this assignment challeng-
ing and highly relevant and explored it with open, but uncertain minds. While 
their findings made clear to them the significant scope of the changes com-
ing to their national coastal zones (e.g., complete loss of beach systems and 
associated gross domestic product, flooding of communities and major infra-
structure), their recommended goals were, at best, aspirational in scope (e.g., 
achieve a sustainable Blue Economy). And the recommended action was dis-
appointingly timid (e.g., need for better education and stronger political will).
14 L.V. Weatherdon, et al., “Observed and Projected Impacts of Climate Change on Marine 
Fisheries, Aquaculture, Coastal Tourism, and Human Health: An Update.” Frontiers in Ma-
rine Science 3, no. 48 (2016), doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2016.00048.
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This exercise demonstrated that even when we are presented with, or dis-
cover for ourselves through research, the dramatic changes coming to most 
coastal and ocean social-ecological systems, we find it difficult to imagine and 
push for the bold actions that will be required to prepare us for these changes. 
Clearly, contemplation will not suffice. Therefore, the ioi portfolio of ocean 
governance capacity development courses must place much more empha-
sis going forward on providing an in-depth understanding of the profound 
changes that are coming to our coastal and ocean communities, societies, and 
economies. We must be working with our course participants on bold, but 
practical, actions that will prepare and empower them to lead the adaptation 
to the future ocean. In other words, the ioi courses need to be about ocean 
literacy—understanding the ocean’s influence on us and our influence on the 
ocean—with a focus on preparing for change.
<UN>
Strategic ioi Initiatives for Developing Capacity  
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Université Sainte-Anne, Petit de Grat, Nova Scotia, Canada
 Introduction
This essay outlines challenges of future ocean governance and the strategic 
efforts of the International Ocean Institute (ioi) toward achieving the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals, in particular sdg 14, postulated at 
the Rio+20 Conference.1 Major challenges arise from marine and coastal envi-
ronmental, policy, and knowledge issues related to the changing climate, pres-
sures on coastal and ocean development, and the international management 
of limited ocean resources. These challenges call for strategic initiatives with a 
focus on international ocean governance and developing capacity for effective 
local institutional arrangements, together with integrated ocean literacy and 
human resource development programs that incorporate research and pro-
mote continuous improvement.2
 Strategic ioi Principles—Looking Back, Looking Forward
Elisabeth Mann Borgese, the founder of the ioi, emerged as an energetic 
proponent of a new ocean governance paradigm during the late 1960s. She 
saw the ocean as a significant frontier of humankind for the realization of a 
shared, secure zone and peaceful space for nations to behave and interact in 
a manner consistent with sustainable marine environmental use beyond na-
tional borders. She espoused the concept of ‘sustainable management’ based 
1 “Sustainable Development Goals,” United Nations, http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelop 
ment/sustainable-development-goals/, last visited 13 February 2018.
2 This essay presents the personal views of the authors and does not necessarily represent the 
views of the International Ocean Institute.
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on  equity and on a participatory, bottom-up system of decision-making as the 
future of ocean governance. The realization of the principles described below 
 characterizes the ioi’s perspective on the future of ocean governance and lays 
the foundation for the establishment of ioi strategic initiatives.3
The Principle of Common Heritage of Mankind. In 1967, Malta’s Ambassador 
to the United Nations, Arvid Pardo, urged the UN General Assembly to recog-
nize that resources of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction are 
the common heritage of mankind.4 Pardo’s initiative led to global efforts to-
ward advancing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea includ-
ing the principle of the common heritage of mankind and reserving the ocean 
for peaceful purposes. As a common heritage space, the ioi supports the idea 
that the ocean cannot be owned, that all nations share ocean resources ben-
efits and do not allow military installations in territorial commons areas, and 
that the ocean must be preserved for the benefit of future generations.5
Coastal and Ocean Security. For the ioi, the concept of coastal and ocean se-
curity includes social and human rights, as well as consideration of economic 
and environmental priorities of coastal communities. Regional co-operation 
for peaceful purposes, including joint surveillance and enforcement of regu-
lations on peaceful uses and humanitarian operations, offers safeguards for 
regional security under the United Nations Agenda for Peace.6
Sustainable Development. The contribution of the ocean to the sustainable 
development of living and non-living resources is fully recognized in sdg 14, 
‘Life below water’, with the stated goal to “conserve and sustainably use the 
oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development,”7 while reduc-
ing negative anthropogenic impacts. The ocean provides sustainable nutri-
tional sources from capture fisheries and aquaculture and makes a significant 
contribution to food and water security. Continued growth of energy from 
3 E. Mann Borgese (ed.), Peace in the Oceans: Ocean Governance and the Agenda for Peace Pro-
ceedings Pacem in Maribus xxiii, Costa Rica, 3–7 December 1995, Intergovernmental Oceano-
graphic Commission Technical Series No. 47 (Paris: unesco, 1997).
4 United Nations General Assembly, “Agenda Item 92,” Twenty-second Session, First Commit-
tee, 1515th meeting, 1 November 1967, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/
texts/pardo_ga1967.pdf.
5 J. Frakes, “The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and the Deep Seabed, Outer Space, 
and Antarctica: Will Developed and Developing Nations Reach a Compromise?” Wisconsin 
International Law Journal 21 (2003): 409–434.
6 United Nations Secretary-General, “An Agenda for Peace,” UN Doc. A/47/271, S 2411, 17 June 
1992.
7 “Sustainable Development Goals: Goal 14—Life below water,” United Nations Development 
Programme (undp), http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-develop 
ment-goals/goal-14-life-below-water/, last visited 13 February 2018.
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coastal and offshore regions in the form of hydrocarbons, the petrochemical 
sector, and renewable energy from wave, tidal, and wind power means that the 
ocean is key to sustainable energy development. As one of the world’s largest 
industrial sectors, travel and tourism8 have an important ocean presence en-
compassing cruise ships, sport fishing, sailing, surfing, swimming, sun-bathing, 
and eco-tourism, together with the supporting industries, and increased op-
portunities for sustainable coastal economic development. For the ioi, the 
sustainable development of all the aforementioned activities—now and in the 
future—are dependent on a system of responsible ocean governance.
Education and Development of Human Resources. Education and the devel-
opment of human resources is the most important contribution of ocean de-
velopment to the economic security of states. The ioi affirms that the rich 
resources acquired by states through their exclusive economic zones (eezs) 
can only be realized through skilled human resources with scientific, techno-
logical, and management capacities for the ocean. This realization highlights 
interdisciplinary training and education and emergent forms of ocean gover-
nance and information technology associated with sustainable ocean manage-
ment. The ioi is committed to providing ocean literacy in support of future 
ocean governance.
 Major Challenges for Ocean Governance
The ioi’s recently consolidated global network of operational centres and 
focal points, as well as its reorganized financial administration and manage-
ment structures, are aimed to cope with the emerging challenges to the future 
of ocean governance. These major challenges are categorized as marine and 
coastal environmental, policy, and knowledge challenges.
Marine and Coastal Environmental Challenges. Uncontrollable environmen-
tal events affect the marine and coastal ecosystems and may have detrimental 
consequences on the physical environment. Environmental  challenges arise 
from (i) global warming trends from the increasing presence of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere; (ii) increased frequency and severity of coastal 
storms; (iii) resource shifts attributed to changes in stock abundance, and 
spatial and seasonal redistribution of marine species; and (iv) increased hu-
man activity in the coastal zone. Extreme environmental events pose a seri-
ous threat to coastal and ocean security, and diminish management efforts to 
maintain sustainable development activities.
8 See “Global Travel and Tourism Industry—Statistics & Facts,” The Statistics Portal, https://
www.statista.com/topics/962/global-tourism/, last visited 13 February 2018.
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Policy Challenges. The changing coastal environment presents acute man-
agement and policy challenges and threatens coastal community sustainabil-
ity. Policy is required to institutionalize the principle of the common heritage 
of mankind through enforcement of the concepts of the peaceful uses of re-
gional seas for sustainable development and maritime zones of peace. Ocean 
governance policy based on the strategic ioi principles of sustainable develop-
ment and our common heritage recognizes (i) the need to define community 
priorities, vulnerability, resilience, and adaptive capacity over strategic plan-
ning periods; (ii) the establishment of a hierarchical chain of local, regional, 
and national decision-making authority; (iii) the development of ocean and 
coastal management plans based on precautionary and ecosystem-based ap-
proaches, as well as preparedness measures and emergency plans for extreme 
events; and (iv) the institutionalization of an ocean literacy program.9
Knowledge Challenges. Research and training are required to support policy 
challenges. Knowledge challenges influence the ioi principles of education 
and development of human resources. Ocean governance research presents 
particular challenges for (i) establishing a new ‘ocean information baseline’ to 
enable closer coastal community engagement and participation for collecting 
and validating unique local data; (ii) developing interdisciplinary and local ad-
aptation strategies;10 (iii) defining coastal community preparedness measures 
to account for physical, socio-economic, and cultural human impacts; (iv) de-
veloping new institutional arrangements to deal with the preparation, emer-
gency planning, and decision analysis for extreme events; and (v) integrating 
stakeholders in education, training, and applied research processes. ioi re-
sources focus on ocean governance training, education, and capacity develop-
ment initiatives supported by pertinent publications and public outreach, and 
facilitated by international partnerships.
 Strategic ioi Initiatives
The ioi principles and the marine and coastal environmental, policy 
and knowledge challenges act together to determine strategic ioi initia-
tives for ocean governance. The ioi initiatives respond to the challenges 
by (1)   developing  capacity toward defining an effective ocean governance 
9 D.E. Lane, C. Mercer Clarke, D. Forbes and P. Watson, “The Gathering Storm: Managing 
Adaptation to Environmental Change in Coastal Communities and Small Islands,” Sus-
tainability Science 8, no. 3 (July 2013): 469–489.
10 D.E. Lane, “Planning in Fisheries-related Systems: Multicriteria Models for Decision Sup-
port,” in Handbook on Operations Research in Natural Resources, eds., A. Wentraub et al. 
(Springer, 2007), 237–272.
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 institutional  framework; (2) providing ocean literacy in support of national 
institutions and for the ongoing delivery of applied ocean research; and (3) 
improving international outreach and communication.
Developing Capacity for Ocean Governance Institutions. The ioi affirms the 
need for new ocean governance institutions for all coastal nations and com-
mits to supporting initiatives that align the ioi principles to institutional de-
velopment. Ocean governance institutions respond directly to major policy 
challenges. Through its strategic outreach programs, the ioi supports the 
establishment of ocean governance institutions characterized by levels of lo-
cal, regional, and national authority, supporting legislation, collaborative ar-
rangements, and the appropriation of funds for management operations and 
research.
The ocean governance institution is authorized through established stra-
tegic ocean management plans based in statutory law with a clear mandate 
and the authority and responsibility to make decisions. Decision-making in 
the institution includes the capacity to evaluate and analyse options through 
effective strategic planning, while monitoring and tracking measures the im-
pacts and outcomes of decisions taken. Local institutions are responsible for 
decision-making on sewage treatment, water management, coastal develop-
ment and zonal planning, access and allocation for inshore and nearshore fish-
eries and aquaculture and energy projects, marine conservation planning, and 
commercial and recreational marine activities. At the regional and national 
levels, governance mechanisms are established for integrating local coastal 
and ocean management plans, formulating and implementing national oceans 
policy, and the assurance of prioritized resources for implementation. The 
budgets of ocean governance institutions for coastal nations are designed to 
achieve the goals of sdg 14 and their designated mandates. Sources of bud-
getary funding for ocean governance institutions should be prioritized by na-
tional governments.
The ‘participational structures’ at the local governance level are pioneered 
by Agenda 21 and its concepts of “integrated coastal and marine management.”11 
This collaboration brings together local government, non- governmental 
 organizations, academic institutions, political leaders, business and profes-
sional communities, the media, and the public at large in the decision-making 
process. Collaborative policy ensures that decisions are compatible with the 
core cultural values of the coastal communities and the integration of tradi-
tional indigenous knowledge. Collaborative ocean policy also integrates natu-
ral science with social science information.
11 United Nations Secretary-General, supra note 6.
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The ioi seeks to extend its mission to promote effective ocean governance 
institutions and structures internationally. The ioi has the unique opportu-
nity to define ocean governance institutions and provide assistance to coastal 
nations as they prepare their new institutional arrangements. This role aligns 
the ioi training and education program with the delivery of policy and knowl-
edge responses to the stated challenges. Based on the fundamental principles 
of the ioi’s vision, mission, and goals,12 an international network of ocean 
governance institutions is envisioned as the key delivery of Elisabeth Mann 
Borgese’s legacy. For the ioi, ongoing institutional funding is assumed from 
ioi’s main donor, the Ocean Science and Research Foundation, to maintain 
ioi’s independence from changing political trends and economic agendas.
Ocean Literacy and Support for Research. Education, training, and applied 
research in coastal and ocean science, engineering, management, and socio-
economics support the ongoing activities of ocean governance institutions 
and the ocean industry. Ocean governance institutions embrace careers in the 
ocean sector developed by virtue of education and training programs. The ioi, 
as an experienced and credible ‘honest broker’, holds a strong strategic posi-
tion as an international leader for the delivery of global ocean education and 
training in support of ocean governance institutions and in response to knowl-
edge challenges. Accordingly, the ioi mission to “conduct training and educa-
tion for developing capacity to meet the crucial demand for knowledgeable 
future leaders in ocean governance” is critical.13 The ioi strives for accredita-
tion and certification of its training courses to ensure that they remain a global 
benchmark for high-quality, state-of-the-art capacity development programs 
in ocean governance education. This includes expanding ioi outreach through 
Internet-based training offerings, and open access to relevant documents and 
research papers through the IOI-supported publications World Ocean Reviews 
and the annual Ocean Yearbook.14
Finally, the ioi actively relies on coastal and ocean natural and social sci-
ence researchers in the presentation of its training and education programs. 
While not a central activity of the ioi, inherent research capacity is retained 
through affiliation with universities hosting ioi centers and through networks 
of senior research fellows and international and regional ocean institutions. 
These ties ensure that cutting-edge information and current scientific, legal, 
12 “ioi Vision, Mission and Goals,” International Ocean Institute (ioi) (2015), https://www 
.ioinst.org/about-1/vision-mission-and-goals/.
13 Id.
14 “Publications,” ioi (2016), https://www.ioinst.org/publications-1/; see also World Ocean 
Review website, https://www.ioinst.org/publications-1/ and Ocean Yearbook website, 
https://brill.com/view/serial/OCYB.
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and policy developments are integrated into all practical ioi activities to sup-
port ocean governance.
International and Alumni Outreach. As a strategic priority, ioi maintains 
memoranda of understanding with key partners in the sphere of ocean affairs, 
capacity development, and education. Experts who lecture in ioi training 
courses ensure that current scientific and political knowledge is included in 
our courses. The ioi promotes responsible ocean governance at all levels of 
co-operation, for example, the United Nations, the Commonwealth, national 
development agencies, and regional initiatives. The ioi enjoys special consul-
tative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council and with 
other UN specialized agencies.
The ioi’s network of thousands of alumni comprises country leaders, min-
isters, ambassadors, scientists, politicians, negotiators, and leading employees 
of government authorities and academic institutions. Many ioi alumni are 
professionals in maritime affairs and are dealing daily with issues related to 
ocean governance. As a strategic initiative, the ioi will increase its efforts to 
mainstream experience and knowledge of alumni back into ioi’s activities and 
training offerings. This will benefit the developing international ocean gover-
nance community and future ioi course participants.
 Summary
The future outlook of the ioi in participating in the delivery of ocean gover-
nance is optimistic. Elisabeth Mann Borgese inspired the vision, mission, and 
goals of the ioi to consider the ocean as a common heritage for humankind 
and to adopt the Agenda for Peace. Through its strategic initiatives for develop-
ing capacity in ocean governance, the ioi takes up the challenge to influence 
coastal nations toward establishing ocean governance institutional arrange-
ments and delivering the goals of sdg 14. The ioi’s capacity to deliver its ocean 
literacy mission is dependent on the international community’s willingness 
to prioritize the place of the oceans, to establish an international network of 
ocean governance institutions, and to support ocean education and applied 
research.
Part 3
Law of the Sea and Principled Ocean Governance
∵
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 The point of break-through to the world of the next century is along the path 
of the evolving legal order. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, in its interaction with the Conventions, Agreements, and Programmes 
emanating from the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, has set into motion a process of fundamental transformation. 
 These new legal instruments should be seen as one single process generat-
ing one single dynamic system. Their overlaps should be utilized as common 
ground for common action, in such a way that they reinforce one another in 
the process of building a better world for the next century. 
 Elisabeth Mann Borgese* 
 *  The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource (Tokyo: United Nations University 
Press, 1998), 189. 
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Introduction
Editor: Moira L. McConnell
Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s commitment to the law of the sea and her role in 
the development of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(unclos) is well known, as is her life-long advocacy for its implementation 
as a way to bring about a change to the international socio-economic system. 
Elisabeth’s faith in the role of international law as a ‘break-through’ point1 (see 
quotation on facing page) on the road to system transformation may seem 
surprising as she was not a lawyer; many, especially political scientists, might 
question both the role and importance of international law as a force for social 
change. However, she was neither uninformed nor was she naïve. She was a 
political scientist with a sophisticated appreciation of the role of institutions 
and power relations, or, as she described the law of the sea negotiations in 
a 1976 meeting, the “grand game.”2 This meant she was able to adapt to, and 
appreciate, the importance of the interaction between the rapidly changing 
post-colonial political context and the necessary evolution of the international 
legal system. Even as early as the mid-1970s she foresaw the development of 
international law to include more diverse forms of legal obligations that have 
various names and levels of enforceability, now called ‘principles’, ‘guidelines’, 
and ‘codes’, for example, with the terminology of ‘governance’ as way to bring 
about wider global agreement and implementation action.
As many of the essays in this part illustrate, Elisabeth was engaged in a big-
ger project than merely updating or modernizing the law of the sea. She and 
others of like mind were engaged in a quest for a system-wide change in global 
governance. The world’s oceans as the common factor among states were seen 
as an avenue, a medium, to achieve wider social and economic justice and im-
proved global governance. In an important meeting in 1976 she spoke of the 
oceans as a ‘test case’ to establishing this new order for global governance.3
The essays focus on several key aspects of the law of the sea and principled 
ocean governance that Elisabeth emphasized as central. These include the 
promotion of the goals of the movement for a New International Economic 
1 E. Mann Borgese, The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource (Tokyo: United 
Nations University Press, 1998), 189.
2 See, Elisabeth Mann Borgese Fonds, “The New International Economic Order and the Law 
Of The Sea, Seminar organized jointly by unitar and the International Ocean Institute, 7–8 
April 1976,” Dalhousie University Archives, Halifax, Canada, MS-2-744, Box 301, Folder 2.
3 Id.
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Order, although it no longer exists as a political force, through the common 
heritage and related provisions adopted in 1982 in unclos. This was the result 
of what is described in an essay in this part as the ‘package deal’ approach to 
reaching agreement. This aspect was also perhaps a disappointment as she de-
scribed this part of UNCLOS as its “centerpiece” albeit “fundamentally flawed: 
shaped by political and ideological compromise rather than responding to the 
needs of a modern high-tech undertaking.”4 As these essays also demonstrate, 
she was prescient in foreseeing the potential far-reaching evolution of unclos 
after 1982, such as the agreement related to fisheries or the forthcoming agree-
ment related to biological and other resources in areas beyond national juris-
diction. In that respect these essays demonstrate the importance she placed on 
maritime boundary delimitation and the institution and system for resolution 
of disputes as essential in establishing a new legal order, beginning with the 
world oceans.
In her later years Elisabeth began to be more concerned with technology 
and science and she spoke less of law. In two essays published in the Ocean 
Yearbook in the two years before her death she wrote of the “The Crisis of 
Knowledge,” referring mainly to the impact of the high level of uncertainty 
and understanding about technological developments in all ocean sectors.5 A 
concern about the rapid development of technology and the widening gap be-
tween the developed and less developed economies was also the theme of one 
of her last essays, which reported on a meeting of United Nations Open-Ended 
Informal Consultative Process on the Oceans and the Law of the Sea.6 Thus 
Elisabeth’s concern returned always to the quest for a new world order and 
greater equity and for peace.
4 Mann Borgese, supra note 1, 112.
5 E. Mann Borgese, “The Crisis of Knowledge,” Ocean Yearbook 15 (2001): 1–6.
6 E. Mann Borgese, “unicpolos: The Second Session,” Ocean Yearbook 16 (2002): 22–34.
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Edging Towards Principled Ocean Governance:  
Law of the Sea and Beyond
David L. VanderZwaag
Marine & Environmental Law Institute, Dalhousie University,  
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
 Introduction
Elisabeth Mann Borgese is well known for her commitment to advancing the le-
gal order for the improved regulation of the world’s oceans. Her advocacy with 
respect to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos)1 
is the subject of other essays in this volume. However, in the decades since 
1982, legal principles, sometimes linked to provisions in treaties, have become 
critical in the global quest for sustainable seas and healthy coastal communi-
ties. Principles, such as precautionary and ecosystem approaches, have influ-
enced the negotiation, implementation, and interpretation of international 
agreements.2 They may also guide national ocean law and policy reforms, 
for example, encouraging adoption of integrated coastal and ocean manage-
ment approaches and enhancement of public participation in ocean-related 
decision-making.3
The continued importance of principles and the long list of what are con-
sidered to be key ocean governance principles can be seen in the 2016–2017 UN 
Preparatory Committee discussions trying to hammer out possible elements 
for a new international agreement for the conservation and sustainable use of 
marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.4 Wide convergence 
1 Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 u.n.t.s. 3 [unclos].
2 P. Sands et al., Principles of International Environmental Law, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 94–134.
3 D.R. Rothwell and D.L. VanderZwaag eds., Towards Principled Oceans Governance: Australian 
and Canadian Approaches and Challenges (London: Routledge, 2006).
4 See the essay by David Freestone in this volume.
* The research support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada 
(sshrc) through the OceanCanada Partnership Grant is gratefully acknowledged, as is the 
support of the Marine Environmental Observation Prediction and Response Network, based 
at Dalhousie University and funded by the Government of Canada’s Networks of Centres 
of Excellence Program. The research assistance of Jamie Gamblin, J.D. candidate, Schulich 
School of Law, is also recognized.
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was reached on what key principles might be included in a future agreement. 
Among others, they are sustainable development; ecosystem approach; pre-
caution; integrated approach; science-based approach, using the best available 
scientific information and knowledge, including traditional knowledge; adap-
tive management; polluter pays principle; public participation; transparency 
and availability of information; and good faith.5
Getting a firm grip on ocean governance principles is difficult for at least five 
reasons. First, the term ‘principle’ is itself slippery with other terms sometimes 
used interchangeably such as concept, approach, and norm.6 An especially 
confusing terminological issue is whether the terms ecosystem approach and 
ecosystem-based management are synonymous, or whether they represent 
different paradigms.7 Second, the legal status of principles is often uncertain, 
whether they are legally binding or merely ‘soft law’.8 Third, the practical impli-
cations of principles are often contested, for example, as to the precautionary 
measures required by the precautionary principle.9 Fourth, the definitions of 
principles may vary, for example, some versions of the precautionary principle 
call for measures to be cost-effective while others do not.10 Fifth, the inter-
relationship of principles tends to be confusing, for example, the relationship 
between the preventive principle and the precautionary approach.11
This essay provides an overview of how the international community has 
edged forward in developing ocean governance principles. Principles ema-
nating from the unclos and its progeny, such as the Rio Declaration on En-
vironment and Development (Rio Declaration),12 are summarized and the 
importance of UN General Assembly (unga) resolutions and processes in 
promoting principled ocean governance is highlighted. This is followed by a 
5 United Nations General Assembly (unga), Report of the Preparatory Committee estab-
lished by General Assembly resolution 69/292, UN Doc. A/AC.287/2017/PC.4/2 (2017).
6 S. Schiele, Evolution of International Environmental Regimes: The Case of Climate Change 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 104–118.
7 C. Engler, “Beyond Rhetoric: Navigating the Conceptual Tangle Towards Effective Imple-
mentation of the Ecosystem Approach to Oceans Management,” Environmental Reviews 
23 (2015): 288–320; K.A. Waylen et al., “The Need to Disentangle Key Concepts from 
Ecosystem- Approach Jargon,” Conservation Biology 28, no. 5 (2014): 1215–1224.
8 E. Hey, Advanced Introduction to International Environmental Law (Northampton, MA: 
Edward Elgar, 2016), 53–55.
9 S.A. Atapattu, Emerging Principles of International Environmental Law (Ardsley, NY: Trans-
national Publishers, 2006), 208–273.
10 S. Marr, The Precautionary Principle in the Law of the Sea (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2003), 38–40.
11 A. Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), 35–44.
12 31 i.l.m. 874 (1992).
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brief consideration of the role of the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (fao) in developing principled approaches to fisheries and 
aquaculture. The essay also reviews the contributions of key multilateral ar-
rangements and agreements, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(cbd),13 to the evolution of principles. The role of courts and tribunals in in-
terpreting ocean-related principles is not addressed.14
 unclos and Its Progeny
Besides the ‘common heritage of mankind’ principle, unclos is noted for ar-
ticulating three other governance principles.15 First, the protection and pres-
ervation of the marine environment principle is set out in Article 192 as an 
unqualified obligation.16 Second, Article 194, paragraph 2, affirms the principle 
of preventing transboundary harm. While this principle is considered an ob-
ligation under customary international law,17 unclos expands the obligation 
to include a responsibility by states to prevent the spread of pollution beyond 
their zones of maritime jurisdiction. Third, the principle of co-operation also 
receives broad support in multiple unclos provisions, for example, Article 
197 requires states to co-operate on global and regional levels in developing 
international rules and standards for the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment. Co-operative conservation efforts are required for fish 
stocks not recognizing national boundaries including stocks shared across ex-
clusive economic zones (eezs), stocks straddling eezs and the high seas, high 
migratory species, marine mammals, anadromous stocks, and catadromous 
stocks.18 States are also obligated to co-operate in the conservation and man-
agement of living resources in areas of the high seas.19 States bordering on en-
closed or semi-enclosed seas are encouraged to co-operate in managing  living 
13 Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, 1760 u.n.t.s. 79 [cbd].
14 T. Stevens, International Courts and Environmental Protection (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009); D.L. VanderZwaag, “The icj, itlos and the Precautionary Ap-
proach: Paltry Progressions, Jurisprudential Jousting,” Hawaii Law Review 35 (2013): 
617–632.
15 T. Stephens and D.R. Rothwell, The International Law of the Sea (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2010), 474–475. See also the essay by Prue Taylor in this volume.
16 D. Freestone, “Principles Applicable to Modern Oceans Governance,” The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 23 (2008): 385, 387.
17 P-M. Dupuy and J.E. Viñuales, International Environmental Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 58–60.
18 unclos, supra note 1, arts. 63–67.
19 Id., arts. 118–119.
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marine resources, protecting and preserving the marine environment, and in 
marine scientific research.20
Since unclos does not include specific provisions spelling out legal prin-
ciples, there might be some argument over whether it also includes other 
principles. For example, the Preamble recognizes a version of the integration 
principle which matured after the adoption of unclos: “Conscious that the 
problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as 
a whole ….”
Similarly, the UN Agreement on Straddling and High Migratory Fish Stocks 
(unfsa),21 which supplements unclos, also modernizes it through express 
incorporation of the precautionary approach.22 While unfsa does not explic-
itly adopt the ecosystem approach, various provisions in it are supportive of 
such an approach.23 unfsa also fleshes out the principle of co-operation in 
relation to straddling and high migratory fish stocks. States are required to give 
effect to their duty to co-operate by not accessing stocks subject to a regional 
or sub-regional fisheries management organization or arrangement unless 
they are a member or a participant, or agree to apply the measures of the orga-
nization or arrangement.24
 Earth Summits and Their Documents
Any consideration of principles for ocean governance must take account of 
the wider environmental events and agreements occurring after 1982 which 
also articulated principles regarding ocean governance. The 1992 Rio Confer-
ence on Environment and Development (Rio Earth Summit) produced two 
non-legally binding documents which substantially advanced the aspiration 
for principled governance. The Rio Declaration sets out 27 principles with an 
overarching aim to encourage sustainable development. The principle or con-
cept of sustainable development is specifically recognized in Principle 1, “Hu-
man beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They 
are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.” Principle 
3 highlights the closely associated principles of intra- and inter-generational 
20 Id., art. 123.
21 New York, 4 August 1995, 2167 u.n.t.s. 3.
22 Id., see, e.g., arts. 5 and 6, and Annex ii, s. 7.
23 Id. Article 5 requires coastal states and states fishing on the high seas to protect biodiver-
sity in the marine environment and to adopt measures for species belonging to the same 
ecosystem or dependent on or associated with the target stocks.
24 Id., art. 8, para. 4, see also para. 5 regarding co-operation in other cases.
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equity whereby development must ensure the meeting of environment needs 
of present and future generations.
The Rio Declaration is particularly important in pushing for several princi-
pled reforms relevant to environmental management at the national level, but 
also applicable more broadly to ocean and coastal management. For example, 
Principle 15 urges the adoption of the precautionary principle:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.
The polluter pays principle is encouraged in Principle 16 and the principle of 
public participation and access to justice is voiced in Principle 10. Principle 22 
sets out the community-based management principle recognizing the impor-
tant role of Indigenous peoples and other local communities in the achieve-
ment of sustainable development.
The Rio Declaration’s principled contributions have left numerous imple-
mentation issues in their wake. For example, in relation to precaution, when 
are strong versions of precautionary measures appropriate, such as reversing 
the burden of legal proof or prohibiting risky activities versus weaker versions 
such as adaptive management?25 For polluter pays, precisely who is the pol-
luter and what damages should be compensable?26 For public participation, 
who represents the public and what should be the scope of  participation, for 
example, information sharing, consultation, or shared decision-making?27 For 
community-based management, what are the implications of the subsequent 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples28 for Indigenous peoples 
and their communities in terms of ocean management and development?
Also emerging from the Rio Earth Summit, Agenda 21 is the non-legally 
binding global plan of action for mobilizing actions and financing towards 
25 See, for example, International Union for the Conservation of Nature (iucn) Guidelines 
for Applying the Precautionary Principle to Biodiversity Conservation and Natural Re-
source Management (67th iucn Council Meeting, 14–16 May 2007), Guideline 12.
26 G. Roller, “Polluter Pays Principle,” in Environmental Law and Sustainability, eds., K. Bos-
selmann, D.S. Fogel and J.B. Ruhl (Great Barrington, MA: Berkshire Publishing, 2013), 
168–170.
27 D. VanderZwaag, Canada and Marine Environmental Protection: Charting a Legal Course 
Towards Sustainable Development (London: Kluwer Law International, 1995), 35–37.
28 unga Res. 61/295 (2007).
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achieving sustainable development.29 Chapter 17, addressing ocean issues, re-
affirms the need for a precautionary approach to prevent degradation of the 
marine environment30 and emphasizes the need to actualize the principle of 
integrated coastal and ocean management.31 Each coastal state is encouraged 
to establish national and local co-ordination mechanisms for management of 
coastal and marine areas and to promote the development and implementa-
tion of integrated management plans.32
At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, the Johannesburg 
Plan of Implementation33 added little on the ocean governance principles set 
out above. It encouraged application by 2010 of the ecosystem approach to 
fisheries and called for the promotion of integrated, multidisciplinary, and 
multisectoral coastal and ocean management at the national level.34
The main outcome document of the 2012 Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable 
Development, “The future we want,”35 merely reconfirmed previous principles. 
Governments renewed their commitment to sustainable development and its 
three pillars of economic, social, and environmental sustainability.36 All the 
principles of the Rio Declaration were affirmed.37 A specific commitment was 
made to effectively apply ecosystem and precautionary approaches in marine 
management in accordance with international law.38
 unga Resolutions and Processes
Annual unga resolutions have consistently emphasized the need for ecosys-
tem and precautionary approaches in marine management. For example, the 
unga 2016 resolution on oceans and law of the sea urges states to enhance 
efforts towards applying an ecosystem approach and encourages competent 
29 Available at https://www.sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda 
21.pdf.
30 Id., para. 17.21.
31 Id., para. 17.1(a).
32 Id., para. 17.6.
33 Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20 
(2002), Resolution 2, Annex.
34 Id., paras. 30(d) and 30(e).
35 unga Res. 66/288 (2012).
36 Id., para. 1.
37 Id., para. 15.
38 Id., para. 158.
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organizations and bodies that have not yet done so to incorporate an ecosys-
tem approach into their mandates.39
unga processes have also promoted principled ocean governance. For 
example, the UN Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and Law of the 
Sea (unicpolos) at its June 2006 meeting addressed the topic of ecosystem 
 approaches and oceans. While recognizing there is no universally agreed defi-
nition of an ecosystem approach, the meeting identified a long list of key el-
ements. They include the need to use integrated decision-making processes, 
strive to balance diverse social objectives, restore degraded marine ecosystems 
where possible, assess the cumulative impacts on marine ecosystems, and seek 
to minimize adverse impacts on marine biodiversity, especially on rare and 
fragile ecosystems.40
In September 2015, the unga launched the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable De-
velopment, transforming the concept or principle of sustainable development 
into a 15 year plan of action for meeting 17 sustainable development goals and 
169 targets.41 Goal 14 is to conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas, and 
marine resources for sustainable development. The Goal is supported by ten 
targets, including increasing access by small-scale artisanal fishers to marine 
resources and markets.42
 fao Code of Conduct and Guidelines
In considering wider principles of ocean governance, the principles specifi-
cally relevant to living resources are key. The fao Code of Conduct for Respon-
sible Fisheries (the Code) encourages principled governance approaches to all 
fisheries.43 The Code calls for application of the precautionary approach and 
setting precautionary reference points for fisheries.44 Although not specifically 
referring to the ecosystem approach, it encourages many elements of such an 
approach, for example, broadening management measures to ensure conser-
vation of not only target species but also species belong to the same  ecosystem; 
39 unga Res. 71/257 (2016), paras. 227, 229. See also unga Res. 71/123 (2016) (sustainable 
fisheries), para. 11.
40 Report on the work of the United Nations’ Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on 
Oceans and the Law of the Sea at its seventh meeting, UN Doc. A/61/156 (2006).
41 unga Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
(2015).
42 Id., Target 14.b.
43 (Rome: fao, 1995).
44 Id., art. 7.5.
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promoting selective and environmentally safe fishing gears and practices; pro-
tecting and rehabilitating all critical fisheries habitats; and managing fisheries 
as a biological unity over entire areas of distribution.45 The Code also encour-
ages the integration of fisheries into coastal area management.46 It further en-
courages application of the social equity principle, calling on states to protect 
the rights and access of small-scale of fishers to secure just livelihoods.47 Spe-
cific guidelines on all four principled aspects of the Code have been developed, 
namely, the ecosystem approaches to fisheries and aquaculture, integrated 
coastal management, and sustainable small-scale fisheries.48
 Multilateral Agreements and Arrangements
Finally, it must be noted that there are other key components in facilitating 
principled ocean governance, and only a broad overview is possible in this 
short essay with a focus on adoption and implementation of precautionary 
and ecosystem approaches. At the global level, international agreements vary 
widely in the strength of their precautionary embraces. The 1996 Protocol 
to the London Convention (LP)49 adopts a strong ‘reverse listing’ approach 
to  precaution whereby only wastes listed on a global ‘safe list’ may be con-
sidered for ocean dumping and only after undergoing waste assessment au-
dits.50 Through 2013 amendments, future ocean fertilization activities will be 
restricted to  small-scale for research purposes and authorization will be sub-
ject to stringent environmental impact assessment requirements.51 The cbd 
calls for a  precautionary approach through its preamble and various decisions 
have emphasized the need for taking a precautionary approach to  proposed 
45 Id., arts. 6.2, 6.6, 6.8, 7.3.1.
46 Id., art. 6.9.
47 Id., art. 6.18.
48 Respectively the following fao documents: The Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries, fao 
Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries No. 4, Suppl. 2 (2003); Ecosystem Approach 
to Aquaculture, fao Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries No. 5, Suppl. 4 (2010); 
Integration of Fisheries into Coastal Area Management, fao Technical Guidelines for Re-
sponsible Fisheries No. 3 (1996); and Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-
Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication (2015).
49 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter, 1972. London, 7 November 1996, 36 i.l.m. 1 (1996).
50 D.L. VanderZwaag, “The International Control of Ocean Dumping: Navigating from Per-
missive to Precautionary Approaches,” in Research Handbook on International Marine En-
vironmental Law, ed., R. Rayfuse (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015), 132–147.
51 International Maritime Organization, Res. LP.4(8) (2013).
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 climate- related geo-engineering activities through biodiversity impact assess-
ments and restricting activities to small-scale scientific research studies.52 The 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants53 has adopted a weak 
version of precaution, requiring detailed scientific risk assessments before a 
chemical can be listed for elimination or restriction.54 Although the Confer-
ence of the Parties (cop) is required to decide on a precautionary manner 
whether to list a chemical, only 28 chemicals have been listed to date.55 The 
Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (unfccc) might be described as adopting a discretionary rather than 
a precautionary approach to climate change mitigation since it give parties 
broad discretion to determine their nationally determined contributions.56
The cbd has encouraged an ecosystem approach to fisheries and broader 
ocean management. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 sets a target 
of ensuring by 2020 that all fish and invertebrates are managed and harvested 
sustainably, legally, and applying ecosystem approaches.57 Two cop decisions 
advocate the ecosystem approach as a strategy for integrated coastal and ocean 
management that promotes conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity 
in an equitable way and provide 12 principles to guide implementation.58
Efforts towards more principled governance have also occurred at the re-
gional level, but overall progress is difficult to assess in light of the numerous 
forms of regional co-operation. They include 18 regional sea programs,59 large 
marine ecosystem projects and arrangements,60 and over 40 regional fisheries 
bodies.61
Common constraints in applying precautionary and ecosystem  approaches do 
stand out for regional fisheries management organizations and  arrangements. 
52 cbd, cop Decision X/33, Biodiversity and Climate Change (2010), para. 8(w).
53 Stockholm, 22 May 2001, 2256 u.n.t.s. 119 (Stockholm Convention).
54 D.L. VanderZwaag, “The Precautionary Approach and the International Control of Toxic 
Chemicals: Beacon of Hope, Sea of Confusion and Dilution,” Houston Journal of Interna-
tional Law 33 (2011): 605, 618–620.
55 Stockholm Convention, supra note 53, art. 8(9); “All pops listed in the Stockholm Con-
vention,” Stockholm Convention Clearing House, accessed 30 November 2017, http://chm 
.pops.int/TheConvention/ThePOPs/AllPOPs/tabid/2509/Default.aspx.
56 unfccc, Decision 1/CP.21 (2015), Annex, “Adoption of the Paris Agreement,” art. 4.
57 cbd, cop Decision X/2, Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 (2010), Annex, Target 6.
58 cbd, cop Decision V/6 (2000) and cop Decision VII/11 (2004).
59 See UN Environment, Moving to Strategy and Action: Regional Seas Outlook for the Imple-
mentation of the Sustainable Development Goals, Regional Seas Reports and Studies No. 
200 (2017).
60 See essay by Kenneth Sherman in this volume.
61 “Regional Fisheries Bodies (rfb)”, fao, accessed 4 December 2017, http://www.fao.org/
fishery/rfb/en.
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Precautionary approach implementation has often floundered through the set-
ting of high total allowable catches even when scientific information is  lacking 
or limited and ignoring or over-riding precautionary scientific advice because 
of socio-economic and political pressures.62 Implementation of the ecosys-
tem approach has been hindered by managerial fixation on standard single 
stock assessments,63 limitations in multispecies and ecosystem modelling,64 
failure to consider changing ocean conditions in decision-making,65 limited 
political interest in subjecting all transboundary fish stocks to co-operative 
management,66 and nominal progress in controlling fisheries bycatch and dis-
cards.67 Limited understanding of complex social-ecological systems is a cross-
cutting issue.68
 Conclusion
As reviewed above, principled ocean governance has certainly edged forward 
from the limited inclusion of the four key principles in unclos. A broad array 
of environmental principles, promoting the overarching goal of sustainable 
development, but equally applicable to the oceans, has now emerged through 
both legally-binding agreements and soft law documents.
62 D.A. Russell and D.L. VanderZwaag, “Ecosystem and Precautionary Approaches to In-
ternational Fisheries Governance: Beacons of Hope, Seas of Confusion and Illusion”, in 
Recasting Transboundary Fisheries Management Arrangements in Light of Sustainabil-
ity Principles, eds., D.A. Russell and D.L. VanderZwaag (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010), 
61–67.
63 M.G. Burgess et al., “Describing Ecosystem Contexts with Single-species Models: A Theo-
retical Synthesis for Fisheries,” Fish and Fisheries 18 (2017): 264–284.
64 See, for example, M.J. Fogarty, “The Art of Ecosystem-based Fishery Management,” Cana-
dian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 71 (2014): 479–490.
65 M. Skern-Mauritzen et al., “Ecosystem Processes Are Rarely Included in Tactical Fisheries 
Management,” Fish and Fisheries 17 (2016): 165–175.
66 See, e.g., D.L. VanderZwaag, M. Bailey and N.L. Schakell, “Canada-U.S. Fisheries Manage-
ment in the Gulf of Maine: Taking Stock and Charting Future Coordinates in the Face of 
Climate Change,” Ocean Yearbook 31 (2017): 3–26.
67 E. Gilman, K. Passfield and K. Nakamura, “Performance of Regional Fisheries Manage-
ment Organizations: Ecosystem-based Governance of Bycatch and Discards,” Fish and 
Fisheries 15 (2014): 327–351.
68 R. Biggs et al., “Strategies for Managing Complex Social-Ecological Systems in the Face of 
Uncertainty: Examples from South Africa and Beyond,” Ecology and Society 20, no. 1 (2015): 
852–866.
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Moving from paper to practice is sure to be a ‘never ending voyage’. Conflicts 
over human values and interests are bound to continue.69 Debates over the 
appropriate balance among economic, environmental, and social dimensions 
of sustainability will not go away.70 Principles, such as ecosystem-based man-
agement, will continue to evolve.71 We are all on the road to kingdom come.72
69 K. Blosselmann, The Principle of Sustainability: Transforming Law and Governance (Burl-
ington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), 207–208.
70 C. Voigt, Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law: Resolving Conflicts 
between Climate Measures and wto Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 3–5.
71 R.D. Long, A. Charles and R.L. Stephenson, “Key Principles of Marine Ecosystem-based 
Management,” Marine Policy 57 (2015): 53–60.
72 D.L. VanderZwaag, “On the Road to Kingdom Come,” in The Challenge of Arctic Ship-
ping: Science, Environmental Assessment, and Human Values, eds., D.L. VanderZwaag and 
C. Lamson (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990), 219–244.
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The Deep Sea Floor as a Battleground for Justice?
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 The Promise of Wealth in the Unknown Depths
In the second half of the twentieth century, marine minerals appeared on the 
radar of scientists, politicians, and industry. Technology was advanced enough 
that seabed mining no longer seemed a futuristic dream, and the area where 
these minerals were found was uncharted territory, meaning that, for a short 
moment, the wealth of the oceans seemed up for grabs.
The mineral that looked most promising in the 1960s, the polymetallic 
nodule,1 had been discovered in 1873 by the crew of the research vessel hms 
Challenger. The first marine manganese nodule was taken on board southwest 
of the Canary Islands, and the vessel continued collecting nodule samples un-
til 1876. The largest deposits reported by the crew were located in the Pacific 
and Indian Oceans, often at great depths.2 It was another 90 years before the 
geologist John L. Mero attempted to calculate the economic value of nodule 
deposits in the oceans. In 1964, he published his study, The Mineral Resources of 
the Sea.3 The estimates looked promising. The nodules, if they were harvested, 
could bring great wealth to those exploiting them.
To prevent a race amongst states or private actors to claim the seafloor, the 
United Nations (UN) set up the Ad-Hoc Seabed Committee to examine the use 
of seabed resources outside national jurisdiction in the interest of mankind.4 
A race was prevented, but the concept of ‘interest of mankind’ needed to be 
given legal meaning. This essay argues that advocates for developing countries 
1 Polymetallic nodules are also referred to as manganese nodules. They are one of the three 
marine mineral resources that are regulated and administered by the International Sea-
bed Authority (isa). The others are polymetallic sulphides and ferromanganese crusts. See 
“Deep Seabed Mineral Resources,” isa, last accessed 2 February 2018, https://www.isa.org.jm/
mineral-resources/55.
2 Cf. G.P. Glasby, “Historical Introduction,” in Marine Manganese Deposits (New York: Elsevier 
Oceanography Scientific Publishing Company, 1977), 1.
3 J.L. Mero, The Mineral Resources of the Sea (New York: Elsevier Oceanography Scientific Pub-
lishing Company, 1964).
4 United Nations General Assembly (unga), UN Doc. GA Resolution 2340 (xxii), 18 December 
1967, A/RES/22/2340.
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used the marine polymetallic manganese nodule, and its potential value, as a 
vehicle for justice in preparation for and during the Third United Nations Law 
of the Sea Conference (unclos iii). They pushed for a holistic ‘ocean treaty’, 
where revenue from marine mineral mining in areas beyond national jurisdic-
tion would be allocated to the benefit of all mankind.
 Arvid Pardo’s Speech Fuels Developing Countries’ Hopes
Mero’s estimates made their way to the UN, transmitted through the  Maltese 
ambassador, Arvid Pardo, when he delivered his famous speech about the ap-
plication of the concept of common heritage of mankind to the seafloor outside 
national jurisdiction in the First Committee of the UNGA on 1 November 1967.5 
Pardo had been working on a proposal since 1966, when the United States (US) 
had commissioned the UN to compile a report on deep-sea resources.6 The 
Maltese government had tested  Pardo’s proposal against the “interest of some 
poor countries (but not the major  powers) in the sea,”7 and it was forwarded to 
the UN in the form of a ‘note verbale’ in August 1967,8 which finally led to Arvid 
Pardo’s speech in November.
Arvid Pardo painted a rosy picture of the resource deposits of the deep seas, 
in which he relied heavily on Mero’s calculations, stating that “the commercial 
exploitation of the mineral resources of the ocean floor, … are imminent.”9 
He anticipated a bright future for the industry, and told his audience that pro-
totypes of commercial mining vehicles were already “under construction.”10 
The same applied to the extraction technology, which sounded quite simple: 
“The nodules will be raked from the ocean floor and pumped into the vessel; 
from the submersible the nodules will be transferred easily to an accompany-
ing cargo-ship by means of floating conduit.”11
5 unga, “Statement of Arvid Pardo,” 1 November 1967, First Committee, 1515th Meeting, UN 
Doc. A/C.1/PV.1515, para. 5.
6 University of Malta—Arvid Pardo Study Area—Pardo Room, Personal Correspondences 
and Materials, Undated letter from Dr. Arvid Pardo to Salvino Bussutil.
7 Id., 2.
8 unga, “Malta: Request for the Inclusion of a Supplementary Item in the Agenda of the 
Twenty-second Session,” Plenary, 22nd Session, 1583rd Meeting, UN Doc. A/6695, 18 
 August 1967.
9 unga, “Statement of Arvid Pardo,” supra note 5, para. 34.
10 Id.
11 Id.
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Today we know that Mero’s estimations were optimistic,12 and that the 
extraction technology was more costly and challenging than Pardo had an-
ticipated in 1967. Still, Pardo’s speech did not come out of the blue. Several 
 countries, led by the United States, had been looking into seabed resources, 
and his speech kick-started activity to realize the concept and potential for 
utilizing marine minerals.
 A Constitution for the Oceans?
Elisabeth Mann Borgese “contacted him [Pardo] immediately,”13 when she 
heard of his speech. At that time, she was working at the Center for the Study 
of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara, California. She had already 
started drafting a proposal on ocean governance and the common heritage of 
mankind, to which an “unknown gentleman in Connecticut”14 had drawn her 
attention. Elisabeth and Arvid started working together during the prepara-
tions for unclos iii, launching four workshops and two conferences, Pacem 
in Maribus (pim) i and ii, which were held in Malta in 1970 and 1971.15
The original idea of their collaboration was to draft “A Constitution for 
the Oceans”16 that would address all issues related to ocean governance 
in a holistic way, but would take care of developing countries in particular, 
by allocating the resources of the deep sea for their benefit. The goal was to 
avoid “institutionaliz[ing] the division between developed and developing 
nations,”17 and to promote “systematic planning for the conservative use of 
ocean resources.”18 Thereby underlining the importance of utilizing the re-
sources on and below the seabed.
12 Cf. C. Sanger, Ordering the Oceans: The Making of the Law of the Sea (London: Zed Books, 
1986), 18.
13 Dalhousie University Archive—Elisabeth Mann Borgese Fond, MS-2-744, Box 345, Folder 4, 
Arvid Pardo Retrospect and Prospect, 1999, 1 [MS-2-744].
14 Id.
15 Cf. Id., 2.; pim Conferences were held until 2013. See “Pacem in Maribus (pim) Confer-
ences,” International Ocean Institute, https://www.ioinst.org/about-1/ioi-story/pacem-in 
-maribus-pim-conferences/.
16 MS-2-744, id, Box 43, Folder 48, discussion on “a constitution for the oceans.” See also, 
S.V. Scott, “The los Convention as a Constitutional Regime for the Oceans,” in Stability 
and Change in the Law of the Sea: The Role of the los Convention, ed., A.G. Oude Elferink 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), 9–38.
17 MS-2-744, id, Box 43, Folder 48, 2.
18 Id.
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The first pim conference was about bringing together scientists, political 
leaders and industry to represent “the internationalization of research & de-
velopment,” “the world community of science,” and “the world community 
of production.”19 Their task was to discuss the utilization of resources, the 
ecology of the ocean and the role of scientists.20 Elisabeth compiled the out-
comes of pim i in a final report. Not all participants agreed on all issues. The 
US oil industry and its supporters in Congress wanted to operate on a “first 
come, first served”21 basis, and were critical towards the concept of “common 
heritage.”22 There had been a “de facto boycott called by the American Petro-
leum Institute,”23 not to appear at the Malta conference.
James Dawson, an insurance expert from Britain pointed out that the in-
dustry was oblivious to the challenges ocean-based mining would pose. He 
warned that land-oriented industry was “leaping into the sea as if the seabed 
were a flat prairie where skies are always blue and the sea-weed as high as a 
sea-elephant’s eye.”24 The American economist Neil Jacoby warned against a 
“carry-over of terrestrial thinking into the maritime environment,”25 since “too 
little is known about seabed geology to evaluate concession areas today ….”26
There was concern from scientists that they were “caught in an acute pro-
fessional crisis,”27 torn as they were between fast-developing new technologies 
and industry interests. Paul Ehrlich, a Center Associate, warned of “ecocide”28 
if the oceans were swamped by industry interest without regard for scientif-
ic knowledge. Others, meanwhile, were concerned that freedom of research 
would be put at risk if researchers had to avoid collecting data from remote 
places for fear of causing “exploitation by foreign commercial interests.”29
The differing opinions on successful ocean mining and meaningful alloca-
tion of revenue showed even in the 1970s that the discussions in the United 
Nations would not be easy. Not only was there a mixture of more or less veri-
fied scientific knowledge on the technological possibilities and the potential 
economic value of the marine minerals, there was also no agreement on how 
19 Id., Box 43, Folder 49.
20 Id., 1.
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to govern those resources once they were accessible. Elisabeth concluded, 
“Ocean resources are not static, but are the product of a rapidly changing ma-
rine technology.”30
 No Peace without Economic Justice?
The discord amongst participants of pim i was reflected in the discussions at 
unclos iii. Those who wanted to use the revenue of the resources in the area 
outside jurisdiction for the benefit of all mankind found themselves battling 
resistance from industry and politicians, who wanted to keep the freedom of 
the seas intact and, if possible, apply it to the seafloor. The first draft of Arvid 
Pardo’s ‘Ocean Space Treaty’31 was taken to Caracas by the Maltese delegation, 
but was not carried further, since it was too ‘holistic’. Ultimately Part xi of the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea32 (unclos) secured 
the principle that resources on the seafloor beyond national jurisdiction would 
be the common heritage of mankind, and the International Seabed Authority 
(isa) was established. Unfortunately, the later 1994 Implementing Agreement 
to the unclos abolished much of its meaning,33 risking that those who rati-
fied the Convention, many of them developing countries, would have to pay for 
an administrative authority without ever seeing any revenue.34
 Prognosis of Commercial Exploitation of Seabed Resources
Despite Arvid Pardo’s positive prognosis that ‘commercial exploitation’ of sea-
bed resources was just around the corner, deep-sea mining has seemed to be 
30 Id., 4.
31 unga, “Draft of Ocean Space Treaty, paper submitted by Malta,” Committee on the Peace-
ful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 23 
August 1971, UN Doc. A/AC.138/53.
32 Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 u.n.t.s. 3 [unclos].
33 For a discussion on amendments and the agreement that modified Part xi of the  unclos, 
see E. Mann Borgese, The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resources—A Re-
port to the Club of Rome (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1998), 111–113; D. Free-
stone and A.G. Oude Elferink, “Flexibility and Innovation in the Law of the Sea: Will the 
los Convention Amendment Procedures Ever be Used?” in Oude Elferink, supra note 16, 
169–221.
34 Cf. A.G. Kirton and S.C. Vasciannie, “Deep Seabed Mining under the Law of the Sea Con-
vention and the Implementation Agreement: Developing Country Perspective,” Social 
and Economic Studies 51, no. 2 (2002), 63–115 at 113. See also P.B. Payoyo, Cries of the Sea 
World Inequality, Sustainable Development and the Common Heritage of Humanity (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997).
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on the horizon for decades without ever really reaching the depths.35 Recent 
projects have looked into mining on the continental shelf,36 but deep-sea min-
ing in ‘the Area’ at depths of up to 4,000 m, as Pardo predicted, has yet to  occur. 
By 2017, although 27 contractors have entered into exploration contracts with 
the isa, it still remains uncertain when industrial exploitation of deep sea 
minerals will actually begin to take place in the Area outside national juris-
diction.37 Until this happens, there will be no revenue flow to the isa.38 The 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is still looking into national 
borders on the continental shelf, which will then define the Area, while other 
open questions include how to handle the contiguous zone.39
 Conclusion
In 1967, idealists like Arvid Pardo and Elisabeth Mann Borgese, saw a chance to 
secure a ‘more just world order’ by allocating resources that were outside na-
tional jurisdiction to the benefit of all mankind. The promising economic po-
tential John L. Mero saw in the polymetallic nodule in 1958 was the engine for 
this development. In 1967, the time seemed right. Maritime boundaries were 
still flexible, a potential source of wealth was discovered in ‘uncharted terri-
tory,’ and former colonies entered the international arena as developing states 
with the chance to shape international treaties in a way that could be beneficial 
for them. Much has changed since the 1970s, and it remains to be seen how 
much of the common heritage of mankind concept will be left once mining 
activity starts in the Area, the sea floor outside national jurisdiction.
35 See J. Harrison, Making the Law of the Sea: A Study in the Development of International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 115–153.
36 See, e.g., “World’s First Success in Continuous Ore Lifting Test for Seafloor Polymetallic 
Sulphides,” Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 26 September 2017, http://
www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2017/0926_004.html; srk Consulting, “png, Tonga, Fiji, 
Solomon Islands, New Zealand, Vanuatu and the isa,” NI 43-101 Technical Report 2011, 
prepared for Nautilus Minerals Incorporated (March 2012), http://www.nautilusminerals 
.com/irm/PDF/1054_0/TechnicalReport2011PNGotherSouthPacificnationsandtheISA; 
“Exploration 2007–2013,” Nautilus Minerals Incorporated, http://www.nautilusminerals 
.com/IRM/Company/ShowPage.aspx?CategoryId=190&CPID=1553&EID=99064433.
37 See “Deep Seabed Minerals Contractors,” isa, last accessed 2 February 2018, https://www 
.isa.org.jm/deep-seabed-minerals-contractors.
38 With regards to the controversy concerning the common heritage of mankind, see K.M.W. 
Owolabi, “The Principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind,” Nnamdi Azikiwe University 
Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence 4 (2013): 51–56.
39 With regards to future challenges, see D. Vidas ed., Law, Technology and Science for 
Ocean in Globalisation: iuu Fishing, Oil Pollution, Bioprospecting, Outer Continental Shelf 
(Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011).
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Article 82 of unclos: A Clear Outcome of  
the ‘Package Deal’ Approach of the Convention 
Negotiation
Frida M. Armas-Pfirter
University of Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina
 Introduction
Article 82 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(unclos)1 is one of the new additions to the international law of the sea. 
 Article 82, paragraph 1, provides, inter alia,
The coastal State shall make payments or contributions in kind in respect 
of the exploitation of the non-living resources of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of 
the territorial sea is measured.
Its implementation is not an easy task and raises many problems.2 But, seeing 
the glass as half full, we also need to acknowledge that there are some impor-
tant elements that have already been defined, e.g., the rate and grace period of 
the payments and contributions, the institution through which the payments 
shall be made, and the basic criteria to distribute the funds collected.
This positive approach to the problem does not imply minimizing several 
complex issues whose resolution is still pending. Undoubtedly, it is necessary to 
solve them to provide greater certainty to the offshore industry and to the work 
of the International Seabed Authority (isa). This essay briefly considers the 
origin and rationale of Article 82, but cannot attempt to solve all the problems. 
Rather it tries to provide useful elements for their solution and, in particular, it 
identifies various problems with respect to the three actors involved in imple-
mentation of Article 82: the coastal state, the isa, and the beneficiary states.
1 Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 u.n.t.s. 3. The 1958 Geneva Convention (infra note 3) 
did not have a provision similar to Art. 82.
2 International Seabed Authority (isa), Issues Associated with the Implementation of Article 82 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, isa Technical Study No. 4 (Kingston: 
isa, 2009). This study was a revised version of a legal study prepared by Aldo Chircop for the 
isa seminar that discussed this issue.
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 The Rights of Coastal States over the Continental Shelf  
and Article 82
As dealt with in Part vi of unclos, the continental shelf, as a natural prolon-
gation of the coastal state’s land territory, comprises the seabed and subsoil of 
the submarine areas that extend beyond the territorial sea to the outer edge 
of the continental margin or to a distance of 200 nautical miles (M) from the 
baselines, where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend 
up to that distance. The entitlement to the continental shelf has always been 
based on the right of the coastal state over the land, although its formulation 
has evolved. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf3 linked the 
right of the coastal state over the continental shelf to ‘adjacency’, and ten years 
later, the International Court of Justice added the concept of ‘natural prolon-
gation’ to that of adjacency:
the rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf 
that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and un-
der the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over 
the land, and as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for 
the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources.4
Natural prolongation as a basis for rights over the continental shelf is set out 
in Article 76, paragraph 1 of unclos, and is also considered customary inter-
national law. This right applies to the entire shelf as “there is in law only a 
single continental shelf rather than an inner continental shelf and a separate 
extended or outer continental shelf.”5
3 Geneva, 29 April 1958, 499 u.n.t.s. 311 [1958 Geneva Convention], art. 1: “The term ‘continen-
tal shelf ’ is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to 
the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that 
limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits the exploitation of the natural 
resources of the said areas.”
4 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 i.c.j. Reports, para. 19. See also F.M. Armas-Pfirter, 
“Working paper on Potential Options on Equitable Distribution of Payments and Contribu-
tions,” in isa, Implementation of Article 82 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, isa Technical Study No. 12 (Kingston: isa, 2013), Annex 6, 83–97, 83–88.
5 Arbitral Tribunal, Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, 2006, para. 213 in fine, 66. This statement 
by the Arbitral Tribunal has been, according to Shabtai Rosenne, “a useful and important 
clarification.” See S. Rosenne, “Arbitrations under Annex vii of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea,” in Law of the Sea, Environmental Law, and Settlement of Disputes: 
Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas A. Mensah, eds., T.M. Ndiaye and R. Wolfrum (Leiden: Brill 
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Article 77 further defines the rights of the coastal state over the shelf as ex-
clusive, not dependent on occupation or an express proclamation.6 Despite 
this concept of single shelf, it is clear that the Article treats the exploitation 
of non-living resources differently whether within or beyond 200 M. This dif-
ference needs to be understood in the historical context of the decade of ne-
gotiations during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. 
When the Conference sessions began in 1973, the 1958 Geneva Convention was 
in force for more than fifty states and, therefore, the exclusive right of a coastal 
state over the resources of the continental shelf adjacent to its coast, up to 200 
meters depth or up to where exploitation was feasible, was widely accepted. 
This reference to the possibility of exploitation to determine the limit made 
it indefinite and subject to technological advances. Bearing in mind that one 
of the driving forces of the Conference was the need to establish a new in-
ternational legal regime (‘the Area’7) for the seabed and its resources beyond 
national jurisdiction, the ‘common heritage of mankind’, it was necessary to 
clearly establish the limits to coastal states’ continental shelves.
A group of states, known as the broad-margin states or margineers,8 acted 
jointly with a clear goal: to consolidate their claim to rights over the shelf fol-
lowing the criterion of natural prolongation, without being constrained by the 
200-M exclusive economic zone (eez).9 As a result of the negotiations, the 
concept of continental shelf as the natural prolongation of a coastal state’s ter-
ritory was consecrated. Therefore, the continental shelf, whether it is inside or 
outside 200 M, is not part of the Area. But the margineers had to make some 
concessions:
– The outer limit of the continental shelf had to be determined according 
to the criteria and restrictions established in Article 76, with the interven-
tion of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.
– The coastal state has the obligation to make payments or contributions 
in kind, not exceeding 7 per cent, with respect to the exploitation of non-
living resources beyond 200 M, and provided it is not a net importer of 
Nijhoff, 2007), 1004. See also later cases: Bangladesh v. Myanmar (itlos, 2012); Bangladesh 
v. India (Arbitral Tribunal, 2014); Nicaragua v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections (icj, 2016).
6 1958 Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 2(2–3); unclos supra note 1, art. 77(2–3).
7 unclos, id., Part xi. For a discussion of the regime of the Area and its importance, see other 
essays in this section of this volume.
8 Broad-margin states include Argentina, Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, New Zealand, Nor-
way, the United States, and Uruguay.
9 See unclos, supra note 1, Part v.
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the mineral resource produced.10 This concept arose as the only viable 
compromise for an extension of the continental shelf beyond 200 M.
It was a quid pro quo in the ‘package deal’ approach adopted in the negotiation 
of the Convention. The final outcome was that the whole continental shelf 
and its resources are subject to the coastal states’ sovereign rights and they 
are separate from the Area and the ‘common heritage’ principle. Further, the 
exploitation of non-living resources is subject to a form of ‘servitude’,11 which is 
established in Part vi (continental shelf). In Part xi (the Area), it is only men-
tioned in relation to the powers of the isa.
There are dissimilar conceptions of the essence of this rule, and conse-
quently, the extent of the coastal state’s rights over the continental shelf be-
yond 200 M. According to one interpretation, the limit of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 M is an ‘encroachment’ on the Area, a sort of “transitional zone 
between the areas within the limits of national jurisdiction and the area be-
yond the limits of national jurisdiction.”12 For those who take this view, the 
payments and contributions of the coastal state are resources that are the 
common heritage of mankind and, as such, must be distributed by the isa.
Others, on the contrary, focus on the fact that by definition, the natural pro-
longation of the state’s territory—the continental shelf—cannot be part of the 
Area, which is “the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the lim-
its of national jurisdiction.” For this reason, during the negotiation of unclos, 
several of the margineer states maintained their opposition to the concept 
of ‘revenue sharing’ until the end, not only due to its economic aspect, but 
also because it implied establishing a dual regime for the continental shelf.13  
10 See D.H. Anderson, “The Status Under International Law of the Maritime Areas Around 
Svalbard,” Ocean Development & International Law 40 (2009): 373–384; T. Koivurova, “The 
Actions of the Arctic States Respecting the Continental Shelf: A Reflective Essay,” Ocean 
Development & International Law, 42, no. 3 (2011): 211–226, 215; T.L. McDorman, “The Con-
tinental Shelf Regime in the Law of the Sea Convention: A Reflection on the First Thirty 
Years,” The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 27 (2012): 743–751.
11 See A. Chircop, “Development of Guidelines for the Implementation of Article 82,” in isa 
Technical Study No. 12, supra note 4, Annex 4, 35–68.
12 Cf. E.D. Brown, The International Law of the Sea, Volume i, Introductory Manual (London: 
Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1994), 262–263. See also R.R. Churchill and 
A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3rd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 
156–157.
13 Cf. A.L. Daverede, La plataforma continental—Los intereses argentinos en el nuevo derecho 
del mar (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, Colección Instituto del 
Servicio Exterior de la Nación 2, 1983), 89, 94–95; J.A. Yturriaga Barberan De, Ámbitos de 
Jurisdicción en la Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho del Mar (Madrid: 
Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1996), 280–281.
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The concession of Article 82 is considered by this position as a result of the 
negotiation of all the issues as a ‘package deal’.14
 Role of the International Seabed Authority in Relation to Article 82
As noted above, Article 82 provides the isa with a limited, yet essential, role as 
the ‘channel’ through which payments and contributions go from the coastal 
state to the developing state beneficiaries.15 The isa was established under 
 unclos as the autonomous body through which states parties “shall … or-
ganize and control activities in the Area, particularly with a view to adminis-
tering the resources of the Area.”16 According to unclos and the Agreement 
relating to the Implementation of Part xi of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (1994 Agreement),17 the isa’s functions 
are fulfilled by its three main organs, namely, the Assembly, the Council and 
the Secretariat, and by two subsidiary ones, the Legal and Technical Commis-
sion and the Finance Committee.18
The 1994 Agreement specifies the role that each organ of the isa has in the 
distribution of benefits and development of the equitable sharing criteria. The 
Legal and Technical Commission is in charge of formulating and submitting to 
the Council the rules, regulations, and procedures related to the distribution 
of benefits, to keep them under review, and to recommend, from time to time, 
such amendments thereto as it may deem necessary or desirable.19
14 See, e.g., the US delegation’s report noting: “Revenue sharing for exploitation of the conti-
nental shelf beyond 200 M from the coast is part of a package that establishes with clarity 
and legal certainty the control of coastal States over the full extent of their geological 
continental margins.” Quoted by A. Roach and R. Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims, 3rd 
ed. (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), 192.
15 McDorman, supra note 10, 751. It is worth considering that during the negotiations, there 
were proposals to designate other UN bodies or regional economic organizations as re-
cipients, so that contributions were not confused with the resources that are the common 
heritage of mankind.
16 unclos, supra note 1, art. 157; Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part xi of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December, 1982, 28 July 1994, 33 
i.l.m. 1309 (1994) [1994 Agreement], Annex, s. 1.1.
17 1994 Agreement, id.
18 The Finance Committee was not established by unclos but in the 1994 Agreement, 
with the task to oversee the financing and financial management of the Authority, 
and has a central role in the administration of the Authority’s financial and budgetary 
arrangements.
19 1994 Agreement, supra note 16, art. 165, para. 2 (a), (f) and (g).
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In turn, the Council’s functions include, specifically, recommending to the 
Assembly rules, regulations, and procedures on the equitable sharing of the 
payments and contributions made by coastal states pursuant to Article 82.20 
For its part, the Assembly has to consider and approve them.21
The Finance Committee has a role regarding all activities that could have 
financial implications for the isa. The 1994 Agreement establishes that the 
Assembly and the Council should consider its recommendations, as regards, 
among others, “rules, regulations and procedures on the equitable sharing of 
financial and other economic benefits derived from activities in the Area and 
the decisions to be made thereon.”22 Although the payments and contribu-
tions in Article 82 are not related to the ‘activities in the Area’, a recommenda-
tion by the Finance Committee might be worthwhile regarding the equitable 
sharing criteria. In any event, the importance of the isa in the framework of 
Article 82 and the problems of fulfilling its mandate are undeniable. There is 
no doubt that the isa must somehow provide for and have in place the means 
to be able to collect and distribute the payments and contributions, and to be 
able to organize the workload that this task will imply.
 State Beneficiaries
The beneficiaries of payments or contributions are the ‘states parties’ to 
 unclos. However, the payments or contributions are not going to be dis-
tributed evenly. Article 82, paragraph 4, establishes that this will be done “on 
the  basis of equitable sharing criteria, taking into account the interests and 
needs of developing States, particularly the least developed and the land-
locked among them.” The list of least developed countries is reviewed every 
three years by the United Nations Economic and Social Council, and there are 
currently 47 states on the list.23 The land-locked states, which were, to a great 
20 Id., art. 162, para. 2(o) and (i). These recommendations need to be adopted by consensus, 
in accordance with Article 161, paragraph 8(d): “Decisions on questions of substance aris-
ing under the following provisions shall be taken by consensus: Article 162, paragraph 2 
(m) and (o).”
21 Id., Article 160, paragraph 2 (f), (i), and subparagraph (g), also grants the Assembly the 
power “to decide upon the equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits 
derived from activities in the Area,” but it must be borne in mind that the funds of Article 
82 are not benefits derived from activities in the Area.
22 Id., Annex, s. 9(7). See also Rule 11 (f) of the Rules of Procedure of the Finance Committee.
23 See “ldc List,” United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (June 2017), 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category/ldcs-at 
-a-glance.html.
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extent, the driving force behind the adoption of Article 82, must also be privi-
leged. Some states have both characteristics and others have only one of the 
two. These and other considerations show that Article 82, paragraph 4, opens 
many options for the implementation of payments and contributions.24
 Conclusion
It is clear that the need to operationalize Article 82 is becoming increasingly 
pressing in the face of the technological advances making it possible to exploit 
hydrocarbons at greater depths. The media has already referred to a real pos-
sibility that Canada may be the first country to make payments and contribu-
tions, and also to the demand made by companies for a clear regulation on the 
manner in which that international obligation will affect royalties.25
In addition, a good working relationship with the states parties to unclos 
is essential for the work of the isa, as the implementation of Article 82 will 
have consequences in its functioning and the costs involved. It is also neces-
sary for the isa to develop the equitable sharing criteria in advance, to avoid 
problems when the time comes, and to provide for the necessary infrastruc-
ture or personnel requirements. But unclos carefully avoided including 
powers either of the isa or other states that may restrain coastal states when 
complying with the obligation imposed by Article 82, even though Article 82 
must be fulfilled in good faith as with all the other obligations set forth in the 
Convention.26 Compliance with Article 82 may potentially be subject to the 
dispute settlement procedures in the Convention, however, and this poses a 
number of challenges.27
24 See a detailed analysis of the beneficiaries and criteria in Armas-Pfirter, supra note 4.
25 Canada has a number of offshore licenses in the continental shelf beyond 200 M. See, 
among others, W. Spicer, “Canada, the Law of the Sea Treaty and International Payments: 
Where Will the Money Come From?” The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, spp 
Research Papers, 8, no. 31 (September 2015), https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/03/final-law-sea-spicer.pdf.
26 unclos, supra note 1, art. 300.
27 As noted in isa, supra note 2, at 67, “The challenges associated with the resolution of 
Article 82 disputes highlight the need for close cooperation between the concerned 
ocs States and the Authority to resolve differences before they degenerate into 
disputes.”
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There have been proposals for an agreement or guidelines in the workshops 
organized by the isa and in its published papers.28 But not much progress has 
been made thus far. Perhaps an option to move faster without generating resis-
tance among coastal states would be to encourage negotiations among states 
in relation to implementation of Article 82. These negotiations may take place, 
although not exclusively, within the isa’s sphere, but avoiding granting the or-
ganization the role of control over the coastal states’ activity.
At the same time, the isa is not precluded from moving forward specifically 
in the tasks assigned indisputably to it by UNCLOS, that is, defining the equi-
table sharing criteria that best take into account the interests and needs of de-
veloping states, particularly the least developed and land-locked among them, 
and analyzing the options of administrative, accounting, and personnel orga-
nization that it may deem necessary to receive and distribute the payments.
28 Several have already been referred to, see Technical Study No. 4, supra note 2; No. 5: “Non-
living Resources of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles: Speculations on the 
Implementation of Article 82 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” 
(2010); No. 12, supra note 4; No. 15: “A Study of Key Terms in Article 82 of the Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea” (2016).
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The Common Heritage of Mankind: Expanding  
the Oceanic Circle
Prue Taylor
School of Architecture and Planning, University of Auckland,  
Auckland, New Zealand
Like life itself, the new order started in the deep ocean, which has been 
declared the ‘common heritage of mankind’ and it is expanding over the 
seas and oceans to the coastal zones until it embraces the whole bio-
sphere in ‘the majesty of the oceanic circle’.1
∵
 Mother of the Oceans, Father of the Law of the Sea
Elisabeth Mann Borgese became known as the ‘Mother of the Oceans’. This 
title embraced both her deep love and respect for the oceans and her enor-
mous contribution to oceans governance, including development of the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos).2 In this task, she 
worked closely with her friend and colleague, Arvid Pardo, former Maltese am-
bassador to the United Nations (UN). Appropriately, his contributions to the 
international law of the sea earned him the title: ‘Father of the law of the sea’. 
From 1967 onwards, they worked as a team advocating for adoption of the ethi-
cal and legal concept ‘common heritage of mankind’ (chm) in unclos.
Central to their work was a shared understanding of the oceans as a com-
plex integrated ecological system, sometimes expressed as the ‘whole of ocean 
space’ or the ‘marine environment’. Their objective was to ensure that ocean’s 
plenitude continued to sustain present and future generations and that its uses 
contributed to peace, security, and the equitable development of peoples. To 
achieve this, a new legal principle was required; one which claimed all ocean 
space as a commons (belonging to all humankind), and placed it under an 
1 E. Mann Borgese, “The Oceanic Circle,” Ocean Yearbook 14 (2000): 1.
2 Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 u.n.t.s. 3.
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international commons management regime, for the benefit of all. Pardo 
summed up chm in these words:
In ocean space, … the time has come to recognise as a basic principle 
of international law the overriding common interest of mankind in the 
 preservation of the quality of the marine environment and in the ra-
tional and equitable development of resources lying beyond national 
jurisdiction.3
This created a new legal regime. States become charged with a legal respon-
sibility to prioritize and act consistently with the common interests of all 
 humanity. They are no longer free to act solely in their individual national or 
collective self-interests. chm creates a kind of trust:
[S]tates suspend or do not assert rights or claims, or in some cases exer-
cise such jurisdiction only within set limits, for the benefit of the whole 
human community, without any immediate return, and conserve and if 
necessary manage areas in conformity with the common interest for the 
benefit of all mankind.4
chm posed a radical challenge for traditional international law, in particular 
the centrality of state sovereignty, the cornerstone of international law, and the 
prioritization of national self-interests. Elisabeth and Arvid were required to 
stanchly defend chm against claims of ‘utopianism’. The existing international 
legal regime, the ‘freedom of the high seas’, was an open access regime that 
left the oceans vulnerable to degradation and therefore had to change. What 
began as a doctrine suited to the needs of traditional maritime empires had be-
come a right to overfish and a license to pollute.5 Despite the difficulties, they 
argued that necessity required a new principle of law given the grave risks aris-
ing from competition for and exploitation of ocean resources, together with 
the inadequacy of traditional international law principles. Critically, chm did 
not disregard the individual interests of states, but rather placed them in the 
longer term collective context of the ‘common good’.6 In 1971, Arvid drafted an 
3 A. Pardo, The Common Heritage; Selected Papers on Oceans and World Order 1967–1974 (Val-
letta: Malta University Press, 1975), 176.
4 A. Kiss, “The Common Heritage of Mankind: Utopia or Reality?” Law in the International 
Community 40, no. 3 (1985): 423–441, 427.
5 A. Beesley, “Grotius and the New Law,” Ocean Yearbook 18 (2004): 98–116, 105.
6 Pardo, supra note 3.
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Ocean Space Treaty to “show how [chm] could be implemented in the marine 
environment as [an integrated] whole.”7
Elisabeth and Arvid worked tirelessly to champion chm and its legal imple-
mentation in the law of the sea and, ultimately, unclos. Where they perhaps 
differed was in their response to the outcome of the negotiations. A combi-
nation of political and economic factors greatly restricted the scope of chm 
to mineral resources on the deep seabed and ocean floor in areas outside of 
national jurisdiction.8 unclos did not apply chm to the entire ocean environ-
ment as a complex and interconnected ecological whole. This created ‘ecologi-
cal nonsense’ that left much of the oceans vulnerable to traditional notions of 
state sovereignty (including creeping claims of sovereign jurisdiction), com-
mon property, and freedom of the high seas. Arvid expressed grave disappoint-
ment with this outcome.9
In contrast, Elisabeth remained wholly committed to the larger vision of 
chm. She saw the use of chm in unclos as a seed, from which a more ex-
pansive regime would eventually grow. For Elisabeth (and others) chm em-
braced a moral force that unifies humanity and is capable of generating an 
integrated or coherent “view of ourselves in our environment that is both new 
and old” and “attempts to blend Western scientific values with Eastern philo-
sophical values.”10 That this vision has not yet come to fruition was not a disap-
pointment but an indication that the ‘philosophical setting’ for chm is not yet 
in place.11 To this day, the ethical and moral foundation of the International 
Oceans Institute remains upholding and expanding chm.12
7 A. Pardo, “The Origins of the 1967 Malta Initiative,” International Insights 9, no. 2 (1993): 
65–69, 67.
8 unclos, supra note 2, art. 136 provides that the ‘Area’ and its resources are the common 
heritage of mankind (chm). ‘Area’ is defined in Article 1(1) as “the seabed and ocean floor 
and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” Resources are defined in 
Article 133.
9 E. Mann Borgese, “Arvid Pardo (1914–1999): In Memoriam,” Ocean Yearbook 14 (2000): 
xix–xxxviii. Note however the relevance of chm to the role of the International Seabed 
Authority (isa) and law relating to outer space, the moon, natural and cultural heritage, 
and Antarctica. See P. Taylor, “The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind,” in Re-
search Handbook on Fundamental Concepts of Environmental Law, ed., D. Fisher (Chelten-
ham: Edward Elgar, 2016), 306–333, 313–316.
10 E. Mann Borgese, The Future of the Oceans: A Report to the Club of Rome (Montreal: Har-
vest House, 1986), 131.
11 Id., 125–134.
12 See “ioi Vision, Mission and Goals,” International Ocean Institute (ioi), https://www.ioinst 
.org/about-1/vision-mission-and-goals/.
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 Today—A New Dawn for the Original Vision
Where are we today—50 years on from Pardo’s 1967 UN speech (which launched 
chm and led to unclos negotiations) and 35 years on from  unclos? Sadly, 
the oceans are in a far more dire state than 50 years ago. The cumulative impact 
of multiple interconnected threats to the health of the oceans now imperils its 
regenerative capacity.13 We also have a more comprehensive understanding of 
the oceans as a complex interconnected ecological system and an integral part 
of the Earth’s climate system.14
The paradox of recent scientific discoveries (e.g., seamounts and thermal 
vents) is that we both know more while also appreciating how little we know. 
The magnitude of the unknown calls into serious question our ability to judge 
the ecological impact of human activities.15 Alongside scientific knowledge 
comes a better appreciation of the multidimensional failures of internation-
al environmental law (including the law of the sea) to halt or turn back the 
continuing trajectory of large-scale cumulative ocean degradation. A recent 
analysis described international environmental law as immature, underdevel-
oped, and ineffective.16 It is a legal system that does not yet adequately serve 
the “greater interests of humanity and planetary welfare.”17 Taken together, the 
need for radical change foreseen by Arvid and Elisabeth, articulated as the prin-
ciple of chm, is now much more urgent than ever before.
Where then, is the new dawn or opportunity for chm? It comes in the form 
of UN discussions on another implementing agreement to unclos.18 This 
13 See Group of Experts of the Regular Process, “First Global Integrated Marine Assessment: 
World Ocean Assessment 1,” United Nations (2016), http://www.un.org/depts/los/global 
_reporting/WOA_RPROC/WOACompilation.pdf.
14 The ocean and cryosphere are the subject of a special report to the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, due in 2019 (https://www.ipcc.ch/report/srocc/). Earth system 
science establishes what we have long known: the oceans are both the giver and sustainer 
of all life on Earth. See W. Steffen, “The Planetary Boundaries Framework: Defining a Safe 
Operating Space for Humanity,” in The Safe Operating Space Treaty: A New Approach to 
Managing the Earth’s System Use, eds., P. Magalhães et al. (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cam-
bridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), 23–47.
15 C.L. Van Dover et al., “Biodiversity Loss from Deep-seabed Mining,” Nature Geoscience 10 
(June 2017): 464–465, doi.org/10.1038/ngeo2983.
16 F. Francioni, “International Common Goods: An Epilogue,” in International Law for 
Common Goods: Normative Perspectives on Human Rights, Culture and Nature, eds., A.F. 
 Vrdoljak and F. Lenzerini (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014), 443–448.
17 Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), [1997] icj Re-
ports 7, separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry, at C(c).
18 United Nations General Assembly (unga), Report of the Preparatory Committee estab-
lished by General Assembly resolution 69/292, UN Doc. A/AC.287/2017/PC.4/2 (2017).
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is currently framed as a regime for the ‘conservation and sustainable use of 
marine biological diversity’. Could chm be used as the normative basis for 
this new regime, in a manner consistent with the original vision of Arvid and 
Elisabeth?
Before outlining how this could occur, it must be noted that the scope of 
this future regime is currently limited to marine biological diversity in ‘areas 
beyond national jurisdiction’ (abnj), i.e., the high seas. This is so despite the 
fact that it makes no sense from an ecological perspective as it perpetuates the 
problem of a lack of legal and practical co-ordination between the manage-
ment of areas within and areas beyond national jurisdiction, and can under-
mine ecological outcomes. In the view of jurist Tullio Treves, the reasons are 
ideological and historical. “State sovereignty is seen as a supreme value: any 
idea that could question recently obtained and hard-fought extensions of it 
are considered with suspicion and rejected off hand by a substantial number 
of States.”19 In his view, despite persuasive arguments for a different approach, 
and the growing awareness of the problems, change will only come slowly and 
“it is a political requirement” to proceed on this limited basis.20
This essay argues for a very different approach: the magnitude and ur-
gency of the problems faced no longer affords us the time for slow incremen-
tal change! Drawing from the vision of Elisabeth and Arvid, chm can—and 
must—be used as the overarching normative concept for a whole of ocean 
space regime; encompassing the seabed, the water column, surface and space 
above, as an interconnected ecological whole. In this way, chm extends across 
and co-ordinates priorities and interaction within and between all pre-existing 
ocean jurisdictions.
This approach does not deny state sovereignty. When applied within nation-
al jurisdiction, states retain the legal power to control and regulate activities. 
But this sovereign authority is subject to limitations (or ecological responsi-
bilities) specifically designed to protect the interests of all, by serving the well-
being of the whole. In this way, chm rejects unfettered sovereignty, but does 
not replace it with an international common or joint property regime.21 Given 
the diverse capacities, approaches, and results obtained from the exercise of 
sovereign rights in national jurisdiction, a period and process for co-ordinating 
19 T. Treves, “Principles and Objectives of the Legal Regime Governing Areas Beyond Na-
tional Jurisdiction,” in The International Legal Region of Areas Beyond National Jurisdic-
tion: Current and Future Developments, eds., E.J. Molenaar and A.G. Oude Elferink (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2010), 7–25, 12.
20 Id.
21 This misunderstanding of chm caused its rejection by developing states in the context of 
the UN Convention on Biological Diversity. Taylor, supra note 9, 316.
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ecological responsibilities would be required, together with a more expansive 
understanding of benefit and burden sharing. As Peter Sand’s research dem-
onstrates, precedents exist within international biodiversity policy and law. 
States are already beginning to act as global environmental trustees, in a man-
ner that strengthens (not weakens) their sovereign legitimacy.22
As applied to abnj, an additional key element of chm would be that of non-
appropriation—preventing states from claiming or exercising sovereignty/
sovereign rights over abnj. The objective is to halt continued and new forms of 
creeping sovereignty, thereby protecting abnj as a global ecological commons; 
belonging to all but owned by none. This will require better delimitation of 
existing and extended claims to national jurisdiction,23 in addition to halting 
claims to parts of abnj. chm fundamentally changes the existing ‘freedom of 
the high seas’ regime. It constrains the exercise of those freedoms (e.g., fishing, 
navigation, pipe and cable laying)24 by the fulfilment of ecological responsi-
bilities that prioritize and meet the interests of all. This is very different from 
the current understanding according to which these freedoms or rights are 
constrained only by the rule of ‘due regard’ to the interests of other states ex-
ercising those rights.25 In short, chm places ‘use rights’ within the overarching 
prior context of ecological responsibilities. States are required to act as global 
environmental trustees.
By using chm as an overarching normative concept, in the manner outlined 
above, we create a very important opportunity; to strengthen and commit in 
moral solidarity (and legal form) to the objective of protecting and restoring 
the oceans as an integrated ecological system. This requires us to clarify the 
relationship between protection/restoration and human use. As ecological in-
tegrity is clearly the precondition for long-term well-being of all life, of which 
humans are a part, its protection/restoration must be the clearly articulated 
objective.26 To achieve this, we can no longer employ the techniques of a weak, 
‘do no harm’ approach. These approaches, especially in the context of biodi-
versity protection, use vague obligations that leave space for a ‘balancing of 
interests’. This enables governments to sacrifice (or trade off) the integrity of 
22 P.H. Sand, “The Concept of Public Trusteeship in the Transboundary Governance of Bio-
diversity,” in Transboundary Governance of Biodiversity, eds., L. Kotzé and T. Marauhn 
(Leiden: Brill, 2014), 34–64.
23 A.G. Oude Elferink, “The Regime of the Area: Delineating the Scope of Application of 
the Common Heritage Principle and Freedom of the High Seas,” International Journal of 
Maritime and Coastal Law 22, no. 1(2007): 143–176.
24 unclos, supra note 2, art. 87(1).
25 Id., art. 87(2).
26 K. Bosselmann, The Principle of Sustainability (New York: Routledge, 2017), 40–45.
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ecological systems for economic benefit, without this being a clear violation of 
the law.27 As Francioni observes, the cumulative effect of this approach is that 
“most environmental damage is caused by lawful acts that have had adverse 
effects on the environment.”28
The use of chm, as described above, creates a new ‘default position’ for the 
law as it applies to the oceans. This gives the law a new overarching objective 
or purpose.29 The function of a new default position is to define the start point 
for what is acceptable human activity, in the absence of specific law.30 It also 
provides a guiding concept for more specific law thereby defining the spirit 
or intention, according to which law is written, interpreted, and applied (and 
when necessary amended). Thus, chm can provide a critical co-ordinating 
role, mitigating against the current fragmentation of ocean regimes, and creat-
ing coherence for new topic specific ocean regimes.
The current abnj discussions illustrate the potential risks of fragmentation 
in the creation of new issue specific regimes. This work could be viewed as 
largely ‘technical’ in nature because the primary focus is on one form of re-
source use, with economic potential (marine genetic resources). Discussions 
are proceeding on the basis that only sampling is required, with the most 
important issues being benefit-sharing of scientific research and outcomes, 
capacity building, and technology transfer.31 In contrast, civil society has ad-
vocated for comprehensive protection of marine biological diversity via a gov-
ernance regime to remedy the multiple gaps and weaknesses in existing law.32 
This objective has become confined to discussions on ‘area based conservation 
measures’ (e.g., marine protected areas) for abnj only. This approach (on its 
own) risks creating a dichotomy between special areas (worth saving) and non-
special areas (which are not worth saving). If we are to protect and restore the 
whole  marine environment, then such distinctions (when used alone) are un-
tenable.33 Furthermore, the ‘relationship’ between these two specific regimes 
27 K. Bastmeijer, “Ecological Restoration in International Biodiversity Law: A Promising 
Strategy to Address Our Failure to Prevent?” in Research Handbook on Biodiversity Law, 
eds., M. Bowman, P. Davies and E. Goodwin (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2016), 387–413, 
400.
28 Quoted in Bastmeijer, id., 402.
29 Bosselmann, supra note 26. Contra Treves who suggests that a revised ‘freedom of the 
high seas’ principle should be the default position for abnj regimes, supra note 19, 21–25.
30 A. Jóhannsdóttir, The Significance of Default (Jur. dr. dissertation, Uppsala Universitet, 
Sweden 2009), http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:173192/FULLTEXT01.pdf.
31 Treves, supra note 19, 16–20.
32 Id., 20–21.
33 Bastmeijer, supra note 27, 403.
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is yet to be defined, as is the applicability of ‘freedom of the high seas’ and/or 
chm as guiding concepts.34
This brief discussion of chm does not answer many critical questions, in-
cluding how to bring about its acceptance by states, and how to implement it 
in a broader governance and institutional context, including progressively ap-
plying it to existing regimes. These matters are critically intertwined and pose 
difficult challenges. Nevertheless, several important trends and developments 
are emerging in international law to address similar issues in related contexts. 
These include cosmopolitanism, global environmental constitutionalism, 
states as environmental trustees, and ecological approaches to law.35 More 
specifically, despite its terminology it is not inherently an anthropocentric 
concept. However, it needs to be better articulated as the ‘common heritage of 
all life’ embracing an understanding of intrinsic value and humanity as part of 
ecological systems.36 In addition, the social equity aspect of chm needs to be 
better understood and applied within the overarching framework of ‘strong’ 
sustainable development, and not confined to regimes for resource use.37
 Conclusion
The abnj discussions, despite their limited framing, present a critical opportu-
nity to return Elisabeth and Arvid’s original vision for chm. Measured against 
the current state of negotiations, how realistic is this?
To date, there are few, if any, signs of states advocating for chm, as outlined 
here.
State sovereignty dominates as the supreme value.38 Despite years of dis-
cussions, many states may not be in a hurry to negotiate at all, reasoning that 
their sovereign interests are best protected by the freedom of the high seas 
principle.39 Much of the discussion on chm has reduced it to the status of a 
34 unga, supra note 18, para. 38(b) at p. 17/19: “further discussions are required.” Another 
problem is how marine protected areas will restrict traditional high seas freedoms in or-
der to protect ecological systems.
35 K. Bosselmann and P. Taylor, eds., Ecological Approaches to Environmental Law (Chelten-
ham: Edward Elgar, 2017).
36 P. Taylor, An Ecological Approach to International Law (London and New York: Routledge, 
1998), c. 6. See also E. Mann Borgese, The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global 
Resource (Tokyo: unu Press, 1998), 198.
37 Mann Borgese, id.
38 Treves, supra note 19.
39 Id.
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 polarizing ideological tool, limited to conflicts over marine genetic resources in 
abnj. References to its broader ethical and ecological responsibility elements 
are vague. Efforts to keep the work progressing has led to a ‘pragmatic’ ‘package 
deal approach’ which may (it is feared) see chm dropped altogether.40
However, when measured against a different reality, the prospects for chm 
change. The ecological need is becoming ever more urgent and apparent and 
the limited scope and trajectory of the current discussions (into marine genet-
ic resources and ‘area based conservation measures’) for abnj only, re-enforce 
Elisabeth and Arvid’s concerns about the deficiencies of traditional interna-
tional law. The future they foresaw is the reality we now confront, and it is one 
that requires urgent solutions.
Fifty years ago, the Mother of the Oceans and the Father of the Law of the Sea, 
led the way. It is now our task to advance strategies of ‘realistic’ utopianism,41 
and to remain alert to regressive trends. As Arvid Pardo reminded us: “It will 
be up to all of us to frustrate [designs to thwart chm] and to open deeper and 
wider cracks in traditional international law until, in the eternal cycle, a new 
global order emerges from the ruins of the old, better to serve all humanity.”42
40 D. Tladi, “Pursuing a Brave New World for the Oceans: The Place of Common Heritage in a 
Proposed Law of the Sea Treaty,” in The Pursuit of a Brave New World in International Law: 
Essays in Honour of John Dugard, eds., T. Maluwa, M. du Plessis and D. Tladi (Leiden: Brill, 
2017), 87–113.
41 A. Peters, “Realizing Utopia as a Scholarly Endeavour,” The European Journal of Interna-
tional Law, 24, no. 2 (2013): 533–552; P. Taylor and L. Stroud, Common Heritage of Mankind: 
A Bibliography of Legal Writing (Malta: Foundation de Malte, 2013).
42 Pardo, supra note 7, 69.
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The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) provides 
a detailed and generally comprehensive coverage of key issues relating to the 
regime of the ocean. It was famously compared by Tommy Koh, Chair of the 
final session of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1982 with a ‘con-
stitution for the oceans’.1 However there are some gaps or ‘unfinished agendas’ 
in unclos and as our understanding of the importance of high seas and deep 
sea ecosystems has increased it has become increasingly clear that the con-
servation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction (or abnj) is one such unfinished agenda.2
In 2004, the United Nations General Assembly (unga) agreed to the recom-
mendation of the United Nations Informal Consultative Process on the Oceans 
and the Law of the Sea (unicpolos) to establish a process to look further into 
the question. To address the full range of issues related to the conservation 
of biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction, it established the cum-
brously named ‘Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to study issues 
relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diver-
sity beyond areas of national jurisdiction’.3 This Working Group, which soon 
1 T.T.B. Koh, “A Constitution for the Oceans,” The Law of the Sea—Official Text of the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Pub. Sales No. E.83.V.5 (New York: United Nations, 
1983), http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf.
2 See Freestone, “Governance of abnj,” supra note 1.
3 Further meetings were held in 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, with a final  meeting in 
 January 2015. See the bbnj Working Group website, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/biodiversity 
workinggroup/biodiversityworkinggroup.htm.
* The author has drawn on his previous writings, see, e.g., “Problems of High Seas  Governance,” 
in The World Ocean in Globalisation: Challenges and Responses, eds., D. Vidas and P. Schei 
(Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2011), 99–130; “Governing the Blue: Governance of Areas beyond 
 National Jurisdiction in the Twenty-first Century,” in The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction, 
ed., Clive Schofield et al. (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2014), 729–751; “Governance of Areas beyond 
 National Jurisdiction: An Unfinished Agenda?” in Law of the Sea: unclos as a Living Treaty, 
eds. J. Barrett and R. Barnes (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
2016), 231–266 [‘Governance of abnj’].
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 became known as the bbnj Working Group, held its first meeting in 2006, its 
second in 2008, and a third in 2010. Initial progress was slow. Matters highlight-
ed in the discussions included the absence of a global legal instrument regu-
lating the establishment and monitoring of marine protected areas (mpas) in 
abnj, even though protected areas have proven to be extremely effective in 
maintaining biodiversity in coastal contexts, the absence of comprehensive 
environmental impact assessments (eias) for new activities in abnj, as well 
as the lack of co-ordination between those international organizations that 
are charged with regulating specific sectoral activities. However, a significant 
number of delegations expressed doubt as to whether a further legal instru-
ment was necessary and suggested strongly that improved implementation 
of existing regimes should be the first priority. A part of the discussion also 
focused on whether the United Nations (UN) was the most appropriate forum 
for this discussion and whether the Convention on Biological Diversity (cbd) 
might provide both a more appropriate forum and perhaps a better basis for 
action on this issue than UNCLOS. In particular, delegates were aware of the 
discussions in various cbd Conference of the Parties (cop) meetings leading 
up to the 2010 Aichi Target 11 which envisaged that
[b]y 2020, at least 17 per cent of terrestrial and inland water areas and 10 
per cent of coastal and marine areas, especially areas of particular im-
portance for biodiversity and ecosystem services, are conserved through 
effectively and equitably managed, ecologically representative and well-
connected systems of protected areas and other effective area-based 
conservation measures, and integrated into the wider landscape and 
seascape.4
Even before the development of the Aichi targets, the cbd cop established 
that the comparative advantage of the cbd was in providing scientific advice 
and guidance on this matter and as a result, in October 2007 the Government 
of Portugal hosted in the Azores a cbd Expert Workshop on Ecological Criteria 
and Biogeographic Classification Systems for Marine Areas in Need of Protec-
tion. In 2008, the cbd cop 9 Decision IX/20 on “Marine and coastal biodiver-
sity” adopted the scientific criteria recommended by the Azores Workshop for 
identifying ecologically or biologically significant marine areas (or ebsas) in 
4 See Convention on Biological Diversity (cbd), cop 7, Decision VII/30, Strategic Plan: Future 
Evaluation of Progress (2004), Annex ii, Goal 1.1; K. Scott, “Conservation on the High Seas: 
Developing the Concept of the High Seas Marine Protected Areas,” International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 27 (2012): 849–850.
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need of protection in open-ocean waters and deep-sea habitats.5 Annex 1 sets 
out the seven criteria in detail, but simply stated they are: (1) uniqueness or rar-
ity; (2) special importance for life history stages of species; (3) importance for 
threatened, endangered or declining species and/or habitats; (4) vulnerability, 
fragility, sensitivity, or slow recovery; (5) biological productivity; (6) biological 
diversity; and (7) naturalness.
Decision IX/20 also set out in Annex ii, “Scientific Guidance for Select-
ing Areas to Establish a Representative Network of Marine Protected Areas, 
Including in Open Ocean Waters and Deep-sea Habitats,” and accepted the 
offer of the Governments of Canada and Germany to organize and host an-
other workshop to “provide scientific and technical guidance on the use and 
further development of biogeographic classification systems, and guidance on 
the identification of areas beyond the national jurisdiction, which meet the 
scientific criteria in annex i to the present decision.”6 That workshop was held 
in Ottawa, Canada, in September/October 2009 and was able to report back to 
cop 10 in Nagoya, Japan, that same year.
At cop 10, the parties decided to initiate a science-driven process to de-
scribe ebsas.7 To that end, by Decision X/29, the cop requested its executive 
secretary to work with parties and competent organizations at international, 
regional, and sub-regional levels, to convene a series of regional workshops to 
facilitate the description of ebsas.
This was the origin of the series of regional and sub-regional scientific work-
shops convened by the cbd Secretariat team to describe ebsas. It was never 
intended that ebsas would have any legal status per se. The process of iden-
tifying them was to be a science-led process and the adoption of appropriate 
measures for the conservation and sustainable use of areas identified as  ebsas 
would be left to the relevant competent international organizations in accor-
dance with international law. In other words, while the cbd does not have 
competence to designate marine protected areas, information shared through 
the ebsa identification process may help strengthen the scientific basis for 
protective measures to be taken by other sectorial organizations. To date, more 
than 15 workshops have been held8 and more than 150 sites identified by the 
workshops. Although the sites are identified by an ostensibly non-political, 
5 cbd, cop 9, Decision IX/20, Marine and Coastal Biodiversity (2008).
6 Id., para. 19.
7 cbd, cop 10, Decision X/29, Marine and Coastal Biodiversity (2010), para. 36.
8 For a full list see “Background on the ebsa Process,” cbd Secretariat, https://www.cbd.int/
ebsa/about.
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 scientific process, to date international organizations have not been willing to 
rely on this process to adopt their own protection measures.9
In the meantime the bbnj Working Group had continued its debates in the 
UN. However, the lively debates on improved governance became overshad-
owed by controversy over the future regime for exploitation of  marine genetic 
resources beyond national jurisdiction.10 The G-7711 and China argued that the 
common heritage of mankind concept in unclos, which applies to deep sea-
bed minerals,12 should also apply to the living resources of the deep ocean floor, 
many of which may have important industrial and pharmaceutical potential. 
They argued that, rather than being subject to the open access regime of the 
high seas water column as advocated by some states, if the drafters of unclos 
had been aware of these unique living resources—rather than simply being 
aware of the famous ‘manganese nodules’—they would doubtless have spe-
cifically included these within the deep sea bed regime of common heritage.13 
These polarized positions produced a stalemate in the discussions at the bbnj 
Working Group. However, at the May 2011 meeting there was a breakthrough. It 
was agreed that the issues of protection of biodiversity through conservation 
and management tools such as eias and mpas should be linked with issues 
relating to access and benefit sharing of marine genetic resources.14 This was 
discussed further at the 2012 bbnj Working Group meeting and at the UN Con-
ference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in June 2012. The outcome doc-
ument of the Rio Conference, entitled “The future we want,”15 contained the 
commitment “to address, on an urgent basis, the issue of the conservation and 
sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas  beyond national juris-
9 See D. Freestone et al., “Can Existing Institutions Protect Biodiversity in Areas Beyond Na-
tional Jurisdiction? Experiences from Two On-going Processes,” Marine Policy 42 (2014): 
167–175. And note the recent award of a seabed mining exploration licence by the isa to 
Poland regarding a site on the Mid-Atlantic Ridge which covers the unique “Lost City” 
ebsa.
10 See David Leary et al., “Marine Genetic Resources: A Review of the Scientific and Com-
mercial Interest,” Marine Policy 33 (2009): 183.
11 The Group of 77 or G-77 is an important voting bloc of the developing countries within 
the UN system.
12 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 
1833 u.n.t.s. 3, art. 138: “The Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind.” 
Article 133 further provides that ‘resources’ means “all solid liquid or gaseous mineral re-
sources in situ in the Area at or beneath the seabed, including polymetallic nodules.”
13 For records of these discussions see bbnj Work Group, supra note 3.
14 unga, UN Doc. A/66/119 (2011), Annex 1: Recommendations of the Ad Hoc Open-ended 
Informal Working Group to study issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use 
of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction and Co-Chairs’ sum-
mary of discussions.
15 unga Res. 66/288 (2012), Annex.
155Marine Biodiversity in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction
<UN>
diction, including by taking a decision on the development of an international 
instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.”16
To address this commitment, the unga, in Resolution 68/70, asked the 
 Secretary-General to convene three more meetings of the bbnj Working 
Group.17 These took place 1–5 April and 16–19 June 2014 and 20–23 January 2015. 
At its 2015 meeting, the bbnj Working Group decided, after protracted  debate, 
to recommend to the unga that it “[d]ecide to develop an  international  legally 
binding instrument [ilbi] under the Convention on the conservation and sus-
tainable use of marine biological diversity of areas of areas beyond national 
jurisdiction .…”
In 2015 the unga accepted the bbnj Working Group’s recommendation for 
the establishment of a Preparatory Commission, to begin work in 2016 and to 
report to the unga in 2017 with specific text recommendations for an ilbi.18 
Four sessions of the Preparatory Commission were held; in March and August 
of 2016 and in March and July of 2017. Early in the morning of the day after its 
final session was due to end, on 21 July 2017, after a protracted and contentious 
session, the Preparatory Commission, despite having been unable to reach 
consensus on all of the proposed elements of an ilbi, did reach consensus to 
recommend that the unga
take a decision, as soon as possible, on the convening of an intergovern-
mental conference, under the auspices of the United Nations, to consider 
the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee on the elements 
and to elaborate the text of an international legally binding instrument 
under the Convention.19
The unga is expected to take such a decision in the near future, but in the 
light of the complexity of the issues to be addressed, the negotiations at the 
international conference seem likely to take a number of years. It remains to 
be seen whether the new ilbi when concluded will indeed fully complete this 
unfinished agenda of the ‘constitution for the oceans’.
16 Id., para. 162; unga Res. 68/70, Oceans and law of the sea (2013), para. 197.
17 unga Res. 68/70, id., para. 200.
18 Topics to be included were identified in the package agreed by the bbnj Working Group in 
2011, namely, the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction, in particular, together and as a whole; marine genetic resources, 
including questions on the sharing of benefits; measures such as area-based  management 
tools, including marine protected areas; environmental impact assessments, as well as 
capacity-building and transfer of marine technology.
19 unga, Report of the Preparatory Committee established by General Assembly resolution 
69/292, UN Doc. A/AC.287/2017/PC.4/2 (2017), para. 38(b).
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 Introduction
The most important modern theoretical contribution made to ocean bound-
ary-making is the recognition that establishing maritime boundaries and outer 
limits of national maritime spaces has a functional role.1 Under this theory, 
boundaries and limits are not regarded as separate jurisdictional or geometric 
entities, but rather they are important elements for sustainable development 
of the oceans. The theory of ocean boundary-making has been the subject of 
intense interdisciplinary research.2 The value of the contributions made by 
any particular discipline towards the delimitation of a maritime boundary is 
largely measured by its ability to support more effective ocean governance.
Contemporary international practice recognizes the fundamentally inter-
disciplinary nature of the delimitation of maritime spaces. The roles of techni-
cal and scientific experts has evolved from simple technical tasks of depicting 
a geometric line or area on a nautical chart to developing a wide set of creative 
boundary scenarios and proposals. The boundary scenarios are developed in 
view of all the legal, historic, economic, strategic, technical, and scientific data 
and information available for the particular maritime region and are depicted 
in a variety of formats. Flexibility to accommodate any intrinsically special and 
relevant circumstances of each maritime boundary seems to be one of the key 
factors for success.
This essay cannot provide a full description of the evolution of ocean bound-
ary-making methodologies. Instead it highlights the evolution of the scientific 
methodology employed in the delimitation of international maritime spaces, 
which comprises two components: the determination of the outer limits of 
1 D.M. Johnston, The Theory and History of Ocean Boundary-Making (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1988).
2 United Nations, Handbook on the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries (New York, 2000).
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maritime spaces under national jurisdiction and the delimitation of interna-
tional maritime boundaries.
Whereas the outer limits of maritime spaces under national jurisdiction are 
determined by states as a result of unilateral actions by the coastal state, in-
ternational maritime boundaries between claimant states are either created 
as a result of (i) international legal agreements reached through bilateral or 
multilateral negotiations and diplomacy, or (ii) third-party interventions such 
as enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to 
 regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means in accordance 
with Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.3
Some of the methodologies described here are applied by national organi-
zations worldwide in support of routine operations. Other methods, however, 
are the result of analyses of boundaries determined by international courts 
and tribunals. For example, one of the most important recent developments 
in the delimitation of the outer limits of the continental shelf are presented in 
the Scientific and Technical Guidelines produced by the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf (clcs).4
 Early Methods and Pioneers
A review of the evolution of methodology in the delimitation of maritime spac-
es must consider both national legislation and the work of international law 
conferences and the resulting conventions. The League of Nations Codification 
Conference of 1930 and the First and Third United Nations Conferences on the 
Law of the Sea are as much a tour de force as the corpus of codified international 
law produced by the latter two conferences, such as the 1958  Geneva Conven-
tions on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone5 and the Continental Shelf,6 
and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos).7
Various scientific and technical scholars have made important contribu-
tions to the discussion of the delimitation of maritime spaces in the context 
3 The Charter of the United Nations was signed, in San Francisco, on 26 June 1945, at the con-
clusion of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, and came into 
force on 24 October 1945. The Statute of the International Court of Justice is an integral part 
of the Charter. See Part xv of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
4 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (clcs), Doc. CLCS/11 (13 May 1999); Doc. 
CLCS/11/Add.1 (3 September 1999).
5 Geneva, 29 April 1958, 516 u.n.t.s. 205.
6 Geneva, 29 April 1958, 499 u.n.t.s. 311.
7 Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 u.n.t.s. 3.
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of national legislation and international law conferences and conventions. For 
example, Shalowitz’s study provides an excellent example of the evolution 
and development of methods and techniques for the delimitation of maritime 
spaces in the influential national legislation of the United States.8 Similarly, 
Boggs has described the seminal contributions made on scientific and techni-
cal aspects relating to the determination of the outer limit of the territorial 
sea and the determination of international maritime boundaries during the 
1930 Codification Conference.9 The technique used to determine the offshore 
limits of the territorial sea from a selection of points along baselines was origi-
nally defined by Boggs as the method of envelopes of arcs first introduced as 
a proposal for codification in international law by the US delegation at the 
1930 Hague Conference. This method provides an offshore limit every point of 
which is located at a prescribed distance from the nearest point on the coast. 
Shalowitz advanced a more elegant definition of this method where the off-
shore limit “is the locus of the centre of a circle the circumference of which 
is always in contact with the coastline, that is, with the low water line or the 
seaward limits of inland waters.”10
The legal evolution of the determination of outer limits from straight lines 
has been reviewed elsewhere.11 From the technical standpoint, the difficult 
task of determining offshore limits from straight or archipelagic baselines is 
compounded by the fact that neither of these has ever been rigorously defined 
in the legal literature from a geodetic perspective. The existing literature only 
speculates as to what the nature of these lines might be.12
The vast body of work by Alexander13 and many others describes methods 
for the determination of all baselines, the delimitation of maritime spaces, 
8 A.L. Shalowitz, Shore and Sea Boundaries: With Special Reference to the Interpretation and 
Use of Coast and Geodetic Survey Data, Volume 1, Boundary Problems Associated with the 
Submerged Lands Cases and the Submerged Lands Acts (Washington, DC: US Department 
of Commerce, Coast and Geodetic Survey, 1962).
9 S.W. Boggs, “Delimitation of the Territorial Sea: The Method of Delimitation Proposed 
by the Delegation of the United States at the Hague Conference for the Codification 
of International Law,” American Journal of International Law 24, no. 3 (1930): 541–555: 
S.W. Boggs, “Problems of Water Boundary Definition: Median Line and International 
Boundaries through Territorial Waters,” Geographical Review 27, no. 3 (1937): 445–456.
10 Shalowitz, supra note 8, 171.
11 For example, T. Gihl, “The Baseline of the Territorial Sea,” Scandinavian Studies in Law 11 
(1967): 119–174.
12 R.D. Hodgson and E.J. Cooper, “The Technical Delimitation of a Modern Equidistant 
Boundary,” Ocean Development and International Law 3, no. 4 (1976): 361–388. When 
 applied in a rigorous geodetic fashion, the method of trace parallel can implement the 
legal provisions contained in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, Judgment [1951] icj 3.
13 See L.M. Alexander, “Baseline Delimitations and Maritime Boundaries,” Virginia Journal 
of International Law 23, no. 3 (1983): 503–526; L.M. Alexander, “Equidistance and Maritime 
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and their evolving breadth over time, and the interpretation of a wide range 
of scientific and technical provisions and terms discussed during the Third 
Conference on the Law of the Sea and codified in unclos. The development 
and analyses of international maritime boundary delimitation methods in 
state practice and judicial settlements has been extensively studied and scru-
tinized in international scientific and legal literature.14 The description of 
equidistance, simplified or modified equidistance, half- or partial-effect, bisec-
tors, equi-ratio, parallel and meridian, and enclave methods15 for the delimi-
tation of international maritime boundaries in the exclusive economic zone 
and the continental shelf in order to achieve an equitable solution are beyond 
the space and scope allocated to this essay. In particular, key elements of the 
modern methodology established by the International Court of Justice, the In-
ternational Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and other tribunals in case law, 
are important.16 However, a number of objective and subjective factors, which 
underlie this methodology, remain to be discussed and clarified.
As a corollary to this section, it will suffice to quote Alexander in order to 
gain an appreciation of the enormous progress and advancement made in the 
introduction of science and technology in the delimitation of maritime spaces 
and the ability to develop and present perceptual information to courts and 
tribunals since 1985:
The third point is that we had with us at The Hague what I felt was a spec-
tacular display of specially prepared maps, illustrating graphically the 
injustice which would be wrought on the people of Guinea, should the 
Court rule in favor of Guinea-Bissau’s boundary claim. Many of the maps 
were transparent overlays and I personally believe that our cartographic 
materials, some of which we managed to leave on display even after our 
Boundary Delimitation,” in International Boundaries and Boundary Conflict  Resolution, 
ed., C. Grundy-Warr (Durham: ibru Press, 1990), pp. 1–7; L.M. Alexander, Alternative In-
terpretations of Geographic Articles in the 1982 los Convention (Kingston, RI: Center for 
Ocean Management Studies (coms), University of Rhode Island (uri), 1990).
14 For example, C. Lathrop, ed., International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. 1–vii (Brill Nijhoff 
and the American Society of International Law).
15 For example, United Nations, supra note 2.
16 Various decisions from these tribunals propose a three-step methodology to implement 
the equitable principles/relevant circumstances approach for delimiting the exclusive 
economic zone and the continental shelf: (i) draw provisional delimitation line; (ii) con-
sider whether the line should be adjusted by the consideration of relevant circumstances; 
and (iii) apply a proportionality test.
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presentations, may have helped our cause considerably. Guinea-Bissau, I 
might note, had no special maps whatever.17
 The Impact of New Technologies on Ocean Boundary-making
Developments in data gathering and processing technologies have in turn sig-
nificantly impacted the development and application of methodologies for the 
delimitation of maritime spaces. For example, the availability of global naviga-
tion satellite systems (gnss) in geodesy, multi-beam echo-sounding, and light 
detection and ranging (lidar) in coastal hydrography, satellite imagery and 
remote sensing designed to detect and classify vast amounts of information in 
cartography, and marine, land, air, and space techniques in geophysics, provide 
high-quality data in volumes unprecedented in the history of science.
Modern gnss in geodesy such as global positioning systems (GPS)18 and 
its augmentation systems, the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System 
(glonass),19 and the soon to be operational Galileo20 and BeiDou-221  systems, 
allow not only for highly accurate positioning of baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured, but also monitoring of changes over 
time. These positioning systems provide worldwide kinematic positioning of 
vessels at sea and their spatial relationships with respect to outer limits and 
international maritime boundaries. Further, they are accurate enough to de-
scribe the attitude (heave, roll, and pitch rotations) and deformations of ves-
sels in real-time.
The challenges posed by the need to process and derive useful information 
from large amounts of high-quality data have, in turn, been met by  exponential 
developments in computer hardware and software technologies. While the 
availability of geographic information systems and large database storage 
 architectures22 have become standard tools for technical experts, specialized 
17 L.M. Alexander, “Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Case Study: Maritime Boundary Maps,” in The 
Continental Shelf: Resources, Boundaries and Management, eds., T.A. Grigalunas and L.C. 
Hanson (Kingston, RI: coms, uri, 1986), 74.
18 See, “gps Advanced Control Segment (ocx),” Los Angeles Air Force Base (25 October 
2011), http://www.losangeles.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Article/343736/gps-advanced 
-control-segment-ocx/.
19 See glonass website, https://www.glonass-iac.ru/en/.
20 See “Galileo Status: Fact Sheet,” European Space Agency (last updated July 2017), https://
esamultimedia.esa.int/docs/galileo/GalileoFactsheet2017.pdf.
21 See “China will make BeiDou Navigation Satellite System available to global users by 
2020,” Next Big Future (28 June 2016), https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2016/06/china-will 
-make-beidou-navigation.html.
22 Multi-user relational geodatabases of unlimited size.
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software has also been developed to address specific needs in the delimitation 
of maritime spaces. Some of these maritime delimitation software products 
are available as commercial products. The ability to process big data23 is now, 
for example, explored as a user-behavior analytics tool in various applications 
relating to worldwide legal and illegal fisheries monitoring.24
Important advances in the production and visualization of large digital el-
evation models,25 large amounts of high- and super-resolution air and satellite 
imagery, and digital charts and maps have been achieved over the last two 
decades. Multi-media technologies used to display such information are part 
of the current practice in international maritime boundary diplomatic nego-
tiations and any other third-party intervention dispute settlement processes, 
including the preparation of materials in judicial processes, particularly oral 
hearings. These technologies have become evident in the preparation of sub-
missions to the clcs and presentations that states make in the process of their 
consideration.
Special mention must be made of the nautical technology that makes use of 
all national maritime limits and international maritime boundaries for mod-
ern marine navigation purposes: the Electronic Chart Display and Information 
System (ecdis).26 ecdis is an operational navigation display, an interpreter 
of sensors, and a source of real-time information designed for route planning, 
positioning, and collision and grounding avoidance. It is an important tool in 
maritime transportation, marine natural resources exploration and exploita-
tion, and the enforcement of maritime boundaries and limits. New standards 
for the depiction and deposit of limits of maritime spaces and maritime 
boundaries in digital format are currently being developed.27
The development of these new technologies interact with the process of 
delimiting maritime spaces in a symbiotic manner: Technology provides 
 indispensable information for the determination of outer limits and inter-
national boundaries. In turn, new technologies may impose requirements 
on the methodology employed in the delimitation of international maritime 
spaces.
23 Volumes of data so large and complex that are impossible to process with common hard-
ware and software tools.
24 See, for example, the Global Fishing Watch website, http://globalfishingwatch.org/.
25 W.B.F. Ryan et al., “Global Multi-Resolution Topography Synthesis,” Geochemistry, Geo-
physics, Geosystems 10, no. 3 (2009), doi.org/ 10.1029/2008GC002332.
26 The International Hydrographic Organization maintains a set of standards related to 
 ecdis in the form of Special Publications, see their website at http://iho.int.
27 See “Main Page (S-121),” International Hydrographic Organization (last updated 16 March 
2018), http://www.s-121.com/w/index.php/Main_Page.
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 Introduction
Previously neglected maritime boundary disputes are acquiring newfound 
economic, political, and academic significance. Rising sea levels, changing 
distributions of marine natural resources, and growing demand for those re-
sources have combined to create a ‘perfect storm’ for policy-making, diploma-
cy, and research. When surveying the world’s maritime boundaries, it becomes 
clear that hundreds of disputes have been resolved. However, why states re-
solve their disputes, and with what motivation, is often unclear. Most studies 
describe the process as a matter of legal technicalities, driven by economic 
 interests. As Douglas Johnston argues, boundary-making in the ocean is func-
tionalist: done with an eye towards the functional usage of the maritime space 
itself.1
Yet hundreds of maritime disputes remain unresolved. The existence of a 
dispute can hinder the economic exploitation of offshore resources such as 
oil and gas and complicate the management of transboundary fish stocks. In 
other instances, maritime boundary disputes contribute to larger international 
tensions and conflicts. States do not necessarily resolve boundary disputes for 
functional purposes whenever it is convenient to do so. Instead, a number of 
factors may hinder or facilitate dispute resolution.
 Maritime Boundaries
Maritime boundaries define the geographic spaces within which states, com-
panies and individuals operate. An international legal regime for the oceans 
1 D.M. Johnston, The Theory and History of Ocean Boundary-Making (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1988).
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came into being through the 1958 Geneva Conventions, the 1982 United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos), and parallel developments 
in customary international law. As a result, many states implemented 200 nau-
tical mile exclusive economic zones (eez) in offshore waters, and a number 
of boundary disputes arose or became more significant between the maritime 
zones of ‘adjacent’ or ‘opposing’ coastal states. Some of these boundaries were 
immediately settled, but a large number remain disputed.
To understand the international law of maritime boundaries, it is essential 
to understand the difference between land and maritime space. While the con-
cept of occupation is essential in establishing title to land territory, it does not 
hold relevance in the maritime domain. Contrary to the customary interna-
tional law rules on sovereignty over land territory, occupation of the continen-
tal shelf cannot in itself lead to acquisition of sovereign rights. Thus, a marked 
separation between land and maritime space has emerged, with rights to the 
latter deriving from the former. Delimitation of territory on land rests on the 
principle that the territory belongs to one state, and the central point is to es-
tablish which state has the most valid claim. In the maritime domain, however, 
international law accepts that both states can have valid legal titles to a given 
area, in which case it becomes a matter of “reasonable sacrifice such as would 
make possible a division of the area of overlap.”2
 How to Settle a Boundary
Over the course of the twentieth century, principles of maritime boundary 
delimitation developed through a combination of treaties and customary in-
ternational law, with the most important of these being ‘equidistance’. The 
 principle of equidistance entails a boundary that is an equal distance, at ev-
ery point, from the two states’ adjoining or opposing coastlines. This principle 
was codified in Article 6(2) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf.3
However, the International Court of Justice (icj) soon took the view that 
‘relevant’ or ‘special’ circumstances should also be relevant to the delimitation 
of a maritime boundary, with such circumstances including—at times—not 
just coastal length and other geographical variables but also security interests 
and natural resources. This has been deemed equity, a principle different from 
2 P. Weil, The Law of Maritime Delimitation—Reflections (London: Grotius Publications Lim-
ited, 1989), 91–92.
3 499 UNTS 311. See also: T.M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), 62.
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equidistance. Indeed, as far back as 1969 the icj explained that “[e]quity does 
not necessarily imply equality.”4 Since 1982, the icj has provided greater speci-
ficity on the principle of equity, with a focus on geographic rather than societal 
and political factors.
The icj currently makes use of three-stage approach to maritime bound-
ary disputes, which it outlined in the Black Sea Case between Romania and 
Ukraine in 2009. First, a ‘provisional delimitation line’ between disputing 
countries is established based on equidistance.5 Second, there is a consider-
ation of ‘relevant circumstances’ that might require an adjustment of this line 
to achieve an ‘equitable result’.6 Third, the Court evaluates whether the pro-
visional line leads to any ‘marked disproportion’ taking the coastal lengths of 
the states into consideration.7 Yet the development of the international law 
on maritime boundaries is not complete; it will undoubtedly adapt and evolve 
as new physical, political, technological, and economic developments emerge. 
Notions of equity and special circumstances also render the question of ‘who 
gets what’ more political than some international lawyers might admit.
Currently there are changes that are making the settlement of maritime 
boundary disputes—most of which arose in the 1970s and 1980s as the result 
of the development of rights over the continental shelf and the eez—more 
salient. Settlement of disputes continues to take place, though quite a num-
ber remain. Disputes range from active and conflictual, to dormant and coop-
erative. Prescott and Schofield highlight that “out of 427 potential maritime 
boundaries, only about 168 (39%) have been formally agreed, and many of 
these only partially.”8 The decisions of international courts and tribunals have 
shaped the law of maritime boundary delimitation, but the actual number of 
these decisions is quite limited. States usually rely on unclos and custom-
ary international law as basis for settling their disputes, though this process 
is sometimes complicated by historic claims, treaties or arbitration decisions, 
as well as domestic politics and law. Moreover, unclos does not specify 
how states are to settle their maritime boundary disputes, calling only for ‘an 
4 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Repub-
lic of Germany v. Netherlands) [1969] International Court of Justice (icj), “Judgment of 20 
 February 1969,” para. 91.
5 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine) [2009] icj, “Judgment of 3 
 February 2009,” para. 116.
6 Id., paras. 118–120.
7 Id., para. 122.
8 V. Prescott and C. Schofield, Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (Leiden: Martinus 
 Nijhoff, 2004), 218.
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 equitable solution’.9 Most maritime disputes are settled bilaterally between the 
disputing parties, giving them the freedom to choose whichever result they 
both find comfortable.
 Canada the Laggard?
A comparison of Canada and Norway provides an excellent example of the com-
plexity of these processes. On 21 September 2010, the Russian and  Norwegian 
foreign ministers surprised the Canadian government with an opinion piece 
in The Globe and Mail newspaper. In their co-authored article, Sergei Lavrov 
and Jonas Gahr Støre celebrated the conclusion of a Russia–Norway boundary 
treaty in the Barents Sea. However, they also expressed “hope that the agree-
ment will inspire other countries in their attempts to resolve their maritime 
disputes, in the High North and elsewhere.”10
Given their choice of venue, the message was clearly directed at Canada, 
which has five disputed maritime boundaries. That is a high number of dis-
putes for a country with only three neighbors—the United States, Denmark 
(Greenland), and France (St. Pierre and Miquelon). Lavrov and Støre assumed 
that Canada had not tried hard enough to negotiate solutions and, by writing 
in a Canadian national newspaper, they were criticizing Canadian diplomats in 
a public forum. The problem is that Lavrov and Støre’s assumption was wrong. 
We know this because of research we carried out comparing and contrasting 
Canada’s maritime boundaries to Norway’s, with the resulting detailed article 
published in the Canadian Yearbook of International Law.11
In that article, we examined the history of Canada’s unresolved or only-
partially-resolved boundaries in the Gulf of Maine, Beaufort Sea, Lincoln 
Sea, Dixon Entrance, and seaward of Juan de Fuca Strait. We also looked at 
Canada’s two fully resolved boundaries between Baffin Island and Greenland 
and around St. Pierre and Miquelon. We compared the situation with that of 
Norway, which has successfully negotiated treaties for all seven of its maritime 
boundaries, including with Russia. We sought to understand whether the two 
9 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 10 
December 1982, 1833 u.n.t.s. 3, art. 74.
10 S. Lavrov and J. Gahr Støre, “Canada, Take Note: Here’s How to Resolve Maritime Dis-
putes,” The Globe and Mail, 21 September 2010, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
opinion/canada-take-note-heres-how-to-resolve-maritime-disputes/article4326372/.
11 M. Byers and A. Østhagen, “Why Does Canada Have So Many Unresolved Maritime Bound-
ary Disputes?” Canadian Yearbook of International Law 54 (August 2017), doi.org/10.1017/
cyl.2017.14.
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countries’ different records of boundary settlement are a result of different 
policy approaches, or whether they are a result of specific factors in each dis-
pute, such as its geography, legal history, political context, or the existence of 
natural resources. In essence, we sought to understand whether Canada really 
is a diplomatic laggard. As a case study of the complexity of maritime bound-
ary settlement the situations of both countries are instructive.
 Comparing Canada and Norway
Our research revealed some similarities between the two countries’ experi-
ences with maritime boundary disputes. Both Norway and Canada actively 
sought to resolve their disputes in the mid-twentieth century, after interna-
tional law gave coastal states exclusive rights to resources on the continental 
shelf.  Norway quickly resolved a number of significant disputes in the North 
Sea and the Norwegian Sea. Canada settled its boundary with Greenland in 
1973 and sought to resolve all four of its disputes with the United States by pro-
posing a ‘package deal’. When the offer was rejected, Canada and the United 
States sent part of the Gulf of Maine dispute to the icj. Also, beginning in 2005, 
Norway and Canada began paying more attention to the Arctic. Norway settled 
a small dispute near Greenland in 2006 and its major dispute with Russia in 
2010. Canada initiated negotiations with the United States on the Beaufort Sea 
in 2010 and announced a tentative agreement with Denmark on the Lincoln 
Sea in 2012.
The similarities end here. Norway’s ability to resolve the Barents Sea dispute 
was contingent on the preferences of its more powerful neighbor. Russia be-
came willing to make concessions on the boundary because of its desire for le-
gal certainty with regard to offshore oil and gas, as well as a desire to affirm the 
primacy of the UNCLOS regime in the Arctic.12 The United States has shown 
no comparable willingness to compromise in the Beaufort Sea, presumably 
because the costs of oil and gas development in that remote and seasonally 
ice-bound region are prohibitively high.
Canada’s unresolved disputes are also related to concerns about creating 
legal precedents. In both the Beaufort Sea and Dixon Entrance cases, Canada’s 
legal position is based on a historical treaty or arbitration decision that pre-
vents easy compromises. In contrast, Norway had no old treaties, decisions or 
judgments complicating its disputes and was able to consistently support the 
12 A. Moe, D. Fjærtoft and I. Øverland, “Space and Timing: Why Was the Barents Sea Delimi-
tation Dispute Resolved in 2010?” Polar Geography 34(3) (2011): 145–162.
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win-win principle of ‘equidistance’. Norway and Canada also have different ap-
proaches to uncertainty and risk. Norway exhibited a relatively high tolerance 
for economic risk and was prepared to conclude boundary agreements with-
out knowing the exact location of oil and gas reserves. At the same time, it has 
shown a low tolerance of risk with regards to its relations with Russia, as the 
unresolved boundary was seen as a potential flashpoint for conflict.
Canada is more concerned about certainty with regards to natural resourc-
es, as was demonstrated in 2011 when it pulled back from negotiations on the 
Beaufort Sea because of uncertainty about the location of hydrocarbons. It is 
less concerned about international political risk, because all Canadian bound-
aries are with North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies. At the same time, 
 Canadian politicians are very concerned about domestic political risk and will 
avoid making any moves that could be portrayed as ‘selling out’ on sovereignty. 
Ironically, Canadian politicians are only able to take this approach because of 
Canada’s mostly amicable relationship with the United States, which makes 
the ‘management’ of ongoing disputes a viable option. Lastly, Canada is a fed-
eral country, and several of its boundary disputes are complicated by provin-
cial claims. The provincial level British Columbia government will not stand 
quietly by while the Canadian federal government negotiates over Dixon En-
trance. When it comes to boundary negotiations, Norway benefits from being 
a unitary state.
In short, Norway had a collection of boundary disputes that were of a very 
different character from Canada’s disputes, which are more complicated and 
difficult to resolve. This does not mean that they are unsolvable. But instead 
of making assumptions on the basis of a country’s record of settled versus un-
settled disputes, policy-makers, diplomats and academics need to delve deep 
into the specific reasons why particular disputes remain unresolved—and why 
‘managing’ a dispute might, in some situations, be the best option available.
 The Complexities of Maritime Boundary Disputes
The foregoing case study illustrates the specificity and complexity of maritime 
boundary dispute negotiation and resolution. Treaty provisions, customary 
international law, and judicial or arbitral decisions can all play a role in the 
resolution of a maritime boundary dispute. But while the question ‘who gets 
what’ is sometimes answered—and is almost always guided—by international 
law, the question is also political. In this short essay, we have highlighted how 
diverse factors can influence maritime boundary negotiations and the chances 
of a settlement. It is at the nexus of international law, international relations, 
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and domestic politics where the outcomes to disputes are made. Reducing 
maritime boundary disputes to simple dichotomous options does little to ad-
vance our knowledge of how and why states come to an agreement.
At the same time, there are some factors that we might expect to be present, 
and were certainly present in the cases of both Canada and Norway. The his-
toric origin of a dispute sets its parameters. The engagement, or lack thereof, of 
interest groups determines the amount of pressure on national governments 
for-or-against an effort at dispute resolution. These groups are sometimes mo-
tivated by the potential for resource development in the disputed area. And 
historic patterns of enmity or amity can determine the security relevance of 
the dispute, which in turn might deem a dispute manageable without immedi-
ate impetus for a resolution, or demand an immediate resolution.
These insights will hopefully provide starting points for further enquiry, as 
unsettled maritime boundaries and related disputes are likely to become more 
salient in the future, including as a result of the recognition of sovereign rights 
over extended continental shelves and the consequent need (in some instanc-
es) to draw boundaries beyond 200 nautical miles. Additional studies of how 
other states have approached their maritime boundaries will provide further 
insight into the motivations and complexities of dispute resolution. They will 
also enable us to address the question of whether agreed maritime boundaries 
are always needed, or whether some disputes can be successfully ‘managed’ 
through informal arrangements or resource sharing regimes.
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Legal Aspects of Climate Change
Karen N. Scott
School of Law, University of Canterbury,  
Christchurch, New Zealand
 Introduction
Climate change constitutes the greatest global long-term threat to the health 
of the planet. States have however, been slow to recognize the implications 
of climate change for the oceans—in contrast to the atmosphere and bio-
sphere. The subordinate status of the oceans in the climate regime complex 
is perpetuated by the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (unfccc)1 itself, which pays scant attention to both the impacts of 
climate change on the oceans and the capacity of the ocean to mitigate cli-
mate change through its function as a sink for carbon dioxide (CO2). Scientific 
research now underpins an improved public and indeed policy understand-
ing of the impacts climate change on the oceans: increased water temperature 
and its impact on ecosystems and species including coral reefs; sea level rise; 
and, ironically, a reduction in the capacity of the oceans to absorb CO2.2 An 
excess of CO2 in the oceans also leads to a distinct but connected challenge: 
ocean acidification, the lowering of ocean pH,3 which poses a particular risk 
to calcifying organisms and reef ecosystems.4 However, the development of 
regulatory responses has thus far been fragmented, with a strong emphasis 
on soft targets and obligations designed to fill and bridge the gaps between 
instruments with a mandate to address climate change and ocean acidifica-
tion. Moreover, as the largest natural sink for CO2 the oceans also represent a 
 potential or at least a partial solution for climate change. Mediating this ten-
sion between protection and exploitation, and the moral complexity under-
pinning actions designed to mitigate and adapt to climate change, will be one 
of the greatest challenges for the law of the sea in the twenty-first century. This 
1 New York, 9 May 1992, 1771 u.n.t.s. 107 [unfccc].
2 See M. Rhein et al., “Observations: Ocean,” in Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. 
Contribution of Working Group i to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, T.F. Stocker et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013), 255–315.
3 R. Zeebe et al., “Carbon Emissions and Acidification,” Science, 321, no. 5885 (2008): 51–52.
4 J. Orr et al., “Anthropogenic Ocean Acidification Over the Twenty-first Century and Its Im-
pact on Calcifying Organisms,” Nature 437 (2005): 681–686.
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essay will briefly explore the regime complex5 that applies to climate change 
and the oceans, and focuses on issues relating to mitigation, adaptation, and 
exploitation. It will highlight the disconnect between these regimes and the 
lack of a co-ordinated and integrated approach to oceans climate policy and 
conclude with selected recommendations to support the development of an 
overall legal and policy framework.
 Mitigation
Although the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos)6 
purports to provide a constitution for the oceans, comprehensive in regulatory 
scope, it is not the primary regime for climate change mitigation. Its obliga-
tions on states to protect and preserve the marine environment7 and to pre-
vent and mitigate all sources of marine pollution,8 whilst undoubtedly broad 
enough to encompass anthropogenic climate change and ocean acidification, 
are very general and arguably add little to existing external obligations relating 
to climate change. Articles 207 and 212 of unclos, which set out obligations 
relating to land-based and atmospheric pollution respectively, neither estab-
lish global standards nor require states to comply with any such standards ad-
opted. The one source of greenhouse gas emissions that is subject to specific 
regulation is ship-based greenhouse gas emissions, which since 1997, has been 
subject to regulation under Annex vi of the 1973/78 International Convention 
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships.9 Under Article 211, paragraph 2, of 
unclos these standards are applicable to all unclos parties.
The overarching obligation underpinning the climate change regime is the 
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that prevents dangerous interference with the climate system.10 The ‘climate 
system’ includes the oceans, but the focus of the unfccc is on the atmosphere, 
5 A regime complex may be defined as “a loosely coupled set of specific regimes” which 
“pertain to the same issue domain or spatially defined area … and interaction with one 
another in the sense that the operation of each affects the performance of the others.” See 
O.R. Young, “Building an International Regime Complex for the Arctic: Current Status and 
Next Steps,” The Polar Journal 2, no. 2 (2012): 391–407, 394.
6 Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 u.n.t.s. 3 [unclos].
7 Id., arts 192, 193, 194(5). See also Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius 
v. UK), Annex vii Tribunal, 2015 [538]; The South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. 
 China), Annex vii Tribunal, 2016 [992–993].
8 unclos, id., art. 194.
9 London, 2 November 1973, 1340 u.n.t.s. 184, as amended.
10 unfccc, supra note 1, art. 2.
171Legal Aspects of Climate Change
<UN>
and this is demonstrated by the definition of climate change in the Convention 
itself as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human 
activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere…”11 Targets to 
mitigate climate change are established under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol12 (and 
2012 Doha Amendment13) and, most recently, by the 2015 Paris Agreement,14 
which establishes a global average temperature increase target of “well below 
2°C above pre-industrial levels” with the aim of limiting the increase to 1.5°C.15 
Notably, however, there has been minimal discussion as to the implications of 
a 2oC rise for the oceans, and there is no comparable target relating to ocean 
pH change and there are no specific commitments in relation to the rise in the 
production of CO2, which is the primary cause of ocean acidification.16
In an effort to bridge and indeed fill the gaps between the oceans and cli-
mate regimes a number of soft goals have been developed, particularly in re-
lation to ocean acidification and the related problem of climate change. For 
example, Aichi Biodiversity Target 10 adopted under the auspices of the 1992 
Convention on Biological Diversity calls upon parties to minimize the impacts 
of climate change or ocean acidification on coral reefs and other vulnerable 
ecosystems so as to maintain their integrity and ecosystem function by 2015.17 
The UN General Assembly (UNGA) 2012 resolution adopting ‘The future we 
want’ called for collective action to prevent further ocean acidification and to 
take steps to promote ecosystem resilience.18 Most recently, Sustainable De-
velopment Goal 14.3, adopted by the UNga in 2015, urges states to “minimize 
and address the impacts of ocean acidification, including through enhanced 
scientific co-operation at all levels.”19 Soft targets and calls for action have been 
made by regional organizations such as the Arctic Council,20 as well as by non-
governmental and scientific organizations. Nevertheless, these initiatives fall 
11 Id., art. 1(2) (emphasis added).
12 Protocol to the unfcc, 11 December 1997, 2303 u.n.t.s. 214 [Kyoto Protocol].
13 unfcc, Decision 1/CMP.8 (2012), Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol pursuant to its 
 Article 3, paragraph 9 (the Doha Amendment).
14 Paris Agreement, 12 December 2015 (2016) 55 i.l.m. 743 (2016).
15 Id., art. 2(1)(a).
16 See the essay by Kumiko Azetsu-Scott in this volume.
17 Convention on Biological Diversity, cop Decision X/2, Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 
2011–2020 (2010), Annex.
18 United Nations General Assembly (unga) Res. 66/288, The Future We Want (2012), para. 
166.
19 unga Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
(2015).
20 See the 2013 Kiruna Declaration of the Eighth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council.
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short of binding and meaningful commitments relating to the mitigation of 
climate change and acidification as they relate to the oceans.
 Adaptation
The second regulatory and policy intersection between climate change and the 
law of the sea lies in the area of adaptation. In contrast to mitigation, adapta-
tion to climate change is an important theme within national, regional, and 
global instruments with oceans governance mandates. Adaptation, for exam-
ple, is strongly endorsed within integrated approaches to oceans management, 
particularly in the context of integrated coastal zone management in regions 
such as the Mediterranean.21 The need to promote ecosystem resilience de-
signed to withstand multiple pressures, including climate change, underpins 
the designation of modern marine protected areas (mpas). For example, the 
Ross Sea mpa, established in 2016 by the Commission for the Conservation 
of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (ccamlr)22 in the Southern Ocean—
and the largest mpa in international waters to date—is designed to conserve 
ecosystem function and establish reference areas for monitoring natural vari-
ability and long-term change “to better gauge the ecosystem effects of climate 
change and fishing.”23 More generally, the impacts of climate change and 
ocean acidification on fish stocks is beginning to be considered as part of fish-
eries management by regional fisheries management organizations and states. 
ccamlr, a leader in this area, is now required to consider climate change and 
ocean acidification when adopting conservation measures (including catch 
limits)24 and, in 2016 anticipating the need to take precautionary action to 
protect areas newly exposed by ice retreat, the Commission adopted a mea-
sure permitting those areas to be designated scientific special areas.25 Perhaps 
the most fundamental area of adaptation arises in the context of determining 
21 See, for example, the 2008 Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management to the 1976 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of 
the Mediterranean (amended and renamed in 1995) (2009), OJ L34/19; Regional Climate 
Change Adaptation Framework for the Mediterranean Marine and Coastal Areas, adopt-
ed at the 19th cop of the Barcelona Convention in February 2016 (Decision IG.22/6, Re-
gional Climate Change Adaptation Framework for the Mediterranean Marine and Coastal 
Areas (2016)).
22 Established under the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Re-
sources, 20 May 1980, 1329 u.n.t.s. 47 [CCAMLR].
23 ccamlr Conservation Measure 91-05 (2016), para. 3(i)–(iii).
24 ccamlr Resolution xxviii, Climate Change (2009), preamble and para. 1.
25 ccamlr Conservation Measure 24-04 (2016).
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baselines and maritime boundaries which change or disappear altogether with 
sea level rise. The question of whether the traditional rules of maritime delimi-
tation continue to apply, or whether new solutions such as fixed baselines and 
outer limits by global agreement or otherwise will be developed, has yet to be 
determined.26
 Exploitation
As the largest natural sink for CO2 and as a source of renewable energy, the 
ocean provides clear potential for exploitation in order to mitigate or other-
wise address the impacts of climate change. At the forefront of regulating such 
exploitation is the dumping regime, in particular, the 1996 Protocol to the 1972 
London Convention.27 In particular, in 2006, the Protocol was amended in or-
der to expressly permit and create a legal basis for the disposal of CO2 into 
sub-seabed geological formations.28 More controversially, in 2013, the Protocol 
was amended to create an explicit mandate for the regulation of ocean fertil-
ization, a technique designed to draw down CO2 from the atmosphere into the 
oceans, and, in the future, potentially other forms of marine geoengineering.29
Currently only ocean fertilization for scientific purposes is permitted under 
the Protocol provided that it is carried out consistently with the conditions of 
the Protocol, including the risk assessment framework.30 The relationship be-
tween the Protocol and unclos with respect to ocean fertilization is complex 
and, furthermore, whether the Protocol has a mandate to address marine geo-
engineering more generally is debatable.31 Currently, the emerging regime for 
ocean fertilization—and possibly marine geoengineering more generally—is 
disconnected from the climate change regime. Linking the regimes in order 
to develop a consistent and coherent approach to ocean climate governance 
constitutes a significant challenge to twenty-first century law of the sea.
26 In 2012 the International Law Association established a committee on International Law 
and Sea Level Rise.
27 Protocol to the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter, 7 November 1996 (1997) 35 ilm 1 [1996 Protocol].
28 Id., Annex i, paras. 1.8, 4.
29 International Maritime Organization, Resolution LP.4(8) on the Amendment of the 
 London Protocol to Regulate the Placement of Matter for Ocean Fertilization and other 
Marine Geoengineering Activities (18 October 2013).
30 1996 Protocol, supra note 27, Annexes 4 and 5.
31 See K. Scott, “Geoengineering and the Law of the Sea” in Research Handbook on Interna-
tional Marine Environmental Law, ed. R. Rayfuse (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015) 451.
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 Concluding Remarks
Currently the law of the sea lacks an overall framework to manage the oceans–
climate regime complex. The absence of binding targets relating to ocean pH 
and CO2 emissions and the development of rules relating to marine geoen-
gineering outside of broader climate policy considerations demonstrates the 
limits of the law of the sea to address this important issue. The development 
of a coherent and integrated policy framework is essential going forward and 
could be adopted as an accord under the 1992 unfccc or as a UNGA resolu-
tion. Such a framework could provide the basis for ocean-climate related tar-
gets, including the development of nationally determined  contributions32 of 
specific application to the oceans. The framework could also establish prin-
ciples relating to the development of policy and rules around exploiting the 
oceans for climate change mitigation, including geoengineering. And finally, 
such a framework could provide a basis for linking regimes and institutions, 
navigating the regime complex governing the oceans–climate nexus.
32 Paris Agreement, supra note 14, art. 4.
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Elisabeth Mann Borgese, unclos, and the Arctic: 
The Power of Normative Thinking and Her Legacy
Rob Huebert
Department of Political Science and Centre for Military, Strategic  
and Security Studies, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada
In a volume dedicated to the memory Elisabeth Mann Borgese, it is it is fitting 
to reflect upon the impact that the focus of her life’s work has had on the inter-
national system. Those who have had the privilege of knowing her can attest to 
the power of her ideals and her vision for the future. Coming out of the ravages 
of the Second World War, she dedicated her life to making the world a better 
place. To that end, she concentrated on the study and promotion of the 1982 
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (unclos). It was her core 
belief that the facilitation of an equitable sharing and sustainable utilization 
the world’s oceans would be a fundamental component of international co-
operation and peace. Her commitment and drive in supporting the develop-
ment of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the 
implementation of unclos was an important element of the treaty’s ultimate 
success. She is rightly referred to by many as the ‘mother’ of the Convention 
(alongside its ‘father’, Arvid Pardo, her good friend and colleague).
I had the privilege of being both her Ph.D. student and, for a time, her dog-
sitter. (Throughout her life she was an avid dog lover and usually had at least 
five dogs in her household at any one time.) This gave me the unique oppor-
tunity to spend extensive time with her discussing and debating her thoughts 
and plans regarding ocean governance. As both her writings and our conversa-
tions made clear, she believed that the true value of unclos was in its devel-
opment as a ‘constitution’ of the ocean which established a set of rules and 
procedures that would ensure the sustainable and orderly use of the oceans.1 
But equally important, Elisabeth believed that it provided for the develop-
ment of an international set of norms promoting international co-operation 
that went beyond its specific provisions. In effect, she understood that the de-
velopment of a robust and comprehensive set of rules established by unclos 
1 Elisabeth Mann Borgese was very prolific in her writings. Two of my favorites are The Future 
of the Oceans: Report to the Club of Rome (Montreal: Harvest House, 1986) and Oceanic Circle: 
Governing the Seas as a Global Resource (Tokyo: United Nations Press, 1998).
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would have ramifications well beyond ocean governance and would ultimately 
promote greater co-operation on both land and sea. And she was right!
As important as unclos was in the improvements in the world’s ocean gov-
ernance system, its significance went beyond marine matters. This has become 
abundantly clear in regards to the developing governance of the Arctic. While 
the Arctic is essentially an ocean with five coastal state regions that encircle 
it, it was a frozen ocean that remained largely inaccessible.2 With the excep-
tion of the so-called Canadian clause in unclos, Article 234 on ‘ice-covered 
waters’, there was little attention given to the Arctic during the negotiation of 
the Convention because few thought of the international nature of the region. 
However as the impacts of climate change now opens the region in ways pre-
viously thought impossible,3 it is clear that the strength of unclos both in 
terms of its substance and its normative framework allows for the peaceful and 
co-operative development of a system of rules, organizations, and practices in 
the Arctic region.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, many began to fear that the opening of the 
Arctic waters would unleash a rush to claim and exploit its resources in a law-
less ‘new’ international region.4 Several commentators—myself included—
suggested that there was a need to create a new international treaty specific to 
the Arctic that would replicate the benefits of unclos.5 But by the end of the 
first decade of the 2000s, it became clear that this would have been redundant 
2 Regardless of the challenges faced to reach this location, there are several international 
disputes in the region. The United States disagrees with Russia and Canada over the inter-
national status of the Northeast Passage and the Northwest Passage (internal waters versus 
international strait). Canada and Denmark disagree over the ownership of Hans Island. The 
United States and Canada disagree over the delimitation of the maritime boundary of the 
Beaufort Sea.
3 There is a huge literature on this, see, e.g., A. Anderson, After the Ice: Life, Death, and Geopoli-
tics in the New Arctic (New York: Smithsonian Books, 2009); M. Byers, International Law and 
the Arctic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); C. Emmerson, The Future History 
of the Arctic (London: The Bodley Head, 2010).
4 Among the academic literature, see R. Howard, The Arctic Gold Rush: The New Race for Tomor-
row’s Natural Resources (London and New York: Continuum, 2009); R. Sale and E. Potapov, The 
Scramble for the Arctic: Ownership, Exploitation and Conflict in the Far North  (London: Frances 
Lincoln, 2010). In the media, see “The Arctic: Gold Rush Under the Ice,” The  Economist (3 
 August 2007); W. Underhill, “The North Pole Heats Up,” Newsweek International 42 (5 Decem-
ber 2005).
5 R. Huebert and B. Yeager, A New Sea: The Need for a Regional Agreement on Management and 
Conservation of the Arctic Marine Environment (Oslo: wwf International Arctic Programme, 
October 2006); T. Koivurova, “Alternatives for an Arctic Treaty: Evaluation and a New Pro-
posal,” Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 17, no. 1 (2008): 
14–26, doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9388.2008.00580.x.
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and potentially resulted in fragmentation and legal uncertainty. The terms of 
unclos are as applicable to the Arctic as they are to any other region. The 
framework of ocean governance on specific issues such as the determination 
of the outer limits of the continental shelf is the same for the Arctic coastal 
states as they would be for any other region. More importantly, the normative 
strengths of having established international rules has created a determina-
tion by the Arctic states and other members of the international community 
to build on the existing framework and go beyond unclos on specific issues 
on a co-operative basis.
unclos has provided the backbone of much of the international gover-
nance system emerging for the Arctic in three ways. First, there has been a 
direct application of the rules established by the Convention to the region. 
The Arctic may have been frozen, but it still is an ocean. Secondly, articles of 
unclos have shaped further rules and agreements governing activities in 
the region. Third, the norms established for international co-operation have 
 allowed the region to develop in a peaceful and collaborative manner even as 
the most powerful Arctic coastal states have faced disagreements and conflicts 
elsewhere. Space does not allow for a comprehensive and detailed consider-
ation of these three major impacts, but it is possible to note the most impor-
tant elements of these three forces.
The best example of the direct application of unclos to the Arctic is dem-
onstrated by the efforts of the coastal Arctic states to determine the outer 
limit of their continental shelves under Part vi, the continental shelf. Russia 
was in fact the first country to submit co-ordinates to the Commission of the 
Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf in 2001 (the Commission).6 When the 
 submission was returned to them with a request for additional research,  Russia 
accepted this request and further developed and strengthened its original sub-
mission.7 Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United States have also dedicated 
extensive resources to this task.8 Meeting in Ilulissat, Greenland, in May 2008, 
they agreed in the final declaration to follow the terms of unclos  regarding 
6 United Nations, “Commission on Limits of Continental Shelf Receives it first Submission: 
Russian Federation First to Move to Establish Outer Limits of Its Extended Continental Shelf,” 
Meetings Coverage and Press Releases SEA/1729 (21 December 2001), http://www.un.org/ 
press/en/2001/sea1729.doc.htm.
7 M. Webber, “Defining the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf across the Arctic Basin: The 
Russian Submission, States’ Rights, Boundary Delimitation and Arctic Regional Coopera-
tion,” The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 24 (2009): 659–665.
8 Even though the United States is not a party to unclos. T.L. McDorman, “The Continental 
Shelf Beyond 200 NM: Law and Politics in the Arctic Ocean,” Journal of Transnational Law & 
Policy 18, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 155–194.
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the determination of their respective continental shelves. The importance of 
this meeting lies in two factors.9 First, even though the United States is not 
party to unclos, it still agreed to attend the meeting and signed the final dec-
laration. The declaration let the rest of the world know that the Arctic was not 
an ungoverned zone and that the international ocean governance regime ap-
plied there as in any other location.
Further, unclos has been applied to domestic policies adopted by the 
 Arctic states. One of the best known examples is the use of Arctic 234 by 
 Canada and Russia. It was introduced by the Canadian government during the 
negotiations to gain better protection and control over international naviga-
tion in the Northwest Passage.10 Both governments have utilized this article 
to support their regulatory regime in their Arctic waters. Admittedly, there is a 
considerable debate over whether or not each or both state are exceeding its 
provisions. Nevertheless, Article 234 has been instrumental in how these states 
have approached navigation in their northern waters.11
It is also becoming evident that the Arctic coastal states, along with other 
states with Arctic interests such as China, are applying many of the core co-
operative norms established by unclos to emerging issues. The best example 
of this is potential commercial fishing in their respective exclusive economic 
zones (eez) and the high seas areas of the Arctic. The five Arctic coastal states 
have readily agreed to accept the norm of protecting living resources within 
their eez and to apply the precautionary principle to any possible emerging 
commercial fisheries.12 There has been a willingness of certain non-Arctic 
states to enter into negotiations to provide for a cautious and scientifically in-
formed approached to the exploitation of any new fisheries that may develop 
in the Arctic high seas area as the ice cover retreats. Even more impressive was 
the subsequent agreement reached in December 2017 to forbid commercial 
9 K. Dodds, “The Ilulissat Declaration (2008): The Arctic States, ‘Law of the Sea,’ and Arc-
tic Ocean,” sais Review of International Affairs 33, no. 2 (2013): 45–55, doi.org/10.1353/
sais.2013.0018.
10 D. McRae, “The Negotiations of Article 234,” in Politics of the Northwest Passage, ed., F. 
Griffiths (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987), 98–114.
11 See A. Chircop et al., “Course Convergence? Comparative Perspectives on the Governance 
of Navigation and Shipping in Canadian and Russian Arctic Waters,” Ocean Yearbook 28 
(2014): 291–327.
12 E.J. Molenaar, “The Oslo Declaration on High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean,” 
in Arctic Yearbook 2015, eds. L. Heininen, H. Exner-Pirot and J. Plouffe (Akureyri: North-
ern Research Forum, 2015), 426–431; G. Dickie, “International Accord Bans Fishing 
in Central Arctic Ocean, Spurs Science,” Oceans Deeply (4 December 2017), https://
www.newsdeeply.com/oceans/articles/2017/12/04/international-accord-bans-fishing 
-in-central-arctic-ocean-spurs-science.
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fishing in the central Arctic for the next 16 years.13 Countries such as Russia, the 
United States, and China were able to put aside their differences elsewhere to 
reach this agreement. This clearly indicates the desire on the part of all actors 
to deal with this difficult issue in a co-operative and sustainable manner.
It is important to note that the fishing ban initiative was ultimately led by 
the United States, because it is not party to unclos. One of the greatest chal-
lenges of the application of unclos within the Arctic remains the United 
States’ refusal and/or inability to accede to the treaty. While the United States 
invested extensively in the negotiations of unclos14 and played a major role 
in its creation, the administration under President Ronald Reagan refused to 
sign the treaty until elements of Part xi dealing with the deep-sea mining pro-
visions were changed.15 The United States’ demands were subsequently met 
through the negotiations of a supplementary arrangement.16 However, this did 
not lead to the United States agreeing to be bound by unclos and there re-
main significant domestic political challenges to consideration of the treaty.17
As a result, the United States is unable to participate in any of the bod-
ies created by unclos.18 However the strength and normative power of the 
treaty as international law has been demonstrated by the extent to which the 
United States has continued to use both the terms and the norms established 
by  unclos in their consideration of Arctic issues. Specifically, as described 
above, the United States led the efforts to develop a precautionary approach to 
the possibility of commercial fishing in the Arctic. It has also proceeded with 
the scientific determination of the outer limits of its Arctic continental shelf 
even though it will not be able to submit the findings to the Commission. Nev-
ertheless, they have co-operated extensively with Canada to determine their 
co-ordinates.19
13 US Department of State, Meeting on High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, 28–30 
November 2017: Chairman’s Statement, Washington, DC, 30 November 2017, https://www 
.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/rls/276136.htm.
14 J. Norton Moore, “unclos Key to Increasing Navigational Freedom,” Texas Review of Law 
& Politics 12, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 459–468.
15 E.L. Richardson, “The Politics of the Law of the Sea,” Ocean Development and International 
Law 11, no. 1–2 (1982): 9–24.
16 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part xi of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, 16 November 1994, 1836 u.n.t.s. 3.
17 P. Bonner, “Neo-isolationists Scuttle unclos,” The sais Review of International Affairs 33, 
no. 2 (2013): 135–146.
18 S.G. Borgerson, The National Interest and the Law of the Sea (Washington, DC: Council on 
Foreign Relations, May 2009).
19 J. Verhoef, D. Mosher, and S. Forbes, “Defining Canada’s Extended Continental Shelves,” 
Geoscience Canada 38, no. 2 (2011): 92.
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The ability to proceed on all of these fronts, even though relations on a 
geopolitical level have deteriorated between the key Arctic coastal and other 
states since 2014 is notable. The Russian intervention in Ukraine has seriously 
hurt relations between it and the five Arctic coastal states as well as Sweden 
and Finland.20 There has been a significant movement towards the expansion 
of military capabilities in the region, and relations between the eight Arc-
tic states are difficult.21 Yet, this did not prevent the five Arctic coastal states 
from developing the 2017 agreement to limit fishing in the region. It has also 
not prevented the five coastal states from further developing their respective 
 continental shelf submissions on a peaceful and co-operative basis under 
 Article 76 of unclos.22
These initiatives in the Arctic point back one of the core principles that 
 Elisabeth firmly believed. Even though she dedicated her entire life in the pur-
suit of what many characterized as utopian dreams, she always retained a clear 
understanding of power and a realistic understanding of the international sys-
tem. She understood that the major powers will have significantly different in-
terests at different times. However, she also understood that with the creation 
of a fair and equitable system of governance, even enemies can come together 
when it suits their interests. Furthermore, she understood that the more these 
states behaved in a co-operative fashion, the more they would find it in their 
interests to continue to behave co-operatively. Thus it would not be surprising 
to her that both Russia and the United States and the other Arctic coastal and 
other states are continuing to co-operate in the Arctic. That was precisely, why 
she was such a visionary in truly understanding and promoting the constitu-
tional power of unclos and why it has been so important to the Arctic.
20 See J. Rahbek-Clemmensen, “The Ukraine Crisis Move North. Is Arctic Conflict Spill-over 
Driven by Material Interests?” Polar Record 53, no. 1 (January 2017): 1–15.
21 R. Gramer, “Here’s What Russia’s Military Build-Up in the Arctic Looks Like,” Foreign Policy 
(25 January 2017), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/25/heres-what-russias-military-build 
-up-in-the-arctic-looks-like-trump-oil-military-high-north-infographic-map/.
22 A. Sergunin, “Is Russia Going Hard or Soft in the Arctic?” The Wilson  Quarterly (Summer/ 
Fall 2017), https://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/into-the-arctic/is-russia-going-hard-or 
-soft-in-the-arctic/.
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* The opinions expressed in this essay are solely those of the author.
The itlos Experience in Dispute Resolution
Philippe Gautier
Catholic University of Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, and  
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Hamburg, Germany
After 20 years of existence,1 the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(‘the Tribunal’ or itlos) has established itself as a judicial institution for the 
settlement of sea-related disputes. This is evidenced by international practice. 
So far, 23 contentious cases and two advisory cases have been submitted to it,2 
compared to 26 contentious cases also relating to the law of the sea, during the 
1 The first election of judges of the Tribunal took place on 1 August 1996. The Tribunal was of-
ficially inaugurated on 18 October 1996.
2 itlos: Contentious cases: M/V “saiga” (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea); M/V 
“saiga” (No. 2) Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea); Southern Bluefin Tuna 
(New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan); “Camouco” (Panama v. France); “Monte Confurco” 
(Seychelles v. France); Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks (Chile/
European Union); “Grand Prince” (Belize v. France); “Chaisiri Reefer 2” (Panama v. Yemen); 
mox Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom); “Volga”(Russian Federation v. Australia); Land Rec-
lamation in and  around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore); “Juno Trader” (Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea-Bissau); “Hoshinmaru” ( Japan v. Russian Federation); 
“Tomimaru” ( Japan v. Russian Federation); Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Bay 
of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar); M/V “Louisa” (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. King-
dom of Spain); M/V “virginia g” Case (Panama/Guinea-Bissau); “ara Libertad” (Argentina v. 
Ghana); “Arctic Sunrise” (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation); Dispute Concern-
ing Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between the Republic of Ghana and the Republic of 
Côte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire); “Enrica Lexie” Incident (Italy v. India); 
M/V “Norstar” Case (Panama v. Italy). Advisory cases: Responsibilities and obligations of States 
sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area; Request for an Advisory 
Opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (srfc). Arbitration under An-
nex vii of the Convention: Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand-Japan, Australia-Japan); 
mox Plant  (Ireland v. United Kingdom); Delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the 
continental shelf between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago; Delimitation of the maritime 
boundary  between Guyana and Suriname; Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the 
Straits of Johor  (Malaysia v. Singapore); Delimitation in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh v. In-
dia); “Marine Protected Area” related to the Chagos Archipelago (Mauritius v. United Kingdom); 
ara Libertad (Argentina v. Ghana); South China Sea (Philippines v. China); Atlanto-Scandian 
Herring  (Denmark in respect of Faroe Islands v. European Union); Arctic Sunrise (Netherlands 
v. Russia); Duzgit Integrity (Malta v. São Tomé and Príncipe); Enrica Lexie Incident (Italy v. 
 India); Coastal state rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukraine v. Russian 
Federation). icj: Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada); Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan und 
Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/ Malaysia); Territorial and Maritime Dispute in the Caribbean Sea 
© Philippe Gautier, ���8 | doi:�0.��63/9789004380�7�_03�
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same period of time, submitted either to arbitration (14 cases) under Annex 
vii to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘the Conven-
tion’ or unclos), or to the International Court of Justice (icj) (12 cases) on 
the  basis of jurisdictional links other than Part xv of the unclos (e.g., dec-
larations made under Article 36 of the icj’s Statute, special agreements, and 
compulsory clauses included in other international agreements).
That said, the purpose of this contribution to this book in honor of  Elisabeth 
Mann Borgese is not to give an overview of the extent of judicial work of 
 itlos, but rather to examine whether its practice reveals anything about new 
trends in the field of international dispute-settlement and the challenges fac-
ing the international community in law of the sea matters. These were both 
topics of great importance to Elisabeth Mann Borgese. They will be considered 
successively.
 Settlement of International Disputes
It may first be observed that the system put in place by unclos seems to func-
tion in a satisfactory manner. This is largely due to the compulsory mechanism 
provided for under Part xv, Section 2, of the Convention. As an illustration, it 
may be noted that the 23 contentious cases submitted to the Tribunal were all 
introduced either on the basis of the compulsory jurisdiction3 of the Tribunal 
(19 cases), or pursuant to an agreement transferring to itlos a dispute origi-
nally submitted to compulsory arbitration under Annex vii to the Convention 
(4 cases).
In this context, it should be recalled that, of the four means for settling 
disputes (itlos, icj, arbitration and special arbitration) made available to 
the states parties to the Convention, a certain preference is given to arbitral 
proceedings by the Convention. Arbitration is the compulsory mechanism by 
( Nicaragua v. Honduras); Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia); Sovereign-
ty over Pedra Branca/ Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/ Singapore); 
Maritime  Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine); Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile); 
 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening); Obligation to Nego-
tiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile); Question of the Delimitation of the Conti-
nental Shelf  beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia); 
Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua 
v.  Colombia); Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (Costa Rica v. 
Nicaragua);  Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya).
3 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 
u.n.t.s. 3 [unclos]. See provisional measures proceedings pending the constitution of 
an arbitral tribunal (art. 290, para. 5, unclos) and prompt release proceedings (art. 292, 
unclos).
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 default pursuant to Article 287 of the Convention. The Tribunal may only deal 
with cases that are submitted to it on the basis of the consent of the parties to 
a dispute (through declarations made under Article 287 of the Convention or 
special agreements) or on the basis of its compulsory jurisdiction. This is the 
paradox of ‘the Montreux formula’ contained in Article 287 of the Convention: 
the Convention establishes the Tribunal as a new specialized court for the set-
tlement of sea-related disputes although, pursuant to Article 287, states parties 
are deemed to have chosen arbitration, except if they agree otherwise. In addi-
tion, arbitral proceedings, which are rather costly, have to be financed entirely 
by the parties to the dispute concerned, while the expenses of the Tribunal 
are borne by the states parties and its use is free of charge for them. This may 
raise some questions at a time when the use of public funds is under scrutiny. 
In any event, it is possible for states parties to make fuller use of the Tribunal 
by making declarations under Article 287 of the Convention or by concluding 
special agreements, even after the institution of arbitral proceedings, to sub-
mit a particular dispute to it.
After this introductory comment, it is useful to briefly enumerate some of 
the new features introduced by the Tribunal’s jurisprudence:
– The Tribunal has had the opportunity to deal with a number of urgent 
proceedings (prompt release proceedings and provisional measures 
 proceedings), i.e., cases which have to be completed within a period of ap-
proximately one month, from the day of the submission of the request to 
the date of the delivery of the decision. The swift handling of these cases has 
demonstrated that international proceedings do not necessarily have to be 
long and costly.
– Provisional measures proceedings pending the constitution of an arbitral tri-
bunal, which constitute part of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
under Article 290, paragraph 5, of the Convention, represent a new and dis-
tinct feature of itlos’s jurisprudence. In a number of instances, states parties 
have had recourse to the Tribunal to obtain an interim decision in a  situation 
of urgency, in order to preserve their rights (e.g., as flag state of a detained 
vessel) or to prevent serious damage to the marine environment, including 
fish stocks. Provisional measures prescribed by the Tribunal are binding and 
the parties are obliged to inform the Tribunal of action taken to comply with 
them. This certainly reinforces the usefulness of these proceedings and, fur-
thermore, in some instances, measures of a procedural nature ordered by the 
Tribunal have contributed to the successful solution of a dispute.4
4 See, e.g., Permanent Court of Arbitration, Press Release, 14 January 2005, Case Concerning 
Land Reclamation by Singapore In and Around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore).
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– Although the Convention only refers expressly to advisory proceedings be-
fore the Seabed Disputes Chamber of itlos,5 the Tribunal, in its advisory 
opinion of 2 April 2015, decided that it could also render advisory opinions 
pursuant to Article 21 of its Statute, which states that its jurisdiction com-
prises “all matters specifically provided for in any other agreement which 
confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal.”6 This therefore introduces a new tool 
available to states parties to the Convention. Whenever there is a dispute 
between them, they do not necessarily have to resort to contentious pro-
ceedings, but may prefer to submit a request for a non-binding advisory 
opinion on a particular legal question. They would then have the possibil-
ity of negotiating to find a solution on the basis of an authoritative legal 
opinion. It remains to be seen to what extent states will, in the future, make 
further use of the opportunity to seek advisory opinions from the Tribunal.
The settlement of disputes under the Convention is, however, not immune 
from crisis. Two states parties, which are permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council, did not participate in proceedings instituted against 
them pursuant to the compulsory procedures under Section 2 of Part xv 
of the Convention.7 Incidentally, it may be noted that the reasons invoked for 
the  non-participation in those two instances were that the arbitral tribunal 
constituted under Annex vii had no jurisdiction over the dispute and that they 
were based on declarations made under Article 298 of the Convention, which 
entitles states parties to exclude some matters from the compulsory procedure 
contained in Section 2 of Part xv. Pursuant to the principle of compétence de 
la compétence, included in Article 288, paragraph 4, of the Convention, any 
objection to the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal is to be settled by decision 
of that court or tribunal. Although this principle is the cornerstone of interna-
tional dispute settlement, it is sometimes fragile,8 underlining that the peace-
ful settlement of international disputes—and this applies equally to the action 
5 See unclos, supra note 3, art. 191.
6 Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 3, art. 21. See Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by 
the Sub-regional Fisheries Commission (srfc), itlos Case No. 21, Advisory Opinion of 2 April 
2015, paras. 38 and 48.
7 See South China Sea Arbitration (Republic of the Philippines v. People’s Republic of China), pca 
Case No. 2013–19; “Arctic Sunrise” (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation), Provi-
sional Measures, Order of 22 November 2013, itlos Reports 2013, p. 230; Arctic Sunrise Arbi-
tration (Netherlands v. Russia), pca Case No. 2014-02.
8 In this context, it is perhaps fitting that we recall that, in the Alabama Arbitration, a case 
often quoted as an early assertion of the power of arbitrators to determine their jurisdiction, 
the statement that there was “no disagreement between the two governments as to the com-
petency of the tribunal to decide” on the claims for damages was in fact wording agreed to 
by the parties as a result of negotiations on the sensitive issue of indirect damages. See, e.g., 
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of the Tribunal—should not be taken for granted. It depends ultimately on the 
conduct of states and needs constantly to be defended and preserved.
 Challenges in the Law of the Sea
An examination of the practice of courts and tribunal over the past 20 years 
should give us some indication of the main issues arising in law of the sea mat-
ters. These cases may be divided into three broad categories: delimitation of 
maritime areas (including disputed sovereignty over islands and the exercise 
of rights and obligations in disputed area); arrest and detention of ships (in-
cluding claims for compensation); and environmental disputes.
Delimitation disputes constitute a stable business for international courts 
and tribunals. In the future, they are likely to address new issues relating to the 
delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, such as the 
delimitation of the outer continental shelf in the absence of a recommenda-
tion from the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf or where sci-
entific data are disputed by the parties. In light of the increased use of  marine 
areas, cases relating to the exercise of rights in disputed areas or relating to the 
competing uses of the seas (fishing, marine protected areas, cables and pipe-
lines, etc.) should also emerge.
As mentioned above, several disputes relating to the arrest and detention 
of vessels have been submitted to itlos. These cases may include claims for 
damage caused to private persons (seafarers and cargo or shipowners) of vari-
ous nationalities. Owing to the rule of exhaustion of local remedies, private 
individuals—who have suffered damage as a result of an alleged violation 
of international law—have first to exhaust local remedies available to them, 
before a claim is brought to an international court by their  national state. 
Thus, recourse to interstate litigation is not always perceived as an  efficient 
tool by the shipping community. This may change in the future on the basis of 
itlos’ jurisprudence, which has facilitated access to an international court 
in cases of disputes involving damage to private entities. This is so for two 
reasons. First, the Tribunal has clarified that the rule that local remedies have 
to be exhausted by private claimants before their national state is entitled to 
exercise  diplomatic protection is not applicable to cases where the flag state 
seeks reparation of a prejudice caused to its own rights, such as the freedom 
I. Shihata, The Power of the International Court to Determine its Own Jurisdiction (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), 17–19.
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of navigation.9 Second, in affirming the principle of the unity of the ship, the 
Tribunal found that the flag state whose direct rights have been violated is also 
entitled to claim reparation for the prejudice suffered by private claimants, in-
dependently of their nationalities. It may be added that cases involving arrest 
of vessels may also be submitted to the Tribunal as urgent proceedings under 
its compulsory jurisdiction. There is thus reason to believe that flag states will 
continue to make frequent use of itlos in the case of arrest and detention of 
vessels.
The preservation of the marine environment is certainly one of the ma-
jor challenges facing the international community. itlos has been seized of 
several environmental cases, inter alia, disputes concerning the obligation of 
states parties to preserve the marine environment, including fish stocks. In 
light of the current issues relating to illegal, unreported and unregulated fish-
ing, it may reasonably be expected that such issues will become the source 
of new disputes. In addition, the two advisory opinions rendered by the Sea-
bed Disputes Chamber and the Tribunal, in 2011 and 2015 respectively, have 
clarified the notion of international responsibility which attaches to the state 
sponsoring activities conducted by entities in the Area, or flag states of vessels 
engaged in illegal fishing activities.
The exploitation of mineral resources of the Area, when it becomes a real-
ity, will trigger a number of disputes involving states parties, contractors, and 
the International Seabed Authority. The Seabed Disputes Chamber of itlos is 
well-equipped to deal with these new categories of claims. In this context, the 
main difficulty will probably be to put in place a viable commercial exploita-
tion while ensuring the preservation of the fragile marine environment of the 
deep seabed area.
The core function of international courts and tribunals is to settle disputes 
relating to specific situations. Judges are not law-makers and solutions to 
environmental issues such as land-based pollution, sea level rise and ocean 
acidification, require co-ordinated action on the part of the international 
 community. Nevertheless, legal actions submitted to international courts may 
clarify the obligations and responsibility of states parties. To that extent, pro-
nouncements of international courts may contribute to more efficient imple-
mentation of the international norms. In this respect, it may be underlined 
that, under the Convention, states parties have a broad locus standi. Article 
286 of unclos provides that “any dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Convention shall … be submitted at the request of any party 
9 See, e.g., unclos, supra note 3, art. 90: “Every State, whether coastal or land-locked, has the 
right to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas.”
187The itlos Experience in Dispute Resolution
<UN>
to the dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section.” 
Accordingly, states parties are entitled to make use of Part xv of the Conven-
tion whenever it is alleged that provisions of the Convention have not been 
complied with, as regards the preservation of the marine environment, includ-
ing the global commons.
As the discussion of this essay shows, the Tribunal’s jurisprudence illus-
trates trends in the field of international dispute settlement. They concern in 
particular issues relating to delimitation of continental shelf beyond 200 nau-
tical miles, arrest and detention of ships, and environmental disputes. It may 
be considered that they represent the new challenges facing the international 
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Introduction
Editor: Peter G. Wells
Elisabeth Mann Borgese stated in The Oceanic Circle that “the ocean sciences, 
or science in general, cannot be considered in isolation. They are part of the 
whole system” of ocean governance.1 The essays that follow in this section cov-
er a number of topics representing our current understanding of the physical, 
chemical, and biological makeup of the ocean. They show how the impact of 
an ever-growing humanity needs to be understood and controlled in the in-
terests and health of future coastal populations, and the conservation of the 
ocean’s valuable and irreplaceable biodiversity. The essays are personal over-
views by ocean experts. Collectively, they provide a snapshot of current knowl-
edge and underlie the importance of the relevant science to effective ocean 
governance and management. Ultimately, a comprehensive understanding of 
the whole oceanic system is required—from the watersheds and shorelines to 
the abyssal plains, from surface waters to the depths. However, all of the con-
tributing authors, as did Elisabeth, understand that “our knowledge of ocean 
processes and life in the oceans will remain forever incomplete.”2 This fact 
alone, on the backdrop of growing evidence of overuse and abuse, and global 
climate change, suggests the wisdom of practicing a precautionary approach 
in our relationship with the oceans—to conserve their species, habitats, and fi-
nite resources. The essays should reinvigorate interest in what Elisabeth called 
‘the majesty of the oceanic circle’ and the pivotal role of ocean science in the 
governance and sustainability of our blue planet.
1 E. Mann Borgese, The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource (Tokyo: United 
Nations University Press, 1998), 43.
2 Id., 23.
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Health of the Ocean
Peter G. Wells
International Ocean Institute-Canada, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
 Addressing the Problem
Serious attention to ocean health started after the Second World War, as an era 
of economic recovery, industrial growth, and prosperity began in many devel-
oped countries. Large oil tankers plied the sea. Occasional but severe accidents 
caused huge, highly visible spills. The impact of oil pollution along coastlines 
and on fishery species appeared on the radar of politicians and coastal inhabit-
ants. Ocean health showed signs of being compromised and awareness for the 
welfare of both people and ocean dwelling species began to surface. The new-
ly formed United Nations reacted with conventions and regulations to curb 
such pollution. In the 1960s and early 1970s, as environmentalism blossomed, 
concerns about the oceans expanded to include many industrial effluents 
and chemicals, ocean dredging materials, land-based pollution of many other 
kinds (e.g., riverine sediments), and radioactivity. Elisabeth Mann Borgese, to 
whom this essay is dedicated, recognized the need for ocean protection in her 
various writings and diplomatic initiatives. Endorsed in 1982, the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) Part xii emphasized marine 
environmental protection.1 Many countries continued to enact environmental 
legislation, addressing marine pollution, especially from shipping and land-
based activities.2
During this early era of environmentalism, the governmental and inter-
governmental response to marine pollution was significant.3 It was accepted 
that an understanding of ocean health is a critical underpinning of effective 
ocean governance and sustainability. The science of marine ecotoxicology 
1 Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 u.n.t.s. 3.
2 See Agenda 21, prepared for the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, https://www.sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21 
.pdf. Agenda 21 highlighted the need to control marine pollution from land-based activities 
(lbas), formerly called land-based pollution.
3 See gesamp (the United Nations Joint Group of Experts on Scientific Aspects of Marine 
Environmental Protection (formerly … of Marine Pollution) (www.gesamp.org); the Scien-
tific Committee on Problems of the Environment (scope) (www.scopenvironment.org); the 
Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research (scor) (www.scor-int.org); Brundtland Commis-
sion, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
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evolved rapidly, providing the tools to assess and control marine pollution to 
acceptable levels. The terms ocean health, ecosystem health, marine environ-
mental quality, contamination, pollution, and others were precisely defined.4 
One achievement was clarity and general acceptance of the concept of ocean 
health—it involves both knowing effects of stressors on ocean ecologies as 
well as ocean impacts on human health.5 Understanding both topics under 
the umbrella of unclos Part xii is essential for encouraging and achieving 
ocean protection and conservation, i.e., sustaining ocean health for all species.
 Progress on Core Ocean Health Issues
There are numerous, albeit incomplete, information sources on the state of 
our oceans,6 as ocean ecologies are complex and not yet fully understood. Dis-
coveries of new species and habitats are ongoing; recent finds include species 
of deep-sea crustaceans, jellyfish, Arctic zooplankton, and microbes.7 A more 
comprehensive knowledge of marine biological diversity, vulnerable species, 
and critical habitats is needed to ensure adequate protection.8
Many years of research and discussion have led to a consensus on the pri-
mary threats to ocean health. They include a legacy of fishing and overfishing, 
with its impact on biodiversity and various ecosystems; land-based pollution 
from untreated or partially treated sewage, chemicals of emerging concern such 
4 A. O’Brien et al., “How is Ecosystem Health Defined and Measured? A Critical Review of 
Freshwater and Estuarine Studies,” Ecological Indicators 69 (2016): 722–729; The un-gesamp 
defines marine pollution as follows: “pollution means the introduction by man, directly or in-
directly, of substances or energy into the marine environment (including estuaries) resulting 
in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources, hazards to human health, hindrance to 
marine activities including fishing, impairment of quality for use of seawater, and reduction 
of amenities.” gesamp, The State of the Marine Environment (Oxford: Blackwell Scientific, 
1990).
5 See the essay by Michael Depledge in this volume; see also R.E. Bowen et al., Oceans and 
Human Health: Implications for Society and Well-Being (Wiley-Blackwell, 2014).
6 See gesamp, Pollution in the Open Oceans: A Review of Assessments and Related Studies, 
gesamp Reports and Studies No. 79 (unep, 2009); United Nations, The First Global Integrat-
ed Ocean Assessment: World Ocean Assessment 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017); Global Ocean Commission, The Future of Our Ocean: Next Steps and Priorities (Oxford: 
Global Ocean Commission, Somerville College, 2016), http://www.some.ox.ac.uk/research/
global-ocean-commission/.
7 See essay by Paul V.R. Snelgrove and Anna Metaxas in this volume; P.V.R. Snelgrove, Discover-
ies of the Census of Marine Life. Making Ocean Life Count (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010).
8 E.O. Wilson, Half-Earth: Our Planet’s Fight for Life (New York: Liveright Publishing, 2016).
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as pharmaceuticals and plasticizers, pesticides, metals such as mercury, lead, 
copper, cadmium and chromium, and nutrients; oil pollution, natural and ac-
cidental; sediment loading into estuaries from land-clearing; noise from ship-
ping and oil exploration; and climate change resulting in ocean acidification,9 
shifting water temperatures, and enhanced coastal erosion. Fishing has had 
the greatest impact on ocean biodiversity, and the ecologies of many areas, 
such as the North Atlantic. Trophic levels and food chains have been impacted, 
e.g., overfishing the northern cod. The impacts of legacy contaminants such 
as pcbs and ddt10 are still not fully understood; these substances persist for 
decades in sediments. Noise from shipping and seismic exploration is being 
intensely studied at present, with concerns for marine mammals being para-
mount.11 Plastics and micro-plastics, in enormous quantities, are commonly 
found along coasts and in extensive patches in ocean gyres.12 Oxygen-free dead 
zones near the mouths of large rivers are increasingly common.
Hence, the list of stressors is long. The organization Living Oceans (United 
States)13 has named four pillars of ocean health assessment: climate change; 
changes in and loss of biodiversity (referred to as marine defaunation); habi-
tat change (transition from harvest to habitat degradation); and chemical and 
solid pollution. There are also many smaller, perhaps less important, stressors 
from land-based activities causing cumulative change to the ecosystem.14
The public and governments in different parts of the world are focused on 
a plethora of current ocean health issues. These include the plight of North 
Atlantic right whales; the bleaching and dying off of large swaths of the Great 
Barrier Reef; mortalities of birds and sea turtles caused by plastics; effects of 
noise on whales and porpoises; the global implications to land and sea of an 
Arctic Ocean free of annual and multi-year ice; the impacts of severe storms 
and hurricanes on coastal erosion; increased occurrences of toxic algal blooms 
in coastal waters, e.g., the Gulf of Maine; potential impacts of deep-sea  mining; 
9 See essay by Kumiko Azetsu-Scott in this volume.
10 Polychlorinated biphenyls; dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane.
11 K. Moore, “Evidence-informed Conservation Policies: Mitigating Vessel Noise within Gray 
Whale (Eschrichtius robustus) Foraging Habitat in British Columbia, Canada,” Master of 
Marine Management Paper, Dalhousie University, 2016.
12 unep, Marine Plastic Debris and Microplastics: Global Lessons and Research to Inspire 
Action and Guide Policy Change (Nairobi: unep, 2016), http://apps.unep.org/publications/
index.php?option=com_pub&task=download&file=012194_en.
13 “Four Pillars of Ocean Health,” Living Oceans, last accessed 8 February 2018, http://www 
.livingoceans.org/initiatives/ocean-ecosystems/issues/four-pillars-ocean-health; see also 
the essay by Boris Worm in this volume.
14 B.S. Halpern et al., “Spatial and Temporal Changes in Cumulative Human Impacts on the 
World’s Ocean,” Nature Communications 6, no. 7615 (2015), doi.org/10.1038/ncomms8615.
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increasing numbers of coastal dead zones; and threats to biodiversity from in-
vasive species. Ocean health is also being considered with a broader framework 
of ecosystem-based, coastal, and fisheries management, and global ecosystem 
services.15 Understanding ocean health and supporting the fields of ecology, 
ecotoxicology, and ocean management have become key to achieving the goals 
of unclos and related international conventions and agreements. This will 
ultimately achieve Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s goal of an ocean effectively gov-
erned and protected for all humankind.
 Reporting on Ocean Health
A conceptual framework behind periodic comprehensive reports on ocean 
health, underpinning marine environmental protection, has seven key ele-
ments and recognizes key science–policy linkages, as follows:
1. Ongoing relevant marine science
2. Monitoring, using appropriate indicators16
3. Data and information management
4. Development of indices of ocean health17
5. Development of guidelines and regulations
6. Reporting on the state of the marine environment and communicating to 
decision-makers
7. Action by decision-makers, politicians and regulators, with industry and 
community involvement
New approaches to monitoring and reporting on ocean health have been imple-
mented.18 Various programs have enlarged our knowledge of marine species, 
their movements, and their living conditions.19 The field of restoration ecology 
has emerged, for heavily impacted coastal ecosystems such as mangrove for-
ests, salt marshes, and seagrass beds. There have been many successful efforts 
15 K.K. Arkema and J.F. Samhouri, “Linking Ecosystem Health and Services to Inform Marine 
Ecosystem-based Management,” American Fisheries Society Symposium 79 (2012): 9–25; 
see also the essay by Kenneth Sherman in this volume.
16 See essay by Kenneth Sherman in this volume.
17 B.S. Halpern et al., “An Index to Assess the Health and Benefits of the Global Ocean,” 
Nature 488 (2012): 615–622.; B.S. Halpern et al., “Patterns and Emerging Trends in Global 
Ocean Health,” plos One 10, no. 3 (2015), e0117863, doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0117863.
18 See footnotes 6 and 17.
19 See the Census of Marine Life (www.coml.org), the Ocean Tracking Network (ocean-
trackingnetwork.org), the Global Ocean Observing System (www.goosocean.org), and the 




to create more marine protected areas for conservation and the reduction of 
defaunation. Technology is rapidly producing many new ways to search for and 
access information. Led by Conservation International, the Ocean Health In-
dex program pursues ten goals, multiple indicators, and a normalized scoring 
system that permits comparisons of ocean health between countries on an an-
nual basis.20 Finally, the United Nations Environment Programme (unep, now 
UN Environment) supports improvements at the science-policy interface in 
governmental efforts to protect and conserve ocean health within the frame-
work of ocean management.
 Wicked Problems: The Challenges of Protecting Ocean Health
A wicked problem is “a problem that is difficult or impossible to solve because 
of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often dif-
ficult to recognize”21 and “for which there is no simple method of solution.”22 
Appraising ocean health and finding workable solutions for ocean protection 
is filled with wicked problems.
Population growth is clearly ‘the elephant in the room’. Besides continuous 
land development, expanding coastal population centers emit untreated or 
partially treated sewage and municipal wastes. Sewage directly impacts ma-
rine species and their habitats, threatens human health, and contaminates 
fisheries species.23 Given that global population numbers will likely exceed 
nine billion people by mid-century, controlling sewage pollution will remain a 
major wicked problem.
Understanding the complexity of marine ecosystems, in both their natural 
unaltered states and under the stress of human activities and wastes, is per-
haps the most wicked problem. Many changes are cumulative and long term, 
and some are irreversible. Ecosystems also have negative and positive feed-
back loops, little understood for the majority of trophic levels and species; 
 research such as on puffins in the Northwest Atlantic is beginning to unravel 
20 See Halpern et al. 2012, supra note 17.
21 “Wicked Problem,” Wikipedia, last accessed 8 February 2018, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Wicked_problem.
22 “Definition of Wicked Problem,” Financial Times Lexicon, last accessed 8 February 2018, 
http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=wicked-problem.
23 gesamp, Protecting the Oceans from Land-based Activities, gesamp Reports and Studies 
No. 71 (unep, 2001).
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the complexity of such loops.24 Maintaining monitoring programs is key to un-
derstanding such ecological dynamics and identifying new problems all over 
the globe, some of which are mentioned above. Reliable and uninterrupted 
data collection over long periods of time ensures descriptions of current ocean 
health and predictions of change.25
Finally, there is the wicked problem at the institutional and societal  level 
to co-ordinate global ocean protection. Too many organizations are involved, 
complicating responsibilities and effective action; unep tries to co- ordinate, 
but not every country listens. The ecological implications of the open ocean 
having no owners (the tragedy of the commons in the open sea) is clear— 
fisheries species in many areas outside the eezs are being severely over-
exploited,26 and industrial-scale ocean mining is just beginning.
 Prognosis for Maintaining Healthy Oceans
Upon countering these wicked problems, one encouraging sign is the resilience 
of ecological systems. Some can rebound if stressors are removed (e.g., North 
Sea fisheries during the Second World War). Yet, little is known about the tip-
ping points of natural marine ecosystems. What are the various thresholds for 
recovery? One clear example of apparent non-recovery is the cod fishery in the 
North Atlantic—the population remains small and may be incapable of suf-
ficient recruitment for significantly rebuilding the populations.27
Much is at stake if humanity fails to protect ocean species and ecosystems. 
The consequences of inaction are becoming all too apparent. Despite many 
successful efforts to control marine pollution and to manage coastal and ocean 
areas, more fisheries are becoming unsustainable, people continue to be sick-
ened by algal toxins and industrial chemicals, marine species and key ecosys-
tems are diminished, and economies of coastal countries suffer from declining 
ocean health. Action to counter climate change, overfishing, pollution, and 
over development of coastlines has often been delayed or turned out to be 
ineffective. For some countries, these problems are overwhelming; they lack 
capacity to tackle them successfully.
24 A. Diamond, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada, per-
sonal communication.
25 For example, programs at the Bedford Institute of Oceanography, Canada (www.bio 
.gc.ca) and the Bermuda Institute of Ocean Sciences (www.bios.edu).
26 See essay by Boris Worm in this volume.
27 J. Hutchings, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, various papers and 
recent lecture, November 2017.
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Much more needs to be done to maintain healthy oceans. Recognizing this, 
large international efforts continue to address the big issues and find solutions. 
The Paris Agreement on climate change in 2015 and other climate meetings 
have been essential steps to protect ocean health from this global stressor. 
The UN Ocean Conference in June 2017, laid out a framework for the oceans 
and an agenda to 2030.28 Efforts on marine protected areas and marine spatial 
planning (ocean zoning29) are increasing, especially in offshore regions with 
sensitive habitats, e.g., around seamount ecosystems. Importantly, the linkage 
of ocean health with human health is much more prominent.30 Ultimately, 
concerns for local economies and human health will sway the efforts to protect 
natural marine ecosystems and their inhabitants.
 Conclusion
The international sense of urgency to address ocean health must be main-
tained. Collectively, we must speed up the political, managerial, industrial, and 
scientific responses to the unfolding crisis in parts of the ocean, and especially 
to predicted climate change impacts on the global ocean, its ecosystems, and 
its living resources. With a planet predicted to have two to three billion more 
people by mid-century, mostly living in coastal cities and all under the threat 
of climate change (e.g., sea level rise), strong international political will and 
action are needed now and over the long term. The ocean will survive as it 
has for the past four billion years, but its health and ours will continue to be 
compromised unless we are successful addressing the core issues and threats.
28 See the UN Ocean Conference, 5–9 June 2017, website, https://oceanconference.un.org/
about; see also World Ocean Council, “Sustainable Ocean Summit 2017: The Ocean 
 Sustainable Development Goal (sdg 14): Business Leadership and Business Opportu-
nities, Official Program,” 29 November–1 December 2017, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, 
https://www.oceancouncil.org/event/sustainable-ocean-summit-2017/.
29 D.J. McCauley et al., “Marine Defaunation: Animal Loss in the Global Ocean,” Science 347, 
no. 6219 (16 January 2015), 1255641, doi.org/10.1126/science.1255641.
30 See footnote 5.
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* This essay brings together points raised in discussions on numerous occasions with friends 
and colleagues at the European Centre for Environment and Human Health at the Univer-
sity of Exeter Medical School. I am particularly indebted to Dr. Mat White, Dr. Becca Lovell, 
Dr. Ben Wheeler, Dr. Tim Taylor, Dr. Karyn Morrissey, Dr. Sabine Pahl and Professor Lora 
Fleming for sharing their knowledge and expertise. Any errors in the essay are entirely my 
responsibility.
Oceans, Health, and Well-Being
Michael H. Depledge*
European Centre for Environment and Human Health, University of Exeter 
Medical School, Exeter, Devon, United Kingdom
On 7 December 1972 the crew of the spaceship Apollo 17 took a color photo-
graph of the Earth from 18,000 miles out in space. The ‘Blue Marble’ image they 
sent back not only raised public awareness that most of the planet’s surface is 
covered by water, but reminded us of the deep connection humans have with 
our seas and oceans. Close scrutiny of this and other images of the Earth from 
space reveal a human preference for settlements close to the sea coast and viv-
idly illustrate the worldwide use of the oceans for transport and trade. Depen-
dence on marine resources is clear from the ceaseless activity of the myriad 
fishing fleets and container ships roaming both coastal and open waters, and 
in the hundreds of towering oil rigs endlessly feeding off undersea petroleum 
reserves.
Back on terra firma, human connections with the sea are even plainer to 
see. From seaside holiday resorts and marinas to major ports and industrial 
complexes, over 370,000 miles (592,000 km) of the coastline of the continents 
are adorned with our artefacts. Over a third of the human population (ca. 2.5 
billion people) now lives within 60 miles (96 km) of the coast, with many thou-
sands more joining them every year. In this essay, ways of living sustainably 
and in harmony with marine ecosystems are discussed.
Although coastal areas are deemed desirable locations in which to reside 
or visit, we often fail to grasp the extent of risks to our health and well-being. 
For example, globally, there were ca. 1,562 flood disasters from 1994 to 2004 
that killed ca. 120,000 people and affected two million more overall. Most of 
these events were played out in low elevation coastal zones. One hundred and 
eighty countries have populations located in such areas, mainly in large urban 
settlements. Twenty-one of the world’s 33 megacities (> 8 million people) are 
coastal. When extreme events hit, the lives of enormous numbers of people are 
© Michael H. Depledge, ���8 | doi:�0.��63/9789004380�7�_034
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put in jeopardy and demands on healthcare systems escalate sharply. When 
Hurricane Mitch hit Honduras in October 1998, it caused 18,000 deaths, mainly 
in the coastal zone. Similarly, in the United States, when Hurricane Katrina 
made landfall in New Orleans in August 2005, 1,800 deaths ensued. The level 
of economic development of a community tends to modulate the severity of 
impacts. When Hurricane Sandy hit wealthy New York in 2012, 285 people died, 
while Typhoon Haiyan striking the less prosperous Philippines in November 
2008, killed 5,200 people. By the 2000s, millions more people will face storm 
surges and floods every year as sea level rises. As if to confirm this trend, at 
the time of writing (summer 2017), Hurricane Irma has passed through the Ca-
ribbean and Florida causing utter devastation. The costs in terms of human 
lives and economic damage await quantification, but will undoubtedly be 
enormous.
Coastal dwellers are also vulnerable to undersea seismic events. The Asian 
(Indonesian) earthquake and tsunami of December 2004 killed at least 226,000 
people in coastal areas of 13 countries, with over 500,000 people injured. A fur-
ther ca. 150,000 people died from infectious diseases following the disaster. Up 
to five million coastal residents lost their homes, or access to food and water 
and around one million people were left without a means of making a living. 
The collapse of sewage treatment and land drainage systems resulted in the 
discharge of pathogens into coastal waters. The public (both locals and visi-
tors) were then exposed to dangerous viruses and bacteria through skin con-
tact and following the consumption of contaminated fish and shellfish. On a 
daily basis, wastewater and human sewage of a huge portion of the world’s 
population (> 640 million people) are currently discharged daily, directly or 
indirectly, into coastal seas, mostly without treatment. Past research indicates 
that this generates ca. 120 million cases of gastrointestinal diseases and more 
than 50 million cases annually of respiratory disease. Recent data are not avail-
able so it is hard to assess current trends. However, we do know that viral and 
to a lesser extent, bacterial and protozoan pathogens in polluted coastal waters 
contaminate edible shellfish and fish resulting in ca. four million cases of hep-
atitis A and E, which cause ca. 40,000 deaths, together with a further ca. 40,000 
episodes of disease that lead to long term disability. As seawater temperatures 
rise with global warming, rates of pathogen infections will increase and their 
geographic range will extend. Added to this, an estimated 3–5 million cases of 
cholera result each year in 100,000–120,000 deaths. Harmful algal blooms are 
also increasing in frequency. Around 60,000 cases annually of gastroenteritis 
and respiratory irritation are due to consumption of seafood containing al-
gal toxins. Only a small proportion are diagnosed, usually as paralytic shellfish 
poisoning, amnesic shellfish poisoning, and Ciguatera poisoning.
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For many coastal inhabitants in temperate, higher income countries where 
extreme storms, seismic events, and sewage pollution are less common, the 
threats mentioned above may seem remote. Nonetheless, those living and 
working at sea or along coastlines are exposed everywhere to many other 
hazards. Of note, ca. 372,000 people globally drown each year. Those in fish-
eries and the offshore oil industry are especially at risk. From 2000 to 2006, 
the  average annual fatality rate in the United States was 115 deaths per 100,000 
fishermen. This is three times greater than that of the next most dangerous 
 occupation and more than 25 times that of the US national average for all 
workers. In offshore oil and gas workers, death rates were 27 per 100,000 in the 
United States between 2003 and 2010, seven times greater than the national 
average.
Recreation in coastal areas generates a surprising number of health issues. 
Worldwide, more than 355,000 people are injured annually in recreational 
boating accidents, with more than 40 percent of injuries requiring medical 
treatment beyond simple first aid. Shallow water and open sea recreation 
brings people into contact with poisonous or aggressive marine animals in 
many locations. Dangerous species encountered include sharks, barracuda, 
the blue ringed octopus, lionfish, stingrays, cone shells, and swarms of jelly-
fish. Despite wide public interest and concern, deaths and injuries due to these 
creatures are still quite rare.
A less obvious, long-term health threat arising in the sea involves chemical 
pollutants contaminating seafood. This is perhaps the most underestimated, 
insidious danger of all those discussed so far. Persistent pollutants such as 
heavy metals (especially mercury), polyaromatic hydrocarbons, and a wide 
range of synthetic organic compounds (pcbs, Bisphenol A, brominated flame 
retardants, dioxins, perfluorinated compounds, etc.) have been linked to clini-
cal disorders including neuropathy, cardiomyopathy, endocrine disruption, 
vascular disease, and cancers. Body burdens of environmental chemicals are 
associated with the changing incidence of a wide variety of illnesses world-
wide, so much so that they may be influencing global patterns of disease.
This litany of ocean-related health threats is perhaps both surprising and 
alarming, and clearly warrants much greater attention as ever higher num-
bers of people move to the coast. However, it is important to consider, with 
equal diligence, the enormous range of opportunities and health benefits 
offered by our seas and coastal areas, many of which have previously been 
under- exploited or simply overlooked. Good health and well-being are inti-
mately linked with economic prosperity and education. In many of the world’s 
poorest countries, marine ecosystems generate employment for millions of 
people and offer an attractive environment in which to live. Capture fisheries 
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and aquaculture provide jobs for 10 to 12 percent of the world’s population. 
Over two billion people work in the marine energy sector (non-renewable and 
renewable), mining industries (aggregates and deep sea mining), maritime 
transport, and tourism. In total, approximately two thirds of the global gross 
national product (gnp) is generated within 100 km of the sea coast, with over 
nine billion tonnes of goods being shipped around the world by sea each year. 
Shipping capacity will more than double by 2030. Many other marine-related 
jobs contribute to sustaining coastal communities; for example, employment 
in the extraction of salt, processing and preserving of fish and shellfish, manu-
facturing refined petroleum products; the building, repairing and maintaining 
ships, boats and floating structures; coastal engineering; and the construction 
of flood defenses, ports, coastal towns and cities. All of these activities help 
people to live healthy fulfilling lives.
Marine and medical scientists are keen to point out the dietary health 
merits of seafood. Fisheries produce ca. 160 million tons of fish per annum 
that represent ca. 16 percent of animal protein consumed globally. Fish and 
shellfish rich in omega-3 fatty acids, when combined in a ‘Mediterranean diet’, 
consistently lead to health and well-being improvements, conferring cardio-
protective  effects and a reduced incidence of mammary and prostate cancers. 
Benefits for neurological function also seem likely.
Other marine organisms have facilitated the discovery of new pharmaceuti-
cals. For example, Ecteinascidin 743 is a potent anti-cancer drug derived from 
the Caribbean sea squirt; a series of powerful chemotherapy drugs, the dolas-
tatins, have been extracted from sea hares, Dolabella auricularia; and Cono-
toxin, a potent anti-pain drug, is extracted from marine cone shells. Brevenal 
from the Florida red tide alga also shows promise in treating cystic fibrosis.
Equally exciting is the renewed interest is the use of our seas and oceans 
to directly foster improvements in health and well-being. In the eighteenth 
century, seawater was considered helpful in treating ‘glandular’ diseases such 
as scurvy, scrofula, jaundice, and tuberculosis. One of the first seawater health 
spas, created in Brighton, England, came to prominence when attended by the 
Royal family, leading to other coastal hospitals being established, including 
the Royal Seabathing Infirmary at Margate in 1791. These institutions offered 
so-called ‘thalassotherapy’ to help the weak and sickly recuperate. With prog-
ress in medical science, especially the development of pharmaceuticals, inter-
est moved on from thalassotherapy until around ten years ago when the ‘blue 
gym’ concept emerged. This involves a more scientific approach to assessing 
health and well-being benefits of spending time in and around outdoor blue 
spaces, such as seashores, coastal paths, and estuaries. In England, an analysis 
of census data for 48 million people showed that they reported better health 
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if they live at the coast. Effects were especially strong in areas of deprivation, 
suggesting that coastal living could be used to help tackle health inequalities. 
Physical activity promotes mental and physiological health so if coastal envi-
ronments encourage outdoor pursuits, potential public health benefits could 
be enormous, including reducing the risk of obesity and of developing diabe-
tes, cardiovascular and respiratory diseases as well as various cancers. Further 
health pathways may be via stress reduction and restoration of mental well- 
being, and direct physiological effects mediated through exposure to biologically 
active molecules present in sea spray. The contention is that these biochemi-
cals, once inhaled, reduce inflammatory responses and foster better health.
In summary, coastal dwellers represent a growing proportion of the global 
population at a time when threats to health and well-being from the marine 
environment are increasing rapidly. More frequent extreme weather events, 
sea level rise, rising sea temperatures, and ocean acidification associated with 
climate change are exacerbating dangers posed by harmful algal blooms, mi-
crobial pathogens, and chemical pollution. Paradoxically, as we have seen, this 
is at a time of growing recognition of the health and well-being benefits of 
coastal living. The medical community shows little awareness of the complex 
relationship between marine-related threats and opportunities and their rel-
evance to medical practice. Illnesses arising from contact with the sea or sea 
foods tend to be regarded as being of minor importance compared to health 
risks associated with, for example, smoking, alcohol consumption, obesity, and 
other lifestyle factors. This may be true in a day-to-day sense, but over the lon-
ger term, developing better ways of interacting with the sea and of living in 
coastal environments may greatly improve overall public health.
It is therefore timely to re-evaluate the topic of ‘oceans and human health’ 
in a global context.1 This will put us in a position to mitigate, adapt to, or avoid 
1 For further reading on this topic, see R.E. Bowen, M.H. Depledge, C.P. Carlarne and L.E. Flem-
ing, eds., Oceans and Human Health: Implications for Society and Well-Being (London: Wiley, 
2014); M.H. Depledge, R. Lovell, B. Wheeler, K. Morrissey, M. White and L. Fleming, Future 
of the Sea: Health and Wellbeing in Coastal Communities (London: Foresight Programme, 
Government Office of Science, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/639432/Health_and_Wellbeing_Final.pdf; K. Krajik, “Medi-
cine from the Sea,” Smithsonian.com (30 April 2004), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/ 
science-nature/medicine-from-the-sea-99586066/; M.N. Moore et al., Linking Oceans and 
Human Health: A Strategic Research Priority for Europe, Position Paper 19 (Ostend: Euro-
pean Marine Board, 2015), http://www.marineboard.eu/sites/marineboard.eu/files/public/ 
publication/Oceans%20and%20Human%20Health-214.pdf; and M.P. White, S. Bell, R. Jenkin, 
B. Wheeler and M. Depledge, “The Benefits of Blue Exercise,” in Green Exercise: Linking 
Nature, Health and Well-Being, eds., J. Barton, R. Bragg, C. Wood and J. Pretty (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2016), 69–78.
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threats and relieve ourselves of the sense of gloom and foreboding which 
marine pollution, climate change, and extreme events generate. By fully rec-
ognizing that our seas and oceans can play a role in maintaining or improving 
health and well-being, we can set course for public health policy interventions 
that help us to significantly lower the global burden of disease.
<UN>
The Changing Ocean and the Impact of Technology: 
The Role of the Ocean Tracking Network
Frederick Whoriskey*
Ocean Tracking Network, Department of Oceanography,  
Dalhousie  University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
 It’s Personal
The historic but false vision of the ocean as being so vast and inexhaustible that 
it would benefit humankind forever has been destroyed during my lifetime. 
I lived this change, and watched in dismay as it was documented in scholarly 
publications. The personal experience started in early childhood where sum-
mers were spent on the coast in Scituate, Massachusetts. I passed more time in 
the water with a mask than I did on land. My earliest ocean memories (I was 
born in 1954 and by 8 years old was a devoted snorkeler) are of a nearshore 
zone full of life, and of being able to catch cod (Gadus morhua), flounder (Pseu-
dopleuronectes americanus), striped bass (Morone saxatilis), cunner (Tautogo-
labrus adspersus), American lobster (Homarus americanus; duly licensed as a 
Massachusetts recreational harvester), and dogfish (Squalus acanthias) within 
a few meters of shore. Within ten years, most of these species were gone, and 
the few that remained were greatly reduced in numbers, most probably falling 
victim to overharvesting. This left the American lobster as the major resource 
for the coastal fisheries.1
Concomitant with the fish declines, other stressors were also rearing their 
head. Repeated small-scale oil spills occurred,2 fouling beaches and having un-
documented consequences for the area’s ecology. Plastic waste began to pile up 
on the shore, and the ocean began warming. As temperatures rose, southern 
1 “Living Marine Resources,” Government of Massachusetts, last accessed 2 February 2018, 
http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/czm/oceans/waves-of-change/tech-lmr.pdf.
2 See, for example, Nuka Research and Planning Group, Evaluation of Marine Oil Spill Threat to 
Massachusetts Coastal Communities, Report prepared for the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts, Department of Environmental Protection, December 2009, http://www.mass.gov/eea/
docs/dep/cleanup/laws/osthrt.pdf.
* The Ocean Tracking Network has been supported by Dalhousie University, the Canada Foun-
dation for Innovation, the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, 
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the province of Nova Scotia, and its 
many global partners.
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species like the lady crab (Ovalipes ocellatus) began to make their appearance3 
in what used to be a cold-ocean bastion. The warming of waters immediately 
adjacent to the coast resulted in the lobsters withdrawing to deeper, colder 
water.4 The familiar nearshore lines of buoys marking lobster traps are now 
gone, reducing the socio-economic benefits that flowed from this dominant 
commercial species and changing the social nature of the coastal community. 
New invasive species arrived, displacing the existing, common invasive species 
that in my ignorance I had assumed were our native fauna. In particular, the 
green crab (Carcinus maenas) that probably made its way to North America 
from Europe on the bottom of colonial sailing ships and so enjoyed the area 
that it took over the intertidal and nearshore,5 has now been displaced by the 
Asian shore crab (Hemigrapsus sanguineus),6 which most probably arrived as 
larvae in ballast water of a cargo ship7 from the massive transport network that 
keeps the global economy chugging along.
However, the ocean story is not one of total gloom and loss. The environ-
mental movement that developed in the wake of large-scale environmental 
damage changed public policy and regulatory regimes. Globally, requirements 
were phased in requiring the conduct of environmental impact assessments 
to mitigate or eliminate impacts of proposed projects that could harm the en-
vironment. The concept of sustainable development, so eloquently expressed 
in the Brundtland Report,8 has taken deep international root, and with the 
arrival of the United Nation’s newly crafted Sustainable Development Goals 
(sdg),9 the health of the ocean for the first time has been specifically and 
3 J.C.A. Burchsted and F. Burchsted, “Lady Crabs, Ovalipes ocellatus, in the Gulf of Maine,” 
Canadian Field-Naturalist 120, no. 1 (2006): 106–108.
4 E. Greenhalgh, “Climate & Lobsters,” US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Agency (noaa) (6 October 2016), https://www.climate.gov/news-features/climate-and/
climate-lobsters.
5 E.D. Grosholz and G.M. Ruiz, “Predicting the Impact of Introduced Marine Species: Les-
sons from the Multiple Invasions of the European Green Crab, Carcinus maenas,” Biological 
Conservation 78, no. 1–2 (1996): 59–66.
6 C.E. Epifanio, “Invasion Biology of the Asian Shore Crab Hemigrapsus sanguineus: A Review,” 
Journal of Experimental Marine Biology and Ecology 44 (2013): 33–49.
7 For a review of ballast water transfers, see J.T. Carlton, “The Scale and Ecological Conse-
quences of Biological Invasions in the World’s Oceans,” in Invasive Species and Biodiversity 
Management, eds., O.T. Sandlund, P.J. Schei and Å. Viken (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1999), 195–212.
8 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf.
9 “Sustainable Development Goals,” United Nations Development Programme, http://www 
.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html.
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 unquestionably recognized by the international community as critical to hu-
manity’s future (sdg 14).
 Looming Challenges: The Impacts and Benefits of Technology
There still are huge challenges looming for the ocean, stemming from its ‘open 
access’. An astonishingly rapid development of technology is totally changing 
the nature of humanity’s relationship with the ocean. There is now no loca-
tion in the sea that is not accessible should we want to pay a visit (note, for 
example, film director James Cameron’s ability to construct a personal sub-
mersible to access the deepest portion of the ocean in the Challenger Deep of 
the Mariana Trench10), or to initiate economic activities. The economic drivers 
will be the most formidable. The ocean economy is currently estimated to be 
worth at least US$24 trillion worldwide,11 and systematic attention is now be-
ing focused on developing much more ocean economic activity. ‘Blue growth’, 
or the ‘Blue Economy’, are becoming staples of the economic development 
plans of ocean nations, and we are poised on the brink of a technology driven 
‘ocean industrial revolution’.12 If this economic development is not handled 
carefully, we stand to lose much of the critical ocean biodiversity on which 
a great deal of our current ocean economy (fisheries, nature tourism), food 
security, and valued ecosystem services depend. We also face the possibility of 
a major extinction pulse, similar to the one that was observed for land animals 
when the terrestrial industrial revolution occurred in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries.13
The impacts of technology can swing both ways. While next generation 
technologies may create new problems, they can also help to mitigate or elimi-
nate existing or future problems by providing the information and knowledge 
needed to plan development that will be truly stable. The latter is the world in 
which Dalhousie University’s Ocean Tracking Network (otn) operates.
10 L. Klimas, “What Exactly Did James Cameron Find in the Deepest Ocean Trench?,” 
The Blaze (26 March 2012), http://www.theblaze.com/news/2012/03/26/what-exactly-did 
-james-cameron-find-in-the-deepest-ocean-trench.
11 O. Hoegh-Guldberg et al., Reviving the Ocean Economy: The Case for Action—2015 (Gland: 
wwf International, 2015), http://wwfintcampaigns.s3.amazonaws.com/ocean/media/
RevivingOceanEconomy-REPORT-lowres.pdf.
12 D.J. McCauley et al., “Marine Defaunation: Animal Loss in the Global Ocean,” Science 347, 




 The Ocean Tracking Network
Many animals are unable to meet all of their life-history needs at a single geo-
graphic location. Habitat needs and prey types change as animals grow, requir-
ing changes in geographic location. Seasonal variation in habitat productivity 
may alter the locations where food is available. The habitats and  environmental 
conditions necessary for successful reproduction may be different from those 
needed for feeding or sheltering. Any of these may trigger predictable and 
extensive movements in highly valued species. Should something occur to 
block these movements, populations can decline, and in the worst cases the 
species can be extirpated locally or go extinct.14
As the future Blue Economy develops, the potential for single or multiple 
projects (cumulative impacts) to fall across the migration routes of these 
species is increasingly of concern. If we know what the animal’s needs are, 
and the movement pathways that they follow to meet them, policy and man-
agement decisions can be taken to locate projects or conduct operations in 
ways that minimize the potential impacts. Our problem has been that until 
 relatively  recently, we were unable to document the movements and habitat 
use of aquatic animals. Ocean areas are vast; they cover three dimensions; they 
include extreme temperatures, depths, pressures and other environmental 
conditions; and humans are badly adapted to personally follow aquatic ani-
mals that are at home in the water. Until recently, all of this made it extremely 
difficult for scientists to document movements and the preferred habitats of 
animals in the ocean.
The advent of electronic telemetry since the late 1970s has enabled the ob-
servation of local and long distance migrations of aquatic species and their 
use of particular habitat types.15 A variety of electronic telemetry systems are 
available. Some, like radio telemetry or passive integrated transponders (pit 
tags), are used primarily in fresh water because they depend on transmission 
of radio signals, which will not penetrate long distances in salt water. However, 
data loggers, satellite tags, and acoustic telemetry are available and are widely 
used to track animals in marine systems.16
14 H. Dingle, Migration: The Biology of Life on the Move (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996); R. Nathan et al., “A Movement Ecology Paradigm for Unifying Organismal Move-
ment Research,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America 105, no, 49 (2008): 10952–10959, doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0800375105.
15 N.E. Hussey et al., “Aquatic Animal Telemetry: A Panoramic Window into the Underwater 
World,” Science 348, no. 6240 (2015): 1255642, doi.org/10.1126/science.1255642.
16 M.B. Ogburn et al., “Addressing Challenges in the Application of Animal Movement 
 Ecology to Aquatic Conservation and Management,” Frontiers in Marine Science 4 (2017): 
70, doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2017.00070.
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There are common elements to the marine telemetry technology systems, 
but also big differences among them. Common elements include the need to 
capture animals, humanely attach the tags, and at some point retrieve detec-
tions of the animals from the tags that document the animal’s geographic loca-
tions over time. Data loggers and satellite tags both incorporate environmental 
sensors (e.g., light sensors for light-based geolocation, depth, and temperature 
sensors), allowing scientists to link animal movements to environmental con-
ditions. These tag types store their data on board the tag; however, the way the 
information is retrieved differs. In the case of the data logger, the tag must be 
recovered from the animal, which can occur, for example, when the tagged 
animal is captured in a fishery. By contrast, satellite tags report some or all of 
their data to orbiting satellites whenever the antenna of the tag pops out at the 
water surface. This can occur, for example, when the tag is fitted on the dorsal 
fin of a shark and the shark is swimming at the surface with the fin out of the 
water, or when the tag is a ‘pop-up’ model, designed to release itself from the 
animal on a predetermined set date after the animal was tagged. It then floats 
to the surface where it broadcasts some or all of the contained data, depending 
on the model of the tag and its settings. Satellite tags are large and very expen-
sive; hence they tend to be used on big, high-value species such as tuna. Data 
loggers, whose utility is determined by the probability of the tagged fish being 
captured in fisheries, tend to be used on species where there is a high exploita-
tion rate, increasing the probability of return of the tag.
The third electronic tagging system, acoustic telemetry, uses sound trans-
mission.17 Animals are tagged with an acoustic tag (also known as a ‘pinger’) 
that has a unique identification signal (ID) assigned to each individual, let-
ting all subsequent detections of that tag be attributed to the original animal. 
These tags can also carry additional sensors such as depth and temperature. 
However, to detect the acoustic tags, a network of acoustic receivers needs to 
be deployed in the ocean at known locations. These typically have omnidirec-
tional detection ranges of about 800 m, record the signals from the tags when-
ever they are within range, and store detections until the data can be retrieved. 
Course tracks and residency of animals are determined by linking sequential 
detections on the various receivers in the network. Data retrieval is done in 
one of three ways: by bringing the receiver to the surface and connecting it to 
a computer; in more expensive receiver models, by uploading the data from a 
moored receiver through an acoustic modem to a surface platform or marine 
autonomous vehicle; or in the most expensive model, by cabling the receiver 
17 F. Whoriskey and M. Hindell, “Developments in Tagging Technology and their Contribu-
tions to the Protection of Marine Species at Risk,” Ocean Development & International Law 
47, no. 3 (2016): 221–232, doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2016.1194090.
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to a surface buoy or mobile marine autonomous vehicles that have satellite or 
cellular phone links and can transmit detections in real time. Acoustic telem-
etry has become the most used form of marine electronic telemetry, due to its 
relatively inexpensive tag costs, and the availability of a variety of tag sizes that 
let investigators tag animals as small as 4.5 cm in length or which can last for 
ten years or more. This makes acoustic telemetry a flexible system that can ad-
dress many questions and species (or their life stages) of interest.
Canada’s Ocean Tracking Network (www.oceantrackingnetwork.com) has 
become a world leader in the field of acoustic telemetry. otn is a project and 
system of the United Nations Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commissions’ 
Global Ocean Observing System. Starting in 2008, the otn began deploying 
Canadian state-of-the-art acoustic receivers and oceanographic monitoring 
equipment in key global ocean locations. These are being used to document 
the movements and survival of acoustically tagged marine animals and to link 
both to oceanographic conditions. otn deployments have occurred in all of 
the world’s five oceans, and frequently complement/enhance existing deploy-
ments maintained by otn partners. The >160 species tracked include marine 
mammals, sea turtles, squid, and fish, including sharks, sturgeon, eels, tuna, 
salmon, and cod. Over 400 international researchers from 19 countries are cur-
rently participating in the global network. Innovative use of autonomous ve-
hicles and platforms of opportunities (e.g., meteorological buoys and offshore 
oil infrastructure) to position new receivers is greatly enabling otn’s ability to 
monitor acoustically tagged animals and to retrieve data from moored receiv-
ers via acoustic modems.
A particularly unique element of the otn is its systematic focus on interna-
tional networking through its data system. otn maintains a sophisticated data 
warehouse and is creating networked international nodes to house regional 
telemetry data. Half of the otn staff is devoted to the task of seeing that the 
data from otn’s 1,600+ acoustic receivers are linked to the data flowing from  
>20,000 additional acoustic receivers deployed by individuals and teleme-
try  networks throughout the global ocean.18 otn has been recognized as an 
 Associate Data Unit of the International Oceanographic Data and Information 
Exchange. The sharing of data in this manner is technically challenging; there 
is a need for common or at least exchangeable metadata and data standards, 
and for QA/QC of large volumes of data. A major challenge has been getting 
18 S.J. Cooke et al., “Ocean Tracking Network Canada: A Network Approach to Address-
ing Critical Issues in Fisheries and Resource Management with Implications for Ocean 
Governance,” Fisheries 36, no. 12 (2011): 583–592.
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 individual  investigators to buy into the process of data sharing and making 
their data available for use by the current and future scientific community. 
Some investigators who are reluctant to network are concerned about data 
theft or misuse; however, those investigators who are networking are increas-
ing their productivity.19
 The Future of Electronic Telemetry
Given the need for the information that electronic telemetry provides, the sci-
ence community believes that its use for tracking aquatic animals will only 
grow in the future.20 Continuing technological development (e.g., addition of 
oxygen, pH, and other sensors to tags) and expansion of its use will reduce 
costs and increase its utility by letting it help address the key management 
and policy questions. As the data grow in volume and especially in complexity, 
with varied environmental and animal movement variables measured at dif-
ferent time and geographic scales, much of the action in the field will shift to 
data analytics and visualization. There is a bright future for those with strong 
skills in data analytics and visualization, and with the communication skills to 
work with animal telemetrists.
 Implications for Ocean Governance
Since coastal communities of ocean nations depend on their fisheries/biologi-
cal resources for their socio-economic well-being, there is a critical need to 
inform policy and management systems with the best information possible on 
the impacts of our management decisions and on the potential consequences 
of future ocean development. We know that many valued species must move 
at predictable times to meet their life-history needs. If we want these species 
to prosper and continue to provide benefits to humans, it is imperative that we 
not block these movements. otn researchers are informing policy and man-
agement decisions about fisheries, endangered species, the effectiveness of 
19 V.M. Nguyen et al., “To Share or Not to Share in the Emerging Era of Big Data: Perspec-
tives from Fish Telemetry Researchers on Data Sharing,” Canadian Journal of Fisheries and 
Aquatic Sciences 74, no. 8 (2017): 1260–1274, doi.org/10.1139/cjfas-2016-0261.
20 R.J. Lennox et al., “Envisioning the Future of Aquatic Animal Tracking: Technology, 




marine protected areas, and the potential environmental impacts of proposed 
industrial development in the ocean. They are also linking animal distribu-
tions to environmental conditions, which will provide a predictive capacity 
for changed animal distributions in the face of a changing ocean. As such, 
the otn has an important role to play in the quest to maintain the health of 
the oceans.
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Ocean Remote Sensing from Space:  
A Tale of Three Commons
Dirk Werle
ærde Environmental Research, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
 Introduction
The uniqueness of the ocean lies in its vastness, its constant movement, flow, 
and circulation. This seems to elude graphic illustration on a static map with 
point markings and line drawings, or image capture of the watery element, 
particularly when it takes the form of currents, waves, fog or clouds, or when 
it is precipitating, melting or blowing. Geometric representations and instant 
snapshots of the ocean are ephemeral and fleeting, subject to interpolation 
and interpretation. Exploring, representing and articulating the dynamics of 
ocean space is a challenging endeavor that can be enriched by the view from 
above—high above—from outer space, via the pathways of cyberspace.1
 The View from Above
Viewing the ocean from outer space is an unusual, formidable perspective. It 
differs profoundly from that of the traditional lookout in the mast of a sail-
ing vessel or present-day, ship-based radar instruments, horizontally scan-
ning their immediate surroundings and committing important observations 
and positions to a log. By contrast, modern satellite-based sensors are pointed 
downward. The vertical perspective permits map-like arrangements of data 
collections. These are scalable and in effect comparable with other geospatial 
information as it relates to marine surveillance, mapping, and synoptic views 
of environmental conditions. Moreover, while confined by Kepler’s Laws to or-
bital motion several hundred kilometers high above the rotating Earth, optical 
and radar remote sensing systems can effortlessly repeat their measurement 
1 P. Meyer, “Outer Space and Cyberspace: A Tale of Two Security Realms,” in, International Cy­
ber Norms: Legal, Policy & Industry Perspectives, eds., A.-M. Osula and H. Rõigas (Tallinn: nato 
ccd coe Publications, 2016), 155–169, https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/ 
pdf/InternationalCyberNorms_Ch8.pdf.
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cycle, covering vast swaths of ocean surface and eventually the entire globe on 
a regular basis.
In a typical scenario, satellite-based sensors transform the radiation or back-
scatter response to a stream of electrons. Data streams are rapidly transmitted 
to a ground-based facility and processed by algorithms that record them as 
ocean color, temperature, sea surface elevation, or sea ice, as the case may be. 
Over the past decades, scientists and mariners have learned to utilize and in-
terpret wide-area coverage of ocean remote sensing data, often in conjunction 
with in situ validation data from a buoy or Argo float network. They study spa-
tial and temporal dimensions of biophysical and chemical processes, measure 
trends of global sea level rise, and monitor oscillations, such as El Niño and La 
Niña events (Figure 1). They routinely assess the risk of operating in remote 
and harsh marine environments by integrating up-to-date satellite data into 
mapping, modeling, and forecasting activities.2
2 I.S. Robinson, Discovering the Ocean from Space: The Unique Applications of Satellite Oceano­
graphy (Heidelberg: Springer, 2010).
Figure � Time series of altimeter measurements from the Jason-2 satellite showing 
averaged sea surface height anomalies in the Pacific Ocean during the develop-
ment of an intense El Niño event in 2015. Darker shades of red indicate where 
the ocean stood higher than the normal sea level, as warmer water expands to 
fill more volume. Darker shades of blue reveal where sea level and temperatures 
were lower than average, resulting from water contraction. Normal sea level con-
ditions appear in white; continental landmasses appear in grey.
Source: nasa Earth Observatory; nasa Earth Observatory maps by 
Joshua Stevens, using Jason-� data provided by Akiko Kayashi and 
Bill Patzert, nasa/jpl Ocean Surface Topography Team.
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Advanced satellite technologies and constellations of high-precision sen-
sor systems are revolutionizing the way we can observe the ocean surface on 
a  daily basis at spatial resolutions that range from a few hundred meters to 
several kilometers. Microwave scatterometers provide detailed global data 
on near-surface wind fields and on sea ice distribution. Altimeters observe 
ocean circulation patterns, measure significant wave height, and monitor sea 
levels at centimeter accuracy. Synthetic aperture radars are similar ‘weather-
independent’ instruments generating detailed imagery of coastal wind fields, 
waves, frontal currents, surface oil pollution, and sea ice. Along-track scan-
ning radiometers provide accurate sea surface temperature maps. Ocean color 
radiometry is essential in coastal regions for measuring parameters such as 
chlorophyll-a concentration, primary productivity, and suspended matter. 
Many of these ‘surficial’ data sets and time series are used for validating multi-
dimensional marine ecosystem models of ocean space.3
Over the coming years, public and private sector investments in Earth ob-
servation technology and geospatial infrastructure will amount to billions of 
dollars, supporting the scenarios and applications mentioned above. They 
hold promise for more capable sensors, more frequent and detailed observa-
tions, and more timely delivery of related products and services originating 
from the increasingly crowded precinct of low Earth orbits. Going beyond 
the view from above and rapid development of space technology, how will 
policy-makers, managers, and the public-at-large receive and react to scientific 
evidence of ocean change? What societal benefits might be gained, given the 
coveted view from above?4 And, conversely, can Earth observation technolo-
gies help to sustain the health of the ocean, given open and reliable access to 
online data streams and scientific research into essential ocean variables?5
 Digital Pathways across the Global Commons
One might address the concerns related to ocean science policy, societal ben-
efits, and ocean health from a global commons point-of-view by following the 
pathways of digital data and image representations of ocean space, as they 
3 Task Team for an Integrated Framework for Sustained Ocean Observing, A Framework for 
Ocean Observing, IOC/INF-1284 rev. (Paris: unesco, 2012), doi: 10.5270/OceanObs09-FOO, 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002112/211260e.pdf.
4 S. Djavidnia, V. Cheung, M. Ott and S. Seeyave, eds., Oceans and Society: Blue Planet (New-
castle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholar Press, 2014).





accumulate from sensors based in outer space and enter a third domain of the 
global commons, namely, cyberspace. Cyberspace has rapidly emerged as the 
main vector for transmitting electronic signals, processing data, and accessing 
information. Satellite oceanography worldwide is thriving in this man-made 
domain; scientists and fast-growing users groups by and large depend on open 
access to it.
One of the essential infrastructure elements of cyberspace is the interconti-
nental fiber-optic cable network. It shuttles more than 90 percent of the world-
wide Internet traffic across the ocean floor; the remaining traffic is handled 
by high-speed data links via communication satellites.6 Once more, the cyber-
netic pathways of Earth observation data—this time processed data to end 
users—transects the global commons of ocean space and outer space. While 
both of these domains are governed by international treaties, cyberspace is 
not, at least not yet. A significant challenge to the viability of the emerging 
cyber-common is inadequate security, insufficient norms and regulations, and 
ineffective mechanisms of enforcement.7 Restriction or outright disruption of 
access to Earth observation data would significantly blindside our ability to 
monitor vast areas of ocean space.
Meanwhile, satellite remote sensing is accumulating enormous data sets, 
filling archival storage vaults by the petabyte; many of them are openly avail-
able online.8 Data volumes have already reached a critical mass to be used in 
 interoperable ways for large-scale syntheses and big data analytics. Assimilation 
with a host of other geospatial records is an exciting and demanding element 
of future interdisciplinary scientific research and operational oceanography. 
It relies on improved connections between data repositories and automated, 
custom-made queries so as to extract, reveal, and quantify relationships.
Approaching the topic from a social justice perspective, Elisabeth Mann 
Borgese recognized the value of, and the all-important access to, Earth obser-
vation data at a very early stage of its development. Two years after the 1972 
6 N. Starosielski, The Undersea Network (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015).
7 M. Barrett, D. Bedford, E. Skinner and E. Vergeles, Assured Access to the Global Commons 
( Norfolk, VA: Supreme Allied Command Transformation, North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion, 2011), http://www.act.nato.int/globalcommons; see also D. Livingstone and P. Lewis, 
Space, the Final Frontier for Cybersecurity? (London: Chatham House, 2016).
8 Examples include the US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency Centers for En-
vironmental Information (https://www.nodc.noaa.gov/), the US National Aeronautics and 
Space Agency’s (nasa) WorldView portal (https://worldview.earthdata.nasa.gov), or the 
European Union’s Copernicus Marine Environmental Monitoring Service (http://marine 
.copernicus.eu); some non-governmental organizations are focusing on specific themes, for 
example, the Global Fishing Watch (http://globalfishingwatch.org) and https://windy.com.
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launch by the United States of their first civilian Earth Resource Technology 
Satellite (ERTS-1, later re-named LANDSAT-1), and four years before their pio-
neering seasat radar satellite returned a bounty of ocean measurements, she 
asserted, “only when satellite detection of natural resources is  governed by inter-
national law will it benefit mankind.”9 Her 1987 proposal for the  establishment 
of a World Space Organization (wso) under the auspices of the United Nations 
was informed by experience gained during the negotiations leading up to the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Mann Borgese’s overarching 
and principled wso framework did not find support then.  Instead, smaller and 
voluntary non-binding international and intergovernmental  arrangements 
started to emerge at the time, as the initial scope of satellite observation and 
resource mapping was broadening to include  environmental assessment and 
monitoring activities.
During the 1980s, the Group of Seven (G7) countries established partner-
ships in the international arena to “coordinate comprehensive and sustained 
Earth observations for the benefit of humankind.”10 The G7 Committee on 
Earth Observation Satellites (ceos) was initially formed in 1984 as a mecha-
nism for national space agencies to collaborate on missions and data systems. 
Under the United Nations umbrella, the Global Ocean Observing System 
(goos) informs environmental management policies and agreements and 
co-ordinates observations for climate, ocean health, and real-time services. 
The Group on Earth Observations (geo) is a voluntary intergovernmental 
partnership of more than 100 nations pursuing the creation of an ambitious 
Global Earth Observation System of Systems, connecting Earth observation 
resources with a wide range of designated societal benefit areas. More often 
than not, these exemplary efforts of governance, collaboration and regulatory 
capacity-building are struggling to keep up with the relentless pace of ocean-
related activities and technology development.
9 Elisabeth Mann Borgese documented her points of view in two papers: “The Common 
Heritage,” ceres: fao Review on Development (November/December 1974): 55–57; 
“Towards a World Space Organization,” Canadian Institute for International Peace and 
Security Points of View No. 5 (November 1987): 1–7. Both papers are available at https://
findingaids.library.dal.ca/elisabeth-mann-borgese-fonds/.
10 ceos has been in operation since 1984 (http://www.ceos.org); goos (http://www 
.goosocean.org) was established in 1992 by the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Com-
mission of unesco; the intergovernmental Group on Earth Observations (http://www 
.earthobservations.org) first came together in 2003, adopted a Framework Document in 
2004 defining scope and intent of the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (http://
www.geoportal.org) and endorsed the geoss 10-year implementation plan in 2005.
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 Prospects for Observing Ocean Space from Outer Space  
through Cyberspace
Not unlike ocean circulation, the oceanic circle of satellite remote sensing data 
is also a continuous system: from surface to sensor to user, driven by the quest 
for a constant supply of reliable data and image products. Uninterrupted flow 
is the key to its function, and open access is essential for widespread appli-
cations in the near future. Scientists, researchers, and operational managers 
will continue to be leaders in marine monitoring activities and forecasting ser-
vices. Citizen science is likely to join in these efforts, taking advantage of data 
democratization and data access opportunities. Emergency responders will 
focus on near real-time analysis for natural and human-made disasters, such 
as major storms, oil spill pollution, harmful algal blooms, or oxygen-depleted 
dead zones.
At the institutional level, satellite data are increasingly used in conjunction 
with other geospatial tools to assess regulatory regime performance and to 
enforce rules concerning large marine protected areas or illegal, unreported 
and unregulated fishing. The growing body of spatial-temporal information 
derived from ocean observing satellite sensors will continue to challenge con-
ventional assumptions of movement and circulation patterns. Many efforts 
are bound to move beyond co-ordinating the activities of Earth observation 
producers.11 Examples include Copernicus, The European Earth Observa-
tion  Programme12 and its Marine Environment Monitoring Service,13 and the 
 Global Fishing Watch.14 They will involve a complex combination of actors, 
mandates and authorities. As a case in point, one might consider a private 
company launching a satellite sensor into space on an Indian or Russian rock-
et, providing  environmental monitoring services and geospatial products via 
Internet to government or non-governmental organizations concerned with 
the implementation, enforcement, or monitoring of international regimes.
The role of satellite observations in addressing marine surveillance and en-
vironmental issues at local, regional, and global scales could be viewed as being 
largely instrumental, or technical, complemented by advanced  methodological 
11 M. Onoda and O. Young, eds., Satellite Earth Observations and Their Impact on Society 
and Policy (Singapore: Springer, 2017), https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-10 
-3713-9; see also D.J. Whalen, “For All Mankind: Societal Impact of Application Satellites,” 
in Societal Impact of Spaceflight, eds., S.J. Dick and R.D. Launius (Washington, DC: nasa, 
2007), 289–312, https://history.nasa.gov/sp4801-part1.pdf.
12 See Copernicus, http://copernicus.eu/.
13 Supra note 8.
14 Supra note 8.
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approaches first to identify, then classify, and eventually model the magnitude, 
characteristics, and extent of ocean features. As such, the observations from 
outer space cannot solve problems of climate change, marine habitat loss, 
ocean acidification, or overfishing. Yet, reliable satellite data and time series 
of ocean space will frequently form the geospatial backbone when it comes to 
addressing, alleviating, and solving these problems. How beneficial the view 
from above and how useful the digital manifestations of the oceanic satellite 
data circle can be for humankind will in no small part rely on open access and 
emerging governance regimes of the cyberspace common.
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Large Marine Ecosystems: Their Status and Role 
in Ocean Governance
Kenneth Sherman
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Marine 
Fisheries Service Laboratory, Narragansett, Rhode Island, United States
 Introduction
As a participant in the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission’s (ioc) 
annual meetings in the 1980s, I remember at one of the sessions a particularly 
passionate and forceful delivery by Professor Elisabeth Mann Borgese on the 
need to advance the legal authority for management of the oceans under the 
terms of the law of the sea. That memorable delivery was later shared with Pro-
fessor Lewis Alexander, of the University of Rhode Island (uri), who directed 
the Marine Affairs Program at uri and was a longtime colleague of Professor 
Mann Borgese. Professor Alexander participated with her in many law of the 
sea conferences and workshops.
As Director of the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(noaa) Fisheries Laboratory at uri’s Bay Campus, I served as a guest lecturer 
on marine fisheries science in Professor Alexander’s seminar courses and was 
well aware of his expertise in law of the sea matters. It was in the course of joint 
study with Professor Alexander that we developed the concept of adapting the 
management principles from the law of the sea to the assessment and man-
agement of large marine ecosystems (lmes) defined on the basis of four eco-
logical criteria: bathymetry, hydrography, productivity, and trophic linkages.1 
 Following an initial period of joint study, Professor Alexander and I convened 
the Symposium on Variability and Management of Large Marine Ecosystems at 
the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Sci-
ence (aaas) in 1984. We were invited by the aaas to prepare a peer- reviewed 
volume of selected papers from the Symposium that was published by the 
aaas and serves as the seminal volume on large marine ecosystems.2
1 For maps of the 66 large marine ecosystems (lmes) globally, see the US noaa lme Portal, 
http://lme.edc.uri.edu.
2 K. Sherman and L.M. Alexander (eds.), Variability and Management of Large Marine Ecosys-
tems, American Association for the Advancement of Science (aaas) Selected Symposium 99 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).
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 Large Marine Ecosystems’ Fusion of Science and Governance
The fusion of the lme approach to the assessment and governance of coastal 
ocean goods and services evolved and has emerged as a global lme move-
ment during the past three decades. Among the invited speakers to the ini-
tial aaas lme Symposium and contributors to the seminal lme volume was 
a multidisciplinary cross-section of well-known experts in marine fisheries 
(M. Sissenwine), marine population dynamics (J. Beddington, N. Dann), marine 
economics (G. Pontecurvo, F. Christy), oceanography (A. Bakun, N. McCall), as 
well as marine law and governance (M. Belsky, T. Scully). From the inception of 
the Symposium in 1984 and forward over three decades of the lme movement 
to the present, a concerted effort has been directed towards the integration 
and fusion of natural sciences with social sciences as an essential foundation 
of the lme approach to ecosystem-based management (ebm). The lme ap-
proach is based on the best available science applied to assess changing condi-
tions or states of the environment and major components of the biogeochemi-
cal processes to support governance of marine goods and services within the 
spatial domains of entire lmes.
The lme approach to assessment and governance is dependent on quan-
titative metrics from time-series measurements of suites of indicators under 
the broad umbrella of five lme modules: (i) productivity, (ii) fish and fisheries, 
(iii) pollution and ecosystem health, (iv) socio-economics, and (v) governance 
(Figure 1). The metrics of the first three modules are based on natural science 
data, and the metrics of the last two modules are based on social science met-
rics. During the intervening 33 years since the initial 1984 lme Symposium, 
a firm science foundation has been established through the contributions of 
450 authors of 18 volumes of lme studies published by aaas, Westview Press, 
Blackwell Science, Elsevier Science, the International Union for Conservation 
of Nature, and several United Nations agencies. In addition, 304 articles on 
lmes have been published in marine science journals. An annotated list of 
volumes and published journal articles was published in 2016.3 The published 
literature includes results of LME assessments based on the broad umbrella of 
science-based modular indicators.
The productivity module metrics are based on primary productivity mea-
sured as gCm2yˉ1. The primary productivity drives the trophodynamics of the 
lme and can be related to the carrying capacity of the ecosystem in relation 
3 E. Kelley, ed., Large Marine Ecosystems of the World: An Annotated Bibliography, noaa Techni-




to supporting fisheries yields.4 Other biogeochemical indicators of change in 
lmes include photosynthetically active radiation, chlorophyll a, zooplankton, 
and ichthyoplankton and oceanographic conditions including water tempera-
ture, salinity, density, circulation nutrient flux, and acidification. Application 
of satellite derived data is useful for monitoring temperature, chlorophyll, and 
primary productivity.
The goods and services of lmes are tightly integrated in the fish and fisher-
ies module. In lmes, monitoring data on fish and fisheries serve as economic 
goods and vital trophodynamic services transforming primary productivity to 
small pelagic fish species, up the food web to mid-size bottom feeders, and on 
to apex predators, including sharks and marine mammals. Human interaction 
through overfishing can affect the structure and sustainability of the fisheries, 
underscoring the need for ecosystem-based adaptive fisheries management.
The pollution and ecosystem health indicators for lmes include an index 
to assess the health of coastal ocean waters based on a consideration of lme 
capacity for (i) food provisioning, (ii) artisanal fishery support, (iii) natural 
4 M.J. Fogarty et al., “Fishery Production Potential of Large Marine Ecosystems: A Prototype 
Analysis,” Environmental Development 17, no. 1 (January 2016): 211–219.
Figure � The five lme modules and suites of indicators of changing ecosystem conditions.
Source: “The 5 lme Modules: Integrated Ecosystem Assessments,” US 
noaa, last accessed � February �0�8, http://lme.edc.uri.edu/index 
.php/lme-modules/�-module-introduction.
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productivity, (iv) carbon storage, (v) coastal protection, (vi) tourism and 
recreation, (vii) coastal livelihoods and economics, (viii) clean water, (ix) 
biodiversity,5 and (x) multiple marine ecological disturbance.6 Total  dissolved 
inorganic nitrogen loading from land-based sources of nutrient over- enrichment 
can lead to extreme conditions of oxygen deficiencies in lmes and formation 
of dead zones.
It is the socio-economics module wherein the programmatic application 
of scientific findings are applied in decision-making, including the results of 
time-series monitoring of lme productivity, fish and fisheries, pollution and 
ecosystem health, and habitat conditions (e.g., sea grasses, corals, mangroves). 
Integration of social and economic indicators is factored into management 
decisions for recovery, development, and sustainability of lme goods and ser-
vices.7 The socio-economics dimension of lme management is critical to the 
global economy and well-being. An estimated 80 percent of the global marine 
fishery catch is produced annually in the world’s lmes.
The total goods and services within the spatial domains of the world’s 
lmes contribute an estimated US$12.6 trillion annually to the global econ-
omy. To respond and manage adaptively to changing ecological conditions, 
socio- economic considerations in operationalized lme projects are being 
closely integrated with science-based assessments designed to monitor lmes 
at  appropriate spatial and temporal scales to implement ecosystem-based 
 management practices.8
 Governance Module v
The application of the science-based assessment modules has evolved over 
three decades. Those of us engaged in the development of the lme approach 
to the assessment and management of coastal ocean goods and services were 
5 B. Halpern et al., “Ocean Health Index for the World’s Large Marine Ecosystems,” in Large 
Marine Ecosystems: Status and Trends, ioc-unesco and unep (Nairobi: United Nations 
 Environment Programme, 2016), 239–249.
6 B.H. Sherman, “Multiple Marine Disturbance Assessments for Latin American and Carib-
bean Large Marine Ecosystems,” Environmental Development 22 (June 2017): 129–142.
7 A.M. Duda, “Strengthening Global Governance of Large Marine Ecosystems by  Incorporating 
Coastal Management and Marine Protected Areas,” Environmental Development 17, no. 1 
( January 2016): 249–263.
8 V. de Barros Neto et al., “Two Decades of Inter-governmental Collaboration: Three Develop-
ing Countries on the Move towards Ecosystem-Based Governance in the Benguela Current 
Large Marine Ecosystem,” Environmental Development 17, no. 1 (January 2016): 353–356.
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acutely aware that we were among those in the marine science community 
undertaking a paradigm shift. The shift from single species and single sector 
focused management actions to multispecies and multisectoral ecosystem-
based management was seen as a more effective strategy for moving toward 
sustainable development of the oceans.
The changeover movement towards ebm in the United States had its ori-
gins with the Stratton Commission Report that argued for establishment of 
a cabinet level organization to consolidate and oversee US ocean activities. 
Professor Alexander was active in drafting the Stratton Commission Report. 
He believed that reorganization of the federal government for advancing a 
 national oceans agenda and principles of the law of the sea was desirable and 
practical. In this regard the legal opinions of Martin Belsky, as published in 
several lme volumes, supported the legal status of lmes as an ecologically 
defined domain for implementing ebm practice.9 When Professor Alexander 
and I conceived of the lme approach in 1983, we were in step with a grow-
ing movement towards an ecosystem-based governance system. I had been 
drafted from my plankton research in the National Marine Fisheries Service 
(nmfs) in the early 1970s to serve on a planning group in nmfs’s Washington, 
DC, headquarters to plan a conversion to multidisciplinary fishery science for 
the entire nmfs as a national Marine Research Monitoring, Assessment, and 
Prediction program (marmap).
I returned from nmfs headquarters following the two-year (1970–1972) 
 effective transition from individually operating nmfs laboratories around the 
United States to a formally organized national system of four fisheries science 
centers. The Northeast Fisheries Science Center, Southeast Fisheries Science 
Center, Southwest Fisheries Science Center, and Northwest and Alaska Fisher-
ies Science Center were merged into the newly established noaa in 1970. The 
marmap program was described for implementation as a groundfish monitor-
ing component modeled after the US Northeast Continental Shelf groundfish 
monitoring program at the nefsc and an oceanographic–ichthyoplankton/
zooplankton monitoring program modeled after the California Comparative 
Fisheries Investigation (calcofi). Both activities were incorporated into a 
long-term assessment of the changing conditions of the US Northeast Con-
tinental Shelf lme extending 260,000 km2 from the Gulf of Maine to Cape 
9 M.H. Belsky, “Legal Regimes for Management of Large Marine Ecosystems and their Com-
ponent Resources,” in Large Marine Ecosystems: Stress, Mitigation and Sustainability, eds., 
K. Sherman, L.M. Alexander and B.D. Gold (Washington, DC: aaas, 1993), 227–236.
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 Hatteras.10 It was largely from this experience that the marmap program 
served as the precursor to the global lme approach.
In 1993 I was invited by the Global Environment Facility (gef) to brief them 
on the lme approach. The gef provides financial support to economically 
developing countries that are committed to improving their environment, in-
cluding sustaining the goods and services of lme. In 1995 the gef adopted the 
lme approach in their operational program as a means to introduce and sup-
port ebm practices for developing coastal countries around the globe. Since 
these initiatives, noaa has been providing scientific and technical assistance 
to the development and implementation of 22 lme-based ebm projects in 
 Africa, Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the Pacific. The gef support 
for advancing the lme approach to sustainable development of the oceans is 
consistent with the statements of world political leaders made at three global 
environmental summits (1992 United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development; 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development; 2012 Rio 
+20) and the United Nations commitment in 2015 to the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goal for the oceans (sdg 14).11
 gef and lme Governance Strategy Supporting Ocean 
Sustainability
The commitment of the gef is in keeping with Professor Mann Borgese’s idea 
of international peace and order through the oceans. One can view it as a tangi-
ble expression of the community of nations contributing substantial amounts 
of financial support to economically developing countries to empower their 
people in a global effort to advance sustainable development of lmes along 
their coasts. Since 1995, 110 countries have been provided with US$3.15 billion 
in catalytic financial support from the gef and its co-financing partners for 
the planning and implementation of ebm practice in lmes.12 This global 
movement is consistent with the goal and targets of the sdg14 practice of ebm 
in lmes. This practice is based on a governance regime that is in keeping with 
the country-driven proposition of bottom-up solidarity in joint planning of a 
transboundary diagnostic analysis (tda). It uses science-based methods for 
10 K. Sherman, N.A. Jaworski and T. Smayda (eds.), The Northeast Shelf Ecosystem: Assess-
ment, Sustainability and Management (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Science, 1996).
11 See essay by David VanderZwaag in this volume.
12 K. Sherman, “Toward Ecosystem-Based Management (ebm) of the World’s Large Marine 
Ecosystems During Climate Change,” Environmental Development 11 (2014): 43–66.
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determining the priority of ecosystem issues to be addressed by the participat-
ing countries planning and implementing gef supported lme projects. The 
tda phase is followed by the policy-driven Strategic Action Programme (sap) 
to be implemented over an initial typically five-year operational phase. In some 
cases, the gef will support successful saps for several multi-year  cycles into a 
self-financing sustainable project  future. The tda and sap processes serve as 
a bottom-up governance approach to reach consensus in prioritizing stressors 
to be mitigated by countries sharing the goods and services of lmes wherein 
they join together in moving towards ecosystem-based governance practices. 
The movement is multidisciplinary in strategy and multisectoral in operation 
across the five modules (Figure 1) and major socio-economic sectors, namely, 
fishing, energy, tourism, shipping, and mining.
From a philosophical perspective, the lme approach is in keeping with Pro-
fessor Mann Borgese’s ocean vision for the “making of a new integrated order 
based on new forms of international cooperation and organization.”13 Coun-
tries have shown a willingness to come together for the common purpose of 
developing and sustaining their shared lme goods and services across nation-
al boundaries within the spatial domain of ecologically defined lmes of the 
world. The world’s first lme governance Commission and Convention was es-
tablished by the three nations sharing the goods and services of the Benguela 
Current lme, namely, Angola, Namibia, and South Africa. The Commission 
was established in 2007 and the Convention for the Benguela Current lme was 
ratified by the three countries in 2014.14 Together they reflect a new way of 
ocean governance that is very much in keeping with Professor Mann Borgese’s 
philosophy wherein the common ocean interests bind countries together in 
peaceful pursuit of socio-economic benefits on behalf of their people.
13 E. Mann Borgese, The Future of the Oceans: A Report to the Club of Rome (Montreal:  Harvest 
House, 1986).
14 De Barros Neto et al., supra note 8.
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Ocean Acidification in Canadian Waters
Kumiko Azetsu-Scott
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Bedford Institute of  
Oceanography, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, Canada
About one quarter of the carbon dioxide (CO2) produced by human activities 
since the start of the Industrial Revolution (anthropogenic CO2, mostly from 
fossil fuel burning with much smaller contributions from cement production 
and land use change) has been taken up by the oceans.1 The oceans provide 
a great service to the planet by slowing down the accumulation of CO2 in the 
atmosphere, which is the major cause of global warming. However, this addi-
tional CO2 is changing the fundamental chemistry of the oceans. CO2 dissolves 
in the surface water to form carbonic acid, which upon dissociation results 
in a decrease in pH and the concentration of the carbonate ion, a building 
block of calcium carbonate (CaCO3) shells and skeletons. Ocean acidification 
(OA) refers to the decrease in pH and carbonate ion concentration due to the 
increasing anthropogenic CO2 in the ocean (Figure 1). The upper ocean pH has 
decreased by 0.1 pH unit (approximately 30 percent increase in acidity) over 
the past 200 years and is expected to fall an additional 0.3 pH unit by 2100 
(approximately 150 percent increase in acidity).2 Oceans have not experienced 
such a rapid pH change for at least the last 66 million years, and possibly the 
last 300 million years. This raises serious concerns about the ability of marine 
organisms to adapt. During some of the acidification events in the Earth’s his-
tory, selective extinction and slow recovery of some species have occurred.3
Organisms that form CaCO3 shells and skeletons will experience direct im-
pacts because acidity increases the solubility of CaCO3. Both ecologically and 
economically important organisms in a variety of tropic levels have CaCO3 
structures. Some examples of ecologically important organisms are cocco-
lithophores, which are the basis of some marine food chains, pteropods, which 
are a food source for a variety of northern fish, and warm and cold water 
corals which provide important habitats for other organisms. Economically 
1 C.L. Sabine et al., “The Oceanic Sink for Anthropogenic CO2,” Science 305, no. 5682 (2004): 
367–371, doi.org/10.1126/science.1097403.
2 K. Caldeira and M.E. Wickett, “Ocean Model Predictions of Chemistry Changes from Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions to the Atmosphere and Ocean,” Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans 
110, no. C9 (2005): C09S04, doi.org/10.1029/2004JC002671.
3 B. Hönisch et al., “The Geological Record of Ocean Acidification,” Science 335, no. 6072 (2012): 
1058–1063, doi.org/10.1126/science.1208277.
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 important organisms with CaCO3 structures include shellfish such as oysters, 
mussels, clams, shrimp, lobsters and crabs. Studies of biological responses to 
OA have been an active research field over the last 10–15 years. These labora-
tory studies have shown malformation and dissolution of shells of organisms 
including cocolithophores, pteropods, and oyster and clam larvae in seawater 
with high CO2, therefore low pH. Biological effects of OA to both CaCO3 and 
non-CaCO3 organisms have also been reported. Studies have demonstrated 
decreased survival, calcification, growth, development, and abundance in re-
sponse to acidification,4 reproduction and physiology, metabolic rate, depres-
sion of immune systems, behavioral change, and taste of shrimp.5
Although many organisms with CaCO3 shells and skeletons showed nega-
tive effects from OA, some were not affected and others even thrived in acidi-
fied water. Given the variable responses of individual types of organisms to 
ocean acidity, together with other stressors such as warming, deoxygenation, 
and pollution, it is difficult to predict how whole marine ecosystems respond 
to climate change and acidification. To investigate marine ecosystem response, 
4 K.J. Kroeker et al., “Impacts of Ocean Acidification on Marine Organisms: Quantifying Sensi-
tivities and Interactions with Warming,” Global Change Biology 19, no. 6 (2013): 1884–1896.
5 S. Dupont, E. Hall, P. Calosi and B. Lundve, “First Evidence of Altered Sensory Quality in 
a Shellfish Exposed to Decreased pH Relevant to Ocean Acidification,” Journal of Shellfish 
 Research 33, no. 3 (2014): 857–861.
Figure � What is ocean acidification?
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several studies have been conducted using mesocosms,6 which mimic future 
warm and acidified oceans, and studies using natural analogues such as under-
water volcanos where CO2 gas is released and natural acidification conditions 
are formed.7
Since CaCO3 shells and skeletons are more soluble at lower temperatures 
and higher pressures, high latitude and deep water ecosystems will be more 
vulnerable to the stress of OA. Also, the solubility of gases, including CO2, is 
higher in cold water than in warm water. Thus, although OA is a global threat, 
cold waters in Canada may be particularly vulnerable. Ocean acidification also 
lowers the oceans’ capacity to absorb anthropogenic carbon directly (the solu-
bility pump) and through changes in primary productivity and phytoplankton 
species composition (the biological pump), providing a negative feedback to 
climate change.
Ocean acidification is controlled and enhanced by various mechanisms and 
Canada’s three oceans have distinct drivers (Figure 2). In the Pacific, wind-driv-
en upwelling brings the intermediate depth water, corrosive to organisms with 
CaCO3 shells and skeletons, to the surface.8 This upwelling is a natural phenom-
enon and occurs seasonally. The intermediate water of the Pacific has inher-
ently higher CO2 than Atlantic water due to the accumulation of CO2  produced 
by microbial respiration. The supplementary addition of  anthropogenic CO2 
has, however, lowered the pH of this water to a critical level. In the Arctic, the 
first observations of corrosive surface ocean waters were reported.9 The Arctic 
Ocean receives a large amount of fresh water from rivers, seasonal ice melt, 
and glacial meltwater. This fresh water has little buffer capacity and  effectively 
reduces the pH of Arctic waters. Decreasing ice cover enhances the uptake of 
6 U. Riebesell, R.G.J. Bellerby, H-P. Grossart and F. Thingstad, “Mesocosm CO2 Perturba-
tion Studies: From Organism to Community Level,” Biogeosciences 5 (2008): 1157–1164, doi.
org/10.5194/bg-5-1157-2008.
7 J.M. Hall-Spencer et al., “Volcanic Carbon Dioxide Vents Show Ecosystem Effects of Ocean 
Acidification,” Nature 454 (2008): 96–99.
8 R.A. Feely et al., “Evidence for Upwelling of Corrosive ‘Acidified’ Water onto the Continental 
Shelf,” Science 320, no. 5882 (2008): 1490–1492, doi.org/10.1126/science.1155676.
9 M. Chierici and A. Fransson, “Calcium Carbonate Saturation in the Surface Water of the 
Arctic Ocean: Undersaturation in Freshwater Influenced Shelves,” Biogeosciences 6 (2009): 
2421–2432; M. Yamamoto-Kawai et al., “Aragonite Undersaturation in the Arctic Ocean: 
 Effects of Ocean Acidification and Sea Ice Melt,” Science 326, no. 5956 (2009): 1098–1100, doi.
org/10.1126/science.1174190; L. Robbins et al., “Aragonite Undersaturation in Greater than 20% 




atmospheric CO2, further accelerating Arctic acidification.10 In the Atlantic, 
the effects of corrosive Arctic water, freshwater input from the St. Lawrence 
River, hypoxic (low oxygen) water in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and high rates 
of anthropogenic CO2 uptake in the deep convection region of the Labrador 
Sea act to enhance OA. Corrosive Arctic water can be traced southwards along 
the biologically and commercially active shelf region of Eastern Canada.11 In 
the St. Lawrence Estuary, acidification is closely related to hypoxia caused 
by the multi-decadal changes in water mass composition due to circulation. 
Its pH has decreased from 7.9 in the 1930s to 7.65 by the 2000s, much faster 
than the global average.12 Labrador Sea Water (lsw) is formed each year in 
the Labrador Sea by winter deep convection, subsequently spreading to the 
intermediate and deep waters of the North Atlantic. lsw is well ventilated and 
contains high concentrations of anthropogenic CO2. As a result, the pH of the 
lsw is steadily decreasing.
Ocean acidification in coastal regions exhibits much higher temporal and 
spatial variability than in open oceans. Seasonally variable freshwater inputs 
10 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (amap) (2013), amap Assessment 2013: 
Arctic Ocean Acidification (Oslo: amap, 2013).
11 K. Azetsu-Scott et al., “Calcium Carbonate Saturation States in the Waters of the Cana-
dian Arctic Archipelago and the Labrador Sea,” Journal of Geophysical Research 115, no. C11 
(2010): C11021, doi.org/10.1029/2009JC005917.
12 A. Mucci, M. Starr, D. Gilbert and B. Sundby, “Acidification of Lower St. Lawrence Estuary 
Bottom Waters,” Atmosphere-Ocean 49, no. 3 (2011): 206–218, doi.org/10.1080/07055900.201
1.599265.
Figure � Canadian acid highway and regional amplification drivers.
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from rivers and glacial meltwater also reflect the local geology,13 therefore, 
freshwater inputs affect each coastal region differently. Nutrient input from 
the land enhances coastal productivity, resulting in increased microbial res-
piration leading to oxygen depletion and further CO2 production. As a result, 
ocean acidification is accelerated.14 In urban coastal areas, emissions of other 
acidifying gases, such as nitrogen oxides (NOx) and sulfur oxides (SOx), can 
also contribute to enhanced coastal acidification.15
Canada is one of the first countries in the world to experience the adverse 
impacts of OA. Ocean acidification is likely to alter the structure and function 
of its marine ecosystems. Hence, fishing industries, subsistence fisheries by 
Indigenous communities, and tourism will be directly influenced. The results 
of these changes will threaten economies, especially those directly connected 
with fisheries, culture, and subsistence of Indigenous peoples and eco-tourism.
Beyond Canadian waters, global food security risks caused by OA and 
climate change, especially for developing nations, need to be emphasized. 
 Reducing nutrient input to the coastal area, developing new aquaculture prac-
tices such as close monitoring of intake water to the hatcheries, and cutting 
down the emissions of acidic gases such as NOx and SOx can help to slow down 
the progress of local OA and thus manage risks. However, global ocean acidifi-
cation will inevitably progress further unless the global emission of CO2 result-
ing in the accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere is controlled and reduced.
13 K. Azetsu-Scott, M. Starr, Z-P. Mei and M. Granskog, “Low Calcium Carbonate Satura-
tion State in an Arctic Inland Sea Having Large and Varying Fluvial Inputs: The Hudson 
Bay System,” Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans 119, no. 9 (2014): 6210–6220, doi.
org/10.1002/2014JC009948.
14 D. Ianson et al., “Vulnerability of a Semi-enclosed Estuarine Sea to Ocean Acidification 
in Contrast with Hypoxia,” Geophysical Research Letters 43, no. 11 (2016): 5793–5801, doi.
org/10.1002/2016GL068996.
15 K.A. Hunter et al., “Impacts of Anthropogenic SOx, NOx and NH3 on Acidification of 
Coastal Waters and Shipping Lanes,” Geophysical Research Letters 38, no. 13 (2011): L13602, 
doi.org/10.1029/2011GL047720.
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Ecological Change in the Oceans and  
the Role of Fisheries
Boris Worm
Department of Biology, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
When I took a course with Elisabeth Mann Borgese in 1999, she reminded us 
that the oceans are constantly changing, both in their outer appearance, and 
their internal workings. Constant ecological change makes the ocean fascinat-
ing to observe and study, but challenging to understand and manage.
Long-term changes are brought about by geological processes such as sedi-
ment transport, volcanism, and plate tectonics that affect the very shape of 
ocean basins and the extent of habitat features such as shallow shelf seas con-
ducive to biological productivity. On intermediate time scales, climate-driven 
changes in ocean temperature, circulation, and chemistry can have profound 
ecological effects on the abundance and distribution of marine life forms, and 
even caused massive extinction events in the past. Over the last few thousand 
years, however, people have gradually become a dominant agent of change in 
the oceans. Initially tied to the continents where we evolved, human hunters 
at least 42,000 years ago started to venture out into the ocean to pursue large 
fish.1 Driven by changes in fishing technology, human population size, and 
global trade, this role has been extending to all ocean basins, and even parts 
of the deep sea. Over the last two decades, the profound ecological change 
brought about by human activities has also been studied in detail by the sci-
entific community.
Although human impacts on ocean ecosystems involve many pathways, 
there is little doubt that fishing— defined here as any extraction of marine 
animals and plants—is the activity that historically has had the most trans-
formative ecological effects.2 Although it is not clear how much marine life 
has been removed over the entire history of fishing, recent total catches likely 
1 S. O’Connor, R. Ono and C. Clarkson, “Pelagic Fishing at 42,000 Years Before the Present and 
the Maritime Skills of Modern Humans,” Science 334, no. 6059 (2011): 1117–1121, doi.org/10.1126/
science.1207703.
2 B. Worm and H.S. Lenihan, “Threats to Marine Ecosystems: Overfishing and Habitat Degrada-
tion,” in Marine Community Ecology and Conservation, ed., M.D. Bertness (New York: Sinauer, 
2013), 449–476.
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exceed 100 million tonnes each year, when accounting for unreported landings 
and discards that are not captured by official statistics.3
This intense pressure has caused many species to become rare, or even ex-
tirpated at a local scale. For example, an estimated 96% of local extinctions in 
coastal ecosystems around the world involved fishing and hunting.4 Another 
study of the factors that drive extinction risk today found that exploitation 
caused a majority of marine species losses (55 percent), followed by habitat loss 
(37 percent).5 Clearly, by targeting certain species of commercial interest, we 
can eliminate these species from local ecosystems and regional seas, although 
very few cases of global marine extinctions have so far been documented.
Unfortunately, many fishing methods are unselective, such that a number 
of species are captured in addition to the intended target species. Bycatch is 
often thrown back dead at sea, and such total global discards may exceed 10 
million tonnes per year.6 Consequently, while contemporary fisheries are not 
usually targeting marine mammals, seabirds, and sea turtles, 20 to 38 percent 
of these species are threatened, many of them because they end up as bycatch 
in various fisheries.7
The depletion of both target and bycatch species can have a range of sec-
ondary effects, depending on how those species are connected in the local 
food web. Numerous studies have now quantified these ripple effects, such as 
the unregulated growth of certain prey species, or the decline of predators that 
were dependent on a fished forage species. Some of these so-called trophic 
cascades may have even changed plankton species composition at the bottom 
of the food web, although it is not yet clear how general these effects may be.
Another class of effects arises from the interaction of fishing with sea-
floor habitats and sedentary species, many of which are affected by bottom-
touching trawls and dredges. Biogenic habitats formed by corals, sponges, and 
other fauna tend to be particularly vulnerable, and often take many years to re-
cover after being impacted by fishing gear. Scientists are now trying to map the 
distribution of such sensitive habitats in order to protect them from repeated 
disturbance.
3 D. Pauly and D. Zeller, “Catch Reconstructions Reveal that Global Marine Fisheries Catches 
are Higher than Reported and Declining,” Nature Communications 7 (2016): 10244, doi.
org/10.1038/ncomms10244.
4 H.K. Lotze et al., “Depletion, Degradation, and Recovery Potential of Estuaries and Coastal 
Seas,” Science 312, no. 5781 (2006): 1806–1809, doi.org/10.1126/science.1128035.
5 N.K. Dulvy, Y. Sadovy and J.D. Reynolds, “Extinction Vulnerability in Marine Populations,” 
Fish and Fisheries 4, no. 1 (2003): p. 25–64, doi.org/10.1046/j.1467-2979.2003.00105.x.
6 Pauly and Zeller, supra note 3.
7 Worm and Lenihan, supra note 2.
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When taken together, these various impacts can bring about lasting ecologi-
cal changes. Heavily fished ecosystems tend to lack many of the larger, slow-
growing predators such as sharks and groupers. The density of large predators 
is often reduced by an order of magnitude or more, and their prey species may 
dominate the ecosystem, if they are not fished in return. We often find a pat-
tern of serial depletion from high-value to low-value species, called fishing-
down (or fishing-through) food webs. In many coastal ecosystems today, the 
size spectrum is heavily skewed towards small species, harvestable fish and 
invertebrates have become scarce, and their local diversity is depressed. Shelf 
ecosystems are often heavily trawled and formerly abundant species have been 
compromised, with some under strict management to rebuild their depleted 
stocks. Open-ocean and deep-water ecosystems are exploited by globally op-
erating distant-water fleets, which may lack the strong oversight now seen in 
some coastal waters. As a consequence, there are very serious concerns about 
unregulated overexploitation of pelagic fish such as tuna, billfish, and sharks, 
as well as poorly known deep water species of diverse taxonomic origin.
In summary, the long history of fishing has drastically changed the species 
composition, abundance, and diversity of most coastal and shelf ecosystems, 
with increasing global changes seen in open water and deep-sea habitats as 
well. Many of these changes are poorly understood due to the ‘shifting base-
line syndrome’,8 whereas data collection only began after many impacts had al-
ready taken place, and successive generations of people perceived the changed 
ocean of their youth as a ‘natural’ baseline. As populations decline, it is also 
difficult to distinguish the effects of fishing from those of other growing im-
pacts such as pollution, coastal habitat transformation, and climate change. 
Looking forward, there is a concern that increasing industrialization of the 
ocean through energy projects, aquaculture, and urban expansion could accel-
erate the ‘defaunation’ process that began on land and is now well underway in 
many ocean ecosystems.9
A detailed assessment of ecological change in the oceans, and its con-
sequences for human well-being, has detailed many of the unintended 
 consequences, including compromised productivity, ecosystem stability, fish-
ery yield, coastal protection, and water quality.10 Harmful events such as toxic 
algal blooms, beach closures, and fishery collapses became more common 
8 D. Pauly, “Anecdotes and the Shifting Baseline Syndrome of Fisheries,” Trends in Ecology & 
Evolution 10, no. 10 (1995): 430, doi.org/10.1016/S0169-5347(00)89171-5.
9 D.J. McCauley et al., “Marine Defaunation: Animal Loss in the Global Ocean,” Science 347, 
no. 6219 (2015): 1255641, doi.org/10.1126/science.1255641.
10 B. Worm et al., “Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean Ecosystem Services,” Science 314, 
no. 5800 (2006): 787–790, doi.org/10.1126/science.1132294.
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with the increasing depletion of species and degradation of ecosystems. Con-
versely, many of these changes were shown to be reversible when local areas 
were protected from fishing and direct impacts of human use. A subsequent 
study also showed that improved fisheries management can reverse many of 
the consequences of historic overfishing seen at larger scales.11 These studies 
provide both a warning and a hopeful incentive to reverse some of the ecologi-
cal changes brought about by a long history of overexploitation.
A key challenge in contemporary ocean management, however, is to find 
the right balance between using ocean ecosystems for human benefit, and 
protecting them from deleterious change (or reversing such change where it 
has occurred). This challenge is amplified by global climate change, which can 
profoundly affect ocean ecosystems. Well-enforced protected areas in a wide 
range of representative ecosystems can serve as a tool to hedge against man-
agement uncertainty, but also as a laboratory to isolate the effects of certain 
impacts, such as fishing, from other factors, such as climate change. Marine 
protected area coverage has been increasing steadily at a relative growth rate 
of approximately 8 percent per year since 1960, and now exceeds 4 percent of 
global ocean area.12 Many of these areas are not well managed, staffed or fund-
ed, however, compromising their usefulness.13 Moreover, the management 
of fisheries in the remaining 95 percent of global ocean area has only slowly 
been progressing towards sustainability, and business-as-usual scenarios still 
project  continued depletion.14 Improved management would bring about 
profound economic and ecological benefits, particularly in heavily exploited 
waters found, for example, across East Asia and Europe.15 Unfortunately, only 
strong political will, global enforcement of existing rules, and elevated interna-
tional coordination will make this happen.
Addressing the wider ecological impact of fishing requires careful scientific 
analysis and the construction of ‘dose–response’ functions that examine the 
trade-offs between various degrees of ocean use and their ecological impacts. 
A recent example concerns the fishing of small planktivorous ‘forage’ fish, 
which represent a critical food source for many seabirds, marine mammals, 
11 B. Worm et al., “Rebuilding Global Fisheries,” Science 325, no. 5940 (2009): 578–585, doi.
org/10.1126/science.1173146.
12 B. Worm, “Marine Conservation: How to Heal an Ocean,” Nature 543 (2017): 630–631, doi.
org/10.1038/nature21895.
13 Id.
14 C. Costello et al., “Global Fishery Prospects under Contrasting Management Regimes,” 





and predatory fishes. Increasing demand for fishmeal from globally expand-
ing aquaculture and livestock operations has put growing pressure on these 
fisheries. A comprehensive modeling study16 quantified the benefits (for-
age fish yield) versus unintended impacts (mammals, birds, and fish species 
negatively affected) of these fisheries in a range of representative ecosystems 
 (Figure 1), providing fisheries managers with a science-based decision-making 
tool. The study concluded that most negative impacts can be avoided by reduc-
ing exploitation rate by about 50 percent below the rate that would produce 
maximum sustainable yield (msy). This management scenario still offers near- 
optimal yield (~ 80 percent of msy) while greatly reducing associated ecosys-
tem impacts.
Another recent paper came to similar conclusions with respect to the eco-
system effects of fishing invertebrates,17 and a third report showed this more 
generally for the effects of fishing on the collapse of bycatch and weakly pro-
ductive target species.18 All three studies clearly indicate that traditional man-
agement targets of msy produce large unintended consequences that can be 
mitigated by treating msy as a limit, not a target. Substantially lower exploita-
tion rates will initiate the rebuilding of fish biomass and size structure, help to 
recover collapsed stocks, and reverse some of the most deleterious ecosystem 
consequences. In the medium to long term, this will produce comparable fish-
ery benefits, while minimizing ecosystem impacts, and reducing the cost of 
fishing, thus increasing the profit margin for fishers towards maximum eco-
nomic yield (mey). Therefore, reducing the exploitation rate below the level 
of msy will greatly benefit fishers (greater profit and security), managers (sus-
tainable long-term yield from a more stable and productive ecosystem), and 
species (fewer collapses and more robust populations). So far, very few regions 
may have reached this goal; however, one well-documented example concerns 
the California Current large marine ecosystem,19 where previous overexploita-
tion has been reduced to a level that is consistent with greatest conservation 
benefits.
In conclusion, while ecological change is the norm over the ocean’s history, 
many of the changes seen in recent decades are brought about by the overuse 
of marine living resources, the unintended consequences of fishing, as well as 
other human impacts. Many of these impacts still appear to be reversible, and 
16 A.D.M. Smith et al., “Impacts of Fishing Low-trophic Level Species on Marine Ecosys-
tems,” Science 333, no. 6046 (2011): 1147–1150, doi.org/10.1126/science.1209395.
17 T.D. Eddy et al., “Ecosystem Effects of Invertebrate Fisheries,” Fish and Fisheries 18, no. 1 
(2017): 40–53, doi.org/10.1111/faf.12165.
18 Worm, supra note 11.
19 Id.
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few global extinctions have occurred in the ocean. Both the knowledge base 
and the management innovations needed to constrain or reverse deleterious 
ecological change do exist, and are being used in a variety of regions around 
the world. It is my hope that fisheries management can transform itself and 
may increasingly contribute towards a sustainable, resilient, and carefully 
managed ocean ecosystem.
Figure � Modeling of trade-offs in fisheries management. The projected long-
term fishery yield (thin line) is shown as a proportion of maximum 
sustainable yield (msy) of targeted forage fish species. The ecological 
impact of taking that yield (thick line) is measured as the proportion 
of marine mammals, seabird, and fish species groups whose biomass 
varied by more than 40 percent as a result of forage fish depletion 
(after data in Smith et al., supra note 16). Environmental impacts of 
two different management strategies for maximum yield, and near-
maximum yield are illustrated, respectively.
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 Overview of Habitats
Coastal habitats at the land–sea interface span from hard substratum, rocky 
intertidal environments to sediment-covered estuaries, salt marshes, eelgrass 
beds, mangals (mangrove habitats), and sandflats and mudflats (Figure 1). Sed-
imented intertidal and subtidal nearshore habitats occur globally; sandflats 
and mudflats occur from the equator to the poles, in contrast to temperate 
latitude salt marshes and tropical mangroves. Seagrasses occur globally except 
at the poles. The accessibility of these habitats has enabled studies that gen-
erated important ecological paradigms, but the extremely harsh conditions 
of some of these environments limits transferability of knowledge to other 
habitats. Many species cannot tolerate energy from waves, potential aerial ex-
posure, and fluctuating temperatures and salinities, resulting in low species 
diversity, but the availability of abundant sunlight, nutrients from land, and 
substrata all help support high abundances of tolerant species. Indeed, these 
habitats provide critical support for abundant juveniles of many commercial 
species, among others. The structural complexity afforded by seagrass beds, 
salt marshes, and mangals also pre-empts coastal erosion.1
Sandflats and mudflats are generally the least productive sedimented habi-
tats. Nonetheless, their invertebrate fauna such as mud shrimp (amphipods) 
support migratory seabirds and other transient species. The plants that domi-
nate eelgrass, salt marshes, and mangals produce organic matter and biogenic 
habitat that support high abundances of other species that utilize the plant de-
tritus, associated grazers, and structural complexity to avoid predators. Micro-
bial breakdown of organic material can exhaust oxygen, resulting in hypoxia 
(low oxygen) near the seafloor or just below the sediment surface, reducing 
species richness.
1 D.M. Alongi, Coastal Ecosystem Processes (Boca Raton, FL: crc Press, 1998).
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Figure � Coastal environments. (A) Mangals with mangroves and associated 
fauna, Galapagos Island, Ecuador; (B) Corals, Great Barrier Reef, 
Australia; (C) Mudflat, Roscoff, France; (D) Kelp bed, Nova Scotia, 
Canada; (E) Eelgrass, Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada; (F) Rocky 
intertidal, Oregon, United States.
Photo credits: A, C, F (P. Snelgrove); B, D (A. Metaxas);  
E (R. Gregory).
Tropical and temperate reefs, the primary occupants of hard substrata in 
coastal habitats, extend from intertidal to subtidal depths, limited primarily by 
light penetration to the seafloor. As with some sedimented habitats described 
above, both types of reefs create biogenic habitats where dominant species 
(corals and seaweeds, respectively) ‘engineer’ physical structure that provide 
refugia from predation, augment food supply, and enhance abundance and 
biodiversity, among other functions.
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Most tropical coral reefs occur in warm, shallow waters between the Tropics 
of Cancer and Capricorn, covering a total area of ~ 250,000 to 600,000 km2. The 
main architects, scleractinian (stony) corals, generate calcium carbonate skel-
etons and build structurally complex colonies. Corals harbor algal symbionts 
(termed zooxanthellae) that provide the coral with organic carbon, allowing 
them to thrive in regions depleted in nutrients and otherwise low in primary 
productivity.
Most ecologists consider coral reefs to be the most biodiverse marine habi-
tat. This diversity results from the many species associated with the reef, rather 
than the corals themselves (~ 1,000 species worldwide). Tropical reef species 
range from macroalgae to diverse invertebrates (e.g., annelids, molluscs, echi-
noderms) to fish, with thousands of morphospecies in single regions. Macroal-
gae use the physical structure for attachment and the rich nutrients generated 
through excretion for growth. Similarly, increased particulate concentration, 
and thus, food availability, attracts many small invertebrate species. Fish use 
coral reefs for feeding, spawning, nesting, mating, and sheltering.
Highly productive temperate reefs similarly have increased biomass and 
biodiversity relative to the surrounding habitats. On these reefs, dense stands 
of canopy-forming macroalgae (mostly brown, but also reds and greens) gen-
erate habitat structures sufficiently complex to support entire ecosystems. 
Kelp beds and forests, and rockweed beds, are the most common plant- 
dominated ecosystems on rocky substrata in temperate and polar oceans. 
Kelp beds cover > 25 percent of the world’s coastlines and thrive in cold-water, 
nutrient-rich areas. Kelps live up to 25 years, depending on species, exhibit 
high rates of  primary production, and provide important functions, thus at-
tracting many species. Many herbivores, particularly gastropods (e.g., snails, 
abalone) and echinoids (sea urchins) aggregate in kelp beds because of the 
rich production, and many detritivores feed on degrading kelp material. Abun-
dant  secondary producers, in turn, attract predators (e.g., crabs, fish, mam-
mals) to kelp beds. Many invertebrates (e.g., echinoids, asteroids) and fishes 
(e.g., rockfish) also use kelp bed shelter as nurseries. Kelp beds export large 
amounts of detritus to adjacent ecosystems, both onto beaches and into 
deeper, nutrient-limited subtidal environments. In regions with a narrow con-
tinental shelf, the reach can extend to bathyal submarine canyons at 200 to 
2,000 meters.
Continental shelves include some of Earth’s most productive habitats, 
 fueled by nutrients from land and rivers, and upwelling from deeper waters. 
These habitats support most of the world’s major fisheries. Reduced wave en-
ergy relative to the intertidal and shallow subtidal environments, coupled with 
sediments supplied by riverine input and coastal runoff, cover much of the 
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continental shelf in sediment. Depending on wave energy, sediment supply, 
and history, mud or sand may dominate a location, each with different faunas. 
Suspension feeding organisms, such as surf clams, dominate higher energy 
sand environments, whereas deposit feeding organisms, such as sea cucum-
bers, dominate lower energy, mud-covered environments. Collectively, these 
environments recycle organic matter and regenerate nutrients critical to ocean 
production.
 Knowledge Gaps
The complexity of coastal systems (e.g., population connectivity, dispersal po-
tential, species interactions, biodiversity, and ecosystem functioning) leaves 
many knowledge gaps that limit our capacity for their sustainable use. Our cur-
rent knowledge is biased towards larger organisms (e.g., fish) and commercial 
species relative to small invertebrates and microbes, and towards temperate 
environments in developed nations over those in tropical and polar environ-
ments and developing nations.
 Overview of Pressures
Because of their proximity to human populations, coastal environments ex-
perience many human-induced pressures acting together, including pollution, 
loss of habitat, ocean warming, ocean acidification, sea level rise, invasive spe-
cies, aquaculture, and increased fishing pressure.2
Increased coastal development has caused habitat loss in recent decades on 
the order of 1–10 percent per year. Physical disturbance, such as from dredg-
ing and bottom trawling, alters substrate and thus modifies habitat suitability 
or physically removes ecosystem engineers, such as seagrass and kelp beds. 
Increased sedimentation, whether from deforestation or increased riverine 
input, reduces light penetration, inhibiting plant and algal growth. Inorganic 
(e.g., metals) and organic pollutants (e.g., untreated waste, fertilizers, plastics) 
can affect marine organisms and their communities, lethally or sub-lethally, or 
cause eutrophication (excess nutrient supply) and anoxia.
Global change can impact coastal habitats profoundly. Faster warming 
of coastal waters than of the open ocean places key species at risk, causing 
2 C.M. Duarte et al., “Paradigms in the Recovery of Estuarine and Coastal Ecosystems,” Estuar-
ies and Coasts 38, no. 5 (2015): 1202–1212.
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‘ tropicalization’ of temperate ecosystems in some regions. Coral death from 
bleaching, caused by symbiotic algae when a thermal threshold is exceeded 
over protracted periods, has reached alarming levels in most tropical oceans. 
Cold-adapted kelps are also vulnerable to warming waters, resulting in ongo-
ing regime shifts to surf-dominated ecosystems, particularly in  rapidly chang-
ing regions, such as the Northwest Atlantic. Temperate species that inhabit 
coastal areas are shifting towards polar regions, with profound ecosystem-level 
changes. Ocean acidification will further impact coastal ecosystems, reducing 
survival of species with calcareous shells or skeletons, such as economically 
valuable bivalves (e.g., oysters, clams, mussels) and reef-building corals. Lastly, 
sea level rise is expected to impact low lying coastal areas globally. Models pre-
dict average rises of 30 to 120 cm by the year 2100, although predicted rises 
increase annually with ongoing delays in implementing strategies to mitigate 
climate change. Sea level rise will affect regions of the world differently, with 
purported disappearance of some low-lying islands already (e.g., five reef 
 islands in the Solomon Islands, Southwest Pacific).
Increased marine traffic globally has already accelerated the spread of inva-
sive species. Proximity to ports, tourism operations, and aquaculture sites has 
impacted coastal habitats in particular. Non-native species typically lack pred-
ators and competition, grow fast, and are generalists in the invaded regions. In 
turn, they can outcompete native species, limit the abundance of their prey, 
and alter trophic interactions. Several systems illustrate significant ecosystem 
changes, such as the alteration of intertidal trophic interactions on the east 
coast of North America by introduced Chinese mitten crabs, and the effects of 
 lionfish introductions on fish recruitment in Caribbean reefs.
Coastal mineral and oil extraction add further pressures. Removal of sand 
for beach replenishment or for minerals alters local seafloor biota, and dump-
ing of waste material from mining can smother seafloor communities. Oil ex-
ploration adds noise and unknown impacts of seismic surveys, whereas drill 
cuttings can smother local seabed communities, in contrast to the more wide-
spread and catastrophic effects of oil spills, particularly on seabirds, marine 
mammals, and intertidal environments.
Humans extract large quantities of living resources from coastal environ-
ments in various fisheries, from fish to invertebrates to macroalgae. Nations 
depending on these fisheries for jobs, revenue, and food, i.e., protein, have 
depleted many stocks. This intense fishing effort has also altered food webs 
and damaged bottom habitat. The removal of many top predators has necessi-
tated switches to other, lower value fish species and extension of fishing effort 
into deeper water. Bottom contact fishing gear can damage biogenic habitats, 
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homogenizing complex seafloor habitat and eliminating the species associ-
ated with those habitats.
The collapse of many fisheries has contributed to rapid expansion of marine 
aquaculture of many finfish and invertebrate species, as well as macrophytes 
such as kelp and commercial seaweeds. Most aquaculture occurs in nearshore 
habitats, sometimes increasing organic enrichment, spreading disease, and de-
creasing the genetic diversity of wild populations. Finfish aquaculture usually 
depends on fishmeal produced from wild fisheries, e.g., anchovies, a practice 
that further pressures natural populations.
 Needs and Solutions
The dense, complex human activities in the coastal region require multiple ap-
proaches to achieve sustainable use, maintenance of ecosystem integrity, and, 
where possible, rehabilitation of degraded ecosystems. However, although 
some pressures can be addressed locally or regionally, others require coordi-
nated global efforts.
Integrated ecosystem based management (iebm) and marine spatial plan-
ning are integral components of a solution. The spatial proximity of and mul-
tiple connections between coastal ecosystems require holistic management 
of human use of coastal areas. iebm recognizes complex interactions within 
and among ecosystems, rather than focusing on the ecology and pressures ex-
perienced by single species. Although slow to operationalize, the approach is 
gaining momentum with increasing recognition of the complexity of coastal 
environmental issues. Marine spatial planning (msp) is one tool to support 
iebm. msp brings together multiple marine users and stakeholders and allows 
comprehensive evaluation of individual and cumulative pressures in a particu-
lar area, facilitating iebm implementation.
Marine protected areas (mpas) can protect relatively unaffected coastal 
ecosystems or facilitate recovery once stressors of impacted systems are re-
moved.3 Most coastal states that signed the Convention on Biological Diversity 
are now establishing mpas to meet their commitment to protect at least 10 
percent of their coastal and marine environments by the year 2020. Effective 
mpas, zoned to include some no-take areas, are difficult to achieve in coast-
al regions because of the needs of multiple stakeholders. However, effective 




networks of mpas do exist, based on sound ecological principles and direct 
engagement of major stakeholders (e.g., along coastal California).
Ecological restoration can rehabilitate degraded coastal ecosystems, such as 
seagrass beds and oyster reefs. Some restoration efforts include mass seagrass 
planting to restore meadows, out-planting cultured oysters to create oyster 
reefs, and creation of artificial coral reefs to enhance recruitment to natural 
reefs. Though time-consuming and expensive, ecological restoration has met 
success in regions of the United States such as Virginia and Florida (seagrasses) 
and Chesapeake Bay (oysters). Effective restoration requires first removing the 
stressor that degraded the ecosystem. Additionally, success hinges upon eco-
system monitoring during restoration. Trade-offs between marine protection 
and restoration will determine the best approach for a particular location.
Many also view ecosystem based management as critical for enhanced 
fisheries management efforts, which also uses tools such as gear restrictions 
(and size selection), spatial and temporal closures, and bycatch limits. But 
many fisheries biologists emphasize a precautionary approach that identifies 
population reference points for each species, below which significant declines 
in numbers will occur. In parallel, aquaculture is working to develop plant-
based feeds and better containment practices.
 Conclusion
Intense human interaction with the coastal ocean has depleted coastal habi-
tats more severely than other marine regions. Our dependence on fisheries, 
aquaculture, and other coastal resources demands more sustainable efforts, 
particularly given expected increases in human populations and their need for 
protein and other marine resources. Improvements in scientific tools (sensors, 
genetics, models, digital imaging, etc.) offer substantial opportunities for ad-
dressing how we manage ocean use. However, political will and societal sup-
port will ultimately determine whether we can reverse coastal degradation 
and sustain these critically important habitats.
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 Overview of Habitats
The deep sea is one of the most remote and expansive habitats on Earth, span-
ning depths of 200 m to beyond 10,000 m in the deepest trenches. The oceanic 
seafloor forms through a combination of seafloor spreading at mid-ocean ridg-
es (mor) and sedimentation of materials from the sea surface over millions 
of years, as ocean plates move from their origin at mor to subduction zones. 
The generally uniform temperature and salinity, and absence of light, define 
an environment far less variable than in most shallow-water environments.1
The area of sediment-covered seafloor comprises more habitat than all oth-
ers on Earth combined. Near the continental shelf, sediments often contain 
terrigenous material transported by rivers and coastal currents, whereas sedi-
ments in the abyssal plains (sometimes more than one kilometer thick) are 
derived from the shells of open-water organisms. The composition of sedi-
ments defines the fauna living on and within them. Because of the absence of 
light, most deep-sea organisms depend on sinking food material produced in 
surface waters (phytodetritus), fecal pellets, fish or zooplankton carcasses, or 
material transported laterally (pieces of kelp and land-based organic material 
such as wood).
Exposed hard substratum occurs mainly in areas with relatively steep pro-
files, such as the walls of submarine canyons and the flanks of seamounts, as 
well as on newly produced seafloor near spreading centers. Strong currents 
typically characterize steep sloping environments, limiting accumulation of 
sediments, and exposing hard substratum.
Submarine canyons incise the continental slope and can range over 1,000 m 
in depth. Because of their topography, canyons can act as conduits of  sediment, 
1 E. Ramirez-Llodra et al., “Deep, Diverse and Definitely Different: Unique Attributes of the 
World’s Largest Ecosystem,” Biogeosciences 7 (2010): 2851–2899.
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phytodetritus, and other food falls, and influence the direction and velocity 
of ocean currents. Seamounts are underwater mountains, mostly volcanic in 
origin, that rise at least 1,000 m above the seafloor but do not break the sea 
surface. The exact number of seamounts is unknown, but they supply a large 
proportion of the hard substratum in the deep sea. Seamounts provide mosa-
ics of different habitats of varying slope, depth, elevation, coarseness of sub-
stratum and hydrothermal activity, and their shape and elevation affect ocean 
circulation.
Areas at mor are tectonically, and in some cases volcanically, very active. 
Slabs of basalt or chimney-like structures of sulphides comprise the newly 
created seafloor, where hydrothermal vents occur, expelling hot, chemically-
altered seawater either through focused flows on chimneys or diffuse flows 
through cracks in the basalt. The hydrothermal fluid is enriched in toxic met-
als and hydrogen sulphide and devoid of oxygen, with temperatures that can 
reach 20–40°C in diffuse flows and > 400°C in the fluid emanating from black 
smokers.
 Overview of Biological Communities
The soft-sediment communities that dominate the deep sea include species 
that remove particles from suspension and others that ingest sediment grains 
and associated food (Figure 1). Small worms, crustaceans, molluscs, and other 
invertebrates dominate these sediments; the limited and often poor quality of 
food limits the sizes and numbers of individuals that these environments can 
support. Fishes living near the seafloor feed on these organisms, but the cold 
temperatures and limited food result in reduced metabolic rates and organ-
isms grow slowly, produce low numbers of offspring, and reproduce at a late 
age. Reduced numbers and size do not mean reduced diversity, however, and 
we now recognize the deep sea as among the most species-rich environments 
on Earth. These sedimentary organisms recycle carbon, nitrogen, and phos-
phate, the basic building blocks of life on Earth. Despite generally low process 
rates in the deep sea, these organisms play a vital role in the delivery of global 
ecosystem functions (that support life on Earth) and services (benefits derived 
by humans) because they cover such vast areas.
Species that occur on hard substratum need a firm surface on which to affix, 
typically suspension feeding and thus requiring currents that deliver a sup-
ply of food particles (Figure 1). The most common megafaunal invertebrate 
species include sponges, deep-water hard and soft corals, sea pens, anemones, 
bryozoans, and bivalves, whose sessile adult stages occupy canyon walls and 
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seamounts. These phyla can reach locally high abundances with favorable 
 conditions such as adequate food supply. For example, increased local primary 
productivity can occur near the summit of seamounts. As a result, seamounts 
support large concentrations of reef-forming stony corals and gorgonian and 
soft corals, as well as dense aggregations of fish such as redfish, grenadiers, 
tuna, and sharks.
The communities at hydrothermal vents are highly specialized to the unique 
environmental conditions, with polychaetes, bivalves, gastropods, decapods, 
and fish dominating the biomass. Biodiversity in these habitats is lower than 
the surrounding deep sea, with mostly endemic species. Primary production 
by microbes that utilize the hydrothermal fluid drives these ecosystems and 
accumulates much higher biomass than in the surrounding deep sea. Most 
metazoan secondary producers harbor these microbes as obligate or faculta-
tive symbionts that supply them with a reliable source of carbon.
Figure � Deep-sea hard (A–C) and soft (D) substratum environments. (A) Hydrother-
mal vent tubeworms, Endeavour, Northeast Pacific; (B) Corals and fishes, East 
Diamante Volcano, Western Pacific; C) Deep-water coral and redfish, Northeast 
Channel canyon, Nova Scotia, Canada; (D) Muddy continental slope, Nova Scotia, 
Canada.




Less than 0.0001 percent of the area of the deep sea has been investigated, and 
not all habitats at the same rate. Hundreds of thousands (possibly millions) 
of species remain unknown and most will never be known. We lack funda-
mental knowledge on the structure and function of populations, communities, 
and ecosystems and the processes that regulate them. Certain benthic ecosys-
tems are particularly data poor, such as in the abyssal plains and trenches. The 
remoteness and harshness (e.g., crushing pressures, no light) of the habitats 
make experimentation on rates of these processes challenging. One habitat 
that remains particularly elusive is the deep water-column, in the benthope-
lagic (1,000–4,000 m) and abyssopelagic (> 4,000 m) zones, where a virtually 
unknown fauna of deep-sea fishes, gelatinous zooplankton, and pelagic mol-
luscs dominate.2
 Overview of Human Pressures
Climate change is expected to have significant impact in the deep sea. The 
composition and abundance of the dominant primary producers, secondary 
consumers, and associated trophic links in surface waters will change through-
out the world’s ocean, and, most importantly for the deep sea, in the large 
gyres overlying the abyssal plains. These changes, in turn, will affect the export 
of surface production to the deep sea, where it constitutes the main source 
of energy. The total available energy to the deep sea is expected to decrease, 
and changes in food quality may lead to taxonomic shifts in the dominant 
players, and possible associated changes in ecosystem function. The warmer, 
more acidic waters associated with global change are already moving into the 
deep ocean. For organisms with shells or calcium carbonate skeletons, such as 
deep-water corals, significant impacts are expected, with cascading effects on 
other fauna that feed on these organisms or depend on them for habitat. In 
some parts of the ocean, reduced abundances and reduced biological diver-
sity already occur in oxygen depleted areas known as oxygen minimum zones. 
 Climate change and nutrient loading are increasing the spatial extent and fre-
quency of such zones.3
2 R. Danovaro, P.V.R. Snelgrove, and P. Tyler, “Challenging the Paradigms of Deep-sea Ecology,” 
Trends in Ecology and Evolution 29, no. 8 (2014): 465–475.
3 E. Ramirez-Llodra et al., “Man and the Last Great Wilderness: Human Impact on the Deep 
Sea,” PLoS One 6, no. 8 (2011): e22588, doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0022588.
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The collapse of many coastal fisheries has pushed fishing pressure into 
deeper waters over the last 50 years. Arguably, no deep-sea fishery is sustain-
able because recovery of populations is very slow. Some deep-sea fisheries 
target specialized habitats, such as seamounts and canyons, focusing pressure 
and causing serial depletion. Because many of these fisheries occur in inter-
national waters, known as areas beyond national jurisdiction (abnj), they are 
poorly managed and monitored, if at all, leaving behind depleted habitats of-
ten badly damaged by bottom-contact fishing gear.
Oil and gas activities occur on all continental margins, except Antarctica, 
and continue to expand. The effects of these activities can be localized to a 
few  hundreds of meters during equipment installation and up to kilometers 
during discharge of drilling muds and other water-based toxic or  smothering 
 discharges. Unpredictable effects can occur over tens of kilometers and through-
out the water column during accidental oil blowouts, as with the Deep Water 
Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. The impacts can range from the destruc-
tion of long-lived, slow growing, vulnerable marine ecosystems, to changes in 
ecosystem functions. The effects may persist over years to decades or longer, 
depending on the magnitude and frequency of the activities or accidents.
Deep-sea mining has been gaining momentum both within exclusive eco-
nomic zones (eezs) and in the Area where the International Seabed Authority 
(isa) has already granted contracts for mining exploitation in the Clarion-
Clipperton Zone in the Pacific Ocean, the Mid-Atlantic Ridge, and the South-
west Indian Ridge. The targeted resources are manganese nodules in the 
abyssal plains, massive seafloor sulphide deposits on hydrothermal vents, and 
cobalt crusts on seamounts for valuable metals such as nickel, copper, cobalt, 
gold, and silver. Mining activities destroy bottom habitat during the physical 
removal of nodules, sulphides, and crusts, and generate smothering plumes 
during physical removal and disposal of discharges from the support ship. 
Recovery of the sediment ecosystems in the abyssal plains is expected to take 
decades to centuries, and millennia for individual nodules. Ecosystems at hy-
drothermal vents are not uniformly resilient to disturbance and recovery may 
take from a few years to decades or centuries. Mining of cobalt crusts will affect 
vulnerable marine ecosystems that abound on seamounts that can be several 
centuries old, and require several decades to centuries to recover.
 Needs and Solutions
Many of the pressures in the deep sea require global solutions, such as the 
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions, and a deep-sea specific strategy to 
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mitigate their impacts is not feasible. However, some pressures can be allevi-
ated by sustainable practices. While it is almost impossible to predict with any 
accuracy the overall impact of anthropogenic activities on deep-sea habitats, 
the precautionary principle can guide our efforts as we continue to collect 
more information.
The deep sea exemplifies the ‘tragedy of the commons’; the lack of clear 
‘ownership’ of resources creates a challenge for effective management, particu-
larly in abnj. Increasing recognition of the problem has led to some interna-
tional efforts to reduce pressures in particularly sensitive areas, such as those 
with abundant deep-water corals; however, these efforts are complicated by 
challenges of appropriate legal tools, adequate enforcement, and international 
compliance.
Clearer and stricter guidelines can be used to control the activities of ex-
tractive industries, such as oil and gas and deep-sea mining. While oil and gas 
activities generally fall within national jurisdictions, international agreements 
are needed for the regulation of mining in the Area. The mandate and respon-
sibility for safeguarding ecosystems from serious harm in the Area falls within 
the isa. Given the increasing momentum, and the already awarded contracts, the 
isa needs to accelerate the development of regional strategic management 
plans and regulations that protect the marine environment from serious 
harm.
One spatial tool that we have available is an effective network of marine 
protected areas (mpas). Many states are designing such networks to protect 
representative ecosystems and enhance the overall resilience of the deep sea 
to disturbance. In British Columbia, Canada, an offshore mpa is being consid-
ered that will include all known hydrothermal vents and many seamounts in 
the eez. In the United States, national marine monuments were established to 
protect submarine canyons and seamounts off New England. International ef-
forts by scientists, contractors, and the isa are attempting to design networks 
of areas protected from the influence of any mining activities, following the 
same elements as those for mpas.
 Conclusion
The vastness of the deep sea can lull us into thinking that it is inexhaustible. 
However, evidence of human impacts is now seen in every deep-sea environ-
ment that has been explored, even in the deepest trenches, spanning from con-
taminants to trawl scars to garbage. Because the deep sea is one of the most 
pristine remaining habitats on Earth, we must develop effective strategies to 
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preserve its rich biodiversity and ecosystem functions and services. We have 
the opportunity to collect baseline information prior to development, so that 
we know what ‘normal’, ‘unimpacted’, or ‘healthy’ actually mean. However, just 
as rapid advancements in science technology offer hope, parallel advances in 
fishing and oil/mineral development are accelerating pressures and increas-
ing the urgency to address the problem. “Caring for the deep sea” will require 
regional and international cooperation, compromise and creativity. We cannot 
afford to wait; we must act now to protect this unique and irreplaceable part 
of the ocean commons.
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The Role of Citizen Science in Ocean Governance
John A. Cigliano
Department of Biological Sciences, Cedar Crest College, Allentown, 
Pennsylvania, and Schoodic Institute at Acadia National Park,  
Winter Harbor, Maine, United States
 What Is Old Is New
Over 40 years ago, Professor Elisabeth Mann Borgese recognized the need 
for effective governance of the oceans for the good of all of humanity. This 
need still exists, maybe even more so now, in addressing issues such as climate 
change, ocean acidification, overfishing, and floating islands of trash (to name 
just a few). But what can we do to advance effective and lasting governance 
of the ocean? Are there new techniques, policies, or international agreements 
that we can employ? Actually, I would argue that something as old as recorded 
history is one of our better hopes, namely, citizen science.
Citizen science is public participation in scientific research, i.e., science 
conducted by amateurs. Prior to the late nineteenth century, almost all of sci-
ence was conducted by amateurs (today, we would call them citizen scientists). 
Quite a few of these so-called amateurs have had a profound effect on science: 
Aristotle, Copernicus, and Darwin, to name a few. Darwin is of particular note, 
not only because of his theory of evolution by natural selection, but because 
as he was developing and working to experimentally support his theory, he 
collaborated with other citizen scientists from around the world who sent him 
observations and specimens, thus, making Darwin an early adopter of ‘crowd-
sourcing’1 citizen science.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, amateur scientists became 
marginalized as the number of professional scientists increased and gained 
positions of authority.2 Fortunately, citizen science did not go extinct. Citi-
zen science projects continued with professional scientists leading and citi-
zen scientists contributing. Examples include Wells Cooke’s collaboration 
with citizen scientists (he referred to them as co-operative observers) on bird 
1 Crowdsourcing is the process of obtaining data by soliciting contributions from a large, un-
defined network of people.
2 J. Vetter, “Introduction: Lay Participation in the History of Scientific Observations,” Science in 
Context 24, no. 2 (2011): 129.
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 migration from 1881 to his death in 1916.3 But there were still examples of the 
‘old’ citizen science. For ocean science and governance, the most notable ex-
ample is Jacques Cousteau. No one can deny the influence Cousteau had (and 
still has) on marine biology, conservation, public awareness, and stewardship.
Today, citizen science is not just surviving, it is thriving,4 though the use 
of marine and coastal citizen science for conservation has lagged behind its 
use in freshwater and terrestrial systems.5 But it is growing. And it has made a 
difference.
 Citizen Science and Ocean Governance
To develop effective ocean governance, it is critical to increase our understand-
ing of the effects of stressors on marine species and ecosystems. No stressor 
will likely have as much of an impact on our ocean as climate change, in both 
magnitude and scope. Citizen scientists are helping to increase our under-
standing on how coastal ecosystems are being affected and are helping to de-
velop mitigation strategies. For example, the Coastal Observation and Seabird 
Survey Team (coasst) collects information on beached seabirds in the US 
 Pacific Northwest, which has helped to understand the mechanism(s) of el-
evated mortality and/or beaching caused by climate forcing.6 In the Gazi Bay 
Project, local stakeholders in Kenya, in collaboration with professional scien-
tists, conduct long-term and large-scale experiments on mangrove restoration, 
which has led to the planting and monitoring of over 20,000 trees and the de-
velopment of the first community-led blue carbon project.7
However, to really have a significant effect on ocean governance, citizen sci-
ence must influence policy and management. Townhill and Hyder argue that 
one of the greatest promises of marine and coastal citizen science is in the 
3 T.S. Palmer, “In Memoriam: Wells Woodbridge Cooke. Born Jan. 25, 1858–Died March 30, 
1916,” The Auk 34, no. 2 (1917): 119–132.
4 J.A. Cigliano and H.L. Ballard, “The Promise of and the Need for Coastal and Marine Citizen 
Science,” in Citizen Science for Coastal and Marine Conservation, eds., J.A. Cigliano and H.L. 
Ballard (New York: Routledge, 2017), 3–15 at 4.
5 J.A. Cigliano et al., “Making Marine and Coastal Citizen Science Matter,” Ocean & Coastal 
Management 115 (2015): 77–87, doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2015.06.012.
6 J.K. Parrish et al., “Defining the Baseline and Tracking Change in Seabird Populations: The 
Coastal Observation and Seabird Survey Team (coasst),” in Cigliano and Ballard, supra note 
4, 19–38.
7 J.A. Cousins, M. Huxham and D. Winton, “Using Citizen Science to Address Conservation 




support of policy, legislation, and management because the issues that need 
to be addressed are at large spatial and temporal scales.8 One of the advan-
tages of citizen science is the ability to collect large amounts of data in time 
and space. The Wetland Bird Survey (WeBS) Project in the United Kingdom 
is an example of how citizen science has influenced policy. Citizen scientists 
monitor waterbirds, and the information collected has been used to designate 
protected  areas and to inform environmental impact assessments.9 Citizen 
 science also informs the management of marine protected areas (mpas) in Cal-
ifornia, United States. California adopted a two-phased approach to monitor-
ing:  regional baseline monitoring and statewide long-term monitoring.  Citizen 
scientists from multiple organizations play a significant role in conducting 
baseline surveys throughout the state. Data from the monitoring programs are 
used to  determine management effectiveness of the mpas.10
Ultimately, our best hope for effective and long-lasting ocean governance is 
through building capacity for stewardship in local communities, and through 
public awareness and education to encourage local and global governance. 
Citizen science has been effective in both. An example of effective capacity- 
building is the One People One Reef (Hofagie Laamle) project, located in the 
Federated States of Micronesia. The project was initiated by the local commu-
nity of Falalop Island of Ulithi Atoll because of concerns about declining fish-
eries and reef degradation. It has now expanded to communities on all of the 
inhabited islands of the atoll. Professional scientists, who were invited to par-
ticipate by local community leaders, and local citizen scientists work  together 
to collect ecological and fisheries data. This project is a true collaboration: the 
local citizen scientists share their knowledge of their reefs, which has framed 
the research program, and the professional scientists train local scientists on 
how to collect data, share the data from the research, and interpret the data 
with community leaders. The information gained from the research has in-
formed management plans, which were developed and implemented by the 
local communities. An unexpected and welcomed consequence of the  project 
8 B.L. Townhill and K. Hyder, “Citizen Science and Marine Policy,” in Cigliano and Ballard, 
id., 178–193 at 178–179.
9 “The Wetland Bird Survey (WeBS),” British Trust for Ornithology, http://www.bto.org/
volunteer-surveys/webs.
10 R. Meyer, E. Meyer, L. Sievanen and A. Freitag, “Using Citizen Science to Inform Ocean 
and Coastal Resource Management,” in Cigliano and Ballard, supra note 4, 132–152 at 
136–147.
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was a renewed interest in traditional practices and cultural history related to 
fishing and management.11
Many conservation-related citizen science projects have educational com-
ponent and public awareness goals. Often the focus is on school children, such 
as the Long-term Monitoring Program and Experiential Training for Students 
(LiMPETS) program that engages schoolchildren in sandy beach and inter-
tidal monitoring in California. The goals of this program are to increase ocean 
and science literacy in schoolchildren, to develop a long-term dataset that can 
be used by researchers and resource managers (LiMPETS conducts baseline 
surveys as part of the management plan for California mpas, see above), and to 
encourage students to become environmental leaders and stewards. LiMPETS 
accomplishes this by engaging local schoolchildren and their teachers fully in 
the scientific process, from data collection to analysis and presentation.12
There are also quite a few programs that are using technology to raise aware-
ness and to educate on a regional or global scale. Redmap (Range Extension 
Database and Mapping Project) focuses on Australia.13 The project has two 
main goals: (1) ecological monitoring to provide an early indication of poten-
tial species range shifts along the coasts of Australia by collaborating with 
citizen scientists who report observations of marine species that are uncom-
mon to a particular location, and (2) actively engaging the marine and broader 
community in a constructive dialogue on marine climate change. The Redmap 
team does this virtually (through the website and webinars) and in person; 
it regularly makes presentations and holds question and answer sessions at 
various venues around Australia (e.g., boat shows, fishing competitions, dive 
clubs, schools, and marine community festivals). As of 2016, Redmap’s web-
site had almost one million visitors, was featured in over 245 media reports, 
and received five major awards for community engagement and scientific 
excellence.14
11 N.L. Crane et al., “Collaborating with Indigenous Citizen Scientists Towards Sustainable 
Coral Reef Management in a Changing World: The One People One Reef Program,” in Cigli-
ano and Ballard, id., 197–216.
12 A. Wasser, “Engaging Youth and Schools in Coastal Citizen Science: Balancing both Edu-
cation and Science Goals,” in Cigliano and Ballard, id., 218–236.
13 For an example of a global program, see Marine Debris Tracker, http://www.marinedebris 
.engr.uga.edu.
14 E.J. Hind-Ozan, G.T. Pecl and C.A. Ward-Paige, “Communication and Trust-building with 
the Broader Public through Marine and Coastal Citizen Science,” in Cigliano and Ballard, 
supra note 4, 261–278 at 264–268.
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 The Need for and Potential of Citizen Science for Effective 
and Lasting Ocean Governance
Professor Mann Borgese was obviously correct about the need for effective and 
lasting ocean governance. Citizen science can help bring this about. But while 
there have been significant advances in the use of citizen science to support 
ocean governance, it has not reached its full potential. So now, what can we 
do to ensure that citizen science does reach its full potential? Here are a few 
recommendations.
1. Purposely engage key stakeholders such as beachgoers, recreational and 
commercial fishers, divers and snorkelers, surfers, and boaters. These are 
people who have an interest or stake in the health of marine and coastal 
systems and who are passionate about, connected to, or feel responsibil-
ity for the oceans and coast near and far from their own homes. Engaging 
these stakeholders helps to ensure that information from citizen science 
projects will be acted upon, by the stakeholders becoming better stew-
ards themselves and possibly by becoming leaders in efforts to change 
policy. And when communities are engaged, there is potential for rela-
tively quick and broad advances in governance.15
2. Increase public awareness through education and public outreach. En-
gaging young school children could be especially fruitful. The oft-used 
phrase that ‘our children are our future’ is true. Engaging communities 
directly in citizen science projects or in public awareness activities that 
are based on the project can be very effective in raising awareness, and I 
would argue, should be part of every citizen science project. A particular-
ly promising way to virtually engage and educate large numbers of citizen 
scientists over large areas is through the use of smartphone technology. 
There have been significant advances over the last several years in us-
ing smartphones to take and upload photos, and in the development and 
use of smartphone apps. Many projects that engage citizen scientists in 
this way have associated websites and social media platforms to build 
community and to educate and raise awareness.16 Projects that directly 
engage citizen scientists also use websites and social media to build com-
munity and raise awareness.17
3. Engage policy-makers and managers in projects as citizen scientists. 
 Co-creating projects or collaborating with policy-makers and managers 
15 Supra note 11.
16 Some additional examples include flukebook (flukebook.org) and Secchi Disk (www.sec-
chidisk.org).
17 For example, Earthwatch.org, REEF.org, and Reefcheck.org.
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can be especially effective for advancing ocean governance.18 After all, 
these are the people who will make and enact governance policy. Engag-
ing with them will not only allow them to see the issues that are affecting 
the ocean up close, but it will also build trust between them and profes-
sional scientists. And it could increase the likelihood that they will use 
the findings of citizen science projects to inform policy and management 
(e.g., overcoming the doubt about data quality).19
Citizen science has and still can contribute significantly to effective and lasting 
ocean governance. Of course, it alone cannot fulfill Professor Mann Borgese’s 
hope for an ocean that is effectively governed for all of us. But it can, and 
should, be a major part of our efforts to fulfill her hope.
18 Supra note 5.
19 Supra note 5.
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 Co-management, of course, is not a panacea. Its applicability is limited. Its 
take-o�f point is rather high on the scale of social development. It presupposes 
the existence of infrastructure — cooperatives, village councils, organized 
user groups, etc. Poor coastal villages in poor countries do not have this sort 
of infrastructure, and the task of making them active partners in integrated 
coastal management is daunting. And yet if integrated coastal management 
does not include them, integrated coastal management is neither integrated nor 
sustainable. The upgrading of livelihoods in poor coastal villages is also essential 
if migration of the poorest people to the shanty towns of coastal megacities is to 
be halted and further urban sprawl, entailing further degradation of the coastal 
environment and exposing swelling masses of poor to the hazards of natural or 
anthropogenic catastrophes, are to be prevented. Ways must be found to include 
the inhabitants both of poor villages and coastal megacities in integrated coastal 
management. 
 Elisabeth Mann Borgese* 
 *  The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource (Tokyo: United Nations University 




Elisabeth Mann Borgese was visionary on institutional requirements for inte-
grated coastal and ocean management (icom), particularly for the governance 
design of mega-cities that occur primarily in coastal areas. In thinking about 
the social development aspects of icom, Professor Mann Borgese advocated 
that environmentalism and human rights were key elements in future icom 
arrangements and strongly believed that capacity building was essential for its 
success. Furthermore, she viewed icom on a broad geographic scale as
including the eez on the seaward side and the watershed on the land-
ward side. It necessarily includes the management of rivers that may 
originate in land-locked countries. It will therefore become necessary to 
include land-locked countries of the hinterland.1
Big ideas were Elisabeth’s forte, as well as her lifelong work and passion. She 
believed that good ocean management
must enhance efficiency in the economic system, safeguard the integrity 
of the ecosystem, and promote equity, both intragenerational and inter-
generational. That is the very essence of the new paradigm.2
With that expansive framing for this part on icom, the informative and 
thought-provoking essays cover aspects of questioning and rethinking icom 
assumptions, outlining the theory and practice of coastal and marine spatial 
planning, the use of geospatial data infrastructures for ocean governance, and 
marine protected areas for conservation planning. Additional coastal and 
ocean management themes include the application of ecological economics, 
sustainable tourism considerations, protecting marine species at risk, the miti-
gation and regulation of ocean noise, the use of information and knowledge at 
the science–policy interface for icom, and addressing climate change impacts 
on the world’s oceans and coasts.
1 E. Mann Borgese, The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource (Tokyo: United 
Nations University Press, 1998), 147–148.
2 E. Mann Borgese, Ocean Governance and the United Nations (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Pol-
icy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1995), 111.
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The Promise of Integrated Coastal and Ocean 
Management: Questioning the Past, Rethinking  
the Future
Lucia M. Fanning
Marine Affairs Program, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
 Introduction
There is general agreement that the 1992 United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro provided global recognition 
and acknowledgement of the dismal failure of sectoral management in un-
derstanding, anticipating, and responding to consequences arising from our 
interactions with other biotic and abiotic components of coastal and marine 
ecosystems. The conference is credited with also providing a globally accepted 
alternative approach to marine and coastal area management and develop-
ment as outlined in Chapter 17 of Agenda 21.1 One that spans not only multiple 
jurisdictional levels but requires the co-ordination of sectoral activities and in-
fluences across the land-sea-air interface. With over 178 heads of state signing 
the final text of the agreement at the Rio Conference, the stage was set to adopt 
and implement integrated coastal and ocean management (icom).
In her 1995 reflection on progress regarding the implementation of 
 Agenda  21 and the integrated approach for managing coastal and ocean ac-
tivities,  Elisabeth Mann Borgese cautioned that we needed to take a long-term 
view and not be frustrated by the apparent lack of political will and means 
available for implementation that she was observing some three years after the 
Rio Earth Summit.2 She had reason for such optimism as within a few years, 
scholars and practitioners alike from across the globe were documenting the 
exponential growth in projects and programs focusing on developing and im-
plementing icom.3
1 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/Conf.151/26 
(Vol. ii), 13 August 1992.
2 E. Mann Borgese, “Commentary: Earth Summit Implementation: Progress Achieved on 
Oceans and Coasts,” Ocean & Coastal Management 29, no. 1–3 (1995): 13–21.
3 B. Cicin-Sain and R.W. Knecht, Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management: Concepts and 
Practices (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1998), 517; A. Vallega, Fundamentals of Integrated 
Coastal Zone Management (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999), 267; J. Sorensen, “Baseline 2000 
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In this essay, my intent is not to detail how one goes about implementing 
the icom approach or to evaluate the myriad of reported successes and fail-
ures that have been communicated by icom scholars, practitioners, and critics 
over the past twenty-five years. I will instead focus on two areas more worthy of 
reflection, which I hope Elisabeth Mann Borgese would have found interesting 
and provoking. Drawing on the work of biodiversity researcher Raphaël Billé, 
the first focuses on observing past practices and the apparent unchallenged 
acceptance of assumptions that have obtained an aura of dogma for many who 
teach and work in this field. The second area raises concern over our naïveté 
surrounding the resolution of current and future issues confronting coastal 
and marine socio-ecological systems at a time of unprecedented and dynamic 
global change.
 Questioning the Past
Having taught a graduate-level course on icom to master’s students in marine 
management for over a decade, I have found that many of them unquestion-
ingly accept the theories and underlying assumptions that they have been ex-
posed to in the abundance of readings, lectures, and seminars attended since 
starting graduate school. To counter this perceived intellectual apathy, the first 
reading assigned to them in my class is Billé’s 2008 paper challenging the ‘en-
trenched illusions’ associated with integrated coastal management.4 The re-
sulting class discussions always fulfill my intended effect, with one student this 
year stating how angry she was after reading the paper as it meant that many 
of the supporting arguments used in her thesis required a rethinking! Using ex-
amples drawn primarily from a European context, Billé sets out to question the 
validity of key assumptions underpinning the progress associated with icom 
since Agenda 21.
The first of these illusions centers on the notion that managing problems 
in the coastal zone can be achieved through co-ordination, using processes 
of stakeholder consultation, and consensus building. If this is indeed so, Billé 
asks, “Does presenting environmental management as a pure problem of co-
ordination tacitly imply the existence of one general interest, with objectives 
 Background Report: The Status of Integrated Coastal Management as an International Prac-
tice (Second Iteration),” Urban Harbors Institute Publications Paper 31 (Boston: University of 
Massachusetts Boston, 2002).
4 R. Billé, “Integrated Coastal Zone Management: Four Entrenched Illusions,” Surveys and Per-
spectives Integrating Environment & Society 1, no. 2 (2008), http://sapiens.revues.org/198.
Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management264
<UN>
common to society as a whole?”5 Clearly this is not the case, and the limita-
tions imposed by consensus in addressing the multiple values and interests in 
coastal and marine social systems become evident. Situations in which there 
is an absence of conflict or unequal power relationships among the diversity of 
stakeholders are relatively rare in icom.
The second illusion centers on the notion of coastal management being led 
by a single coastal manager, be it an individual or organization. While individ-
ual coastal projects may have identifiable project managers under a particular 
agency, the approach leading to successful integrated management of socio-
ecological systems clearly is not under the control of a single coastal manager 
or unit. Billé suggests that possible explanations for this continued illusion is 
the perception of control it allows and the convenient veiling of the reality of 
power struggles and conflict in the coastal zone.
The third illusion focuses on the notion of a community as coherent, egali-
tarian, and consensual, thereby advancing calls for a community-based re-
sponse to managing coastal and marine socio-ecological systems. Additional 
characteristics associated with the illusion are that there is community lead-
ership and a defined territory to be managed by the ‘community’. Despite 
 evidence to the contrary, Billé suggests an explanation for the longevity of the 
illusion may be found in the synonymous use of the terms ‘community’ and 
‘local’ and the not necessarily valid assumption that community-based man-
agement includes public participation and inclusion of local needs and knowl-
edge in management decision making.
The final illusion relates to the belief that more knowledge leads to bet-
ter decisions, what Billé identifies as the ‘positivist illusion’. While numerous 
examples from across the globe invalidate this assumption, efforts aimed at 
icom still focus heavily on filling knowledge gaps. Paradoxically, while sci-
entists generally address their understanding of uncertainty associated with 
socio-ecological systems with the call for more research, they are also among 
the first to (correctly) note that we can never acquire all the knowledge needed 
to make fully informed decisions. While not disputing the need to be better 
informed, icom requires interventions in the form of actions, using the best 
available knowledge. As quoted from R.E. Johannes and cited by Billé, “the key 
question … is no longer what data is needed to make the right decision, but 
rather what are the best decisions that can be made given the (incomplete and 
controversial) knowledge on hand.”6 This is the precautionary principle as ap-
plied to icom.
5 Id., at 2.
6 Id., at 9.
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 Rethinking the Future
[I]n a world in which uncertainty is the name of the game, the only thing 
that is certain is that this world will change.7
Despite some skeptics, the human ability to fundamentally influence process-
es essential to ecosystem functioning has resulted in both intended and unin-
tended consequences, manifested at scales ranging from local to global. Given 
the increasing speed with which drivers of change are affecting coastal and 
marine socio-ecological systems, the demand for icom to effectively respond 
to these challenges is equally pressing. I will use two examples to highlight the 
urgent need for practitioners and scholars of icom to re-evaluate whether cur-
rent approaches and tools will be appropriate to address this new reality and 
its prevalence for surprises.
The first example focuses on the need to rethink our present ability to man-
age for change rather than stability. This need became particularly poignant 
following the shock of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2011 Fukushima 
nuclear accident, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria in 2017 in the Atlantic 
Basin, recent landslides and flooding, and the 2008 financial crisis, just to men-
tion a few. The recent works of Simon Thrush and colleagues in New Zealand 
and that of Henrik Österblom at the Stockholm Reliance Centre in Sweden are 
used to support the points made here.8 As noted by Thrush, from a natural sci-
ence perspective, regime shifts tend to be unwanted and many ecologists focus 
their efforts on understanding the factors responsible for maintaining system 
integrity. Likewise, in the policy realm, the ‘governors and the governed’ strive 
for an environment that assures stability rather than uncertainty and change. 
Yet the evidence from the interconnected social and natural world is that we 
need to expect and be able to make decisions that robustly deal with surprises. 
More so than those living inland, coastal populations whether in urban or rural 
settings are at the forefront of having to deal with the surprises and shocks that 
are becoming the new reality.
Reminding us of the imperfect nature of knowledge and the unpredictabil-
ity of multidimensional socio-ecological systems due to as yet unknown in-
terconnected pressures, Thrush’s and Österblom’s work serves as a siren call 
7 E. Mann Borgese, Sustainable Development in the Oceans (Halifax: International Oceans 
 Institute, n.d.), at 15.
8 S.F. Thrush et al., “Addressing Surprise and Uncertain Futures in Marine Science, Marine 
Governance, and Society,” Ecology and Society 21, no. 2 (2016): 44; H. Österblom et al., “Marine 
Ecosystem Science on an Intertwined Planet,” Ecosystems 20 (2017): 54–61.
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to expect more uncertain futures. Preparing for the unexpected requires sci-
entists as well as policy-makers and practitioners to be aware of shocks that 
“may originate outside traditional marine ecosystem science, and make this 
‘unknown’ part of the wider research and policy agenda.”9 This will require 
existing icom governance processes to not only become more participatory, 
but for the tools being used to explicitly address issues of power imbalances 
and inclusivity in order for decisions to be robust.
This brings me to the second example highlighting the need to reassess the 
consequences of the tools being used today to potentially deal with current 
and near future surprises in coastal and marine socio-ecological systems. While 
more attention is being paid to the challenges and opportunities of using new 
technologies such as remote sensing, geo-visualization, and big data analytics 
to contribute to icom solutions spanning across scales of governance,10 this 
example focuses on the growing acceptance of marine spatial planning (msp) 
as the tool to manage conflicts and assure a level of predictability in a marine 
area being managed.11
Apart from the potential mismatch in designating zones for marine-based 
activities given the previously discussed increasing prevalence for surprises 
in socio-ecological systems, an issue warranting attention is the process sur-
rounding what and how data are included to provide data layers used in deci-
sion support. Given the already mentioned need for governance processes to be 
more participatory, inclusive, and aware of power imbalances to help mitigate 
increasing shocks, current msp practices need rethinking. As noted by Bouc-
quey and colleagues,12 due to the close relationship between ecosystem-based 
management and msp, deciding what data are collected is generally skewed 
towards those characterizing the natural ecosystem and the  socio- economic 
9 Id. (Österblom et al.), at 58.
10 W. Ouellette and W. Getinet, “Remote Sensing for Marine Spatial Planning and Integrated 
Coastal Areas Management: Achievements, Challenges, Opportunities and Future Pros-
pects,” Remote Sensing Applications: Society and Environment 4 (2016): 138–157; R. Newell 
et al., “Visualizing Our Options for Coastal Places: Exploring Realistic Immersive Geovi-
sualizations as Tools for Inclusive Approaches to Coastal Planning and Management,” 
Frontiers in Marine Science 4 (2017): 290; A. Rumson et al., “Coastal Risk Adaptation: The 
Potential Role of Accessible Geospatial Big Data,” Marine Policy 83 (2017): 100–110.
11 A.O. Tuda et al., “Resolving Coastal Conflicts Using Marine Spatial Planning,” Journal of 
Environmental Management 133 (2014): 59–68; C.M. Botero et al., “An Indicator Framework 
for Assessing Progress in Land and Marine Planning in Colombia and Cuba,”  Ecological 
Indicators 64 (2016): 181–193.
12 N. Boucquey et al., “The Ontological Politics of Marine Spatial Planning: Assembling 
the Ocean and Shaping the Capacities of ‘Community’ and ‘Environment’,” Geoforum 75 
(2016): 1–11.
267The Promise of Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management
<UN>
activities that are taking place in order to determine the effect on the system 
through the use of models. This exercise of power by msp experts can poten-
tially reduce the diversity of interpretations by which different actors expe-
rience the natural system, leaving stakeholders involved in msp with “little 
opportunity to initiate particular self-characterization or to suggest different 
modes of representation.”13
 Conclusion
This essay has attempted to provoke discussion on the readiness of icom 
practitioners, scholars, and decision-makers to effectively address the increas-
ing prevalence of surprises and shocks that have become the new reality for 
coastal and marine socio-ecological systems. It does so by first questioning our 
acceptance of icom assumptions from the past and calling for a rethinking of 
our current approaches for dealing with the future. What is not in question is 
the promise of icom to help address the challenges and seize opportunities at 
a time of great change in marine ecosystems and in our use of the sea and its 
resources. This is the ‘new reality’ facing coastal and marine socio-ecological 
systems.
13 Id., at 7.
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Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning: Balancing  
the Ecosystem Approach and the Sustainable  
Blue Economy
Scott Coffen-Smout*
Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Bedford Institute of Oceanography,  
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
 Theory and Practice
The concept of coastal and marine spatial planning (cmsp) originates from the 
1970s term ‘sea-use management and planning’ to address growing problems of 
multiple ocean-use conflicts.1 A comprehensive approach to the  governance 
of maritime affairs was proposed by academics, including controlling human 
use interactions and related data requirements. It recognized the  challenges 
of developing integrated management frameworks and data and information 
systems for decision-making. The post-2006 concept of cmsp developed at a 
unesco workshop that year adopted pivotal ecosystem approaches to man-
agement as the basis for its implementation.2 While interpretations of cmsp 
vary globally, it is generally defined as “a public process of analyzing and al-
locating the spatial and temporal distribution of human activities in marine 
areas to achieve ecological, economic, and social objectives that usually have 
been specified through a political process.”3 In fact, cmsp processes are as 
 important as the plan itself in building trust, understanding, and political ac-
ceptance. cmsp has become an international tool for ocean space  management, 
1 E.D. Brown, “Sea Use Planning in the North Sea: The Legal Framework,” Proceedings of the 
Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute (The Hague, 1978); E.L. Miles, “Concepts, 
Approaches, and Applications in Sea Use Planning and Management,” Ocean Development 
& International Law 20, no. 3 (1989): 213–238; H.D. Smith and C.S. Lalwani, The North Sea: Sea 
Use Management and Planning (Cardiff: Centre for Marine Law and Policy, uwist, 1984).
2 F. Douvere, “The Importance of Marine Spatial Planning in Advancing Ecosystem-based Sea 
Use Management,” Marine Policy 32, no. 5 (2008): 762–771.
3 C. Ehler and F. Douvere, Visions for a Sea Change. Report of the First International Workshop 
on Marine Spatial Planning, ioc Manual and Guides No. 46, icam Dossier, 3 (Paris: unesco, 
2007); C. Ehler and F. Douvere. Marine Spatial Planning: A Step-by-Step Approach Toward 
Ecosystem-based Management, ioc Manual and Guides No. 53, icam Dossier No. 6 (Paris: 
unesco, 2009).
* Comments given here are in a personal capacity.
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 involving multiple ocean use sectors to support economic development and 
marine conservation. In theory, this requires science-based evidence to bal-
ance the Blue Economy, as guided by sustainable economic development prin-
ciples, and marine environmental protection. This balancing act plays out in 
the  complex political economy of negotiated trade-offs for economically and 
ecologically sustainable outcomes.4 The outcome of cmsp is the co-ordinated 
planning and management of all human activities in a marine planning area to 
anticipate, prevent, and mitigate human-ecosystem and human-use conflicts. 
This essay prescribes cmsp content beyond unesco’s definition above.
Reasons for the adoption of cmsp approaches include reducing or avoid-
ing use conflicts, clarifying multiple jurisdictions, increasing option values for 
marine conservation, and enhancing ecosystem services. cmsp practices have 
been implemented in competing use areas and advanced to varying degrees 
in Australia (Great Barrier Reef), Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.5
Spatial allocations of activities through zoning and political process driv-
ers are central to cmsp. It requires (1) a shared vision of ocean space that is 
ecosystem-based, integrated, area-based, adaptive, strategic, anticipatory and 
participatory; (2) data, information, analytical assessment, monitoring, and 
reporting that supports informed decisions and actions; and (3) a central plan-
ning blueprint that sets direction for decision-making that may contain zones, 
permitting, temporally dynamic measures, and activity restrictions analogous 
to urban land-use planning strategies.6
cmsp in practice requires the development of an integrated management 
plan with shared goals and actions based on collaborative input of stakehold-
ers and regulators. The purpose of cmsp includes (1) a rational use of marine 
space to balance the Blue Economy, as guided by sustainable economic devel-
opment principles, and marine conservation and environmental protection; 
(2) achieving social and economic objectives7 by strategic action planning; 
(3) managing conflicting and future uses; and (4) addressing cumulative effects.
4 S.E. Lester et al., “Evaluating Tradeoffs Among Ecosystem Services to Inform Marine Spatial 
Planning,” Marine Policy 38 (2011): 80–89.
5 J.S. Collie et al., “Marine Spatial Planning in Practice,” Estuarine, Coastal and Shelf Science 
117, no. 20 (2013): 1–11; S. Jay et al., “International Progress in Marine Spatial Planning,” Ocean 
Yearbook 27 (2013): 171–212.
6 T. Agardy, Ocean Zoning: Making Marine Management More Effective (London: Earthscan, 
2010).
7 J. Walmsley et al., “Development of a Human Use Objectives Framework for Integrated 
Management for the Eastern Scotian Shelf,” Coastal Management 35 (2007): 23–50; T. Hall 
et al., “Advancing Objectives-based, Integrated Ocean Management through Marine Spatial 
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Plans range from a legally binding, regulatory-based zoning plan with a de-
tailed blueprint prescribing where, when, and how activities occur, to a spatial 
characterization of human use and ecological sensitivity for voluntary man-
agement guidance, codes of practice, and decision support. The differences be-
tween these plan types are significant on many levels, but particularly in terms 
of governance agreements and the requirements for stakeholder engagement. 
In a spatial characterization-based plan, cmsp is a tool for collating data and 
information for assessment, monitoring, and reporting that supports informed 
decisions and actions, leaving industry sectors to implement the shared vi-
sion via sectoral decision-making. In a legally binding, regulatory-based plan, 
however, decision-making is centralized with a management authority and 
adhered to by each industrial sector. Regardless of the type of plan, cmsp re-
quires whole-of-government political will, strong leadership, and direction for 
effective ocean management. cmsp places higher standards of accountability 
on industry sectors, but it also provides greater certainty for their activities, 
albeit potentially creating winners and losers.8
In some jurisdictions, cmsp potentially overrides existing divisions of con-
stitutional and sector-based authority through a governance structure that 
supports communication among ocean regulators, industry sectors, and stake-
holders, with a unified decision-making authority. In nations where cmsp 
planning and implementation authority is not explicitly stated in law and 
policy, a collaborative approach is essential among multi-jurisdictional au-
thorities. Given the multi-jurisdictional context at play in Canada, a collabora-
tive governance approach is necessary and joint planning and management 
authorities (i.e., federal, provincial, and First Nations) with unified control may 
be required to achieve successful cmsp outcomes.
 Data Drivers and Supporting Tools
Marine geospatial data and information at appropriate planning scales are 
core elements in the development of knowledge products for effective plan-
ning, management, and decision support. Spatial knowledge products are 
valuable and include maps, geographic information system (gis) data layers, 
analytical methodologies, data inventories, digital atlases, and fact sheets. 
Planning: Current and Future Direction on the Scotian Shelf off Nova Scotia, Canada,” Journal 
of Coastal Conservation 15, no. 2 (2011): 247–255.
8 W. Flannery et al., “Exploring the Winners and Losers of Marine Environmental Governance/
Marine Spatial Planning: Cui bono?,” Planning Theory & Practice 17, no. 1 (2016): 121–151.
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Data and information collection, analysis, and sharing are essential in the 
 planning process. Data collation for assessment, monitoring, and reporting 
supports informed decision-making and management actions. When using 
ecological and socio-economic geospatial data and information, it is impor-
tant to depict data consistently and at appropriate scales to build trust and 
confidence among users. Interactive and analytical gis-based decision- 
support tools engage stakeholders and ensure data accessibility and trans-
parency. While these tools help develop options for spatial management, gis 
analyses and spatial solutions still require politically acceptable decisions by 
governmental authorities.
cmsp depends on spatial management tools and effective information and 
databases to conduct geospatial assessments and to map and share biological, 
physical, social, and cultural information on open data portals. Important ele-
ments include (1) a map or survey of marine cadastral information on legally 
defined rights and responsibilities; (2) valuation methods to assess ecological, 
economic, social, and cultural importance; (3) intensity of use metrics and 
compatibility matrices to characterize pressures, effects and interactions, in-
cluding cumulative effects analysis; and (4) risk assessment tools to provide 
management and mitigation advice and scenario planning. Data needs are de-
termined by planning goals, and spatially relevant baseline information may 
include
– fisheries management, conservation and licensing zones, and catch and 
 effort distributions;
– oil and gas management zones and infrastructure;
– ocean dumping and disposal zones;
– marine transportation management and monitoring zones;
– maritime vessel traffic densities and patterns;
– military operational and training exercise areas;
– marine protected and conservation areas;
– ecologically and biologically significant areas;
– species at risk range distributions and critical habitat;
– shoreline and subtidal habitat classifications;
– remotely sensed earth observations;
– scientific research and monitoring zones;
– ecotourism and recreational use;
– cultural, archeological and traditional use zones;
– priority use areas determined by area-specific physical habitat and oceano-
graphic characteristics;
– navigational safety zones for submarine cables, pipelines, and drilling rigs/
ships; and
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– inshore zones for aquaculture and seaweed leases, shellfish harvesting 
 closures, port/harbor authority anchorage areas, and private water lots.
cmsp should proceed with the best available data, information and knowl-
edge, but with awareness of the spatial and temporal realities of ocean manage-
ment. Expectation of perfect data is unrealistic, and the dynamic and  complex 
 marine environment creates planning limitations. However, a data gap is no 
excuse for inaction, nor is an incomplete understanding of ecosystem struc-
ture, function, connectivity, and ecological sensitivity. Gaps can be supple-
mented by targeted data acquisition based on inventoried management needs 
and by local ecological knowledge from coastal communities and aboriginal 
traditional knowledge from indigenous communities. The unpredictable ef-
fects of climate change-based drivers such as ocean acidification and species 
range shifts may also affect cmsp implementation. Planning with such uncer-
tainty requires flexibility and adaptiveness, particularly for range shifts in com-
mercial fish species and coastal communities at risk from sea level rise and 
storm surges.
 Governance and Capacity Development
Intergovernmental communication and co-ordination of cmsp-related mat-
ters require a multilateral governance platform to engage multi-sectoral regu-
latory authorities. These platforms benefit from the willingness of all parties 
to engage fully and broadly in marine planning and to not allow departmental 
mandates favoring economic development or marine conservation to obfus-
cate intergovernmental planning processes. Where multilateral governance 
processes fail due to conflicting mandates, interests, and capacity, bilateral en-
gagement arrangements between authorities may be more productive, but may 
never be the preferred option. Intergovernmental engagement requires clearly 
stated objectives, benefits, and outcomes of cmsp, as well as a co- ordinated 
whole-of-government approach rather than a single departmental mandate-
based approach. Reluctance to participate by partners and stakeholders may 
result if cmsp proceeds without long-term funding, policy development, sup-
porting governance frameworks, or if the initiative is cast as a ‘pilot’ without 
long-term government commitment.
The development of coastal and marine spatial plans requires good gover-
nance advice such as:
– Use transparent planning processes so stakeholders see how input is used.
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– Plan at a regional scale to maximize opportunities for meeting plan 
objectives.
– Minimize socio-economic impacts on resource users.
– Use the best available science in management decision-making.
– Seek areas where uses are appropriate rather than focus on areas where to 
avoid activities.
– Use areas nominated by communities and resource users for marine conser-
vation planning.
– Minimize the total area protected while meeting objectives of the plan.
– Build on and enhance existing conservation measures where possible.
– Use appropriate management tools and protection levels for the conserva-
tion needed.
– Respect existing uses where compatible with plan objectives and promote 
sustainable uses.
– Develop operational codes of practice on the ‘how’ and ‘when’ conditions 
for ocean activities.
Interdisciplinary expertise enhances development and implementation of 
coastal and marine spatial plans. Planning team members with such skills play 
honest broker roles in multi-stakeholder planning processes and have the best 
prospect of successful plan implementation. Recommended csmp-related ca-
pacity development includes spatial data management, spatial analysis for 
decision support and risk assessment, cumulative impact assessment, marine 
management and ocean governance, and leadership capacity and negotiation 
skills development.
 Future cmsp Considerations
cmsp processes may be biased where strong single sector industries are in-
volved. For example, aquaculture or marine renewable energy may advocate a 
sectoral Blue Economy driver to launch broadly based spatial planning. How-
ever, the outstanding governance and decision-making challenges for future 
effective cmsp processes relate to broader issues such as global protein pro-
duction and demand via aquaculture, or offsetting carbon dioxide emissions 
through marine renewable energy development. cmsp may also be driven by 
internationally agreed marine conservation targets achieved through related 
processes for marine protected area network planning. Partnerships among in-
dustry sectors and the marine conservation community will need promotion 
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to meet these competing challenges. As Elisabeth Mann Borgese wrote, “It is 
quite possible … that radical innovation in economic thinking will come from 
‘ocean economics’ rather than from land-oriented resource or  environmental 
economics.”9 cmsp approaches need to foster radical thinking and innova-
tions so that Blue Economy drivers generate the oceans’ goods, resources, and 
services necessary for future human development, while sustaining ocean 
health using the ecosystem approach. Balancing these complexities through 
cmsp may ensure future ocean sustainability.
9 E. Mann Borgese, “The Economics of the Common Heritage,” Ocean & Coastal Management 
43, no. 8–9 (2000): 763–779.
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Information Matters: Global Perspectives about 
Communication at the Science-Policy Interface
Suzuette S. Soomai and Bertrum H. MacDonald
School of Information Management, Faculty of Management,  
Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada
The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and the 1992 
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro marked major turning points in international 
environmental politics with endorsed multilateral agreements, and conserva-
tion and protection placed on many national agendas.1 Subsequent global en-
vironmental assessments have systematically assembled scientific  information 
intended for decision-making regarding sustainable  development. Now, over 
forty years later, governmental and intergovernmental organizations continue 
to produce a diverse range of scientific publications containing information 
aimed at guiding public policy-making for coastal and ocean management. 
Today, much of this large volume of information is accessible through numer-
ous communication methods. Recently, improving information flow at the 
science-policy interface has become a priority in the urgent need to achieve 
sustainable development globally. At the Rio+20 Conference in 2012 many 
countries agreed to support actions to strengthen provision and access to time-
ly and accurate scientific information, and to promote use of the information 
and communication technologies in decision-making.2
Since 2002, the interdisciplinary Environmental Information: Use and 
 Influence research program at Dalhousie University has been studying char-
acteristics of the science-policy interface. This research shows that scientific 
information fulfills an important role in decision-making, and the process 
of generating scientific information may be as important as the publications 
themselves.3 We have concluded that building understanding of how informa-
tion is produced, communicated, and used within governmental organizations 
is central to strategies for ensuring information reaches decision-makers effec-
tively. Our case studies on the awareness, communication, and use of informa-
tion produced by governmental organizations engaged in coastal and ocean 
1 P.S. Chasek, D.L. Downie, and J.W. Brown, Global Environmental Politics (Boulder, CO: West-
view Press, 2016).
2 United Nations General Assembly, The Future We Want, UN Doc. A/66/L.56 (24 July 2012).
3 Environmental Information: Use and Influence (eiui), http://www.eiui.ca.
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management have highlighted the complexity of the science-policy interface 
in environmental governance.4 In fact, many interfaces exist in relation to dif-
ferent decision-making contexts. The contexts may be influenced by many 
 factors: the environmental or resource management issue, the spatial and tem-
poral scale of such issues, societal and political factors, diverse subjects and 
knowledge, available information products and framing of issues, uncertainty, 
organizational structures and cultures, and the involvement of multiple actors 
and related networks.5 Information flow between producers and users of in-
formation is seldom linear or unidirectional, contributing to the complexity of 
interactions at the science-policy interface. Furthermore, information needs 
for decision-making are often multifaceted. Our studies are providing empiri-
cal evidence to understand characteristics of the interface, particularly with 
regard to the range of factors noted above.
How information is utilized and with what effect varies considerably. The 
terms ‘use’ and ‘influence’ of information are often used interchangeably and 
the method chosen to measure these concepts is determined by the selected 
benchmark and the time scale of use and influence. Metrics of use and in-
fluence may also differ for stakeholders with competing interests in decision-
making processes. Evidence of indirect use of information, e.g., increased 
awareness, typically is unnoticed or not fully appreciated compared to direct 
use, e.g., information incorporated into policies or legislation, because it is 
simply easier to measure direct use of information. State of the environment 
reports, for instance, those produced by the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion of the United Nations6 and the Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific 
 Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection,7 increase general awareness of 
the status of resources and environmental issues, and may influence chang-
es in behavior of managers and the public that is only noticeable long after 
release of the publications. In contrast, the acceptance of annual fisheries 
 scientific advice by fisheries managers, the fishing industry’s recognition of 
quotas, and the subsequent sustainability of fisheries are examples of direct 
and  immediate use of information in decision-making contexts.
4 B.H. MacDonald, S.S. Soomai, E.M. De Santo, and P.G. Wells, eds., Science, Information, and 
Policy Interface for Effective Coastal and Ocean Management (Boca Raton, FL: crc Press, 
 Taylor & Francis Group, 2016).
5 Id.
6 For example, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (fao), State of the 
World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2016 (Rome: fao, 2016).
7 For example, imo/fao/unesco-ioc/wmo/who/iaea/un/unep Joint Group of Experts 
on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection (gesamp), A Sea of Troubles, 
Report No. 70 (Nairobi: gesamp, 2001).
277Information Matters
<UN>
What makes information ‘useable’? Research over the past decade has 
shown that three key attributes—credibility, relevance (or salience), and 
 legitimacy—influence the uptake of information in decision-making.8 With 
each environmental issue, credibility refers to the perceived validity of the in-
formation used, in the eyes of the stakeholders; relevance reflects the extent 
to which work carried out is related to the context of the policy process, i.e., to 
the needs of decision-makers; and legitimacy reflects fairness and political ac-
ceptability of the outputs, e.g., it includes the views and values of all stakehold-
ers. Reports commissioned by government departments and agencies (grey 
literature) are often more useful to policy-makers as the information in these 
reports is more likely to be policy-relevant than that found in academic re-
search papers.  Similarly, established internal processes for producing scientific 
advice and making management decisions—as seen in fisheries management 
organizations, such as Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization—are key factors in producing cred-
ible, relevant, and legitimate information for decision-making.9 Furthermore, 
policy-makers and advisors frequently make decisions based on in-house 
 policy briefs that summarize available scientific information in less technical 
language than in many research publications.
Today, governance at various levels espouses evidence-based policy-making 
where scientific advice is expected to inform decisions. However, while scien-
tific information may inform policy-making, it may not necessarily influence 
policy outcomes.10 This point underlies a distinction between evidence-based 
and evidence-informed policy-making. Typically, policies address diverse 
agendas simultaneously. Trade-offs or compromises often come into play when 
multiple sources of information are available for decision-making and many 
stakeholder groups are involved. Consequently, socio-economic and political 
factors can eclipse the use of scientific information and advice. Nonetheless, 
information can be used to set the scope, as well as to inform issues.
Identifying the challenges in the communication of information and its use 
in decision-making is beneficial for mitigating problems at the science-policy 
8 W.C. Clark, R.B. Mitchell, and D.W. Cash, “Evaluating the Influence of Global Environmen-
tal Assessments,” in Global Environmental Assessments: Information and Influence, eds., 
R.B. Mitchell, W.C. Clark, D.W. Cash, and N.M. Dickson (Cambridge: mit Press, 2006), 
1–28.
9 S.S. Soomai, “Understanding the Science-Policy Interface: Case Studies on the Role of 
 Information in Fisheries Management,” Environmental Science & Policy 72 (2017): 65–75.
10 P. Gluckman, “Science Advice: A Bastion against the Post-truth/Post-trust Torrent?,” Key-
note address, Annual Conference of the Joint Research Centre of the European Com-
mission, Brussels, 26 September 2017, http://www.pmcsa.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/17 
-09-26-European-Commission-Joint-Research-Centre.pdf.
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interface. Five years after Rio+20, an apparent disconnect was noted between 
the information and knowledge produced by scientists and the information 
and knowledge used by policy-makers, and concern about the disconnect con-
tinues to grow largely because declining environmental trends are still evident 
in spite of the availability of many research reports. Publication of The First 
Global Integrated Marine Assessment (World Ocean Assessment i) in 2016 is a re-
cent example of significant continuing efforts to produce and synthesize cur-
rent information on the oceans.11 But this massive report is not the first of its 
kind as comprehensive reporting on the state of the marine environment has 
occurred since the 1970s. Why is such repetition needed? What information-
related questions still need to be addressed?
Prioritizing production and dissemination of reports such as World Ocean 
Assessment i, and evaluation of their use and influence is required, especially 
in light of the extensive fiscal and personnel resources required to undertake 
such work. Mandates from government often direct scientific research; such 
mandates are usually policy-specific and are based on legislative initiatives 
and availability of funding. When government budgets tighten, both new and 
established information products may be undervalued or cut as an austerity 
measure. Governmental organizations may reduce production of publications 
or, once produced, not optimize their use. Responsible organizations,  however, 
will want to know how their information is being used and whether their 
publications contribute in any way to coastal and ocean management. In the 
 absence of evidence of impact, it may no longer be viable to produce expen-
sive synthesis publications on the assumption they will positively influence 
coastal and ocean management. Despite continued effort to increase knowl-
edge about the oceans, better understanding is needed of how to use existing 
information for making policies and decisions that are aimed at solving many 
of today’s serious coastal and ocean problems.
While effective communication of information is recognized as vitally im-
portant at the science-policy interface, dissemination methods may need to 
be reconsidered to ensure that all appropriate audiences are reached. Many 
current methods only succeed in information reaching interested  individuals 
or groups, who typically respond to governmental and non-governmental 
 requests for input in decision-making. Because such individuals and groups 
are already active in coastal and ocean conservation issues, they may be better 
able to contribute to policy development. Initiatives to bring new networks 
11 United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, The First Global Inte-
grated Marine Assessment (World Ocean Assessment i) (Regular Process Global Report-
ing and Assessment of the State of the Marine Environment, including Socio-economic 
 Aspects, 2016), http://www.un.org/depts/los/global_reporting/WOA_RegProcess.htm.
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into decision-making activities require understanding the communication be-
haviors of many groups. For example, the rapid rise in social media use over 
the past decade means that communication through these channels is more 
likely to engage wider audiences, such as younger members of a population, in 
environmental issues. While non-governmental organizations (ngos) increas-
ingly rely on social media (e.g., Facebook and Twitter) in their advocacy cam-
paigns in policy arenas, governments’ use of social media is limited for reasons 
of security and privacy.
Although the production and communication of information has been the 
focus of many studies, understanding of information use from the perspective 
of decision-makers is incomplete. To build understanding of the use and influ-
ence of information at the science-policy interface requires gaining access to 
managers and policy-makers at various levels of government bureaucracies, as 
well as decision-makers. Decision-makers commonly seek information outside 
of the formal communication channels in governmental organizations, and 
their advisors may rely on the knowledge and advice of peers and other con-
tacts, rather than directly consulting published material. Studies on informa-
tion seeking and sharing behaviors of decision-makers can show relationships 
and tensions between the “push” of scientific information on one side and the 
‘pull’ of policy on the other. Policy-making often extends beyond scientists, 
managers, policy-makers, and politicians to include a wide range of stakehold-
ers, e.g., international groups, ngos, industry, journalists, think tanks, and the 
interested and general public. Research on the roles that these multiple ac-
tors play in decision-making is contributing to growing understanding of the 
science-policy interface. Recently, in this context, our attention has turned to 
examine the place of environmental ngos in decision-making, particularly in 
relation to the designation of marine protected areas.
For the production of credible, relevant, and legitimate information, the 
involvement of multi-stakeholder partnerships is often encouraged. To facili-
tate co-production of information, networks of excellence and communities 
of practice can enable scientists to collaborate with various groups, including 
industry, in multidisciplinary research projects. Such initiatives often recog-
nize the need for data and information management expertise, and a require-
ment to translate the resulting information into accessible language for the 
benefit of various users in research partnerships. This solution-oriented ap-
proach is illustrated in our studies of the Gulf of Maine Council on the  Marine 
 Environment where managers from Canada and the United States have for-
mally collaborated in coastal environmental programs for over 25 years.12
12 Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment, http://www.gulfofmaine.org.
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In today’s post-truth society, policy-making can easily be influenced by 
whose ‘truth’ is more popular or more pervasive, and the most convenient fit 
for decision-making.13 Further, the same information used by different organi-
zations in different contexts can lead to divergent outcomes. In many contexts, 
boundary organizations and persons playing a bridging role between scientists 
and policy-making groups can be instrumental in enhancing communication 
at the interface.
As we look ahead, world-wide environmental governance is being led by the 
United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 17 Sustain-
able Development Goals (sdgs). Experts on global environmental politics have 
stated quite categorically that successful implementation of the 2030 Agenda 
will depend on “effective and robust science-policy interfaces at the global, 
regional and (sub-) national levels.”14 Furthermore, “viable science- policy in-
terfaces are not only important for monitoring the progress of the sdgs, …they 
will also be indispensable for regular assessment and as early warning systems 
to identify new challenges.”15 The consequences of not acting on available in-
formation in the face of serious environmental issues, such as climate change, 
will be disastrous.
What can be done, going forward? For one, in marine policy and decision-
making we can use more effectively and more rigorously what we already 
know about the oceans and about the production, communication, and use of 
marine scientific information. Increased understanding of information path-
ways and the science-policy interface can raise the visibility of information 
and guide many interested individuals and groups to determine the most ap-
propriate entry point in policy-making processes. Likewise, issues related to 
climate change or ecosystem approaches to management can be more effec-
tively resolved or facilitated through transparent and accountable information 
production and communication, coupled with open access to information by 
all actors involved in public policy decisions.
Good environmental governance of the oceans is a dynamic, multidisci-
plinary, iterative, and participatory process. It involves frequent interactions 
between scientific and decision-making groups and various stakeholders to 
enable efficient uptake of information for effective decisions. Information 
does matter.
13 Gluckman, supra note 10.
14 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable De-
velopment, “The Role of the Science-Policy Interface for the National Development of 
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As trite as it may sound, everything has a location. The issue with geospatial 
information and technologies is that more locations and applications relate 
to the Earth’s brown and green surfaces, and built environments, rather than 
to the blue ocean. This fundamental issue of disproportionate data collection, 
analysis, and use is at the heart of a tremendous growth in new applications 
and data created within the ocean domain. From a marine spatial planning 
perspective, it also forms the need for ocean governance through data sharing 
and scientific communication.
The driving forces of the new era of ocean geospatial development are cli-
mate change, resource use/depletion, and geopolitical conflicts. The greatest 
benefit of geospatial technology and analysis is that these forces can be viewed 
as they occur in reality, as interconnected and overlapping problems that have 
spatial extents, as well as spatial causes and solutions. Ocean governance hap-
pens somewhere, within situations having locations, movements, and interac-
tions. Whether it be political, technical or natural, location is central, and so 
location-based technologies and geospatial data must be at the core of any 
analysis or policy associated with governance.1
Geospatial data infrastructures are expressions of policies and products. 
Data management is the essential, but not sole, product component. Within 
this are related issues of connectivity (bandwidth), security, metadata, soft-
ware, storage, preservation, open access, privacy, and cloud computing, to 
name a few. Processes of collecting, sharing, and communicating geospatial 
data are changing radically, thereby forcing a reflection on the policies and 
products. This will continue to have an enormous impact on ocean governance 
as it gets to the core of management issues preceding decision-making.
The entire system of geospatial data and technology has for some time been 
defined as spatial data infrastructures (sdi). From data collection to meta-
data, format integration, distributed computer interaction, software, storage, 
1 S.M. Maxwell et al., “Dynamic Ocean Management: Defining and Conceptualizing Real-time 
Management of the Ocean,” Marine Policy 58 (2015): 42–50.
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 archiving, processing, analysis and communication (mapping display), the en-
tire system has been viewed as something that should work harmoniously as 
one positive feedback system. For over three decades now, the sdi ideal has 
been held up as a goal.2
A focus on bathymetric data at one kilometer resolution was perhaps the 
first example of geospatial infrastructure that could express spatial dimen-
sions of ocean features, as well as allowing for integration of data into other 
products and visualization tools. This has given way to new products at finer 
resolution in tens of meters or better. While these tend to be spatially limited 
(small areas), the technology has achieved a maturity where the only barrier to 
mapping the entire seafloor at such fine resolution is cost.
One should also note that disasters still drive data collection and mapping, 
exemplified by the Deep Water Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the 
MH370 air crash in the Indian Ocean, and recent Atlantic Basin hurricanes. 
Moreover, significant efforts have been undertaken to align/combine data 
types and sources for a more fulsome view of an active ocean in all its dimen-
sions, and not simply features derived from bathymetry.3
Data fuels geospatial infrastructures and this has created a shift to ‘open 
data’, with better standards and formats that are interchangeable between pro-
prietary systems. Data policies in the past (i.e., cost recovery, security/privacy 
concerns) created barriers to access and use of ocean-based geospatial data. 
Ocean data managers and funding agencies are looking toward open data as a 
solution to their needs for innovation, data sharing, and the development of 
better tools and shared analysis.4
Open ocean data holds the promise of more knowledge translation and 
refined data for decision-making, rather than merely enormous quantities of 
data stored on massive servers that never see the light of day. Models and ana-
lytical techniques that are too complex and take too long when data is seques-
tered by only one organization can now be shared and improved upon quickly. 
Actual costs are lowered when data is made available to the community.
The exponential growth in the collection of ocean-based geospatial 
data is changing the level of detail with which we can visualize the ocean. 
2 D.J. Wright, “Spatial Data Infrastructures for Coastal Environments,” in Remote Sensing and 
Geospatial Technologies for Coastal Ecosystem Assessment and Management, ed., X. Yang 
(New York: Springer, 2009), 91–112.
3 R.G. Sayre et al., “A Three-dimensional Mapping of the Ocean Based on Environmental Data,” 
Oceanography 30, no. 1 (March 2017): 90–1-3, doi.org/10.5670/oceanog.2017.116.
4 C. Kalyvas et al., “A Survey of Official Online Sources of High-quality Free-of-Charge Geospa-




Wave gliders, autonomous vehicles on or below the surface, remotely con-
trolled submersibles, drones, telemetry tracking of fish and mammals, buoy 
arrays, satellite platforms with better sensors and more data collection, and 
more platforms, are collecting data at finer resolutions, with more accuracy, 
and in near real-time. Access to better sensors and data collection in the at-
mosphere and on land means a greater ability to develop integrative models of 
the Earth.5 There should be no end in sight for more and better data collection.
If we have so much data, then surely we must be able to address geospatial 
ocean issues more adequately. Herein is the opposing side of the geospatial in-
frastructure. More data does not necessarily translate into more information 
and knowledge or better decision-making. Research and development in the 
areas of artificial intelligence and machine learning, combined with cloud 
computing and big data, will be needed more than ever.
And yet, with the advent of these new tools to deal with vast quantities 
of data, we are creating new governance problems that we must attend to in 
the ocean geospatial community, especially as it relates to the complexities 
of a three/four-dimensional ocean. What this has led to is a greater need for 
computational models, algorithms, geospatial statistics, and other computer 
 science approaches to deal with ever larger quantities of spatially referenced 
big data.6
An interesting set of solutions to these problems is coming from advances 
in augmented and virtual reality systems that provide the opportunity to visu-
alize data about the ocean in multiple dimensions and temporal scales (past, 
present and future). In some ways, this is creating a situation where we can 
visualize spatial representations akin to movies. Computer graphics turn the 
unreal or imagined into near realistic explorations of the environment. Finding 
Nemo is no longer a cartoon, but the future of how we will see our data.
The software we use is about comfort and exposure; what one learns is usu-
ally what one uses. In the past, such software was strictly in the domain of the 
expert, as well as expensive and heavily reliant upon more powerful comput-
ers and mass data storage devices. Analytical programs and data visualization 
tools that have built-in spatial tools for experts and non-experts are becoming 
the norm. The days of exclusive geospatial technologies are fast coming to an 
5 J. Casas, “The Importance of Earth Observations and Data Collaboration within Environ-
mental Intelligence Supporting Arctic Research,” nasa Marshall Space Flight Center (2017), 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20170008157.pdf.
6 J.C. Wallis, E. Rolando, and C. Borgman, “If We Share Data, Will Anyone Use Them? Data 
Sharing and Reuse in the Long Tail of Science and Technology,” PLoS ONE 8, no. 7 (2013): 
e67332, doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0067332.
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end, which will open geospatial data visualization into new ocean applications 
from non-ocean communities.7
When the geographic information system (gis) was invented in the late 
1960s by Roger Tomlinson, the size and power of computers were such that the 
memory and capacity to process data was very low. Hardware is now so fast, 
small, and inexpensive that we are almost at a point where it is disposable. 
A server with 10 terabytes of storage and multiple core processors is within 
reach of almost any laboratory or ocean scientist. Storage, processors, and 
Internet connectivity, while still an issue for remote areas, have become fast 
enough to stream massive quantities of video, data, and imagery. It would have 
been unthinkable to be able to live-stream video from an underwater submers-
ible a few years ago. Now we expect it. The days of the expensive mainframes to 
do gis and spatial analysis of mass quantities of data are either over, or close 
to it.
While numerous developments have taken place with respect to geospatial 
technologies and data, ever-more changes in the technology landscape are lin-
ing up to radically alter how we analyze, model, explain, and communicate 
ocean complexities and our uses of that precious resource. Mobile computing 
has matured to a stage where devices such as smartphones, gps units, laptops, 
and data collection platforms like drones have created expectations that data 
collection and access is a given. We are now used to the idea that our mobile 
devices can pinpoint our location within meters. This cannot be overstated 
in terms of implications for ocean geospatial technology and governance. We 
now see projects around the world where fishers and citizens alike collect and 
provide access to real-time data within a mobile computing environment.8
The final, perhaps most exciting, aspect of geospatial technologies impact-
ing our ocean sciences and governance are the systems allowing us to collect 
data remotely, via satellites and/or tracking systems that mix fixed assets, that 
allow for accurate positioning, along with sensors gathering data from mov-
ing through the ocean or above through new and much more accurate space-
based platforms. This necessitates a return to some of the most essential and 
oldest elements of geospatial data infrastructures. Making certain that our 
 descriptions of the data and collection methods used (metadata and ontolo-
gies) are robustly utilized ensures data sharing is both efficient and correct. 
7 S. Liua et al., “A Framework for Interactive Visual Analysis of Heterogeneous Marine Data in 
an Integrated Problem Solving Environment,” Computers & Geosciences 104 (2017): 20–28.
8 D. Wright, V. Kouyoumjian and S. Kopp, “Towards a Community ‘Playground’: Connecting 
CyberGIS with Its Communities,” in CyberGIS: Fostering a New Wave of Geospatial Discovery 
and Innovation, eds. S. Wang and M.F. Goodchild (New York: Springer, 2016).
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These core, pre-use, data challenges test (perhaps exceed) our ability to collect 
and visualize the data we need.9
Communicating spatial relationships always comes back to the map. Maps 
have been central to our understanding and use of the ocean for centuries. In 
terms of ocean governance, marine spatial planning is about communicating 
science and policy through maps. The creation of stable and easy to use web-
based mapping tools, accessible anywhere, and with the ability to do live up-
dates, is an exciting development.10 Ocean governance may not, therefore, be 
hampered by a lack of much-needed data. The future is one where creativity in 
how we visually communicate will change the nature of the governance issue.
Among numerous gifts, Elisabeth Mann Borgese instilled in us a belief that 
the ocean should be open to all, while protected for today and the future. 
 Directions within the geospatial community reinforce these ideals through the 
sharing of geospatial data in an open environment, protected for the future, 
and from more advanced and numerous data sources. It allows us to commu-
nicate how we see the ocean, its use, the issues it faces, and the future we wish 
to create for the protection of the blue planet.
The current and future of how we map the ocean and communicate its na-
ture in geospatial forms differs from the past. Even so, it is still the same as 
before because we are expressing geospatial ‘reality’ as best we can to commu-
nicate both issues and solutions. The driving forces facing our efforts in ocean 
governance—climate, resources, and conflict—require the best we can offer. 
Integrated technologies and geospatial data within an infrastructure should 
allow for the notion of ‘geo-spatial’ to become more inclusive as ‘mare-spatial’.
9 J. Pearlman, D. Schaap and H. Glaves, “Ocean Data Interoperability Platform (odip): 
Addressing Key Challenges for Marine Data Management on a Global Scale,” OCEANS 
2016 mts/ieee, Monterey, California, 19–23 September 2016, doi.org/10.1109/OCEANS 
.2016.7761406.
10 J. Patterson and A. Bickel, “Communicating Local Relevance of Ocean Observations: 
 Integrating Real-time Ocean Sensor Data Visualizations, Online Communications, and 
Ocean Issues to Engage Public Audiences,” OCEANS 2016 mts/ieee, Monterey,  California, 
19–23 September 2016, doi.org/10.1109/OCEANS.2016.7761325.
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Conservation while Pursuing Global Targets
Maxine C. Westhead
Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Bedford Institute of Oceanography,  
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 Introduction
The topic of marine protected areas (mpas) is complex and multi-faceted. This 
essay attempts to summarize contemporary issues in the field of marine con-
servation and draws on recent Canadian experience. To set the stage, here are 
some current global facts and figures related to mpas from ProtectedPlanet.
net, managed by the United Nations Environment World Conservation Moni-
toring Centre, as of November 2017:
– Over 23 million km2 (6.35 percent) of the ocean is covered by over 15,000 
mpas, a ten-fold increase since 2000 when the area covered by mpas was 
approximately 0.7 percent or 2 million km2.
– mpa coverage has increased by approximately 14 million km2 since 2010, 
driven in a large part by the expansion of existing sites, and the creation of 
very large new sites (100,000 km2 and larger).
– The ten largest mpas contribute over 50 percent of the area covered by marine 
protected areas, and the 20 largest mpas contribute 70 percent of the total. 
This is in stark contrast to the median size of mpas globally at less than 5 km2.
– The recent accelerated designation of mpas globally is focused on exclusive 
economic zones (eezs at 39 percent of the global ocean), with only 0.25 
percent of the high seas currently covered by mpas.
It is well understood that mpas are not a panacea for the many problems fac-
ing our oceans and are limited in what they can achieve. There are very real 
and serious threats that mpas alone cannot solve such as ocean acidification, 
climate change, and pollution and plastics. What mpas can do, though, is allow 
ocean space to ‘rest’. Given a chance to recover either unencumbered by hu-
man interference through no-take mpas, or with limited human interference 
through sustainable use mpas, these areas can be left to flourish and better 
support overall ecosystem resilience.
Within existing mpas, active management, monitoring, and reporting 
are critical elements for success. Proper management of mpas once they 
are  designated and ensuring that they do not become ‘paper parks’ are also 
 critical. Other key factors for mpa effectiveness are funding, compliance, and 
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enforcement. mpa managers need to stay active by understanding and track-
ing the threats to each of their sites. Site managers should also have proper 
funding for monitoring the threats and the capacity to actively address or even 
prevent them.
 Calls for Action
Most recently, the Fourth International Marine Protected Areas Congress cul-
minated in a call to action in September 2017 that stressed the importance 
of “ensuring appropriate financial mechanisms for mpas; integrating climate 
change considerations into mpas; and engaging with women, youth and local 
communities to enhance mpa creation and management.”1 In 2014, The Prom-
ise of Sydney was released at the end of the iucn World Parks Congress that 
was supported by over 6,000 participants from 170 countries.2 This document 
recommended to “urgently increase the ocean area that is effectively and eq-
uitably managed in ecologically representative and well-connected systems of 
mpas or other effective conservation measures by 2030; these should include 
strictly protected areas that amount to at least 30% of each marine habitat and 
address both biodiversity and ecosystem services.”
The Promise of Sydney generated the Nature Needs Half movement and ac-
celerated the discussion of target-based conservation. A motion was passed 
regarding a post-2020 strategy to protect 30 percent of our oceans at the iucn 
World Conservation Congress in 2016. Targets will continue to increase, as 
many leaders in the field of marine conservation continue to stress that while 
ten percent protection is better than the current status, it is severely inade-
quate as the final target.
 The Aichi Targets: Problem or Solution?
Aichi Target 113 is a well-known and popular target that is driving many deci-
sions and fueling the political will to make new mpas faster than ever before in 
many countries, including Canada. Target 11 states:
1 “Call for Action,” International Marine Protected Areas Congress, Viña del Mar, Chile, 
9 September 2017, http://www.impac4.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/20171005_CALL 
-FOR-ACTION-IMPAC4-FINAL.pdf.
2 “The Promise of Sydney,” iucn World Parks Congress 2014, http://www.worldparkscongress 
.org/about/promise_of_sydney.html.
3 Convention on Biological Diversity (cbd), “Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 and the 
Aichi Biodiversity Targets,” cbd/cop 10 Decision X/2 (2010).
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By 2020, at least 17 per cent of terrestrial and inland water, and 10 per cent 
of coastal and marine areas, especially areas of particular importance for 
biodiversity and ecosystem services, are conserved through effectively 
and equitably managed, ecologically representative and well connected 
systems of protected areas and other effective area-based conservation 
measures, and integrated into the wider landscapes and seascapes.
Measuring success, though, should not be solely about ticking off percentage 
points in the race to increase mpa coverage of our global ocean.
While this drive is a welcome change from the historically slow pace of mpa 
creation globally, it is important to remember that Target 11 is just one of 20 
targets nested under five strategic goals. This broader context for Target 11 is 
rarely mentioned in the national dialogue about reaching Target 11 by 2020. 
For example, who is working to reduce by half the loss of all natural habitats 
 (Target 5), ensure that all fish and invertebrate populations and aquatic plants 
are managed and harvested sustainably (Target 6), or preventing the extinc-
tion of known threatened species and improving or sustaining their declines 
(Target 12)? If we are to succeed globally, the other 19 targets need to be ad-
dressed at the same frenetic pace that countries are setting to reach the 10 per-
cent target.4
 Ensuring mpas are Effective
mpas have been shown to ‘work’ around the world. But what does it mean for 
an mpa to ‘work’? Edgar has demonstrated that to be effective, mpas should be 
no-take, enforced, old (> 10 years), large (> 100 km2), and isolated.5 They should 
also have year-round restrictions rather than seasonal.6
The difficulty in evaluating mpa effectiveness globally or generically is that 
every mpa is different and unique in that they are established for different rea-
sons. Each site has unique ‘conservation objectives’ and ultimately different 
prohibitions to address them. Best practice suggests that based on individual 
site conservation objectives, each mpa should be specifically designed to best 
4 See S.M. Hagerman and R. Pelai, “As Far as Possible and as Appropriate: Implementing the 
Aichi Biodiversity Targets,” Conservation Letters 9 (2016): 469–478, doi.org/10.1111/conl.12290.
5 G.J. Edgar et al., “Global Conservation Outcomes Depend on mpas with Five Key Features,” 
Nature 506 (2014): 216–220, doi.org/10.1038/nature13022.
6 For opinions on mpa effectiveness, see a recent International Council for the Exploration of 
the Sea (ices) publication: L.H. Pendleton et al., “Marine Protected Areas: All Articles,” ices 
Journal of Marine Science (2017), doi.org/10.1093/icesjms/fsx178.
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meet those conservation objectives. It is not uncommon for mpas to have so-
cial, economic, management, or research objectives.
Given this wide variety of mpa design it is difficult to make sweeping state-
ments about their effectiveness. Many studies have shown that mpas increase 
fish biomass, abundance, and diversity; however, many of these studies focus 
on tropical waters. If done properly, mpas can even enhance local economies 
(e.g., Galapagos Islands and Bonaire Marine Park). More dedicated research 
focused on mpa effectiveness and outcomes in open-ocean ecosystems, spe-
cifically in polar and northern temperate waters, is needed.
Much of the recent global focus has been on making new and larger mpas, 
and rightfully so given the slow pace to date. However, many are not even con-
sidered fully implemented as they do not yet have management plans in place. 
A recent study by Gill et al. looking at mpa performance globally found that 
of all factors examined, staff and budget capacity were the best predictors of 
conservation impact.7 That is, mpas that had adequate staff were found to have 
positive ecological effects 2.9 times greater than those with inadequate capac-
ity. Even though we are still only at 6.3 percent coverage globally and efforts to 
increase protection are still needed, we must be sure to look equally at proper 
management to optimize conservation impacts of these new, young mpas.
 Size Matters
Most mpas are very small, with nearly fifty percent of the 10,000 mpas in the 
online MPAtlas database less than 10 km2.8 Research shows that both small 
and large mpas can achieve important conservation benefits if well-managed, 
however, it is generally thought that larger mpas will produce more benefits 
to a wider range of species than smaller mpas. Small mpas can allow targeted 
protection of species or habitats, and can be important generators of  economic 
benefits based on small-scale fisheries or tourism.
When the Republic of Kiribati announced the Phoenix Islands Protected 
Area (pipa) in 2008 at 408,250 km2, the global race to designate the largest 
mpa began. pipa is now the fifteenth largest mpa in the world. With more em-
phasis being placed on very large marine protected areas, has the pendulum 
swung from too small to too big? The most recent designations are extremely 
7 D.A. Gill et al., “Capacity Shortfalls Hinder the Performance of Marine Protected Areas 
 Globally,” Nature 543 (2017): 665–669, doi.org/10.1038/nature21708.
8 Marine Conservation Institute (2017), MPAtlas [Online], Seattle, WA, http://www.mpatlas 
.org.
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large at well over one million km2. One of the greatest threats to these large 
and largely unmonitored mpas is overfishing and illegal, unregulated and un-
reported (iuu) fishing. Properly enforcing these mpas will be the greatest chal-
lenge moving forward; however, new tools available to managers of large mpas 
such as Global Fishing Watch, DigitalGlobe, and Project Eyes on the Seas will 
certainly help in this regard.
 Residual mpas
In efforts to achieve conservation largely driven by percent coverage targets, 
Devillers et al. found a ‘strong global pattern’ whereby mpas were established 
in remote areas with limited human activity or low promise for future extrac-
tion.9 This approach will ultimately fail to protect areas that are significant 
from an ecological or biological perspective, and important species, habitats, 
or features may be overlooked. Residual mpas are a real concern. Ultimately, 
designating mpas while allowing ‘business as usual’ for most ocean users will 
come at a cost. The greatest cost will likely be that ecological monitoring and 
evaluation of residual mpas will show no conservation benefits or ecosystem 
improvements because of designation, further fueling opposing arguments 
that mpas are not needed or effective. Moving forward, mpas that limit ac-
tivities and are not business as usual will need creative solutions to address 
displacement of fishing effort and socio-economic impacts.
 Networks of mpas
Years of systematic conservation planning exercises around the world have 
helped develop global best practices for mpa network design. Sophisticated 
conservation planning and optimization tools such as Marxan10 can help ex-
plore the complex issues of trade-offs between ecological and socio-economic 
considerations. These spatial tools can help practitioners design strategic, com-
prehensive, representative, and adequate mpa networks rather than resorting 
to the ‘low hanging fruit’, site-by-site, or a residual approach to site selection.
9 R. Devillers et al., 2014. “Reinventing Residual Reserves in the Sea: Are We Favouring Ease 
of Establishment Over Need for Protection?,” Aquatic Conservation: Marine and Freshwa-
ter Ecosystems 25 (2014): 480–504, doi.org/10.10002/acq.2445.




 mpas in the High Seas
eezs cover approximately 39 percent of the global ocean. The remaining 
61 percent are areas beyond national jurisdiction (abnj). The target of ten per-
cent by 2020 currently applies to eezs. There is no global agreement to protect 
this amount in abnj.
Some regional fisheries management organizations have already put con-
servation areas and fisheries closures in place to protect vulnerable marine 
ecosystems (mostly corals, sponges, and seamounts), and many have devel-
oped ‘move-on’ rules or ‘encounter protocols’ for coral and sponge bycatch. 
However, major concerns remain about the lack of mpas, overfishing, and iuu 
fishing on the high seas.
A new international legally binding instrument under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of 
marine biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (bbnj) is cur-
rently in development. The most recent report of the Preparatory Committee 
established by General Assembly Resolution No. 69/292 was adopted on 21 July 
2017, and provides a full outline of the current proposal.11 Moving forward, this 
will be an important mechanism to address the current gap of high seas mpas.
 Looking to the Future
As progress continues toward meeting the ten percent target and beyond, mpa 
practitioners should remain focused on the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity’s guidance for identifying ecologically and biologically significant areas 
(ebsas) and designing networks of mpas.12 That means protecting areas of 
high conservation value (i.e., ebsas) and ensuring representation, connectiv-
ity, adequacy, and replication. Instead of placing mpas in ad hoc residual areas 
where there are fewer conflicts with human use, focus should be on protecting 
areas that are ecologically and/or biologically significant, as well as ensuring 
protection of a wide range of ecosystem types in eezs and abnj, from coastal 
bays to continental shelves, to deep-sea abyssal plains and seamounts.
The Marine Conservation Institute’s newly established Global Ocean Ref-
uge System provides a new and unique way to incentivize mpa practitioners to 
11 United Nations, Report of the Preparatory Committee established by General Assembly reso-
lution 69/292, UN Doc. A/AC.287/2017/PC.4/2, 31 July 2017, http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=A/AC.287/2017/PC.4/2.
12 cbd, “Marine and Coastal Diversity,” cbd Decision IX/20 (2008), Annex 1.
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make strong mpas that offer real protection.13 The award criteria are based on 
both biodiversity value and effective management and compliance. The first 
round of awards to three mpas was granted in 2017. This is the type of positive 
initiative needed to help the global community to ensure that mpas are prop-
erly placed and well-managed.
13 See Global Ocean Refuge System website, https://globaloceanrefuge.org/.
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Is Canada Protecting Its Marine Species at Risk?
Sean Brillant
Canadian Wildlife Federation, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
 Definitions and Legislation
Global extinction of a species is an irreversible condition—a permanent al-
teration of our unique world. It cannot be corrected. It cannot be mitigated. 
 Efforts to compensate for extinction are ineffective excuses for a failed re-
sponsibility. As a result, the only solution is to prevent species from becoming 
 locally extinct or extirpated.
Under natural conditions, some species are common and some are rare. 
This can be a result of a variety of factors, e.g., the abundance of food, habitat, 
mates, and the inherent rates of birth and death for the species. Human activi-
ties, however, affect all of these variables. Thus, rareness and extinction are not 
only a result of human activities, but humans are very good at creating both 
conditions.
If a species is ‘rare’, it generally means that there are only a small number of 
individuals in the population or that they only occur in a relatively small area, 
or both. Rare species are generally also considered at risk of becoming extinct 
(hereafter referred to as ‘at risk’). Regardless of the abundance of a species, 
it may also be considered at risk if its population is (a) drastically declining, 
(b) exposed to severe mortality, or (c) losing an excessive amount of habitat 
(or a reducing quality of habitat). Furthermore, many agencies (e.g., national 
governments, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature) use 
 categories of risk to indicate the magnitude of likelihood that a species will 
become extinct; e.g., in order of increasing likelihood: ‘vulnerable’, ‘threatened’, 
and ‘endangered’.
There can be many reasons a society becomes interested in avoiding the 
extinction of a species. For example, the species may be an important natural 
resource that must be managed to ensure it continues to be plentiful enough 
to be harvested (and profitable), or there may be a need to demonstrate that 
a particular human activity is being managed responsibly, such that it is not 
causing inadvertent damage to living organisms. The species may also have 
inherent value to society that is not linked to any particular need, service, or 
measureable benefit.
Many societies have developed laws that are intended to prevent spe-
cies from becoming extinct. In Canada, several pieces of legislation manage 
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 activities that influence the abundance of organisms living within oceans. The 
Fisheries Act addresses the conservation and protection of species (predomi-
nantly fish) and their habitats, the control and management of their harvest, 
and the prevention of pollution.1 The Oceans Act aims to manage all activities 
within oceans through an integrated approach to maintain biological diver-
sity and productivity.2 The Species at Risk Act (sara) is specifically intended 
to prevent the extinction of wildlife.3 It is noteworthy that as a part of the Act, 
sara explicitly recognizes the intrinsic value of wildlife and the integral role 
of wildlife to Canada’s national identity and history. This establishes an impor-
tant position of Canada’s view of species at risk and it may set an important 
perspective that can influence situations beyond the implementation of sara.
sara is often considered a ‘last-ditch’ law because, as a result of its applica-
tion, it may ultimately protect species that were initially considered under oth-
er laws (e.g., Fisheries Act), but that continue to face an increasing likelihood 
of extinction. Thus, in some cases, this may be due to other acts being imple-
mented inadequately. If a species is granted protection by sara (i.e., becomes 
listed under), several laws come into force. Most notably, it becomes  illegal 
to harm, harass, capture, or kill the listed species (s. 32), and it becomes ille-
gal to damage or destroy their ‘residences’ (s. 33), and critical habitats (s. 58). 
 Although these regulations are potentially very effective, attaining this protec-
tion and implementing and enforcing these laws under sara are problematic.
 Case Studies and Evaluation
In order to determine if Canada is protecting its marine species at risk, three 
distinct case studies are presented to provide insight.
 Case Study 1
In 2012, the Royal Society of Canada produced an Expert Panel Report that 
evaluated Canada’s efforts to sustain marine biodiversity.4 Among the large 
number of features it considered in its evaluation, the report identified that 
there were reduced population biomasses for many marine species, and very 
little evidence of recovery. This was especially evident for marine fish, and 
1 Fisheries Act, r.s.c., 1985, c. F-14, as amended.
2 Oceans Act, S.C. 1996, c. 31, as amended.
3 Species at Risk Act, S.C. 2002, c. 29, as amended.
4 J.A. Hutchings, et al., Sustaining Canadian Marine Biodiversity: Responding to the Challenges 
Posed by Climate Change, Fisheries, and Aquaculture, Expert Panel Report prepared for the 
Royal Society of Canada (Ottawa, 2012).
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some, but not all, marine mammals and bird populations at risk. The report 
recognized the potentially strong enabling tools (e.g., adoption of the precau-
tionary approach, the Oceans Act, and sara) that exist to allow Canada to meet 
its commitments to protect biodiversity, but concluded that Canada has made 
poor progress. Within its evaluation of Canada’s failure to protect marine bio-
diversity, the Expert Panel indicated that (a) sara had not been established 
to its full capacity, (b) there was regulatory conflict within the federal depart-
ment responsible for marine biodiversity (Fisheries and Oceans Canada),5 and 
(c) there was an unwarranted level of discretion for the federal government to 
side-step its own legislation related to conservation.
 Case Study 2
McDevitt-Irwin et al. evaluated the use of Canadian laws (i.e., Fisheries Act and 
sara) to conserve marine fish at risk.6 They showed that once a species of 
marine fish was established as being at risk within Canada by the scientific 
committee responsible for making these assessments (the Committee on the 
Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada), there was a substantial delay in the 
decision by the federal government on whether or not to protect the species 
under sara. Furthermore, species that were considered of greater risk of ex-
tinction (i.e., endangered and threatened species) had relatively longer delays 
in decisions (often due to prolonged consultation periods), and a greater rate 
of denial for protection. The authors also note that during these delays, sub-
sequent evaluations of ‘at risk species’ occasionally moved them into higher 
ranks of risk (e.g., from threatened to endangered). Among the conclusions of 
this study, the authors determine that sara delayed conservation efforts for 
marine fish, and that the Fisheries Act, as it was currently being implemented, 
was failing to meet its obligation to protect Canada’s marine fish stocks.
 Case Study 3
North Atlantic right whales (narw) are one of the most endangered large 
whales in the world. The population estimate in 2015 was 458 individuals,7 and 
5 The Canadian Wildlife Service of Environment and Climate Change Canada is mandated to 
protect marine birds.
6 J.M. McDevitt-Irwin, S.D. Fuller, C. Grant and J.K. Baum, “Missing the Safety Net: Evidence 
for Inconsistent and Insufficient Management of At-risk Marine Fishes in Canada,” Canadian 
Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 72 (2015): 1596–1608.
7 R.M. Pace iii, P.J. Corkeron and S.D. Kraus, “State–Space Mark–Recapture Estimates Reveal a 
Recent Decline in Abundance of North Atlantic Right Whales,” Ecology and Evolution (2017): 
1–12, doi.org/10.1002/ece3.3406.
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the greatest threats to them are ship strikes and entanglement in fishing gear.8 
Current knowledge indicates that most narws swim into Canadian waters ev-
ery summer. The whale has been listed as an endangered species under sara 
since 2005. A sara Recovery Strategy for narws was produced in 2009, and a 
partial sara Action Plan was proposed (though not as yet finalized) in 2016. 
Otherwise, until very recently there have been few actions by Canada to ac-
tively protect this species. During the summer of 2017, an extraordinary num-
ber of narws were killed or harmed by human activities in Canada’s Gulf of St. 
Lawrence.9 Twelve individual narws were found dead, and seven others were 
observed entangled in fishing gear. Detailed necropsies were carried out on 
seven of the dead animals. The expert veterinarians concluded that four died 
as a result of blunt force trauma, and two were killed due to entanglement. 
Although little was known about how much of the narw population uses the 
Gulf of St. Lawrence, and where specifically they aggregated, their presence 
had been reported there for many years. It is clear the species could have ben-
efited from efforts to reduce the risk of harm from human activities. In August 
2017, ships were required to comply with a 10-knot speed limit and a summer 
snow crab trap fishery closed early.
 Summary
These three case studies, and many other reports, point to the conclusion 
that Canada is not adequately protecting its most endangered marine spe-
cies.  Fortunately, these reports provide recommendations for how this situ-
ation can be improved, so as to correct this deficiency in protection. There 
may also be evidence that the federal government is willing and able to act 
on these recommendations. In the 2017 narw mortality event, there was a 
remarkable  response by the federal government to protect narws. Immedi-
ately  following the initial discovery of dead whales, the federal government 
acted  quickly to close the local, active snow crab fishery and impose manda-
tory speed  restrictions on commercial vessel traffic traveling through the area 
of the Gulf of St. Lawrence where the whales were most densely aggregated. 
8 M.W. Brown et al., Recovery Strategy for the North Atlantic Right Whale (Eubalaena glacialis) 
in Atlantic Canadian Waters [Final], Species at Risk Act Recovery Strategy Series (Fisheries 
and Oceans Canada, 2009).
9 P-Y. Daoust, E.L. Couture, T. Wimmer and L. Bourque, Incident Report: North Atlantic Right 
Whale Mortality Event in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, 2017 (Charlottetown, pei: Canadian Wildlife 
Health Cooperative, Marine Animal Response Society, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 
2017).
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Although  implemented in reaction to the disastrous situation, these direct 
changes to protection by the federal government for the benefit of a species at 
risk were unprecedented. It is hoped therefore, that in the future, Canada will 
take similar actions to proactively prevent harm to this species, and to advance 
the conservation of its marine species at risk.
<UN>
Keeping the Noise Down: Approaches to the 
Mitigation and Regulation of Human-Caused 
Ocean Noise
Lindy Weilgart
OceanCare, Switzerland, and Dalhousie University, Halifax,  
Nova Scotia, Canada
Most marine animals, including marine mammals, fish, and invertebrates, 
use sound for almost all aspects of their life, including reproduction, feeding, 
predator and hazard avoidance, communication, and navigation. In the ma-
rine environment, vision is only useful over tens of meters, whereas sound can 
be heard for thousands of kilometers. The potential area impacted by even one 
noise source can extend to millions of square kilometers. Ocean background 
human-caused noise levels have doubled every decade for the last several de-
cades in some areas, mainly from commercial shipping.
So, how should a transboundary pollutant such as noise be regulated? Inter-
estingly, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea includes 
the word ‘energy’ to define ‘pollution of the marine environment’, as in “the 
 introduction by man … of substances or energy into the marine environment … 
which … is likely to result in … harm to living resources….”1 Energy in this 
context can include both thermal and acoustic or noise pollution.2 Thus, 
the  United Nations General Assembly (unga) in paragraph 107 of its resolu-
tion 61/222 on ‘Oceans and the law of the sea’, adopted on 20 December 2006: 
 “Encourages further studies and consideration of the impacts of ocean noise 
on marine living resources….”3 Further, unga resolution 70/235 adopted on 
23 December 2015
[n]otes with concern that human-related threats, such as … underwa-
ter noise … may severely impact marine life … and calls upon States and 
competent international organizations to cooperate and coordinate their 
1 Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 u.n.t.s. 3, art. 1(4).
2 H.M. Dotinga and A.G. Oude Elferink, “Acoustic Pollution in the Oceans: The Search 
for Legal Standards,” Ocean Development & International Law 31, no. 1–2 (2000): 151–182, 
doi.org/10.1080/009083200276102.
3 United Nations General Assembly, “Oceans and the Law of the Sea,” un Doc. A/Res/61/222, 
16 March 2007, para. 107.
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research efforts in this regard so as to reduce these impacts and preserve 
the integrity of the whole marine ecosystem…4
The nineteenth meeting of the United Nations Open-Ended Informal Consul-
tative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, in 2018, is dedicated to the 
theme of ocean noise pollution. Other international fora recognizing ocean 
noise as a threat include the Convention on Biological Diversity, the European 
Union’s Marine Strategy Framework Directive, the Convention on  Migratory 
Species (CMS), the Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black 
Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area, the Agreement on the 
Conservation of Small Cetaceans in the Baltic, North East Atlantic, Irish and 
North Seas, the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of 
the North-East-Atlantic, the International Maritime Organization (imo), the 
 International Whaling Commission, and the International Union for Conser-
vation of Nature.
The main sources of human-caused ocean noise are shipping, seismic airgun 
surveys to detect oil and gas reservoirs under the seafloor, anti-submarine war-
fare naval sonar, and pile driving such as used for offshore windfarms. Various 
mitigation approaches have been used by countries. For some proposed noise-
producing projects, environmental impact assessments (EIAs) are required, 
especially since the CMS ratified and endorsed guidelines on EIAs for marine 
noise-generating activities in 2017.  Depending on the country, eias sometimes 
must include an alternatives analysis, examining a range of suitable alterna-
tives (including a ‘no  action’ alternative) and their estimated environmental 
impact. Some of the most common weaknesses of eias are the lack of serious, 
quantitative risk analyses of cumulative or synergistic impacts (where various 
threats accumulate in a multiplicative rather than additive way). Power analy-
ses are also often absent from eias. Scientific studies of noise impacts should 
include the statistical probability of finding an effect if one is indeed present. 
Would there need to be a dramatic, wholesale die-off of a population to detect 
any effect? Even subtle, hard-to-observe effects can have irreversible, serious 
impacts. Proof of mitigation effectiveness is also generally missing from eias. 
Frequently, there is not enough basic information on species’ distribution and 
abundance in the proposed area or other baseline biological data before an 
eia is produced, hamstringing the usefulness of an eia.
Common mitigation tools include safety zones together with marine mam-
mal observers. Marine mammal observers generally search a 500-m radius 
4 United Nations General Assembly, “Oceans and the Law of the Sea,” un Doc. A/RES/70/235, 
15 March 2016, para. 246.
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around a noise source for marine mammals and turtles. If animals are detected 
within the safety zone, the sound source is powered or shut down until the 
animals leave. The large drawback here is that marine mammals spend a great 
deal of time underwater where they are out of sight, and turtles are hard to 
spot unless very close. Moreover, unless the ocean is very calm, without fog 
or rain, it is difficult to sight marine mammals or turtles. Disturbingly, many 
noise sources are allowed to operate even at night. Passive acoustic monitor-
ing (pam) is often used in such situations, deploying underwater microphones 
(hydrophones) to detect marine mammal sounds. Some species are very vocal, 
such as sperm whales and beaked whales, but others, less so. Furthermore, it 
can be difficult to determine the species, bearing (relative to the noise source), 
and distance of the calling animal. pam shows some promise, especially when 
used with gliders, a type of autonomous underwater vehicle that moves slowly 
forward while going up and down through the water column. Gliders can be 
outfitted with hydrophones to survey an area for whales and dolphins ahead of 
a noise-producing project or military exercise. Theoretically, if an area is ‘clear’, 
the project can proceed with less risk of noise impact. ‘Ramp-ups’ or ‘soft 
starts’ are also used, whereby sound sources are gradually increased in volume, 
to theoretically allow animals time to move away. There is limited proof that 
animals actually do so. Some may be curious and approach the noise at qui-
eter levels only to be hit with the full volume when they are close by. Similarly, 
acoustic deterrents are sometimes employed to chase animals away before the 
louder noise source begins operating. All of these mitigation tools are prob-
ably better than doing nothing, but generally not highly effective in preventing 
environmental degradation of an ecosystem through noise.
By far one of the most effective mitigation tools is spatio-temporal restric-
tion on noise activities. Avoiding areas or times of year which are particu-
larly sensitive, such as breeding, spawning, migration, feeding, or resting, is 
likely to reduce noise impacts. Area-based noise mitigation can also employ 
marine protected areas (mpas). mpas have the advantage that various other 
(non-acoustic) kinds of stressors or threats are restricted, so that cumulative 
or synergistic impacts should be minimized. mpas, however, must be managed 
with noise in mind, which may require noise buffer zones. Low-frequency 
noise which generally travels furthest, is most difficult to mitigate, because 
of the large areas required to keep noise out, compared with mid- and high- 
frequency noise. Nevertheless, lowering noise levels in mpas is better than 
not regulating noise around mpas at all. After a series of fatal mass strandings 
involving mainly beaked whales coincident with naval exercises using sonar 
around the Canary Islands, the Spanish government declared a ban on naval 
exercises in the Canary Islands within 93 km of shore, in 2004. There have been 
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no mass strandings in the Canaries since that moratorium began.5 Another 
approach, albeit still theoretical, is to set aside still-quiet habitat now, know-
ing that vulnerable populations require it to recover. These ‘acoustic refuges’ 
would be designated in habitat that is vital to noise-sensitive populations and 
has remained quiet, in contrast to much of the rest of their habitat.
The other mitigation tool that is highly effective is reducing the noise levels 
through, for instance, quieting technologies. One noise source that does not 
lend itself very well to most of the above-mentioned tools, such as ramp-ups or 
safety zones, is commercial shipping, which is currently unregulated relative to 
noise. It falls into a separate category since the noise is unintentional and of no 
benefit to the noise producer. However, the imo has agreed to voluntary guide-
lines to reduce propeller noise from cavitation and engine noise, for instance. 
Good maintenance and designing ships with noise in mind can cut noise levels, 
with the possibility of some attendant increases in fuel efficiency. A 2017 study 
showed that commercial ships retrofitted for energy efficiency also were 6 to 
8 dB quieter.6 Except for use by the military and sometimes fisheries science, 
ships are not designed to be quiet. If at the design stage, the hull is matched to 
the propeller design, so that a uniform wake field is produced, cavitation noise 
can be reduced. Some ports, such as the Port of Vancouver, are incentivizing 
quieter ships by cutting docking fees for them by up to 47 percent.7 Green cer-
tification programs, such as Green Marine, are starting to include underwater 
radiated noise as one of the measures used for calculating the environmental 
rating of a ship. The imo also uses Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas and Areas 
To Be Avoided as ways to change shipping routes to avoid sensitive marine life, 
which can also help with noise levels.8 Shipping noise levels can, depending 
on the propulsion system, be reduced by simply slowing down. Often, but not 
always, slower ships are quieter. If ships avoid running along the continental 
shelf break, they could reduce the amount of noise entering the deep sound 
channel, a horizontal duct at depth in the ocean that transmits noise very ef-
ficiently over large distances. If ships could instead pass perpendicular over 
5 A. Fernández, M. Arbelo and V. Martín, “Whales: No mass strandings since sonar ban,” Nature 
497 (16 May 2013): 317. doi:10.1038/497317d.
6 M. Gassmann et al., “Underwater Noise Comparison of Pre- and Post-Retrofitted MAERSK 
G-Class Container Vessels,” MPL TM-616 Unpublished report, 30 pp.
7 M. Meuse, “Port of Vancouver to cut docking fees for quieter ships by nearly half,” cbc News, 
26 January 2017, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/vancouver-port-noise 
-incentives-1.3953522.
8 See “Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas,” International Maritime Organization, http://www.imo 
.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PSSAs/Pages/Default.aspx.
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the shelf break or at greater distance parallel to it, this might minimize the 
background shipping noise in the ocean.
Aside from reducing shipping noise, other quieting technologies have 
emerged. An alternative to seismic airguns is Marine Vibroseis, which uses the 
same energy as an airgun, but spread out over a longer duration, so that the 
amplitude (loudness) of the airgun shot is reduced. Although airguns produce 
sound up to 150 kHz, geophysicists only record sound below 200 Hz. Everything 
above 200 Hz is, in effect, ‘wasted energy’. Marine Vibroseis is largely able to cut 
out these unnecessary frequencies, thus sparing mid- or high-frequency hear-
ing whales and dolphins, like beaked whales, harbor porpoises, dolphins, killer 
whales, belugas, and narwhals. Marine Vibroseis helps even low- frequency 
hearing whales, such as the baleen whales, as overall levels are  substantially 
lower.9 Moreover, with Marine Vibroseis there is no injurious sharp onset, 
like a gunshot, where the levels rise almost instantaneously from zero to high. 
Marine Vibroseis prototypes are currently being tested, but are not yet com-
mercially available. There are a wide variety of quieting technologies used 
for pile driving, such as bubble curtains and cofferdams. Innovation of these 
quieting technologies was mainly brought about by the German government’s 
noise limits, the only country to legislate underwater noise in this way.
Overall, however, underwater noise is particularly deserving of precaution-
ary management. Noise impacts on whales are especially difficult to  document, 
particularly the most critical impacts on their populations.10 The ocean is not 
a controlled laboratory; prey distributions change for unknown reasons, whale 
population estimates are very imprecise so population changes are hard to de-
tect and moreover, to link to noise alone and not some other stressor. For these 
reasons, and because marine animals are highly dependent on sound and the 
potential area of impact is so large, the burden of proof should be on the proj-
ect proponents, not those trying to preserve the environment from degrada-
tion through noise.
9 A.J. Duncan, et al., “A Modelling Comparison between Received Sound Levels Produced 
by a Marine Vibroseis Array and Those from an Airgun Array for Some Typical Seismic 
Survey Scenarios,” Marine Pollution Bulletin 119 (2017): 277–288.
10 L.S. Weilgart, “The Need for Precaution in the Regulation and Management of Undersea 
Noise,” Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy 10, no. 3 (2007): 247–253.
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Ecological Economics and the Ocean
Gabriela Sabau
Memorial University of Newfoundland,  
Corner Brook, Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada
 Introduction
Ecological economics was born as a transdisciplinary field of enquiry in the 
1980s out of some ecologists’ and economists’ desire to work together to ex-
plore the intricate interactions between natural and economic systems. 
A principal aim was to find practical solutions for a sustainable economy. 
 Unlike mainstream economics, ecological economics sees the human economy 
as an open subsystem of the larger but finite, closed, and non-growing  global 
ecosystem. Consequently, its functioning should be governed by the same im-
mutable physical laws—the first and second laws of thermodynamics—and 
biological principles, explained in terms of energy and material flows.1 This im-
plies that there are objective limits to the biophysical throughput of resources 
from the ecosystem, through the economic subsystem, and back to the ecosys-
tem as waste. It also implies that a steady-state economy, which deliberately 
minimizes throughput rather than maximizing consumption,2 is more ‘natu-
ral’ than the current unlimited growth economy that has exceeded planetary 
boundaries.3
The main goals of ecological economics are efficient allocation of resources, 
just income and wealth distribution, as well as sustainable scale of the macro-
economy. While competitive markets through relative prices are the policy 
instrument for efficient resource allocation, just distribution and an optimal 
scale are social priorities that must be collectively decided on, based on sci-
ence and ethical judgements rather than on subjective willingness-to-pay cal-
culations. Their implementation requires policies designed to match means 
to alternative ends. Ecological economics assumes that there are ultimate 
means and ultimate ends, and that humans make choices along the entire 
ends-means spectrum (Figure 1). The ultimate means, which are scarce and 
1 N. Georgescu-Roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic Process (Cambridge: Harvard 
 University Press, 1971), 457.
2 H.E. Daly, Toward a Steady-state Economy (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman & Co, 1973), 332.
3 J. Rockström et al., “Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity,” 
Ecology and Society 14, no. 2 (2009): 32, http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/art32/.
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should not be wasted, are low entropy matter-energy that humans extract from 
nature; the ultimate ends of economic activity can be many, from more indi-
vidual material consumption, to achieving “sustainable, equitable and pros-
perous wellbeing.”4
 The Ocean, the New Frontier
Until relatively recently, the focus of ecological economics was mostly ter-
restrial, perhaps due to an early theoretical inheritance from the physiocratic 
school of economic thinking, which believed that land and labor were ulti-
mate sources of wealth. In a seminal 1997 article, Costanza et al. calculated 
that oceans (coastal and marine ecosystems) are also sources of wealth. They 
contributed approximately US$22.6 trillion that year to human welfare, a not 
insignificant amount compared to that year’s global gdp of US$25 trillion.5 
A book advocating for an ecological economics of the oceans and coasts was 
published in 2008,6 in which the authors argued that an ecological economics 
approach would move the management of oceans from the damaging ‘frontier 
economics’ paradigm currently dominating marine management to a sustain-
able governance of the oceans. Frontier economics assumes that biophysi-
cal limits do not exist and that oceans are more or less up for grabs through 
“reckless, exploitative, romantic, and violent behavior” of the “cowboys on 
4 R. Costanza et al., “Modeling and Measuring Sustainable Wellbeing in Connection with the 
UN Sustainable Development Goals,” Ecological Economics 130 (2016): 350–355.
5 R. Costanza et al., “The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital,” Nature 
387 (1997): 253–260.
6 M. Patterson and B. Glavovic, eds., Ecological Economics of the Oceans and Coasts (Chelten-
ham: Edward Elgar, 2008), 372.
Figure 1 The ends-means spectrum 
SOURCE: R. Costanza et al. 2016. Used with permission.
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 illimitable plains.”7 This behavior constantly pushes the frontier with help 
from technology. A frontier economics philosophy of ocean use has led to the 
depletion of global wild fish stocks starting in the 1950s, as larger vessels using 
advanced technologies (e.g., trawling, sonar equipment) coupled with govern-
ment subsidies led to overfishing and high levels of pollutants, with devastat-
ing impacts on marine life. As well, about 88 million tons of plastic litter is now 
in the oceans and about 8 million more plastic items are added every day.8 The 
rate of ocean acidification due to unchecked carbon dioxide emissions is at 
least 100 times faster than at any other time in 20 million years. These human 
impacts threaten not only life in the ocean, but also the functioning integrity 
of the ocean, disturbing its global biogeochemical cycles, its complex spatial 
patterns of marine photosynthesis, and its ability to provide ecological servic-
es. An ecological-economics approach can change the way we view and treat 
the ocean, by addressing the issues of sustainable scale and just distribution.
 Sustainable Ocean
Oceans cover approximately 71 percent of the Earth’s surface and hold about 97 
percent of the Earth’s water. They are essential for regulating the planetary sys-
tem by driving the climate and weather systems and by influencing the global 
carbon cycle. Oceans capture and store 54 times more carbon dioxide than 
the atmosphere, absorbing more than a quarter of the carbon dioxide humans 
emit,9 thus being our best ally in fighting climate change. They also provide 
ecological services like coastal protection, nutrient cycling, and degradation 
of organic wastes (toxin neutralization). Oceans supply numerous biotic and 
abiotic resources from fish and marine biotechnology to minerals, oil and gas, 
and renewable energy. It is assessed that the global capacity of wave and tidal 
energy systems could exceed that of about 120 nuclear reactors, as 80 percent 
of the potential kinetic energy from waves can be converted into electricity.10 
Oceans also provide social and economic goods and services like tourism, 
7 K.E. Boulding, “The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth,” in Environmental Quality 
in a Growing Economy, ed., H. Jarrett (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), 
3–14.
8 T. Juniper, What’s Really Happening to Our Planet? The Facts Simply Explained (New York: 
DK Publishing, 2016), 164.
9 Global Ocean Commission Report, From Decline to Recovery: A Rescue Package for the 
Global Ocean, June 24 2014, 5, https://www.mpaaction.org/sites/default/files/Global%20
Ocean%20Commission_2014_From%20Decline%20to%20Recovery.pdf.
10 Supra note 8, 59.
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 recreation, and marine transportation for both goods and people. Thousands 
of ships are crossing the ocean daily carrying 90 percent of all internationally 
traded goods, according to the International Maritime Organization. In the 
Netherlands, where already floating houses exist, an aquatic architecture firm 
DeltaSync is working to design and develop the first self-sufficient floating city 
in the world. What is the optimal scale of economic and social activities that 
can take place in the ocean?
In ecological economics, optimal scale is identified relative to the ecosys-
tem’s boundaries. It is the point where the marginal (extra) cost of increasing 
an activity equals the marginal benefit of the increased activity. When the mar-
ginal costs exceed marginal benefits, uneconomic growth happens—growth 
whose opportunity cost does not justify the additional benefits of increased 
activity. For instance, when intensified farming discharges too much  nitrogen- 
and phosphorous-rich fertilizers and livestock waste into the sea creating 
 hypoxia zones in coastal waters, the scale of farming is not sustainable and 
needs to be curtailed to eliminate uneconomic growth. Currently, there are 
405 dead zones in coastal waters worldwide that cause many damaging effects, 
from loss of wildlife biodiversity to the collapse of fisheries.11 This is the conse-
quence of seeing the ocean as merely an extractive and waste disposal sector 
of the economy and not as part of the biophysical planetary whole that sup-
ports the economic subsystem and sets ecological limits to economic activity. 
In order to calculate the optimal scale of economic activities in the ocean we 
need to define its ecological sustainability. If ocean ecological sustainability 
is defined as a “social or collective limit on aggregate throughput to keep it 
within the absorptive and regenerative capacities of the ecosystem,”12 global 
restrictions can be calculated and imposed both on the input flows from the 
ocean (depletion) and on the output flows (pollution) going into the ocean. 
Elements of ocean-critical natural capital, which perform vital and irreplace-
able functions, need to be identified and protected. These are monumental 
tasks that  require a clear vision and collaboration of many stakeholders, scien-
tists (marine biology, oceanography, ocean engineering, fisheries and aquacul-
ture, and sustainability science etc.), policy- and decision-makers, ocean users, 
and other public interest representatives. The ecological sustainability of the 
ocean is an objective collective value determined not by subjective personal 
preferences, but by the deep understanding of the need to preserve the long-
term integrity of the ocean.
11 Id., 163.
12 H.E. Daly and J. Farley, Ecological Economics Principles and Applications (Washington, DC: 
Island Press, 2011), 417.
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 A Fair Use of the Ocean
Unfortunately, the ocean, especially the deep sea, remains largely unexplored. 
Moreover, it is difficult to assign use and property rights to the ocean, which 
is a vast, common property asset, non-excludable and rival. The 1982 United 
 Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) started to address the 
issue of open access to the ocean by establishing rights, duties, and responsi-
bilities of coastal states to use ocean space and resources up to a distance of 
200 nautical miles from coastal baselines. unclos opened the possibility for 
further regulation of the use of the ocean by coastal states, especially through 
management of their fisheries, but also of the ocean under their jurisdiction. 
Canada was the first country in the world to adopt an Oceans Act in 1996.13 The 
Act is now being amended to speed up the process of protecting at least 10 
percent of Canada’s oceans by 2020.
Beyond coastal states’ exclusive economic zones, there is a vast ocean rep-
resenting 64 percent of the total global ocean area of international waters or 
‘high seas’ over which there is little, fragmented, or no institutional control. 
As a consequence, the once ‘free’ high seas area, which used to be pristine, 
beautiful, and extremely rich in biodiversity, is now overexploited by most-
ly unregulated users. A biodiversity loss crisis is unfolding on the high seas 
threatening vulnerable marine species of fish, corals and sponges. This use of 
the ocean is neither sustainable nor socially and ecologically just. If we define 
justice as equal opportunity to access the ocean resources and to develop the 
capabilities needed for a good life,14 we understand the urgency of a plan to 
free up the open ocean from its stressors and predators. The 2014 report of the 
Global Ocean Commission15 identified the main drivers of ocean decline and 
proposed actions that are starting to bear fruit: a 2015 United Nations General 
Assembly resolution (69/292) established a process for developing a new in-
ternational legally binding agreement under unclos for protection of high 
seas biological diversity. Of special importance, from an ecological economics 
perspective, is the proposal to turn, by 2020, the high seas into a ‘regeneration 
zone’ where industrial fishing is forbidden, should insufficient actions be taken 
by then and should the state of the ocean continue to decline. Such a zone, 
equivalent to a huge marine protected area, could have a significant impact 
on restoring the health and functions of the ocean, as demonstrated by the 
13 S.C. 1996, c. 31.
14 A. Vatn, Environmental Governance: Institutions, Policies and Actions (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar, 2015), 444.
15 Supra note 9.
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first high seas marine protected area established in 2010 in the South Orkney 
Islands in the South Atlantic under the Commission for the Convention on 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. According to researchers, 
this area is a significant carbon sink, providing negative feedback to climate 
change.16
The global ocean is the common heritage of humankind, an invaluable gift 
of nature that needs to be responsibly used and that demands fair access to its 
wealth. Through its scientific and ethical assumptions, ecological economics 
could lead to sustainable governance of the ocean, a gift to be enjoyed not only 
by this generation, but by future ones too.
16 D.K. Barnes et al., “Why is the South Orkney Island Shelf (the World’s First High-seas Ma-
rine Protected Area) a Carbon Immobilization Hotspot?,” Global Change Biology 22, no. 3 
(2016): 1110–1120.
<UN>
Sustainable Tourism: The Long View
Deirdre P. Shurland
DestiSist, Brunswick, Maryland, United States
When the history of tourism is written in its encyclopedic detail, it will recount 
the influences of ancient civilizations, empires, and dynasties (e.g., Persian, 
Egyptian, Chinese, and Roman). Their relics are the antecedents of today’s 
great cities, with road and infrastructure networks, centers of learning, culture, 
language, religion and architecture, systems of law and government. Particu-
larly in Europe and Asia, this heritage endured over centuries and is today’s 
tourism attractions that draw intense visitor curiosity.
Tourism is commonly reflected through history as movements of people 
across neighboring towns, regions, and countries. Some researchers mark 
the beginning of tourism from the late seventeenth century when the classic 
‘Grand Tour’ reached its pinnacle led by the British aristocracy, landed gentry, 
and wealthy European citizens, as ‘tour-ists’ pursuing experiences in European 
classics and culture.1 Grand touring via horse-drawn carriage took months and 
years, and Italy and France were the most popular destinations.
Over time as the steamboat and railway opened up once impenetrable fron-
tiers, so too the automobile and airplane eventually became modes of trans-
portation that facilitated quicker travel through contiguous states and from 
lower societal strata. These transit modes would move people over greater dis-
tances, in larger numbers and in progressively shorter times, eventually mak-
ing business, leisure, or holiday travel commonplace.
On the demand side and in the current digital age, advances in Internet and 
mobile technologies brought travel planning literally to the palm of the hand, 
where an entire vacation can be decided in a matter of minutes. The imme-
diate consequence was a reduced need for intermediary travel agents and a 
continued explosion of booking websites that ensured wide access to digital 
tools best exemplified by the Airbnb accommodation- and Uber ride-sharing 
platform applications. Described as the ‘sharing economy’, these sites are most 
amenable to today’s twenty-first century traveler—the younger, upwardly mo-
bile millennials (ages 18 to 37), who are already reshaping current and future 
tourism demand, behaviors and trends.
1 U. Gyr, “The History of Tourism: Structures on the Path to Modernity,” European History On-
line, 12 March 2010, http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/europe-on-the-road/the-history-of-tourism/
ueli-gyr-the-history-of-tourism/?searchterm=history%20of%20tourism&set_language=en.
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On the supply side, the 1960s and 1970s saw surges of mass tourism in 
 European countries like Spain2 as part of economic policy that brought rap-
id investment and development, growth, and prosperity, especially to high- 
valued real estate locations along Spain’s east coast and in Mediterranean 
regions with their beaches and agreeable climates. The higher the arrival num-
bers, the more successful the destination was considered. Mass tourism, how-
ever, eventually caused overcrowding that disrupted livelihoods and impaired 
landscapes, quality of life, and services.3 Once entrenched it was difficult to 
reverse. While overcrowding was a phenomenon observed in eighteenth cen-
tury Spain and Italy, today’s ‘overtourism’ at the most popular of European city 
destinations, i.e., Barcelona, Amsterdam, Dubrovnik, and Venice, bears the 
same hallmarks,4 with high numbers of visitors that have spawned protests 
and complaints by residents.
The term ‘sustainability’ evolved from early usage in the eighteenth cen-
tury forestry industry5 when foresters warned of the threats to long-term 
commercial logging from overconsumption of timber resources. In the 1960s, 
sustainability was associated with objectives to arrest the poisoning effects of 
manufacturing process discharges in the environment, which had devastating 
consequences for human health and ecosystem integrity. In the first decade 
of the twenty-first century, sustainability was associated with the social and 
environmental consequences of high rates of production of goods and services 
driven by higher levels of consumption, which depleted resources and perpet-
uated a vicious cycle. In that respect, the focus was on industries such as tour-
ism with its high growth and consumption rates. Most recently a portmanteau 
of terms has emerged (e.g., ecotourism, geotourism, and responsible tourism) 
to promote more ethical objectives for tourism development,6 yet with little 
clarity of concept. As noted below, confusion in the use and multiplicity of 
terms presents a significant barrier to sustainable tourism.
The core issue is the scale of depletion of land, water, energy, and raw ma-
terial resources with consequent impacts. Coastal and waterfront areas are 
2 F. Almeida Garcia, “Tourism Policy and Territorial Imbalances in Spain (1),” Bulletin of 
 Geography. Socio–economic Series no. 22 (2013): 7–19.
3 Id.
4 See “Barcelona Approves New Law to Limit Tourist Numbers,” Condé Nast Traveler, 27 January 
2017; “How Much Tourism is Too Much?,” The New York Times, 29 June 2017; E. Becker, “The 
Revolt against Tourism,” The New York Times, Sunday Review, 17 July 2015.
5 World Ocean Review 4: Sustainable Use of Our Oceans—Making Ideas Work (Hamburg: 
maribus, International Ocean Institute, and mare, 2015), 10, http://worldoceanreview.com/
wp-content/downloads/wor4/WOR4_en.pdf.
6 “The Case for Responsible Travel: Trends & Statistics 2017” (Washington, DC: Center for 
 Responsible Travel, n.d.), http://responsibletravel.org/docs/The%20Case%20for%20 
Responsible%20Travel%202017_Final%20for%20Release.pdf.
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 pressured by high-valued tourism development. Forest and marine ecosystems 
and their inherent ecosystem services (e.g., provisioning, regulating, preven-
tion, and recreation)7 are affected by hotel and resort development, cruise 
 operations, construction of service roads, and other infrastructure. Water and 
energy use by hotels and resorts have often compromised the reliability of 
local supply sources. Inefficient or outdated appliances and equipment, and 
inefficient or wasteful processes have emitted polluting gases and generated 
solid wastes. Airplanes emit significant greenhouse gases. Increased visitor 
numbers are testing the patience of residents. Collectively, all these threaten to 
overwhelm national and local government capacity to manage, accommodate, 
and control tourism impacts.
The prospects for managing tourism impact are discouraging. The World 
Tourism Organization indicates that tourism currently generates 1.2 billion 
 arrivals—projected to increase to 1.8 billion by 2030—accounts for 10 percent 
of global gdp, one in ten jobs, and 7 percent of global exports. This makes 
tourism an attractive development strategy for countries. UN Environment, 
however, is cautioning about pursuing high-consumption forms of tourism 
development. If left uncurbed, current rates of tourism energy and water con-
sumption could double by 2050 along with the costs of remedial action, par-
ticularly for least developed and developing countries.8
The problem lies in the unknown size of the tourism value chain, un-
checked visitor arrival numbers and unmitigated consumption. Tourism is also 
now a contributor to major global issues such as global warming, increased 
disaster impact, and biodiversity loss. Climate change is exacerbating these 
issues by amplifying geographic and environmental risks,9 which are reverber-
ating in increased local conflict and disruption. This is unwelcomed news for 
destinations.
Since 1972,10 the United Nations’ involvement in sustainable development 
has done much to elaborate the concept of sustainability and to advance re-
lated thought, practice, and knowledge. Progress was made on the tenets of 
7 See “Ecosystem Services,” iucn, https://www.iucn.org/commissions/commission-eco 
system-management/our-work/cems-thematic-groups/ecosystem-services.
8 United Nations Environment Programme and World Tourism Organization, “The Sus-
tainable Tourism Programme of the 10-Year Framework of Programmes on Sustainable 
Consumption and Production Patterns,” http://cf.cdn.unwto.org/sites/all/files/docpdf/
brochure10yfpstpenupdated17oct2016.pdf.
9 World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report, 2016 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 
2016).
10 The first major United Nations conference on international environmental issues, the UN 
Conference on the Human Environment, convened in Stockholm, Sweden, from 5 to 16 
June 1972.
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sustainable development (1992 Agenda 21), control of air pollutants (1987 
Montreal Protocol), and global warming (1997 Kyoto Protocol), and reducing 
disaster risks (2005 Hyogo Framework), among other issues. Decades later and 
with agreement from over 190 countries, these UN-led actions culminated 
in the 2015 Paris Agreement to reduce global warming; the 2030 Sustainable 
 Development Goals promoting prosperity, equality and justice for all; and the 
2030 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. Through these and other 
UN programmes, countries are transforming their major impacting and con-
suming sectors.
A range of tourism actors has also been collaborating for decades (public 
and private sector, non-profits, international and regional agencies) to develop 
sustainability approaches, design and implement management systems, and 
co-ordinate action through partner networks. Hotels, as leading targets of these 
actions, achieved savings in water and energy consumption and land resources 
(percentage set aside for conservation), while also improving staff capability 
and community benefits. Many participants touted the advantages of saving 
money and being market leaders. These initial successes yielded best practice 
and case study publications that proved the sustainability business advantage. 
However, to overcome continued criticism of a lack of sustainability, the ma-
jority of tourism actors must participate, which is not the case today. Among 
many barriers cited, particularly by small- and medium-sized businesses, are 
lack of financial capacity to absorb improvement costs, limited know-how, and 
poor understanding of sustainability concepts, with perhaps the most daunt-
ing being the comparatively low return on investment.
With the recent spectacle of extreme events flooding city centers and dev-
astating island communities, sustainability has once again been placed at the 
top of the international tourism agenda. Although rebuilding of destinations is 
projected to last decades, tourism services will gradually recover as infrastruc-
ture systems are restored. As tourism businesses face repeated cycles of busi-
ness interruption from extreme events, they can no longer disconnect their 
operations from the destination’s vulnerability or the rising costs of climate 
resilience.
Large global businesses in financial, manufacturing, and retail sectors have 
organized to reduce value chain risks and decarbonize their operations, thus 
meeting investor demands for corporate social responsibility. They are also 
among a growing list of companies undergoing rapid digital transformation.11 
11 Sectors leading the digital transformation include financial services, retail, health care, 
government, and technology. See “Connectivity Benchmark Report 2017,” MuleSoft, 
https://www.mulesoft.com/lp/reports/2017-connectivity-benchmark.
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Notably absent, or at best underrepresented from these groups, are tourism 
businesses. This suggests that as one of the world’s leading economic sectors,12 
the tourism economy is lagging behind other global sectors in its advancement.
While the destination’s sustainability should be considered a collective goal 
among its stakeholders, its management needs an altered viewpoint. Tourism 
is a dynamic, people-centered system characterized by varying needs interact-
ing at the destination, with its available resources and attractions. The desti-
nation should satisfy visitor needs through quality services but in a reciprocal 
exchange that balances with those of resident communities. Viewing tourism 
as an ‘industry’ is to misunderstand its nature, managing it as a ‘sector’ is to 
miscalculate its consequence. Such a dynamic system requires agile, people-
centered management approaches to address tourism impacts and to build a 
culture of service quality and innovation.
Moreover, the typical destination management agency, e.g., the tourism 
ministry or department has not, to date, been able to provide all the requi-
site skills to manage tourism’s organic nature, complexity and scale. They are 
traditionally under-resourced and frequently hampered by management pro-
cesses that are unable to keep pace with the ever-changing demands of tour-
ism stakeholders. In addition, these agencies are now increasingly tasked with 
responding to a global agenda and coping with fast-emerging, sometimes un-
anticipated local situations. At best, their response times may be described as 
excruciatingly slow or constrained by outmoded processes.
For countries where tourism is the leading economic sector therefore, there 
are three practices that need to be mastered:
 Long-Range Planning
Developing long-range aspirational strategies with 20 to 30-year time hori-
zons13 are important for presenting the tourism development objective in the 
context of national and local priorities, and to addressing the major global de-
velopment issues and agreements discussed above. As a consensus document 
12 The World Travel and Tourism Council (wttc) describes tourism in terms of absolute 
size, growth, and share of exports, as one of the most important industries in the world. 
See “The Comparative Economic Impact of Travel & Tourism,” wttc (November 2012), 
https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/benchmark%20reports/the_comparative 
_economic_impact_of_travel__tourism.pdf.
13 For example, Spain adopted a longer-range view of planned tourism, Turismo 2020, after 
experiencing difficulties with its mass tourism strategies. See “Plan del Turismo Español 
Horizonte 2020,” http://statistics.unwto.org/sites/all/files/pdf/spain.pdf.
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it would be elaborated in partnership with a range of tourism stakeholders, 
which would ensure that its long timeframe remains impervious to changes 
in political administration. Co-ordinated by a lead agency, the strategy will 
be achieved through a succession of short-term, more adjustable action plans 
(3–5 years) by the co-operating public and private sector organizations that 
will sequentially accomplish the main goal. This is the fundamental purpose 
for building common support and sharing the burden of tourism manage-
ment. Achieving the destination’s long-term strategy would be monitored via 
a digital platform that locks in tourism stakeholder commitment and action. 
This approach affirms the importance of planning as a continuous vertical and 
horizontal process and the use of digital technology as an enabling solution for 
speeding up achievement of the defined goal.
 Engaging Tourism Stakeholders
The participation of a wide range of actors organized and communicating ver-
tically and horizontally at the destination is needed to match the complexity 
of the tourism economy. This implies that public and private stakeholders and 
civil society groups are steadily engaged in planning, marketing, operating, and 
managing tourism, with the most agreeable outcomes. This also speaks to a 
tourism governance organization that is transparent, accountable, and guided 
by clear delineation of institutional roles and responsibilities, with resources 
shared and allocated to effectively accomplish the goal. The lead co-ordinating 
agency must have a clear mandate, vision, and institutional prowess to gal-
vanize co-operation across sector agencies and ensure participation of busi-
nesses and civil groups, and also be accountable for outcomes.
 Measuring, Monitoring, and Reporting
Building functional networks of participation across the tourism value chain 
also provides the co-operating infrastructure for measuring, monitoring, and 
reporting on sustainability outcomes. The use of digitized processes will instill 
discipline, spur innovation, and speed up advancement toward sustainabil-
ity goals. Without digitization, destinations will remain forever reliant upon 
moribund systems ill-suited to today’s expanding traveller needs and global 
challenges.
In summary, sustainable tourism is fundamentally about destination stake-
holders building up habits of excellence, continuous improvement, achieving, 
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and resetting new goals. These are tourism’s traditional management weak-
nesses, which may gradually be remedied in cycles of repeated planning, do-
ing, achieving, and learning. Advancement in sustainability requires a culture 
of innovation, good decision-making, and quality data managed through smart 
and available technologies. If these values and technology use are ingrained 
into management processes, twenty-first century tourism destinations are cer-
tain to offer innovative and competitive tourism services for the foreseeable 
future.
<UN>
Ocean and Climate Change Action: Opportunities 
for Economic and Environmental Sustainability
Peter J. Ricketts
Acadia University, Wolfville, Nova Scotia, Canada
The year 2017 was a major one for highlighting the impacts of climate change 
on the world’s oceans and the subsequent effects upon the global population. 
For decades rising sea levels, intensification of storms, continued melting of 
Arctic sea ice and permafrost, and deterioration of coral reefs have been in-
creasing the vulnerability of our coasts to erosion, flooding, and salt water in-
trusion. Scientists have been warning of the catastrophic impacts that climate 
change is having upon the world’s oceans and that these impacts are cumula-
tive over time and will continue to increase in severity.1 Such studies, together 
with more journalistic attempts to raise public alarm (e.g., Alanna Mitchell’s 
cry for help in her book Sea Sick2) have raised awareness but done little to gal-
vanize decision-makers into more resolute action. True, the oceans were final-
ly included in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(unfccc) in the Paris Agreement in 2015, but it seems to take disasters for 
people to realize that significant change is happening. If earlier storms such 
as Hurricanes Katrina in 2005 and Sandy in 2012, and Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 
were not warning enough, the well-publicized impacts of the 2017 hurricane 
season on the Caribbean islands and coastal cities and communities across 
the Gulf and Atlantic coasts of the United States have made it clear that the 
effects of climate change are becoming ever more obvious. Not only do they 
represent event-specific challenges to emergency management at local or re-
gional scales, but the extent, severity, and frequency are also challenging from 
an ocean and coastal governance perspective.
In Canada, many coastal communities, including important population 
centers like Vancouver and Richmond, Toronto, Charlottetown, and Tuktoyak-
tuk are at risk of serious inundation as a result of rising sea levels, increased 
storm surge penetration, and high lake levels due to changes in  precipitation 
1 See, e.g., R. Schubert et al., The Future Oceans: Warming Up, Rising High, Turning Sour (Berlin: 
German Advisory Council on Global Change, wgbu, 2006); P.J. Ricketts, “State of Fear or 
State of Oblivion? What Coastal Zones Are Telling Us About Global Change and Why We 
Need Integrated Ocean and Coastal Management on a Global Scale,” in Integrated Coastal 
Zone Management, eds., E. Moksness, E. Dahl, and J. Stttrup (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 1–23.
2 A. Mitchell, Sea Sick: The Global Ocean in Crisis (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2009).
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patterns. In some cases, entire provinces are facing significant impacts. In 
Prince Edward Island, both the provincial capital and significant low-lying 
coastal areas and islands are at risk of being submerged. Nova Scotia faces the 
very real prospect of becoming an island if the Tantramar marshes on the bor-
der with New Brunswick are inundated by tidal waters. As I expressed at the 
time of the Sustainable Ocean Summit in Halifax in 2017, “there is no doubt 
that in Canada and around the world we are seeing real and tangible impacts 
of climate change that are causing loss of life and livelihood, as well as inflict-
ing billions of dollars in damages to buildings, harbours and infrastructure in 
coastal zones.”3
Beyond Canada, the threat to large coastal cities and smaller communities 
along the eastern seaboard of the United States (especially those on barrier is-
lands and low-lying coastal plains such as in Maryland, Virginia, North  Carolina, 
and South Florida), the Gulf of Mexico, and the northwestern coastlines of 
the United States is also increasing. It is estimated that 13 million Americans 
will be at risk of displacement. Places like Jekyll Island in Georgia, Isle de Jean 
Charles in Louisiana, and Newtok and Shishmarek in Alaska are now looking 
for safer locations. As the experience of New Orleans during and after Hurri-
cane Katrina clearly demonstrates, poorer communities are especially at risk. 
A new study by the Center for Progressive Reform emphasizes that many of the 
most vulnerable are Native Americans. The report even provides a guidebook 
for coastal communities looking to relocate.4
Of course, none of this compares with the catastrophic impacts being faced 
by low-lying small island developing states (sids), which are facing the pros-
pect of complete submergence and in some cases the necessity of evacuating 
their entire population to another country. It is predicted that for the world’s 
52 small island states, sea level rise is as much as four times the global average, 
and increasing levels of vulnerability means trillions of dollars in annual eco-
nomic losses.5 If present rates of sea level rise continue, the list of islands that 
will be either entirely or substantially submerged by the end of this century is 
truly alarming. It includes iconic destinations like the Maldives, the Seychelles, 
3 P.J. Ricketts, “Opinion: The World’s Oceans Desperately Need Our Help,” The Chronicle Her-
ald, 28 November 2017, http://thechronicleherald.ca/opinion/1524578-opinion-the-world 
%E2%80%99s-oceans-desperately-need-our-help.
4 M. Burkett, R. Verchick and D. Flores, Reaching Higher Ground: Avenues to Secure and Manage 
New Land for Communities Displaced by Climate Change (Washington, DC: Center for Progres-
sive Reform, 2017).
5 United Nations Environment Programme (unep), Emerging Issues for Small Island Develop-
ing States: Results of the unep Foresight Process (Nairobi: unep, 2014), https://sustainablede 
velopment.un.org/content/documents/2173emerging%20issues%20of%20sids.pdf.
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French Polynesia, the Solomon Islands, and New Caledonia. Kiribati has al-
ready taken the precaution of purchasing 6,000 acres of land in Fiji as a place 
to relocate its population, and Fiji itself is facing catastrophic consequences 
from climate change, including the loss of vital coral reefs and the potential 
displacement of large portions of its population.
Recognition of the need for action is growing among the parties to the UN 
climate convention. At the 2016 Conference of Parties (cop 22) in Morocco, 
Fiji emerged as a voice for the small island and coastal states most at risk. The 
Pacific nation sought to give a higher profile to the ocean in future climate 
 negotiations through the introduction of the Ocean Pathways Initiative.6 
 Opportunities to push forward on this front came the following year when Fiji 
assumed the presidency of cop 23 in November 2017, in Germany. By then, a 
UN conference on oceans in New York in June and the European Union’s Our 
Ocean Conference in Malta in October had put climate-related ocean issues 
high on the agenda. Oceans Action Day at cop 23 brought together over 220 
high-level representatives, including heads of state, from 60 countries and from 
governments, intergovernmental organizations and international agencies, 
non-governmental organizations, industry, donors, and scientific institutions.
 More Progress Required
The primary focus of Oceans Action Day 2017 was a review of progress on the 
Roadmap to Oceans and Climate Action (roca), a comprehensive set of policy 
recommendations developed by the Global Ocean Forum, a multi-agency ini-
tiative based at the University of Delaware. The so-called ‘roca Initiative’ ad-
dresses the central role of oceans in climate and climate change and identifies 
policy recommendations under six critical areas of concern: mitigation, ad-
aptation, Blue Economy, displacement, financing, and capacity development.7 
A number of startling conclusions emerged from the review.
Global concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere are now 
above 400 parts per million (ppm), long considered to be the tipping point at 
which climate impacts will continue to increase even if emissions are reduced. 
The hottest year on record, 2016, beat previous records set by 2015 and 2014, 
6 “The Ocean Pathway: A Strategy for the Ocean into COP23,” Marrakesh Partnership, 
8  November 2017, https://cop23.com.fj/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/The-Ocean-Pathway 
-Strategy-8.11.2017.pdf.
7 M. Kurz and B. Cicin-Sain, Assessing Progress on Ocean and Climate Action: 2016–2017: A 
 Report of the Roadmap to Oceans and Climate Action (roca) Initiative, roca, https://rocaini 
tiative.files.wordpress.com/2017/11/roca-progress-report-email-november-41.pdf.
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and 2017 was on track to be in the top-five hottest years on record, perhaps 
even the hottest year ever without an El Niño event. It was also the most in-
tense hurricane and typhoon year on record.
The ocean is absorbing 93 percent of the extra heat energy and has taken 
up 27 percent of total CO2 emissions. The combined impacts of ocean warm-
ing, deoxygenation, acidification, and sea level rise are causing major adverse 
impacts on marine species and on the lives of millions of people in coastal re-
gions around the world. In short, the oceans are warming, rising, souring, and 
asphyxiating as they have for the past few decades, but now at a more alarming 
rate than ever. The physical, economic, and food security of populations living 
in coastal and ocean locations are at unprecedented risk.
What can be done? The roca Initiative stresses the need for stronger global 
action by all countries in four important areas:
1. Develop and implement measures to reduce warming trends, such as 
so-called ‘Blue Carbon’ policies that use the ocean and its ecosystems to 
store and absorb (CO2) and reduce emissions at least enough to reach the 
‘less than 2oC’ target of the Paris Agreement and ideally not get beyond 
1.5oC;
2. Increase scientific research into the ocean’s response to global warming, 
the impact on human populations, and the best remedial options;
3. Develop and implement measures to adapt to the new norms of a warm-
er climate, especially ones that utilize natural techniques to reduce the 
vulnerability and increase resilience of coastal ecosystems and popula-
tions; and
4. Develop, promote and apply Blue Economy approaches that recognize 
the capacity of the oceans to sustain economic activities and promote 
low-carbon techniques to increase economic diversity and ensure sus-
tainable management of ocean and coastal resources.
In addition to these four action areas, the importance of addressing popula-
tion displacement, financing and capacity development for sids were also 
identified as critical areas where immediate action is required.
 Work Together for Good and Gain
Canada’s Oceans Act8—proclaimed more than 20 years ago—provides a feder-
al framework for addressing many of the issues raised at cop 23 and many as-
pects of the roca Initiative’s proposed actions on climate adaptation. The Act 
8 S.C. 1996, c. 31.
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has yet to be implemented in any way close to its potential or its promise,9 but 
the current federal government has re-committed to moving forward and has 
allocated significant resources to its Oceans Protection Plan and the Disaster 
Mitigation and Adaptation Fund.10 Many provinces also are taking action to 
address the increased impacts they are facing from climate change. We need, 
however, more effective collaboration between federal and provincial govern-
ments to implement those sections of the Oceans Act that specifically speak 
to ecosystem-based management and integrated coastal and ocean manage-
ment. In addition, the active engagement of First Nations, local governments, 
industry and business, and coastal communities must be incorporated into 
this integrated approach.
In the United States, federal legislation on coastal management and oceans 
has resulted in a great deal of progress over the past 45 years. Despite the cur-
rent White House announcing its intent to pull out of the Paris Agreement, 
much of the groundwork being done is at the state level. However, there is no 
doubt that without the support of the federal government, efforts by Ameri-
can states to combat climate change and implement effective management 
strategies will be more difficult, and the accelerated impacts will continue to 
result in increasing losses of life and infrastructure, and escalating costs to the 
American economy.
Despite the desperate need to deal with the negative impacts of climate 
change, the roca Initiative also points to enormous economic opportunities 
presented by a new approach to ocean and coastal management. The “Blue 
Economy” component of the Initiative identifies the potential to increase 
economic diversity and ensure sustainable management of ocean and coastal 
resources through emphasizing low-carbon solutions. Although the Roadmap 
discusses this primarily in the context of small island developing states, the 
applications for a developed country like Canada are substantial. A recent Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development report on the ocean 
economy, of which the Blue Economy is a component, estimates that even on 
a business-as-usual forecast, the value of ocean-based industries will double in 
value to over US$3 trillion by 2030.11
9 P.J. Ricketts and P. Harrison, “Coastal and Ocean Management in Canada: Moving into the 
21st Century,” Coastal Zone Management Journal 35, no. 1 (2007), 5–22.
10 See “Oceans Protection Plan,” Transport Canada, last revision 22 December 2017, http://
www.tc.gc.ca/eng/oceans-protection-plan.html; Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 
Reports of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, Report 2: 
Adapting to the Impacts of Climate Change (Ottawa, Fall 2017), para. 2.11.
11 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (oecd), The Ocean Economy 
in 2030 (Paris: oecd Publishing, 2016), 13.
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Canada must be a major contributor to and beneficiary from this new global 
ocean economy but developing and implementing an appropriate framework 
for inter-governmental co-operation to address the impacts and opportunities 
of climate change is essential. Without strategic collaboration from all levels 
of government, we will never be able to coordinate the balance between miti-
gation, adaptation, and science needed to start turning the tide in our man-
agement of climate change and its inevitable impacts on humanity, let alone 






 The sea, like a mother, provided nourishment to infant humanity which possibly 
��shed before it hunted. The inventiveness of primitive humankind in ��sh-
catching has amazed many an anthropologist … The earliest cave dwellers in the 
Mediterranean region in Mesolithic times had become ��shermen by the seventh 
millennium B.C. Large numbers of ��shbones were found in their caves. ... Homo 
erectus, the only human species living in Southeast Asia 800,000 years ago, was 
a seafarer, capable of piloting a vessel over at least 600 km of deep fast-moving 
waters, from Java to the Indonesian island of Flores … And since the stone age, 
��sheries have constituted the basis of the economies of coastal communities. 
Fishing encouraged ship-building and enhanced the spirit of science and 
exploration, international trade and naval power. 
 Elisabeth  Mann Borgese* 
 *  The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource (Tokyo: United Nations University 
Press, 1998), 48–49. 
 Fisheries management, even in the most advanced countries, quite simply, has 
been a failure. ... Reliance on the precautionary approach appears to be the 
common-sense alternative, but it is di���cult to reach political agreement on 
when, where, and how to apply it. 
 Elisabeth  Mann Borgese* 
 *  Ocean Governance and the United Nations (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie 




A little known aspect of Elisabeth Mann Borgese was her passion and support 
for small-scale fishing peoples of the world. Certainly, she is known for her 
achievements on the global stage, forging the law of the sea and other major 
international instruments. But from her coastal home, outside Halifax, Cana-
da, she could see the fishing people heading out to sea, and later returning to 
their families and their community. That day-to-day life of coastal communi-
ties mattered to Elisabeth, and was, I think, important in grounding her big-
picture global work.
The quotations from Elisabeth on the opposite page reflect the range of her 
analysis. First, a sense of history, and a poetic ability to capture the importance 
of fisheries over the course of millennia. Second, a profound concern for 
sustainability, and a practical sense of the new approaches needed to achieve 
that, through better fishery and ocean governance. Third, a view to the future, 
and how the human use of the ocean might develop over time. Fourth, an 
enduring and unshakeable holistic vision—one that brings humans and 
nature together, and brings humans together with one another.
A striking line by Elisabeth is this: “Fisheries management, even in the most 
advanced countries, quite simply, has been a failure.”1 Note that she wrote this 
just following one of the world’s most dramatic and significant fishery collaps-
es, the Canadian cod fishery.2 Indeed, that collapse deeply affected the fishers 
near Elisabeth’s home, and affected her as well. After the collapse, Elisabeth 
wrote about some positive changes emerging, ones continuing to this day. Has 
it been enough? Have we ‘found’ sustainability? Are we at least on the path to 
sustainability? The essays in this chapter evaluate the most prominent among 
those changes, as well as some enduring challenges we continue to face.
When we look to foundational change in fisheries, there are perhaps no 
greater shifts in recognized need for improvement than (a) the governance di-
rection of better involving fishers, and others, in the decision-making process, 
and (b) the need to look more broadly and holistically at the ‘fishery system’.3 
1 E. Mann Borgese, Ocean Governance and the United Nations (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Pol-
icy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1995), 112.
2 A. Charles, “The Atlantic Canadian Groundfishery: Roots of a Collapse,” Dalhousie Law Jour-
nal 18 (1995): 65–83.
3 A. Charles, Sustainable Fishery Systems (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2001); A. Charles, “People, 
Oceans and Scale: Governance, Livelihoods and Climate Change Adaptation in Marine 
 Social–Ecological Systems,” Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 4 (2012): 351–357.
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This part highlights these two shifts, at least in aspiration, toward participatory 
co-management and ecosystem based management,4 that is, the ecosystem 
approach.
A third foundational change in recent years has been international rec-
ognition of the crucial importance of small-scale fisheries, particularly with 
the Small-Scale Fisheries Guidelines.5 A fourth major change is the increas-
ing prominence of market-based approaches—both a controversial use of the 
market to allocate fishery access and catch6 and use of the consumer market as 
an incentive for more sustainable fishing, as covered in this part.
Turning to enduring challenges in fisheries, this part explores three 
key  aspects: the need to connect science and other forms of knowledge 
with management decision-making, the need to balance natural resource 
sustainability and economic development, and the need for strong institutions 
that can effectively work at the necessary spatial scales. For each of these, we 
can say that progress has been made, but challenges remain. On the third of 
the challenges, a shining light of progress has been in tackling illegal (iuu) 
fishing through new global enforcement and compliance measures.
Finally, Elisabeth was prominent throughout her career in looking to the 
future, and in doing so, she predicted a greatly expanded role for aquaculture. 
This part closes with two essays on  aquaculture—focused on sustainability 
and on the offshore areas of the ocean.
As Elisabeth Mann Borgese illustrated so well, the ocean’s wealth, and par-
ticularly its living resources, have been crucial historically, as they are today, 
and into the future. Continuing to create livelihoods from the living resources 
of the sea, sustainably, remains a fundamental requirement of humanity.
4 R.D. Long, A. Charles and R.L. Stephenson, “Key Principles of Ecosystem-based Management: 
The Fishermen’s Perspective,” Fish and Fisheries 18 (2016): 244–253, doi.org/10.1111/faf.12175.
5 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (fao), Voluntary Guidelines for Se-
curing Sustainable Small-scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication 
(Rome: fao, 2015).
6 P. Copes and A. Charles, “Socioeconomics of Individual Transferable Quotas and Communi-
ty-based Fishery Management,” Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 33, no. 2 (2004): 
171–181.
<UN>
Scientific Basis for Fisheries Policy  
and Management
Jake Rice
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Ottawa, Canada
 Empirical Foundations
The science foundations of fisheries policy and management have a history of 
over a century. By the 1920s there was already concern about fisheries that had 
failed at least on local and sometimes larger scales, and a desire to avoid such 
failures. From the outset the science foundations were strongly empirical and 
at best weakly theoretical. This emphasis on empirical approaches was not be-
cause fisheries science was necessarily anti-theoretical. Rather, potentially rel-
evant theoretical areas, such as ecology and oceanography, were themselves in 
their infancy. Established theoretical principles were few, and their relevance 
to applied problems was largely unexplored. Nevertheless some of the applied 
problems of unsustainable practices in fisheries were already urgent, and the 
scientists of the day were seeking ways to use available information to address 
practical problems.
To illustrate, the early work that eventually led to concepts such as maxi-
mum sustainable yield (msy) came from empirical observations that as un-
exploited fish populations were reduced in abundance by a fishery, in many 
cases somatic growth rates increased, and recruitment to the fisheries at least 
did not decrease, and in some cases, such as many Pacific salmon, actually in-
creased. These empirical observations began to be systematized into concepts 
like optimal yield and surplus production by the 1930s. Scientists of the day 
did explore theoretical concepts like the Verhulst equation in applied contexts, 
but as efforts to find increasingly powerful mathematical expressions to cap-
ture patterns emerging from the empirical data available on how fish popula-
tions changed with exploitation. From the beginning, progress was captured 
in mathematical equations to represent patterns in the information available, 
facilitating the ability to apply case-specific advances in knowledge to much 
wider ranges of similar problems.
This did not mean the advances in fisheries science were incompatible with 
evolving fields of ecological, oceanographic, and economic theory. As concepts 
like carrying capacity and density dependence were elaborated in ecological 
theory, they enhanced the ability to explain why the empirically-based tools 
© Jake Rice, ���8 | doi:�0.��63/9789004380�7�_055
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that were being developed in applied fisheries science could be expected to 
work. The important point was that the developments in fisheries science were 
not derived from the theoretical ecological concepts, only subsequently to be 
applied to real-world problems. Practice used theory as it became available, 
but did not wait for theory to be developed before exploring the empirical evi-
dence as far as their creativity and experience allowed.
This pattern of a strong degree of empiricism has continued to characterize 
fisheries science. A powerful illustration is that increasingly strongly from the 
1970s through the 1990s, severe declines or collapses occurred in several high-
profile fisheries. In some cases, such as sardines and anchovies in the eastern 
Pacific and cod in the Northwest Atlantic, these were not the first times the 
stocks had shown large declines. However, after extension of jurisdiction and 
implementation of (for the time, cutting-edge) fisheries science as a basis for 
policy and management, another round of such declines, due to rapid drops in 
stock productivities, occurred unexpectedly. Policy and management wanted 
practical explanations for this new round of ‘fishery failures’, not additional 
theoretical concepts.
 Flexible Problem-Solving
The hunt for explanations converged on ecosystem- and decadal-scale changes 
in physical oceanographic conditions and impacts of ocean physics on marine 
productivity. The investigations were based primarily on empirical studies of 
patterns in the fisheries and oceanographic datasets. Oceanographic and ma-
rine food web theory was quick to catch up, but ideas of regime shifts emerged 
from the empirical studies, not the reverse. The theory did not come first, 
prompting empirical investigations that would not otherwise have happened.
This continued importance of empirical problem-solving approaches to 
fisheries science, using theory when available but not waiting for it, and in-
stead relying on information itself when theory is not yet available, has many 
consequences. Some consequences provide advantages for fisheries science, 
others may be limitations. Many of these advantages and limitations may actu-
ally be linked as co-benefits and trade-offs that characterize the science foun-
dations for fisheries policy and management. Seeing how these co-benefits 
and trade-offs interact can provide insights into where fisheries ‘science’ may 
be heading in the near future.
Perhaps of greatest value, by not being locked into any single theoretical 
framework, fisheries science has retained great flexibility. The challenges to 
fisheries sustainability can come from many sources—environmental changes 
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in ocean climate or in abundance of predators or prey, technology changes, 
expanding or cutting back on fisheries targeting other species in the same 
ecosystem, changes in markets or consumer patterns, and other sources. 
Regardless of how comprehensive a theoretical approach to fisheries science 
might be, challenges will arise that are outside the scope of the theory. An 
 empirically-based approach to fisheries science has no conceptual problem in 
simply shifting focus as needed to address new challenges as they arise (there 
may be other limitations, discussed below). Were fisheries science strongly 
constrained by any particular theory, addressing problems out of that scope 
could be either resisted or require a major retrenching of thinking.
 Limitations—Integration and Forecasting
The limitation of this great flexibility in the ability of fisheries science to shift 
focus as new applied problems arise is that there is no obvious pathway to inte-
grate new knowledge with currently established knowledge, as new things are 
learned. Integration is usually possible, but often ends up being approached 
in an ad hoc way because no single pathway for integration emerges in the 
absence of a coherent theoretical framework. This can result in inherent in-
compatibilities co-existing within the general science framework being used 
by fisheries policy and management. For example, a well-managed fishery on a 
species with a typical groundfish life-history reaches msy at about 40 percent 
of unexploited biomass (B0), whereas the International Union for Conservation 
of Nature (iucn) criteria for risk of extinction interpret a population reduced 
to 30 percent of its starting numbers in three generations as ‘threatened’;1 most 
assessments would have sufficient uncertainty that a 95 percent confidence in-
terval on biomass would be wide enough to include both values. These appar-
ent incompatibilities, due to different piece-wise theories, pose real challenges 
to policy and management of fisheries.
A second limitation of the lack of any comprehensive theory of fisheries 
science is that the ability to forecast is limited. When a single theory is applied 
to a fisheries science question, it is possible to develop predictive equations that 
can extrapolate the trajectories of the fish population as far into the future as 
the independent variable(s) in the equation can be forecast. This is occurring, 
for example, with predictions of future distributions and productivities of fish 




populations under various scenarios of climate change. Such forecasts can 
be highly valuable in planning adaptive strategies for fisheries in a changing 
climate.
The above limitation means that such predictions explicitly do not take 
into account the many other factors that affect fish population dynamics, 
because they are explicitly not part of the basis for these predictions. This 
has a  co-benefit that users of these forecasts can be readily informed of the 
limitations in the forecasts, and encouraged to consider them at best as partial 
answers to the policy questions of concern. The need to consider additional 
information in planning is obvious. Were the models used in forecasting 
presented as comprehensive and inclusive, policy-makers and management 
might be more vulnerable to pressures to treat the forecasts as predictive 
rather than illustrative.
On the other hand, keeping forecasting limited by primarily empirical rela-
tionships also limits the scope for forecasting in time and space. Empirically-
based predictions are inherently strongly influenced by the initial conditions, 
and within a biological generation or two, or a decade of ocean climate, the 
dynamics of these systems mean that initial conditions have low influence 
and users are looking at projections of previously projected values. Without 
theoretical constraints on projections, uncertainty is likely to escalate and be 
increasingly unhelpful to policy-makers.
 Co-Benefits—Use of Data and Knowledge Systems
An important aspect of the strong foundation of fisheries science in empiri-
cal approaches is that it highlights the dependence of progress on data quan-
tity and quality. Limitations of this dependence are obvious. Whether done 
through research surveys or monitoring of fisheries, collection of data at sea 
or in remote freshwater sites is demanding of human and financial resources. 
These costs are being reduced by technological advances, but similar techno-
logical advances are being made in other applied science fields as well, leaving 
fisheries science still a comparatively costly endeavor.
Countering those limitations, the fact that improved data for fisheries sci-
ence does get used to improve fisheries policy and management means that 
it is possible to show direct benefits flowing from investments in monitoring 
fisheries and the ocean environment. Monitoring is often an unpopular item 
in budgeting, so documenting the benefits can strengthen support. In addi-
tion, by relying on evidence from monitoring, science has strong incentives to 
watch for deviations in the data streams, and give early attention to changing 
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conditions. Complex and integrative theoretical models may buffer  unexpected 
trajectories of individual input data streams, and if the science inputs to policy 
and management are primarily from such models, the new information in the 
individual data streams may not receive timely attention.
Two of the points made in this essay combine to comprise possibly the great-
est strength of the empirical focus of science foundations for fisheries policy 
and management. When new problems emerge in a fishery—or long-standing 
problems rise in priority—the importance of the data streams to the capacity 
to advise on immediate and longer-term issues means that the adequacy of 
existing data streams to support advice gets scrutiny. In cases when it appears 
that existing data streams do not cover the new priority concern adequately, 
the lack of dominance of any single theoretical framework in fisheries science 
allows the science community to look very broadly at sources of information 
that can fill the voids.
This has allowed fisheries science to be receptive to other knowledge 
systems in cases when ‘science’ monitoring streams were not available to 
fill an advisory need. This broadening of the inclusion of the knowledge of 
local communities and Indigenous peoples with conventional science has 
not always been embraced quickly nor progressed smoothly. However, there 
have been significant advances, in some locations, to bring holders of local, 
Indigenous and/or community knowledge into science-based data collection 
systems. An example was Canada’s Atlantic Coast groundfish sentinel fisheries 
program, which brought together fishers’ knowledge and science following 
the cod fishery collapse. Successes in such syntheses of knowledge systems 
are accumulating quickly, and actually becoming a norm for many fisheries. 
Particularly when  accompanied by advances in co-management of the 
fisheries themselves, acknowledging the value of co-creation of knowledge for 
co-management is a logical step. The flexibility of the science foundations for 
policy and management has made these steps easier for both institutions and 
experts to take.
A final parallel benefit is also appearing in fisheries science. Just as the 
flexibility of a strongly empirical approach to fisheries science facilitated 
‘empirical’ being interpreted broadly as ‘knowledge-based’ rather than narrowly 
‘science-based’, the lack of any single dominant theoretical framework for 
fisheries science is facilitating an increasingly broad interpretation of ‘science’. 
If rigid theoretical frameworks were to be built, these would draw on established 
biological, physical, and chemical theory, with little scope to incorporate 
social sciences. This would accordingly impede placing fisheries policy and 
management into a full socio-ecological system. Instead, the flexibility of the 
science foundations are allowing bridges to be built between the ‘natural’ 
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and social sciences, making the foundations of policy and management both 
broader and stronger. Together these two pathways—broader use of the 
plurality of  knowledge systems and greater inclusiveness of social as well as 
natural sciences in support of policy and management—mean the best years 
for fisheries science may still lie ahead.
<UN>
Legitimacy and Effectiveness through Fisheries 
Co-Management
Evelyn Pinkerton
School of Resource and Environmental Management,  
Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada
 Introduction: Co-Management and Legitimacy  
in Oceans Governance
It is timely to consider the key importance of co-management institutional 
arrangements in successful fisheries management. Co-management is power-
sharing between government agencies charged with the responsibility of 
governing one or more natural resources and the place-based communities, 
organizations, or regions that are most affected by the agency’s decisions.1 Feit 
prefers to call such arrangements ‘co-governance’,2 but it can be useful to re-
serve this term for high levels of power-sharing in joint policy-making, while 
operational decisions such as how, when, and where to take actions are termed 
‘co-management’. Co-management and even co-governance often begins as 
an ‘incomplete’ arrangement in which the scope and geographic scale of the 
power of the non-government party is fairly limited.3 Although such arrange-
ments often evolve, it is seldom to the point of joint policy-making. Authentic 
co-governance is usually driven by court decisions or unique policy situations.
Legitimacy is essential in fisheries co-management. Both the legitimacy 
of senior governments and the legitimacy of local authorities who are work-
ing with these senior governments are important. Although it is desirable to 
have both types of legitimacy, local legitimacy is indispensable and can make 
a system work, even if senior government legitimacy is lacking. There is high 
1 E. Pinkerton, “Attaining Better Fisheries Management Through Co-Management: Prospects, 
Problems, and Propositions,” in Co-operative Management of Local Fisheries: New Directions 
for Improved Management and Community Development, ed. E. Pinkerton (Vancouver: Uni-
versity of British Columbia Press, 1989), 3–33.
2 H. Feit, “Re-cognizing Co-management as Co-governance: Visions and Histories of Conserva-
tion at James Bay,” Anthropologica 47, no. 2 (2005): 267–288.
3 E. Pinkerton, “Toward Specificity in Complexity: Understanding Co-management from a 
Social Science Perspective,” in The Fisheries Co-Management Experience: Accomplishments, 
Challenges and Prospects, eds., D.C. Wilson, J. Raakjaer Nielsen and P. Degnbol (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 2003), 61–77.
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 agreement among social scientists that legitimacy plays a major role in compli-
ance with regulations, so management is problematical if legitimacy is lacking 
at both levels.
This essay focuses particularly on the importance of establishing legitima-
cy through including local Indigenous voices in management decisions. The 
value of legitimacy is currently under-appreciated because of an increasing 
emphasis on efficiency and neoliberal values related to reducing the role of 
government and relying on the market to achieve desirable outcomes.
 A Legitimate Co-Management System
Legitimacy in fisheries management is examined here through a fishery ex-
ample in British Columbia, on the Pacific coast of Canada. In this region, the 
federal government and its Department of Fisheries and Oceans (dfo) faces 
the problem of conflicting demands on fisheries access from sport, commer-
cial, and Indigenous parties, as well as from sub-divisions of all of these. In 
addition, dfo has suffered progressive budget cuts and lacks the capacity to 
monitor and enforce its regulations, especially in the many rural areas where 
dfo presence might exist for only a few days a year. Therefore, incentives ex-
ist to co-manage with local organizations, but there is little guidance for dfo 
regarding how and when to work with local parties.
This essay considers key components of what that guidance might look like 
if social scientists were consulted, using an example from the West Coast of 
Vancouver Island where I have worked with Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
communities since the late 1980s. Kyuquot Sound/Checkleseht Bay (Area 26), 
on the northwest coast of Vancouver Island (Canada), is one of the traditional 
territories that are home to 14 Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations. The essay fo-
cuses on the components of a legitimate clam co-management system in this 
location.4
Prior to establishment of the system, the initial situation could be called a 
worst-case scenario because of the complete lack of local regulations or re-
spect for dfo regulation. The Indigenous community of Kyuquot-Checkleseht 
(KC) hated dfo because they interpreted dfo’s actions since state regulation 
of fisheries began as evidence that the agency was deliberately trying to hurt 
them, and that its regulations had nothing to do with conserving fish. This 
4 E. Pinkerton and L. John, “Creating Local Management Legitimacy: Building a Local System 




 interpretation was partially a response to government policies and actions that 
had marginalized the community and resulted in the loss of virtually all their 
finfish licenses, and partially awareness that government regulations were not 
based on local knowledge. Thus, when the area was closed to clam fishing be-
cause of government belief or precaution that there was paralytic shellfish poi-
son or fecal coliform in the area, residents ate the clams, did not get sick, and 
considered government regulations ill-founded.
But over a 20-year period of 1986–2006, a community member who became 
the KC Fisheries (kcf) manager, Leonard John, built a local management and 
co-management system that was based on scientific, regulatory, political, and 
moral legitimacy. The process and its components are summarized below.
(a) Scientific legitimacy was first built through volunteer community par-
ticipation in clam stock assessment led by a fisheries biologist from 
the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council and later by John. Because the 
community had seen local clam stocks overfished by diggers from the 
entire west coast of Vancouver Island and then closed, they understood 
the importance of stocks rebuilding sufficiently to sustain a harvest.
(b) Regulatory legitimacy was achieved because John enforced the regu-
lations that diggers hold a valid commercial license, dig only during a 
commercial harvest opening, not dig on beaches that were closed due to 
water quality concerns, and deliver real and legal-size clams to buyers. 
If government closures of supposedly contaminated beaches were not 
enforced, the entire area might be closed, so diggers recognized that it 
was in their self-interest to follow government regulations and have an 
orderly fishery and credibility with buyers.
(c) Political legitimacy was gained when kcf was perceived as being able to 
act effectively and decisively as a local authority that could protect com-
munity fishing rights when dfo questioned the boundary of an open 
area, and when John applied for clam licenses for community members 
who had missed the deadline. The political legitimacy it gained by these 
actions put John in a stronger position to assert regulatory authority.
(d) Regulatory capacity was built when dfo created the communal license, 
allowing KC as a successful applicant community to exclude outsiders 
and regulate its own members’ activities. kcf’s community meetings to 
make and revise access and other rules were well attended; rules were 
revised annually and attendees were required to sign a paper that they 
had attended and agreed to these rules, and could lose their license if 
they broke them. Offenders were warned privately and respectfully over 
coffee that they could not repeat the offence and were given a chance to 
indicate their acceptance of this privately, but lost their license and were 
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publicly shamed if they did not. The respectful manner in which rules 
were thus enforced was consistent with traditional local values.
(e) Moral legitimacy was gained because local regulation was open, ac-
countable, democratic, and consistent with the values of the community. 
Management systems based on moral authority perform at a much higher 
level than those run on legal, political, scientific, or regulatory authority 
alone. The local management system met a number of criteria for 
moral legitimacy that are broadly accepted by social scientists: (1) there 
were objective standards in the system; (2) the standards were visible, 
transparent, and culturally appropriate; (3) the outcomes were effective 
and perceived as fair; and (4) the use of natural science in the context of a 
co-operative and highly communicative relationship played a key role in 
legitimacy creation.
Public trust in local resource management because of moral authority resulted 
in a virtuous cycle of further growth of scientific and regulatory authority. 
Economist Samuel Bowles, remembering the importance that economist 
Adam Smith accorded to ‘moral sentiments’, has made the case that well-
designed laws and public policies can harness self-interest for the common 
good only if they do so by appealing to these moral sentiments.5 His study 
showed that incentives that appeal to self-interest are likely to fail when they 
undermine the moral values that lead people to act in other-regarding or 
public-spirited ways.
This highly legitimate local management system was also a co-management 
system because it depended on dfo regulations to legitimize local enforcement 
of the exclusion of outsiders from beaches with communal licenses and also 
to regulate local license use. There were also some management activities 
that senior government agencies required local managers to perform, such as 
water quality testing delegated by Environment Canada (now Environment 
and Climate Change Canada) and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 
or stock assessment surveys that had to be reported to dfo. The existence 
of a competent and legitimate local manager raised the confidence level of 
government agencies that these activities were being carried out effectively.
This local system also benefited from favorable conditions in the clam 
resource and in the community. Clams are more easily monitored than many 
other species because they are non-mobile and located on a limited number 
of known beaches with specific clear boundaries where diggers are highly 
 visible because they require a boat to get to a beach. The community is small, 
5 S. Bowles, “Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May Undermine ‘The Moral 




remote, and culturally cohesive with high rates of seasonal unemployment, 
high dependence on clams for employment, and hold clams in high regard 
as a culturally important resource. These conditions make monitoring and 
management in general easier, and a more feasible foundation upon which to 
build legitimate management and co-management.
 Conclusion
A local management system based on the scientific, regulatory, political, and 
moral components described above can be highly effective, and certainly far 
more effective than a government system working alone. Senior governments 
do not have the capacity to enforce their regulations, or often even to devise 
ones that could work in areas they cannot regularly monitor. In such situa-
tions, government acceptance of and support of local management should be 
based on an awareness that the alternative is, without a local authority, sub-
stantial poaching and overexploitation, the situation that existed before the 
KC local authority developed effective local management. Local authority, 
which contained the appropriate components, demonstrated effectiveness in 
making and implementing its own regulations as well as those of government 
agencies; it kept the system functional, orderly, and acceptable to government 
agencies so that closures were not threatened.
The KC situation benefited from the existence of a highly experienced se-
nior dfo clam manager whose headquarters were located on the east coast of 
Vancouver Island, and who was willing to work with a highly competent local 
manager as the situation evolved into one in which local management could 
be fully developed. Since this situation also benefited from favorable condi-
tions in the nature of the community and the clam resource, which cannot 
always be guaranteed, government managers should be aware of the need for 
a social scientist to assist in the recognition of necessary elements for effective 
co-management. A social scientist would be able to identify missing elements 
and the need for specific kinds of support to allow a potentially effective situa-
tion to become fully operational. Evaluations could be made about which situ-
ations offered the most promise and were worth considerable time investment 
or monetary support. Situations that lacked any of the scientific, regulatory, 
political, and moral components could be addressed with specific attention 
to those components. Building on favorable conditions in the government 
agency, in the clam resource, and in the community, plus the elements of a 
highly legitimate system, would give co-management initiatives a good chance 
of success.
<UN>
Turning Aspiration to Action: Challenges of Making 
the Ecosystem Approach Operational in Fisheries
Mark Dickey-Collas
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea,  
Copenhagen, Denmark
 Introduction
Fisheries are a major impactor on the marine system and also a major provider 
of wealth, security, identity, and food to humanity. At its core, the ecosystem 
approach acknowledges that these two axes (impact and services) need to 
be reconciled. This should be done through informed management that ex­
plores the space between these axes in an equitable manner following what 
have been described as ‘fuzzy’ principles.1 The ecosystem approach to fisheries 
management is an accepted societal objective.2 Many around the world are 
working to make this aspiration a reality through iterative steps; an evolution 
of ideas, processes, and structures. These steps have highlighted challenges 
and some of these are explored here.
Many natural scientists see ecosystem based management as a rationale 
to demand more resources for their science. The idea that more knowledge 
automatically means better management is prevalent, ‘we just need to know 
more to manage better’. In the fisheries realm this seems to be about know­
ing more about energy flow and trophic interactions. The problem is that an 
understanding of the entire fisheries system is an afterthought.  Policy develop­
ment, institutional change, and reconciling economic and social objectives in 
an equitable manner all require something different than just more knowl­
edge of whom eats whom. This is clear from the principles of the ecosystem 
approach described by the Convention on Biological Diversity and the advice 
on operational implementation in fisheries by the Fisheries and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations.
1 S.M. Garcia and K.L. Cochrane, “Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries: A Review of Implemen­
tation Guidelines,” ices Journal of Marine Science 62 (2005): 311–318.
2 K.J. Sainsbury, P. Gullestad and J. Rice, “Design of Operational Management Strategies for 
Achieving Fishery Ecosystem Objectives,” ices Journal of Marine Science 57 (2000): 731–741; 
J. Rice, “Evolution of International Commitments for Fisheries Sustainability,” ices Journal of 
Marine Science 71 (2014): 157–165.
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But are we developing a fisheries system that can deliver these principles by 
adjusting existing management and governance structures to achieve the eco­
system approach? An analysis of the European Union (EU) fisheries manage­
ment system found an institutional gap between fisheries and environ mental 
policy frameworks.3 This gap results in limited integration of broader environ­
mental concerns leading to a standoff between decision­makers, creating frus­
tration for the involved agencies. When executing ecosystem based fisheries 
management, some of the anthropogenic pressures from fishing may not be 
managed by the fisheries agencies, and conversely the consequences for the 
environment of fishing may fall under the remit of non­fisheries agencies. The 
need for co­ordination in management and governance structures is clear.
Further, policy developers and regional managers are generally reluctant to 
acknowledge the need to reconcile multiple objectives across multiple interests,4 
as found in a range of local, national, and regional legislation. An example is 
the ‘horrendogram’ of United Kingdom marine legislation.5  Implications of 
this for implementing the ecosystem approach arise in terms of the tools to 
inform management, including management strategy evaluations, trade­off 
tools, and decision­support tools. In many of these, there is an underlying as­
sumption of a central decision­making body, or event, where independently 
derived evidence can be weighed up and consequences explored, leading to 
an agreed prioritization of management objectives. In reality, though, many 
knowledge brokers are unaware of the dynamics in governance frameworks 
and are not ready for the diplomatic role of working with agencies with their 
own differing power, objectives, and rationales. There is an assumption by tool 
developers that the governance system likes making decisions, that the deci­
sion­making process is linear, and consensus building is part of the knowledge 
provision process.
A further challenge in implementing the ecosystem approach lies in the 
inertia of many existing fisheries management frameworks. They use quantita­
tive engineered evidence for decision­making, applying decision frameworks 
3 P. Ramírez­Monsalve et al., “Institutional Challenges for Policy­making and Fisheries Advice 
to Move to a Full eafm Approach Within the Current Governance Structures for Marine Poli­
cies,” Marine Policy 69 (2016): 1–12.
4 R.L. Stephenson et al. “Practical Steps toward Integrating Economic, Social and Institutional 
Elements in Fisheries Policy and Management,” ices Journal of Marine Science 74 (2017): 
1981–1989; A. Rindorf et al., “Moving beyond the msy Concept to Reflect Multidimensional 
Fisheries Management Objectives,” Marine Policy 85 (2017): 33–41.
5 S.J. Boyes and M. Elliott, “Marine Legislation—The Ultimate ‘Horrendogram’: International 




and risk thresholds, with the consequences of actions explored in relation to 
targets or limits. Ecosystem based fisheries management, representing the 
convergence of resource exploitation and conservation policies,6 challenges 
this well­oiled machine. In considering socio­ecological trade­offs, often a 
clear decision framework with targets and limits is yet to be established, and 
options with likely consequences are explored in a less structured manner. 
Practitioners in this system, building on the integrated ecosystem assess­
ment cycles, acknowledge the need for participatory tool development to 
inform management, for an iterative and consultative process, and for moni­
toring and adaption.7 This challenges the roles played by actors in the system 
with demands to maintain saliency, credibility, and legitimacy in an evolving 
framework.8
Faced with the above set of challenges, where are we now in terms of turning 
aspiration into action? If we take three issues—maintaining biodiversity, pro­
vision of knowledge, and reference points (approaches to optimize catch)— 
are management systems delivering?
 Biodiversity
In considering biodiversity, both in terms of habitat and species, management 
plans tend to be as a result of local concerns (with the exception of the Com­
mission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources), resulting 
in few generic frameworks for fisheries management plans that account for 
biodiversity. Certainly, fishing at traditional maximum sustainable yield (msy) 
will not deliver objectives in terms of securing biodiversity.9 There are good ex­
amples in some locations, such as successful local and fleet­based approaches 
in Australia, and the use of a cap on total removals of fish, as an ecosystem 
conservation method, as in Alaska.
However, while many systems around the world manage through impacts 
on assessed fish stocks, experience shows us that biodiversity concerns are 
6 J. Rice and P. Mace, “Bio­ecological Dimensions of Fisheries Management, Biodiversity and 
Governance,” in Governance of Marine Fisheries and Biodiversity Conservation: Interaction 
and Coevolution, eds., S.M. Garcia, J. Rice and A. Charles (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 
2014), 55–67.
7 M. Dickey­Collas, “Why the Complex Nature of Integrated Ecosystem Assessments Requires 
a Flexible and Adaptive Approach,” ices Journal of Marine Science 71 (2014): 1174–1182.
8 C. Röckmann et al., “The Interaction Triangle as a Tool for Understanding Stakeholder Inter­
actions in Marine Ecosystem Based Management,” Marine Policy 52 (2015): 155–162.
9 B. Worm et al., “Rebuilding Global Fisheries,” Science 325, no. 5940 (2009): 578–585.
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often related to specific fleets or gears, rather than impacts on stocks. Yet, 
in the EU, where some types of gear are associated with fleets from specific 
countries (e.g., demersal and pelagic fisheries in the Baltic Sea, beam trawling 
in the North Sea), the idea of differentially managing gear types or fleets 
would suggest preferential treatment of certain countries, and also challenge 
relative stability (the system of allotting catch shares between member states 
of the EU).
In the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization and North East Atlantic 
Fisheries Commission (neafc) areas of the North Atlantic, we see an evi­
dence­based approach to spatially define and conserve vulnerable marine 
ecosystems (vmes) from fishing impact that is transparent and accepted by 
stakeholders. The neafc vmes provide a rare example of fisheries and envi­
ronment agencies working together as they have been established in partner­
ship with the ospar Commission to protect the environment of the North­East 
Atlantic. The European Commission recently asked the International Council 
for the Exploration of the Sea to examine the trade­offs between benthic im­
pact of fishing gear with weight and value of the catch,10 which occurred with 
stakeholder engagement and consultation with regional sea environmental 
conventions.
 Knowledge
The knowledge being used in fisheries management is also changing. Concerns 
about the impact of fishing on food web dynamics and bycatch of sensitive 
species has hit the headlines in locations such as Australia, South Africa, the 
Americas, and Europe, which has led to questions about the social license of 
fisheries to operate. It has also led to a great improvement in the quantity and 
quality of the science being made available to decision­makers. While that 
improvement in the credible knowledge base has not necessarily resulted in 
an informed decision process, it has improved the awareness of knowledge 
brokers of the arena into which their evidence flows. This is accompanied by 
the realization that feelings and lobbying are as powerful a tool in fisheries 
management as the science, and despite best efforts, the lobbying and science 
often become intertwined.
10 International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, “EU request on indicators of the 
pressure and impact of bottom­contacting fishing gear on the seabed, and of trade­offs 




There is also momentum to increase the knowledge base using traditional 
knowledge, fishers’ knowledge, or citizen science. Local and regional initia­
tives have illustrated the value of a range of approaches. The boundaries of 
what is credible information are changing. Knowledge brokers, however, need 
to ensure credibility of knowledge provision emphasizing that all actors act re­
sponsibly and in good faith. They should not be naïve to the influence of inter­
est or the need to show the data trails leading to transparent decision­making.
 Reference Points
The nature of msy is also changing. Starting as a tool for United States’ foreign 
policy,11 it has encountered difficulties. While driving necessary reductions 
in fishing mortality around the world, the idea that biomasses can be fixed 
independently and managed on an individual stock­by­stock basis has been 
discredited.12 The need for variable reference points that respond to environ­
mental variability is widely recognized. Likewise a recognition that not all fish 
stocks can be fished at msy simultaneously due to species interactions and 
mixed targeting by fleets has led to the concept of ‘pretty good yield’, where 
yield can be forfeited to ensure that more stocks are fished closer to msy than 
previously.13 This concept is now at the center of the EU multi­annual plans for 
the Baltic and North Seas.
In Europe, msy is being further adapted, with target fishing mortality (Fmsy) 
now being assessed for impact on biomass; the Fmsy reference points include 
consideration of preventing biomass falling below limit reference points. In 
the future, the discussions about evolutionary effects of fishing, size of fish in 
populations, and balanced harvesting are likely to have consequences for fish­
ing targets.
11 B. Mesnil, “The Hesitant Emergence of Maximum Sustainable Yield (msy) in Fisheries 
Policies in Europe,” Marine Policy 36 (2012): 473–480.
12 National Research Council, Committee on Evaluating the Effectiveness of Stock Rebuild­
ing Plans of the 2008 Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization, Evaluat-
ing the Effectiveness of Fish Stock Rebuilding Plans in the United States (Washington, DC: 
National Academies Press, 2014).
13 A. Rindorf et al., “Food for Thought: Pretty Good Multispecies Yield,” ices Journal of Ma-
rine Science 74 (2017): 475–486.
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 Summary
In summary, despite not all the developments being labeled as the ecosystem 
approach to fisheries management, the aspiration is turning into action, and 
beginning to deliver. Fisheries management approaches need to incorporate 
fleet management in addition to stock­focused approaches as it is the way that 
fisheries operate that determines their impact on the ecosystem. Actors across 
the system also need to appreciate that multiple objectives and interests need 
to be reconciled. The dominance of the biology focus in fisheries needs to be 
tempered to address community, institutional, and governance challenges. 
The evidence base should encompass multiple forms of available knowledge, 
and the operational gap between fisheries and environmental policy frame­
works needs to be addressed.
<UN>
What Is the Role of the Market in Contemporary 
Fisheries Governance?
Megan Bailey*
Marine Affairs Program, Dalhousie University,  
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
With the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the declaration 
of extended jurisdiction, the nation state became the main focus of fisheries 
management interventions, and subsequent critiques, in the 1980s and 1990s. 
But it wasn’t long before practitioners and scholars turned their attention to the 
role of the market in governing fisheries practices. Using the market is part of 
a larger business-led approach to sustainability: corporate social responsibility 
(csr). csr is dynamic and relational, in that it is continually redefined based 
on the relationship between business and society, and the role and responsi-
bility that society chooses to place on businesses in pursuit of environmental 
and social justice.1 This means that the market and what is sustainable seafood 
are always changing. The theory of change here is that by providing a market 
signal, for example a price premium for a certified product, fish harvesters and 
seafood processors will be incentivized to voluntarily alter their production 
practices to comply with that certification. We now have about thirty years 
of experience trying to operationalize market-based governance through the 
sustainable seafood movement. What and how have we done? What is likely to 
be the role of the market in contemporary fisheries management?
The sustainable seafood movement began with the launch of Earth Island 
Institute’s Dolphin Safe certification as a response to high levels of dolphin 
mortality in the eastern Pacific Ocean tuna purse seine fishery. The Dolphin 
Safe logo communicated to consumers that their canned tuna was not sourced 
from a fishery that set nets on dolphins. The impact was huge. Dolphin mor-
talities dropped by about 98 percent, but in recent years the credibility of the 
1 M. Bailey et al., “The Role of csr in Creating a Seussian Approach to Seafood Sustainability,” 
Fish and Fisheries (2018) 00:1–9 https://doi.org/10.1111/faf.12289.
* I would like to thank a number of colleagues for great conversations and insight related to 
many of the points raised in this essay: John Burton, Simon Bush, Eric Enno Tamm, Keith 
Flett, Jennifer Jacquet, Fred Le Manach, Alice Miller, Helen Packer, Laurenne Schiller, 
 Michèle Stark, Josh Stoll, and Michael Tlusty.
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certification has been called into question,2 and in the intervening years, other 
standards, recommendations, and certifications have followed. In 1997, Unile-
ver and the World Wildlife Fund for Nature joined forces to create the Marine 
Stewardship Council (msc), which today is by far the most pervasive capture 
fisheries certification and eco-label in the world.
The msc is based on three ecological principles with the first pertaining 
to the target fish stock, the second pertaining to ecosystems, non-target spe-
cies, and habitats, and the third pertaining to fisheries management and gov-
ernance systems. About 12 percent of global wild capture fisheries production 
is currently msc-certified. When the msc’s self-declared ‘best environmental 
choice’ slogan became recognizable to major retailers in Europe and the United 
States, environmental non-governmental organizations (engos) campaigned 
hard to influence retailers to make sourcing commitments. In 2010, Walmart 
famously committed to sourcing only msc seafood by 2015, but demand far 
outstripped supply, and commitment dates came and went. To increase the 
supply of ‘sustainable seafood’, two major things happened. The first was that 
Monterey Bay’s Seafood Watch Program changed their categorization of yel-
low seafood from ‘avoid’ to ‘good alternative’, freeing up a plethora of fish and 
seafood that could now be argued to be sustainable. Second, fisheries improve-
ment projects (fips) became normalized. Fisheries that cannot meet the msc 
standard, but are committed to improving production practices toward sus-
tainability, can become recognized as a fip, again freeing up more supply of 
‘sustainable’ products. For example, Walmart has now committed that by 2025 
they will source all of their fish and seafood from certified fisheries or from 
improvement projects.3
The sustainable seafood movement has by and large not facilitated large-
scale transformational changes for myriad reasons, including its lack of 
accessibility to developing world fisheries, questionable credibility, corporate 
agendas, and an exclusively ecological focus. Central to all of the criticisms 
and challenges is the assertion that certifications like the msc have not led 
to continual improvement, in part because they have only created a market 
for sustainable fish and not sustainable fisheries.4 I argue that coercion, 
commodification, and conformity are three central issues to the permanency 
2 A.M.M. Miller and S.R. Bush, “Authority Without Credibility? Competition and Conflict 
between Ecolabels in Tuna Fisheries,” Journal of Cleaner Production (2014): doi:10.1016/j.
jclepro.2014.02.047.
3 See “Walmart Policies and Guidelines, Seafood Policy,” Walmart, https://corporate.walmart 
.com/policies.
4 M.F. Tlusty and Ø. Thorsen, “Claiming Seafood is ‘Sustainable’ Risks Limiting Improvements,” 
Fish and Fisheries (2016): doi:10.1111/faf.12170; S. Ponte, “The Marine Stewardship Council 
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of the continual improvement challenge, and thus are major barriers to achiev-
ing seafood sustainability.
The entire raison d’être for market-based governance, and csr more broad-
ly, is that it is supposed to be voluntary. It goes above and beyond regulation 
to allow a business to choose to do more. Fishing businesses and fish harvest-
ers are supposed to be incentivized (or ‘nudged’ as 2017 Nobel Prize winner in 
economics, Robert Thaler, calls it) into adopting market-based approaches. Yet 
increasingly, we hear talk of fish harvesters being bullied into applying for msc 
certification, being blindly led into the assessment process by downstream ac-
tors, or ultimately coerced into it by buyers who demand that they become 
certified in order to remain a client.5 This immediately taints the transforma-
tive potential of a voluntary program. Second, the sustainability attribute has 
been commodified, and only becomes a business goal if there is market value 
attached to it. This links sustainability to profit, and brings about questions 
about the extent to which csr more broadly should be marketized,6 and the 
role that we afford corporations in defining sustainability. Third, consumers 
are offered an overwhelming quantity of labels and certifications on food 
products generally, but in seafood, these choices actually all conform to one 
sustainability norm, ecological sustainability, ignoring other issues.
To move away from coercion, commodification, and conformity we have 
to prioritize provenance, pre-competitiveness, and people in our pursuit of 
seafood sustainability. The next generation of market-based tools needs to 
encourage and allow fish harvesters to be part of the process of developing 
place-based sustainability criteria, and of designing market-based incentives 
that actually bring benefit to their operation. Second, there is talk of mov-
ing sustainability away from a commoditized attribute, i.e., something that is 
bought and sold on the market. Instead, groups like Sea Pact,7 an amalgama-
tion of mid-supply chain seafood companies, are postulating that sustainabil-
ity should be pre-competitive, something that you don’t try to use to one-up 
your competitors. And finally, a conversation about what sustainability really 
means needs to be forthcoming. While we must recognize the boundaries of 
our ecological system, so too must we recognize human rights, and make sure 
we operate in a space where the needs and rights of fish harvesters and others 
(msc) and the Making of a Market for ‘Sustainable Fish’,” Journal of Agrarian Change 12 
(2012): 300–315.
5 Personal communication with fish harvesters in Alaska, fishing associations in Canada, and 
with processors and traders in Indonesia.
6 H. Packer et al., “Corporate Social Responsibility in the Seafood Industry: A Review of the Top 
150 Grossing Companies and Outlook on Future Research,” Fish and Fisheries (In press).
7 See Sea Pact website, http://www.seapact.org/.
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operating in seafood supply chains are respected. For decades, students have 
been told that fisheries management is not about managing fish, but about 
managing people. Let us then put people back into it, by focusing on market-
based tools that ensure fishing as a livelihood opportunity is maintained and 
is safe.
So what does the next generation of market-based approaches look like? 
Seafood provenance, seafood transparency, and socially-responsible fish are 
good places to start. In Alaska, the salmon fishery went through extensive 
consultation regarding recertification, with industry asserting that the brand 
‘Alaskan salmon’ with or without the msc should be good enough. The same 
conversation has been happening in Iceland, and even in Nova Scotia, Canada, 
where the province is starting to brand itself as a source for high quality sea-
food.8 Focusing on provenance, i.e., where the seafood is coming from, could 
help to facilitate participation by fish harvesters and companies themselves. 
In promoting all fish from a certain place, the benefits of sustainability may 
be shared by all producing in that locale, not just those who have signed up 
for a private certification, meaning coercion toward certifications would not 
be needed.
An issue with provenance becomes verification: How do you know your fish 
comes from Nova Scotia? This leads us to our second interesting trend: the 
move towards transparency. Seafood traceability is a current buzzword in sea-
food sustainability, but traceability is only a tool to verify claims made. It is not 
information, but a system to help information flow.9 So my suggestion is that 
it should not be sustainability that is the tradeable attribute, but rather infor-
mation or transparency. No matter what you are doing, whether it is sustain-
able or not, you should be rewarded for credibly informing the market about 
your practices. By committing to transparency, companies can support a race 
to the top where all production practices, ecological, social, etc., are communi-
cated.10 The market then moves away from demanding verification of certain 
sustainability attributes, getting away from sustainability as a tradeable com-
modity, to demanding and rewarding transparency more broadly.
Finally, the development of socially responsible fisheries, like that opera-
tionalized through Fair Trade usa, Naturland, and the Responsible Fishing 
Scheme, is an interesting evolution in certifications. It will likely face the same 
8 See Iceland Sustainable Fisheries website, http://www.icelandsustainable.is and Nova 
Scotia Seafood, https://nsseafood.com.
9 M. Bailey et al., “The Role of Traceability in Transforming Seafood Governance in the 
Global South,” Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 18 (2016): 25–32.




challenges that the msc has in terms of ensuring it is used where it is needed 
most, and not just where good things are already happening. Additionally, it 
faces the challenge of trying to use the market to address the very issues of in-
equity that the market has brought to bear on fisheries producers in the global 
South. But these certifications move us away from conforming to one sustain-
ability norm, and rather focus on people as much, if not more than, the eco-
logical basis of sustainability. Additionally, it has the benefit of aligning better 
with the guidelines of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations for securing small-scale fisheries.11
The sustainable seafood movement has certainly brought to light less than 
ideal fisheries practices, and has worked to reward those whose practices are 
considered sustainable, at least sustainable by some standards. Some of the 
potential ideas reviewed here may help us to do a bit better, but what is becom-
ing increasingly clear is that the market on its own cannot save our seas or our 
seafood. By trying to work at the business or company level, the sustainable 
seafood movement has forgotten where fisheries governance all started: the 
nation state. Sustainability issues in seafood value chains may have more to do 
with the country of origin than any one company or one product type. If we 
do not try to improve the capabilities of all countries to internally govern their 
fisheries production practices towards sustainability, we will remain in an era 
of transactional, not transformational, change. The markets and certifications 
are no replacement for good state governance, and assuming so risks ignoring 
the entire cultural politics of the sustainable seafood movement.12 The role 
of the market in contemporary fisheries governance then needs to address 
its challenges of coercion, commodification, and constriction, by prioritizing 
provenance, pre-competitiveness, and people in accordance with larger inter-
national and national frameworks.
11 M. Borland and M. Bailey, “A Tale of Two Standards: A Case Study of the Fair Trade 
Certified Maluku Handline Caught Tuna (Thunnus albacares) Fishery,” Marine Policy 
(forthcoming).
12 L.H. Gulbrandsen, “The Emergence and Effectiveness of the Marine Stewardship Coun-
cil,” Marine Policy 33 (2009): 654–660; P.A. Shelton, “Eco-certification of Sustainably Man-
aged Fisheries: Redundancy or Synergy?,” Fisheries Research 100 (2009): 185–190; J.J. Silver 
and R. Hawkins, “‘I’m Not Trying to Save Fish, I’m Trying to Save Dinner’: Media, Celeb-
rity and Sustainable Seafood as a Solution to Environmental Limits,” Geoforum 84 (2017): 
218–227.
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 The Importance of Small-Scale Fisheries
According to some estimates,1 small-scale fisheries constitute at least one-
quarter of the world’s catches. When considering the number of people 
employed in fisheries, more than 90 percent of approximately 120 million 
people, including men and women in the South as well as in the North, in-
volved in full-time and part-time harvest and post-harvest activities, are as-
sociated with small-scale fisheries.2 Unlike large-scale fisheries, where a large 
portion of catches goes into reduction (e.g., for fishmeal production) and for 
non-consumptive uses, about 95 percent of small-scale fisheries catches are 
destined for human consumption. Thus, small-scale fisheries contribute sig-
nificantly to global and local food security, employment both directly and 
indirectly related to fisheries, and to viable livelihoods. The importance of 
small-scale fisheries extends to culture and heritage, and in many instanc-
es, they offer a way of life to many people besides employment. Small-scale 
fisheries values include, among other things, community cohesion, social 
safety net, and resource stewardship.3 A recent trend in many places around 
the world is for small-scale fisheries to offer education and recreational op-
portunities for the general public as they visit fishing villages and enjoy the 
experience of being in fishing communities and eating locally caught fish. 
Because not all of the diverse values of small-scale fisheries are quantifiable, 
they are often underappreciated and easily dismissed, which could lead to 
eroding of communities and social safety net.
1 See the Sea Around Us Project website, http://seaaroundus.org.
2 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (fao), Voluntary Guidelines for Se-
curing Sustainable Small-scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication 
(Rome: fao, 2015).
3 D. Johnson, “The values of small-scale fisheries,” in Social Wellbeing and the Values of Small-
scale Fisheries, eds., D. Johnson, T.G. Acott, N. Stacey and J. Urquhart (Switzerland: Springer, 
2018).
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In effect, small-scale fisheries are not just about the sector, but a system 
of interlinked activities and interdependent relationships, which provide 
diversity, stability, and flexibility for the communities in which they are em-
bedded. The linkage goes both ways. Maintaining communities also provides 
an essential condition for small-scale fisheries to function and prosper. This 
is also important for sustaining the values and norms on which stewardship 
rests, and which makes it possible for communities to manage fisheries with-
out external inputs from central governments or environmental organizations. 
When the moral fabric of communities dissolves, unsustainable fishing prac-
tices may occur and conflicts arise, and the collective action of communities is 
undermined. For communities to thrive through sustainable fisheries, trustful 
relationships must exist among small-scale fishers and other members of the 
communities whose contributions also count.
Some small-scale fishing communities follow a ‘sufficiency principle’ rather 
than a capitalistic logic of profit accumulation, thus expressing their aware-
ness about the need to protect resources for the future. However, for many 
small-scale fisheries, having open access to fisheries resources and engaging 
in informal and unregulated employment provide people with a crucial safety 
valve. Neither of these should be seen only in negative terms, as something 
undesirable and that we should get rid of. In fact, they suggest that a blan-
ket approach to control capacity in small-scale fisheries is not attuned to their 
characteristics and the diversified local situations. Rather than seeing fishing 
as an act of greed in the former case or as an illegal activity in the latter, small-
scale fisheries operate according to the need for people to survive in situations 
where their livelihoods and food security are at stake. After all, one should 
keep in mind that pressure on resources is not all of their doing, but comes 
mostly from the uncontrolled development of industrialized fisheries around 
the world. If there is overfishing by numbers, closing the fisheries or reducing 
access may be necessary. But it should not be the first step. Many things can be 
done to curb overall fishing effort, such as re-distributing resources from large-
scale to small-scale, which will not affect food security. Such a decision also 
aligns with the subsidiarity principle, which suggests that the people closest to 
the resources should be the one exploiting them.4
Despite their impressive contribution and importance, small-scale fisheries 
are often in marginalized and disadvantaged situations. The conditions un-
der which they are working are not always favorable to sustain their overall 
4 M. Bavinck and S. Jentoft, “Subsidiarity as a Guiding Principle for Small-scale Fisheries,” in 
World Small-Scale Fisheries: Contemporary Visions, ed., R. Chuenpagdee (Delft: Eburon Aca-
demic Publishing, 2011), 311–322.
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position within the value chain. For the most part, small-scale fishing people 
face issues with insecure access to resources and their tenure rights are not rec-
ognized. As a consequence, they are displaced from their workplace, both on 
land and at sea. They are, in many cases, simply not able to ‘defend the beach’. 
Small-scale fisheries are also vulnerable to environmental change and other 
large-scale processes that affect their socio-economic conditions. They usually 
have little capital investment and assets that can help them in times of crisis. 
Moreover, they are often victims of unfair competition with industrial fisher-
ies, in terms of supply chain and markets, and are often taken advantage of by 
moneylenders and traders who control prices.
From the governance perspective, small-scale fisheries are not only ignored 
in policy-making, but also have to bear the consequences of erroneous rules 
and regulations that discriminate against them in a way that makes their de-
mise a self-fulfilling prophecy. In other words, if small-scale fisheries are con-
sidered by policy-makers to be a lost cause to begin with, e.g., they are a weight 
on society rather than an untapped possibility, the policies are likely to keep 
them in a situation for which they cannot thrive. An example of this can be 
found in the way subsidies are allocated within fisheries, which shows that as 
much as 84 percent of total fisheries subsidies (about US$35 billion in 20095) 
goes to large-scale fisheries. Further, of this amount, the majority is considered 
‘harmful’ subsidies, while for small-scale fisheries a larger portion of subsidies 
is considered beneficial. One could imagine what situation small-scale fisher-
ies would be in today if the ratio had been reversed. For this reason, the recent-
ly adopted Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries 
(ssf Guidelines6) emphasize the need for states to implement re-distributive 
equity policies, taking into account the marginalized conditions of small-scale 
fishing communities.
The fact that small-scale fisheries around the world are struggling to maintain 
their existence is largely an issue of poor defense mechanisms, including 
lack of power, voice, representation, and lack of organization, which add to 
their vulnerability and marginality. The lack of engagement in policy-making 
processes where their working conditions are determined is a governance 
issue that can be corrected through political will and entrepreneurship. Thus, 
their position should be understood by a thorough analysis of how small-
scale fisheries work in order to keep the possibility open that the observed 
governability problem resides in the governing system, and not in the social or 
5 A. Schuhbauer et al., “How Subsidies Affect Economic Viability of Small-scale Fisheries,” 
 Marine Policy (2017): doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2017.05.013.
6 fao, supra note 2 above.
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natural systems where they operate. In other words, rather than assuming that 
the problems of small-scale fisheries are either ecological or social, we argue 
that the problems of small-scale fisheries are located in the governing system 
and their interactions.
 How Not to Fail
Small-scale fisheries have been ignored for reasons that are not always clear. 
It is true that their large number and their social complexity create challenges 
and difficulties for governance. Because small-scale fishing people are largely 
owner-operators who enjoy their independence and freedom, they are not 
aligned with the government’s idea about efficiency. Thus, the general lack of 
interest and recognition of the sector may even be considered a deliberate act. 
For instance, acknowledging the values and importance of small-scale fisher-
ies would imply policy measures that may lead to change in the distribution 
of resources and power, which would negatively affect large-scale fisheries and 
other influential sectors. The introduction of policies that do not bring out 
these values, but instead undermine small-scale fisheries capacity, serves to 
confirm the predisposition against them.
Small-scale fisheries are not only too big to ignore, but are also too impor-
tant to fail. Recognizing their values and importance is therefore the first step 
in the process of making it possible for them to realize their contributions and 
become prosperous. That is partly an issue of knowledge and information. We 
simply need to know more about their characteristics, situations, and poten-
tials, at local, national, regional, and global scales.
Here, the academic community has an important role to play. Small-
scale fisheries research needs to be broad and holistic, and extend beyond 
a single discipline. It needs to build on and include the experience-based 
knowledge that small-scale fishing people possess, in a way that makes the 
research of small-scale fisheries transdisciplinary. It would also involve com-
parative  research that sorts out how small-scale fisheries are different from 
place to place, and determines how these differences affect viability and 
sustainability.7
These needs are being increasingly addressed globally, including through 
the Too Big To Ignore Global Partnership for Small-Scale Fisheries (tbti).8  
7 G. Bateson and M.C. Bateson Angels Fear: Towards an Epistemology of the Sacred (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988).
8 See Too Big To Ignore, Global Partnership for Small-Scale Fisheries Research website, http://
www.toobigtoignore.net.
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Such initiatives also speak to the need for researchers, practitioners, fishers’ or-
ganizations, environmental groups, and government agencies at various levels 
to work collaboratively in enhancing the profile of small-scale fisheries. This 
can start with identifying the main reasons why small-scale fisheries around 
the world underperform. Further, since good governance requires better data 
and a solid knowledge base, developing an information system specifically 
for small-scale fisheries is important,9 as is in-depth research to improve the 
overall understanding of small-scale fisheries, addressing the key questions 
mentioned above.
Further, small-scale fisheries need to be better organized and empowered 
so that they can play an effective and proactive role in their own governance. 
Improvement in governance requires attention to what Kooiman10 calls the 
three governing orders, i.e., day-to-day decision-making (first order), institu-
tional design and arrangement (second order), and an articulation of values, 
images, and principles that inform behaviors and decisions (meta order). 
 Opportunities for improvement must also be sought in any governing mode, 
be it hierarchical, co- and self-governance. In fact, recent research reveals a 
general tendency of governance reform and transformation in the direction 
of more participatory and cooperative forms of governance in small-scale 
fisheries.11 This is a positive movement relative to the ssf Guidelines, which 
suggest that what they regard as a necessary condition is already happening.
The ssf Guidelines are an important instrument for policy-makers and civil 
society organizations who share a vision of a positive future for small-scale fish-
eries. It is also an instrument that can help empower small-scale fishing people 
and their organizations in expressing their human rights, obtaining legitimacy, 
securing access to resources and markets, and gaining general recognition of 
their important contributions and inherent values. The implementation of 
the ssf Guidelines is now underway around the world.12 Thus, it is essential 
that the academic community pays attention to their uptake as well as actively 
contributes to its success. The ssf Guidelines recognize the important role 
that research may play in this process. Now it is up to the academic community 
to deliver.
9 See Information System on Small-scale Fisheries website, https://issfcloud.toobigtoignore 
.net.
10 J. Kooiman, Governing as Governance (London: Sage, 2003).
11 S. Jentoft and R. Chuenpagdee, eds., Interactive Governance for Small-scale Fisheries: 
Global Reflections (Switzerland: Springer, 2015).
12 S. Jentoft et al., eds., The Small-Scale Fisheries Guidelines: Global Implementation (Switzer-
land: Springer, 2017).
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iuu Fishing and Measures to Improve  
Enforcement and Compliance
Judith Swan
Rome, Italy and Victoria, Seychelles
 Introduction to iuu Fishing
The term ‘illegal, unreported and unregulated (iuu) fishing’ was first used 
in 1997 in the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
 Resources (ccamlr) to capture the scope of uncontrolled fishing in the 
Southern Ocean and the urgency for addressing it. Members agreed that the 
situation called for collective efforts within ccamlr, measures by flag states 
and coastal states and steps vis-à-vis non-Contracting Parties to enhance 
enforcement and compliance with conservation and management measures 
(cmms).
It ignited the determination of the international community to come to 
grips with iuu fishing, which spans activities under international, regional, 
and national governance. It involves practices such as unlicensed fishing, us-
ing forged licenses, illegal transshipment at sea, displaying fake names or call 
signs on a vessel, fishing in prohibited areas/with prohibited gear, use of flags 
or ports of non-compliance with little or no effective controls, and failure to 
comply with reporting or other information requirements.
Even worse, some iuu fishers are known to kidnap people to work as crew, 
then murder them or throw them overboard. Many are involved in transna-
tional crimes including smuggling drugs, people, and arms. They engage in 
bribery and blackmail of government officials, document fraud, and money 
laundering. Fraud throughout the food supply chain is reflected by practices 
such as mislabeling.
In 2009, the total value of iuu fishing worldwide was reported to be between 
US$10 billion and US$23 billion annually, representing between 11.06 million 
and 25.91 million tonnes of fish.1 By 2014, members of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (fao) recognized that the magnitude and 
characteristics of iuu fishing were likely to have changed significantly since 
1 D.J. Agnew et al., 2009. “Estimating the Worldwide Extent of Illegal Fishing,” PLoS 4, no. 2 
(2009), doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0004570.
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that study. To address this, a 2015 fao Expert Workshop proposed, inter alia, 
that fao develop technical guidelines to estimate iuu fishing.2
The changes in iuu fishing are driven by several key factors, in addition to 
the status and value of the stocks. One is the continuing developments in tech-
nology that benefit iuu fishers such as improvements in satellite fish finding, 
gear, and vessel capabilities.
To balance this, technologies for information systems that support compli-
ance and enforcement are emerging or being strengthened. They include elec-
tronic tracking, electronic reporting, and electronic monitoring. It is expected 
that such analyses and trials will expand in future as technologies are further 
developed.
Another major factor that could affect the changing characteristics of iuu 
fishing relates to subsidies. In April 2017, most World Trade Organization (wto) 
members expressed support for prohibiting subsidies for iuu fishing with no 
exceptions and many members identified as a ‘critical area for action’ at the 
December 2017 wto Ministerial Conference an outcome on fisheries subsidies.
The role of markets is obvious; iuu fishers aim to profit, and where the mar-
kets dry up because of consumer preference for sustainably caught fish and 
increasing use of catch documentation schemes and traceability tools, the 
characteristics of iuu fishing will be impacted. Civil society is expanding its 
initiatives to partner with industry and foster consumer demand for sustain-
ably caught seafood, as described below.
The above factors impact the characteristics of iuu fishing, and also 
serve as a basis upon which many compliance and enforcement measures 
are built. Such measures require a robust legal and procedural basis at all 
levels—international, regional, and national. This essay describes existing 
international instruments, trends in regional measures and—most important 
for implementation—forward-looking provisions to be considered for national 
legislation. The legislation, in turn, provides the foundation for operational 
procedures and technical/technological measures.
This essay elaborates the provisions in national legislation that must be 
considered to implement specific compliance and enforcement measures, and 
enable their implementation through supporting provisions, such  as inter-
pretation, institutions, evidence, and jurisdiction. Without such provisions, 
compliance and enforcement cannot exist and without regular review of such 
2 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (fao), Report of the Expert Work-
shop to Estimate the Magnitude of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Globally, Rome, 




provisions to adapt to changing characteristics of iuu fishing and means of 
addressing it, compliance and enforcement suffer.
In this essay, compliance generally refers to the level of conformity with the 
law; it can be voluntary and improved by deterrence. Enforcement refers to 
activities that compel conformity with the law, and may include inspection, 
surveillance/monitoring, investigation, arrest, prosecution, fines, suspensions, 
forfeitures, and other penalties or sanctions. Monitoring, control, and surveil-
lance (mcs) activities support both. Reference in this essay to ‘iuu fishing’ 
includes ‘fishing related activities’3 because of their inclusion in many interna-
tional instruments. This essay focuses on the larger scale iuu fishing, mindful 
that smaller-scale fishing is also adversely affected but that different, but not 
dissimilar, enforcement and compliance mechanisms are needed.
 International and Regional Framework
 International Fisheries Instruments
The crusade against iuu fishing was taken to fao, where in 2001 an Interna-
tional Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate iuu Fishing (ipoa-iuu) 
was adopted. A voluntary instrument, it defined iuu fishing4 and built upon 
the approach discussed in ccamlr, describing actions and measures to be 
taken by all states, flag states, coastal states, and port states and internationally 
agreed market-related measures. It has served as a foundation for development 
of a wide range of regional and national plans of action to combat iuu fishing.
The international community intensified its efforts to develop additional 
international instruments to address various aspects of iuu fishing, including 
the legally-binding 2009 fao Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, 
Deter and Eliminate iuu Fishing.5 Its aim was to provide for cost-effective en-
forcement through harmonized minimum standards, including for informa-
tion and inspection, for denial of entry into, or use of, port for vessels where 
evidence shows iuu fishing activities. The iuu fishers suffer significant eco-
nomic loss and may be subject to prosecution.
3 ‘Fishing related activities’ means any operation in support of, or in preparation for, fishing, 
including the landing, packaging, processing, transhipping or transporting of fish that have 
not been previously landed at a port, as well as the provisioning of personnel, fuel, gear and 
other supplies at sea.
4 Definitions are in Paragraph 3 and apply nationally and regionally. See http://www.fao.org/
fishery/ipoa-iuu/legal-text/en.
5 Entered into force in 2016. See http://www.fao.org/3/a-i1644t.pdf.
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From 2009, several voluntary fao international guidelines were adopted 
that would serve as useful tools in combating iuu fishing,6 importantly includ-
ing the 2014 Voluntary Guidelines for Flag State Performance.7 They were all 
based on the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 
1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement and contained strengthened and 
synergistic measures relating to fisheries monitoring, control, and surveillance.
 Regional Fisheries Management Organizations
Regional fisheries management organizations (rfmos) have mandates to adopt 
cmms that are legally binding on their members and, in most cases, co-operating 
non-members. The measures may apply to areas within and beyond national 
jurisdiction, depending on the competence of the rfmo. They have adopted a 
wide range of cmms establishing compliance tools, including establishment of 
iuu vessel and authorized vessel lists, observer schemes, requirements relat-
ing to vessel monitoring systems (vms), reporting, transshipment, port state 
measures, flag state responsibilities, catch documentation schemes, unique 
vessel identifiers,8 and import–export requirements.9
 Regional Economic Integration Organization
The European Union (EU) has developed robust sanctions against iuu fishing. 
Measures against iuu fishing have been identified, and in respect of iuu fish-
ers, the sanctions aim to reduce revenue and to increase operating and capital 
costs and the cost of the risk of doing business.10 The 2010 EU iuu Regulation 
6 These include the International Guidelines on Bycatch Management and Reduction of 
Discards and International Guidelines for the Management of Deep-sea Fisheries in the 
High Seas (http://www.fao.org/fishery/code/guidelines/en) and the Voluntary Guidelines 
for Catch Documentation Schemes, which were developed for adoption in 2017 (http://
www.fao.org/fi/static-media/MeetingDocuments/CDS/TC2016/wpAnnex.pdf).
7 See http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4577t.pdf. See also K. Erikstein and J. Swan, “Voluntary 
Guidelines for Flag State Performance: A New Tool to Conquer iuu Fishing,” International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 29, no. 1 (2014): 116–147.
8 The tuna rfmos have adopted requirements for unique vessel identifiers.
9 Performance reviews of rfmos continue to make recommendations on strengthening 
compliance and enforcement. See M. Ceo et al., Performance Reviews by Regional Fishery 
Bodies: Introduction, Summaries, Synthesis and Best Practices, Volume i, fao Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Circular. No. 1072 (Rome: fao, 2012).
10 M. Beke and R. Blomeyer, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: Sanctions in the 





includes various tools to control fishing activities such as an iuu vessel list.11 
Member States are to adopt appropriate measures, allocate adequate financial, 
human and technical resources, and set up all administrative and technical 
structures necessary for ensuring control, inspection, and enforcement.
 interpol
interpol has intensified its activities to address iuu fishing through project 
scale,12 which was launched in 2013, mindful that the fishing industry is vul-
nerable to various types of international organized crime. It supports mem-
ber countries in identifying, deterring, and disrupting transnational fisheries 
crime. It has contributed to discussions on fisheries crime in the United Na-
tions Office on Drugs and Crime.
 Civil Society
Civil society has played an important role in supporting the development and 
implementation of measures to combat iuu fishing, including as observers in 
international organizations and rfmos.13
Organizations that are using emerging technologies to identify iuu fishing 
by individual vessels include Global Fishing Watch (Google, Oceana, and Sky-
truth), which makes satellite-based vms data available to the public, and Fish 
Spektrum, which uses automatic identification system (ais) data from the Ma-
rine Traffic database.
 National Measures to Improve Compliance and Enforcement
It is vital that national laws and procedures implement current and emerging 
international and regional obligations, including minimum standards for har-
monization, and respond to the continuously changing characteristics of iuu 
fishing. This will strengthen governance at all levels, reward legitimate fishers, 
and tighten the net around the iuu fishers and their beneficiaries. Key legal 
and procedural recommendations for strengthening and supporting compli-
ance and enforcement measures appear below.
11 Based on Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008 establishing a 
Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate iuu fishing, oj l 286/1 (29 October 
2008).
12 See “Project Scale,” Interpol, https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Environmental-crime/
Projects/Project-Scale.
13 For example, the Marine Stewardship Council and World Wildlife Fund have supported 
traceability and certification of sustainable fisheries to underpin seafood marketability.
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 Legal
National legislation should aim to achieve the following objectives to imple-
ment, and support, compliance and enforcement measures.
(a) Ensure consistency in definition of terms with international/regional 
instruments, including for basic terms such as ‘iuu fishing’, ‘fishing’, and 
‘related activities’.
(b) Ensure clarity in institutional responsibilities for compliance and enforce-
ment, and where several government agencies are involved, provide a 
memorandum of understanding for seamless interagency co-operation. 
Conflict of interest should be prohibited and severely sanctioned.
(c) Ensure a process for taking conservation and management measures that 
is clear, inclusive, and well publicized to foster compliance. A mechanism 
that facilitates implementation of rfmo cmms, which are usually agreed 
on an annual basis, should be integrated in the law.
(d) Provide a strong legal framework for requiring true, correct, and complete 
information and maintaining registers for purposes of compliance/
enforcement.
(e) For vessel registration and control of national vessels in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction, apply the fao Voluntary Guidelines on Flag State 
Performance and other instruments and relevant rfmo requirements.
(f) For licensing, require full information on the vessel as required in inter-
national and regional instruments.
(g) For entry into areas under national jurisdiction by all fishing vessels, 
including those in transit, require reports prior to or upon entry and 
electronic reporting through vms or ais consistent with international 
and regional standards and compatible with equipment in the coastal 
State.
(h) For operations in the fisheries waters, implement extensive reporting 
requirements consistent with regional and international requirements.
(i) Compliance requirements must be specified comprehensively, for 
unlicensed and licensed vessels. The ‘operator’ of a fishing vessel should 
always be responsible for compliance and enforcement.
(j) For strengthened mcs authority, ensure clear institutional functions 
and forge interagency agreements for co-ordinated compliance and 
enforcement. The officers authorized to inspect and arrest should be 
clearly designated and trained, and observers should be empowered for 
scientific, monitoring, and compliance functions.
(k) Technological advances for compliance and enforcement described in the 
introduction, including electronic tacking, reporting, and monitoring, 
must be underpinned by legislation.
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(l) Jurisdiction of the courts must be specified and extend to nationals 
(vessels and persons) in areas beyond national jurisdiction. A ‘Lacey Act’ 
provision should prohibit the import, trade, and other dealings with iuu-
caught fish in areas beyond national jurisdiction.14 Evidentiary provisions 
should govern fisheries-specific activities.15
(m) Offences must be clearly set out. All too often legislation simply summa-
rizes offences in a few sections, leaving unenforceable gaps.16
(n) To address situations where judges do not realize the seriousness of fish-
eries offences, the legislation should include judicial guidelines for de-
termining and penalizing offences and a range of liabilities, fines, and 
penalties.
 Procedures, Institutions, and Capacity Development
Procedures that assess risks of iuu fishing activity should be developed that 
target enforcement operations to the most significant risks. mcs procedures 
should be based on legislation and regional/international obligations and co-
operation, and arrangements for interagency co-operation. They should be 
integrated as appropriate with regional/international organizations and part-
ners. Human capacity development, including training for legal, compliance 
and enforcement personnel of all relevant agencies, and public awareness-
raising, all support efforts to address iuu fishing.
 Conclusion
In two decades, the international community has made great strides in devel-
oping tools for the compliance and enforcement of iuu fishing. Among the 
challenges that still lie ahead are staying ahead of the changing characteristics 
of iuu fishing and ensuring that the innovative measures and tools to address 
them are activated at regional levels and entrenched in national laws and 
processes.
14 See “Lacey Act,” US Fish & Wildlife Service, International Affairs, https://www.fws.gov/
international/laws-treaties-agreements/us-conservation-laws/lacey-act.html.
15 For example, they could include reversal of onus of proof as appropriate.
16 Many countries append a schedule to the act that sets fines for each relevant section and 
can be amended by regulation.
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 Introduction
The high seas, to this day, are viewed by many as a hive of unlawful activity, 
with visions of piracy, illegal fishing, and mysterious sea creatures. Conversely, 
that same 70 percent of our ocean that is outside state waters, beyond 200 nau-
tical miles, may be seen as a frontier area, with little human activity relative to 
nearshore and coastal ecosystems. Somewhere between those two extremes 
lies the truth. Our most intimate connection with the high seas comes from the 
fish on our plate and occasional news stories documenting the catch of a big 
fish by local fishers. On the other hand, public awareness about the high seas 
also centers on iconic species like cod and tuna that have been overfished and 
remain below historic levels. It is the collective decisions of individual coun-
tries that determine the ultimate fate of high seas fish populations. The past 
and future success of these group decisions in adhering to high-level principles 
and the best available science to protect the global commons will dictate if 
we can minimize human impacts and ensure the sustainability of the broader 
marine ecosystem.
 The Challenges of Managing the High Seas and Migratory Stocks
Since the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the United 
Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (unfsa) came into force, implementation has 
been slow but steady, yet new conservation challenges apart from fisheries 
management are emerging. unfsa provides for implementation of global best 
practices for managing fisheries.1 Regional fisheries management  organizations 
1 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
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(rfmos), as described by unfsa, are governed by member states and primar-
ily responsible for managing the straddling and migratory stocks that live in or 
pass through designated regions of the ocean. Those responsible for straddling 
stocks now cover ~65 percent of the high seas and those responsible for highly 
migratory species, such as tunas, swordfishes and billfishes, are in place for 91 
percent of the world’s ocean, including inside and outside of the 200-nautical 
mile limit of coastal states.
Managing high seas fisheries is a delicate balance for countries that are 
mem bers of rfmos, each with different political and economic motivations as 
well as historic access to particular fisheries. Coastal states—countries whose 
waters border adjacent high seas areas and have rights over the fish in their 
coastal waters—vie for access with distant water fishing nations, those states 
fishing in other country’s exclusive economic zones or on the high seas. Fur-
thermore, there are states that previously have not fished within specific rfmo 
areas, often because they are developing their fisheries or due to changing mi-
gratory patterns of fish species, but that want to build their fishing access and 
capacity for food security and trade purposes. Many of the latter may not have 
the competent national bodies to adhere to modern management principles 
such as precautionary decision-making and an ecosystem approach, which is 
now enshrined in the agreed mandates of most rfmos.
The performance of rfmos is measured most notably by the health of fish 
populations included in their mandates, and global assessments show that 
high seas fisheries are still in decline, despite the investments in science, re-
search, management, and diplomatic efforts.2 In addition to annual meetings, 
stock updates, and setting quotas, rfmos engage in performance reviews3 by 
external panels and states participate in ‘review conferences’ on the imple-
mentation of unfsa every five years. While these processes are instituted in 
efforts to hold governments accountable, few high seas fisheries have been 
successfully rebuilt,4 moratoria remain in place, fishing continues to impart 
collateral damage on other species and marine habitats,5 and increasing uses 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, New York, 4 December 1995, 2167 
u.n.t.s. 88.
2 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (fao), The State of World Fisheries 
and Aquaculture 2016. Contributing to Food Security and Nutrition for All (Rome: fao, 2016).
3 M. Ceo, et al., Performance Reviews by Regional Fishery Bodies: Introduction, Summaries, 
Synthesis and Best Practices. Volume i: ccamlr, ccsbt, iccat, iotc, nafo, nasco, neafc, 
fao Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular No. 1072 (Rome: fao, 2012), http://www.fao.org/do-
crep/015/i2637e/i2637e00.pdf.
4 S. Cullis-Suzuki and D. Pauly, “Failing the High Seas: A Global Evaluation of Regional Fisher-
ies Management Organizations,” Marine Policy 34, no. 5 (2010): 1036–1042.
5 G.O. Crespo and D.C. Dunn, “A Review of the Impacts of Fisheries on Open-ocean Ecosys-
tems,” ices Journal of Marine Science 74, no. 9 (2017): 2283–2297, doi.org/10.1093/icesjms/
fsx084.
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of the ocean, as well as climate change, are further reducing the chances that 
fisheries management measures can, in fact, ensure continued production of 
food for a growing global population.
Decision-makers and states that invest heavily in both science and advocacy 
for increased access to ever-diminishing stocks but too often lack the fortitude 
to enact fisheries closures or reductions at the right time, often succumb to 
industry pressure to reduce quotas gradually rather than immediately stop 
overfishing at the initial signs that all is not well. Despite increasing technol-
ogy to track fishing activity, illegal and unregulated fishing continues. As many 
rfmos were put in place following a fishing crisis or population decline, rather 
than in advance of overfishing and mismanagement, targets are often set to 
rebuild stocks to depleted levels rather than to a formerly abundant state. In 
addition, at the first signs of stock improvements, quotas are often increased 
too high, too quickly, reversing years of population rebuilding.
Facing poor or uncertain stock assessments and problems with single- 
species fisheries measures, scientists are developing more sophisticated scien-
tific modeling and managers are taking preliminary steps to incorporate an 
ecosystem approach to manage habitat impacts, bycatch of incidental species 
and predator-prey interactions. Since 2006, and the commitment by states 
through the United Nations General Assembly resolution 61/105, increased 
pressure has been placed on both scientists and managers to assess the 
impacts of fishing on deep-sea habitats from bottom fishing and subsequently 
prohibit fishing activity where these vulnerable ecosystems are known or 
likely to occur. Progress has been made, but not to the degree that has been 
committed.6 Incidental catches of sharks and seabirds are known, but no 
fishing limits have been agreed to in most of the global ocean to ensure no 
further damage to these non-target species While most rfmos are supposed 
to consider the impacts of fishing not only on target stocks, but also on other 
stocks that are impacted, few effective multi-species management systems 
have been put in place.
Increasingly, state fisheries managers are coming to the realization that 
even if they followed all science advice at the right time and fully protected 
the marine ecosystem from direct and indirect impacts of fishing, other hu-
man activities are impacting the ecosystem, including oil and gas extraction, 
6 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the resumed Review Conference on the Agreement 
for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 




deep seabed mining, plastic pollution, and climate change. Often times states 
make decisions outside of rfmos that will fundamentally undermine future 
rebuilding of fisheries, whether it is through lukewarm commitments to reduc-
ing greenhouse gas emissions or enabling resource extraction on valuable fish-
ing grounds. Increasing human activity will make this much more difficult as 
both the science and the governance to manage cumulative impacts of people 
on biodiversity is lacking. The only way that these other impacts can be man-
aged is through global mechanisms that include most of the same states and 
high seas fishing nations.
 Ways Forward for rfmos
There are a few ways forward to improve fisheries management by rfmos, the 
foremost of which is to ensure that states have the political fortitude to follow 
scientific advice, make decisions based on precaution, commit to transparency 
in all aspects of data and decision-making, and act, in a timely manner, upon 
recommendations of performance reviews. Fish do not follow rfmo boundar-
ies so it is imperative that management is consistent across rfmos if there is 
to be any possibility of meaningful rebuilding and ecosystem protection. The 
ingredients for successful fisheries management exist, with the political will of 
member states being the ‘keystone’ ingredient. And the time has come when 
just focusing on managing fisheries must be left to the bygone days of relative 
simplicity.
Many rfmos came into force following unfsa, and hence include in their 
mandates modern best practice in fisheries management such as maintaining 
or restoring stocks at levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yield 
and implementing the ecosystem and precautionary approaches. Some that 
predated unfsa have modernized their conventions to include these prin-
ciples, but several have not. Few, in any case, regularly put these policies into 
practice in all management decisions, but must do so as a way forward.
Some rfmos are adopting more robust and adaptable fisheries manage-
ment tools by developing science-based harvest strategies where fisheries 
management decisions are based on pre-agreed objectives and decision rules. 
In rfmos where they have been tested, harvest strategies have been shown to 
reduce the time and political influence of management decisions, better plan 
for uncertainty, and ultimately maintain stock health over time. These new 
tools should be incorporated by all rfmos to improve management.
An increasing challenge facing rfmos, particularly in light of changing 
stock dynamics due to climate change, is states seeking increased access to 
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stocks that they previously did not fish or only fished for in the past. The po-
litical decisions around quota sharing are thwarting good fisheries manage-
ment decisions and calling into question states’ abilities to equitably manage 
resources. rfmos need to develop just sharing arrangements that consider 
changing stock dynamics and coastal and developing state rights that do not 
hinder precautionary, science-based management.
 Beyond rfmos, a New Evolution
While rfmos have increasingly taken action to reduce the impacts of fishing, 
these actions are neither bold nor broad enough. For fish populations to re-
cover from human impact, they will need long-term respite from our interven-
tions. In the ocean, one option is for states to establish a mechanism allowing 
for high seas marine reserves,7 setting areas off limits to human impacts, and 
ensuring effective and efficient establishment of enforcement mechanisms. 
These reserves can build upon and enhance spatial protection measures in 
place for fisheries. This will require inter-sectoral co-operation where gov-
ernance bodies for fishing, shipping, mining, and oil and gas extraction will 
need an integrated approach to ensuring that all activities are restricted within 
these marine reserve areas.
A second and perhaps more radical option proposed by some is to end fish-
ing on the high seas and allow fishing only in coastal state waters.8 There are 
benefits to this; enforcement may be easier and costs for global instruments 
and regional management organizations would effectively end. The downside 
is that those organizations also provide a venue for sharing best practices and 
information, development of collective science, and ideally are a place where 
states can hold each other to account to higher level commitments and legal 
obligations. A further complication for states to address in this approach is the 
contracting and expanding ranges of fish populations as a result of climate 
change that will require adaptability to having more or less fish in their waters 
from year-to-year.
It is clear that despite global legal frameworks and subsequent incremen-
tal improvements in governance and science for fisheries management, these 
tools are not working as fish populations struggle to recover. While far from 
7 U.R. Sumaila et al., “Potential Costs and Benefits of Marine Reserves in the High Seas,” Marine 
Ecology Progress Series 345 (2007): 305–310.
8 U.R. Sumaila et al., “Winners and Losers in a World Where the High Seas is Closed to Fishing,” 
Scientific Reports 5 (2015), doi.org/10.1038/srep08481.
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the eyes of most people, it is only bold decisions and expedited action that can 
ensure the future of high seas ecosystems, which from an ecological perspec-
tive blend seamlessly into national waters. Our collective track record does not 
bode well, and future success will need strong leadership and a commitment 
to the fish and ecosystems that have served us well for so long. It is only in this 
way that stories of big fish being caught may be part of our ocean future.
<UN>
Balancing Sustainable Tuna Resource  
Management and Economic Development:  
Small Island Developing States Perspectives
Esaroma Ledua and Joeli Veitayaki
University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji
 Introduction
In small island developing states (sids), sustainable fisheries are the overriding 
goal of balancing fisheries management for important resources such as tuna 
and economic development.1 However, reports over time have shown that fish-
eries management in general has continued to fail, sometimes spectacularly. 
Key factors that have hindered the effectiveness of fisheries management in 
sids include the combined effects of small fisheries departments, degradation 
of supporting ecosystems, heavy exploitation, environmental degradation,2 
uncertainties of scientific information, unpredictable variations in the growth 
of fish stocks, heightened economic development demands, and error in the 
implementation of management measures.3 Determining sids’ perspectives 
on what sustainability entails and ways of balancing tuna resource manage-
ment and economic development is difficult but necessary, as it determines 
the long-term sustainable use of fisheries resources such as tuna.
Four species of tuna—albacore (Thunnus alalunga), bigeye (T. obesus), 
yellowfin (T. albacares), and skipjack (Katsuwonus pelamis)—are important 
to Pacific sids due to their value, high abundance, and level of dependence. 
Tuna caught within national waters of fifteen Pacific sids that are mem-
bers of the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (ffa) region contributed 
approximately 1.5 million metric tonnes (valued at US$2.8 billion) of about 
1 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (fao), Code of Conduct for Respon-
sible Fisheries (Rome: fao, 1995).
2 R. Mahon and P. McConney, “Managing the Managers: Improving the Structure and Opera-
tion of Small Fisheries Departments, especially in sids,” Ocean and Coastal Management 
47, no. 9–10 (2004): 529–535; K. Cochrane, “Fisheries Management,” in A Fishery Manager’s 
Guidebook: Management Measures and their Applications, fao Fisheries Technical Paper No. 
424, ed., K. Cochrane (Rome: fao, 2002).
3 D.S. Holland, Management Strategy Evaluation and Management Procedures: Tools for 
 Rebuilding and Sustaining Fisheries, oecd Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Working Papers 
No. 25 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Publishing, 2010).
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2.7 million metric tonnes (valued at ca. US$4.8 billion) of tuna from the West-
ern and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (wcpfc) region in 2016.4 Skip-
jack tuna contributed approximately 58 percent of the total annual catch, fol-
lowed by yellowfin at 28 percent, bigeye at 8 percent, and albacore at 4 percent. 
Thus, tuna is the economic development driver in most Pacific sids.
Consequently, Pacific sids have been working individually, collectively, and 
collaboratively to forge management systems that reflect their  perspectives, 
respect their rights, and increase income from tuna while simultaneously 
 preserving its sustainability. The collaborative and collective arrangements 
of Pacific sids have been spearheaded by the ffa, established in 1979 to 
coordinate the regional drive to secure long-term maximum benefits from 
shared offshore fisheries resources. In 1982, eight of the Pacific sids and 
ffa established a sub-regional agreement known as the Parties to the  Nauru 
Agreement (pna), to formulate initiatives that maximize direct and indirect 
economic benefits to the parties.5 Moreover, the samoa Pathway in 2014 
reaffirmed sids’ perspectives by promoting sustained, inclusive, and equi-
table economic growth, promoting integrated and sustainable management 
of natural resources and ecosystems, while facilitating ecosystem conserva-
tion, regeneration, restoration, and resilience in the face of new and emerging 
challenges.6
Pacific sids’ perspectives are influenced by their rights and responsibilities 
provided under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
 (unclos), Agenda 21 of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, and the fao Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries of 1995. 
These frameworks outlined international standards to protect ecological well-
being, sustainability of highly migratory species such as tuna, and the economic 
development aspirations of sids. They also highlighted the importance of 
using msy as the basis for setting total allowable catch (tac) to ensure that 
living resources in the exclusive economic zone (eez) are not overexploited.
Pacific sids are struggling to sustainably manage their tuna resources 
given the uncertainties surrounding the state of bigeye tuna and the full-to- 
overexploited state of yellowfin and albacore. Many regard msy as inadequate 
for maintaining stocks at levels viable to achieve greater financial returns from 
tuna resources within eezs. As a result, Pacific sids’ perspectives focus on 
4 Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (ffa), “Catch and Catch Values of wcpo Tuna Fisher-
ies by Waters and Fleet 2016,” last accessed 19 September 2017, https://www.ffa.int/node/425.
5 Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of Common Stocks 
(as amended April 2010).
6 “Samoa Pathway—Outcome document,” UN Conference on Small Islands Developing States, 
Apia, Samoa, 1–4 September 2014, http://www.sids2014.org/index.php?menu=1537.
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 sustaining increased benefits derived from foreign fishing nations by setting up 
local tuna processing facilities, domestication of tuna fishing fleets targeting 
stocks within eezs, transshipment in ports, and increased percentages of local 
crews on foreign vessels. Engaging Pacific sids in monitoring, compliance, and 
surveillance (mcs) is also critical given increasing concerns of incompatible 
national tuna management arrangements and regional tuna conservation and 
management measures (cmm). Managing highly migratory fish stocks such 
as tuna requires arrangements that are understood and implemented by all 
stakeholders at national, regional, and international levels.
This essay uses a Pacific sids case study to examine the perspective 
on what  sustainability entails, to explore why Pacific sids national tuna 
management arrangements were not compatible with regional and inter-
national cmms, and to recommend solutions. The focus is on Fiji’s tuna 
management framework, which is evaluated against national, regional,  and 
international standards to determine the degree of compliance with interna-
tional benchmarks on balancing sustainable management of tuna resources 
and economic development.
 Tuna Fisheries Management in Fiji
Fiji’s national fisheries management framework includes the Fiji Tuna Man-
agement and Development Plan (2014–2018) (hereafter the ‘Tuna Plan’), the 
Offshore Fisheries Management Decree (2012), the Fisheries Act, Chapter 158, 
and the Marine Spaces Act, Chapter 158A of the laws of Fiji. The evaluation in 
this essay begins with conformance of the Tuna Plan to measures in the Off-
shore Fisheries Management Decree (2012), which defined how the Tuna Plan 
should be designed. The second level is on the degree of compliance of the 
Tuna Plan and the Offshore Fisheries Management Decree (2012) to regional 
and international control measures outlined under wcpfc-cmm 2015–02 and 
cmm 2016–01, the fao Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, Article 17 of 
Agenda 21, and unclos.
Fiji’s perspectives and intention on balancing sustainable management 
of tuna resources and economic development are reflected under nine goals 
of the Tuna Plan: (1) maintaining stock sustainability to support economic 
growth in offshore fisheries; (2) contributing to Fiji’s gross domestic product by 
promoting development and growth in offshore fisheries; (3) increasing in-
vestments and employment opportunities in the economy; (4) managing resil-
ience of offshore fisheries against climate change risks; (5) protecting fisheries 
investments and ensuring food security; (6) sustaining ecosystem health and 
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exercising the precautionary approach; (7) managing tuna under rights-based 
and integrated fisheries management frameworks; (8) strength ening institu-
tions; and (9) promoting capacity to support resource building and knowl-
edge-based management.
The common fisheries management approach of using msy or mey for set-
ting allowable catch limits is difficult to achieve in Fiji given its lack of capacity, 
resources, and differences in perspectives. For example, the country’s tac of 
12,000 metric tonnes per annum set under the Tuna Plan was to allow the at-
tainment of Fiji’s economic development goals specified in the Plan. This tac 
exceeded the mey level of 6,610 metric tonnes recommended by the Secre-
tariat of the Pacific Community (spc) and the ffa scientists in 2012, which Fiji 
viewed as inadequate to attain greater financial returns from tuna resources.7
Section 2.3(iv) of the Tuna Plan identified overfishing and overcapacity as 
the main risks associated with the tuna fishery (albacore, yellowfin, and bigeye) 
in Fiji. This implied that the Fiji government was aware that the national and 
regional measures were not effectively controlling overfishing. Nevertheless, 
Fiji’s domestic fleet continued to expand fishing on the high seas and waters of 
neighboring states. Tuna caught in international waters by Fiji’s domestic fleet 
increased from 10 percent of total annual catch in 2001 to 45 percent in 2015.
Fiji’s rights under regional tuna cmms and international frameworks have 
influenced its perspective of balancing sustainability of tuna resources and 
economic development. Prior to the adoption of wcpfc-cmm 2010–05 in 
2010, the total number of Fiji-flagged vessels targeting albacore was 92, but this 
grew to 121 vessels in 2011, 113 vessels in 2012, and 102 vessels in 2015, before 
vessel numbers dropped to 89 in 2016.8 According to paragraph 1 of wcpfc-cmm 
2015–02, “Commission Members, Cooperating Non-Members, and participat-
ing Territories (ccms) shall not increase the number of their fishing vessels 
actively fishing for South Pacific albacore in the Convention Area south of 20°S 
above 2005 levels or recent historical (2000–2004) levels.”9 Paragraph 2 states 
that “the provisions of paragraph 1 shall not prejudice the legitimate rights 
and obligations under international law for small island developing State and 
7 Fiji Fisheries Department, Fiji Tuna Management and Development Plan (2012–2016) (Suva: 
Fisheries Department, 2012).
8 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (wcpfc), “Fiji,” Annual Report to the Com-
mission. Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics, Scientific Committee Thir-
teenth Regular Session, Rarotonga, Cook Islands, 9–17 August 2017, WCPFC-SC13-AR/CCM-07, 
Table 3.
9 wcpfc, “Conservation and Management Measure for South Pacific Albacore,” Conservation 
and Management Measure (ccm) 2015–02, Commission Twelfth Regular Session, Bali, Indo-
nesia, 3–8 December 2015.
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Territory ccms in the Convention Area for whom South Pacific albacore is an 
important component of the domestic tuna fishery.”
Paragraph 41 of wcpfc-cmm 2014–01 and cmm 2016–01 also encouraged 
Fiji to overfish resident bigeye tuna stocks within national waters to a maxi-
mum of 2,000 metric tonnes. Prior to 2014, bigeye landings by Fiji’s domestic 
tuna longline fleet averaged only 740 metric tonnes per year. The catch grew to 
1,586 metric tonnes in 2014, 1,169 tonnes in 2015, and approximately 1,190 metric 
tonnes in 2016.10 Similarly, after implementation of wcpfc-cmm 2014–01 and 
cmm 2016–01, annual catch levels of yellowfin increased from 1,292 to 2,748 
metric tonnes during 2005–2013, to 3,594 metric tonnes in 2014, 3,647 tonnes in 
2015, and 3,928 tonnes in 2016.11 The regional tuna cmms encouraged overfish-
ing of resident stocks of targeted tuna species within sids’ eezs and failed to 
protect the sustainability of targeted tuna stocks for future generations.
To address the paradox between sustainability of tuna and greater financial 
returns from tuna, we must balance sustainability of tuna stocks and sids’ in-
come over the long term. The way forward may be possible not only by devel-
oping an alternative source of income, but mostly by containing the growth 
spirals of economies and the depletion of tuna resources. There is a need to de-
velop a new management approach beyond msy and mey that (a) recognizes 
sids’ dependence on tuna resources, (b) reduces longline fishing competition 
between sids and distant water fishing nations (dwfns), (c) promotes inven-
tion of appropriate technology and new sources of energy to reduce costs of 
sids’ domestic fleet, (d) increases fair sharing of benefits through increased 
onshore activities of foreign fishing nations, (e) enhances accountability of 
tuna fisheries managers and fishers, and (f) encourages sustainability. sids’ 
economic benefits from tuna longline fishing has increased steadily in the 
last twenty years, but their involvement in the purse seine fishery is limited to 
crewing vessels. Our case study showed that 45 percent of Fiji’s domestic tuna 
longline fleet’s annual catch is from international waters adjacent to its eez. 
Reducing dwfns’ longlining activities will balance sids’ growing demands of 
expanding their fishing activities into adjacent high seas areas. At the moment 
sids cannot compete with dwfns in purse seining, and see longline fishing 
as an important way forward for balancing sustainable tuna resource manage-
ment and economic development.
10 wcpfc, “Fiji,” supra note 8, Table 1.
11 wcpfc, “Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye, Yellowfin and Skipjack 





This essay has focused on the sids’ perspective of balancing the sustainability 
of tuna resources and economic development. This refers to the sustainable 
increase in the sharing of benefits between sids and foreign fishing nations 
through the establishment of local tuna processing facilities, domestication of 
tuna fishing fleet’s targeting stocks within eezs, transshipment in ports, and 
increased percentages of local crews on foreign vessels. McCoy supported this 
statement that transshipment undertaken in ports has enhanced catch verifi-
cation efforts and has also been a source of direct financial benefit to some ffa 
member countries.12 Our case study shows that Fiji has been profiting from its 
domestic longline fleet fishing beyond Fiji’s eez.
The common fisheries management approach of balancing sustainable 
tuna resource management and economic development using msy and mey is 
difficult for sids, which sees these management arrangements as impediments 
of their rights specified under unclos and wcpfc-cmms. It is important to 
develop a management system capable of better balancing tuna resource 
sustainability and long-term financial sustainability of tuna developments in 
sids.
12 M.A. McCoy, A Survey of Tuna Transshipment in Pacific Island Countries: Opportunities for 
Increasing Benefits and Improving Monitoring (Honiara: ffa, July 2012).
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Sustainable Aquaculture: Protecting Our Oceans 
and Feeding the World
David Roberts
Sustainable Blue, Centre Burlington, Nova Scotia, Canada
 Aquaculture’s Time Has Come
The sustainability of aquaculture will not be a choice for the future, but a 
 necessity. Aquaculture has grown from an alternative means of producing 
marine and freshwater plants and animals to an integral part of the existing 
food supply and, in fact, the most promising means of supplying the protein 
that the world will require to feed its growing population.
Over the last 30 years the world has seen changes in fishing technologies/ 
effort that have facilitated our ability to extract fish and other aquatic 
organisms from the sea, lakes, and rivers at a rate never before experienced. 
As the world population has continued to increase so has the demand for 
aquatic protein and therefore our ability to sell ‘all that we can catch’, or 
extract from these aquatic environments. As we continued to extract at a 
rate greater than is biologically sustainable, we are faced with a diminished 
resource base and overfished species. Embracing terms such as maximum 
sustainable yield, countries began to implement quotas on fishing effort and 
gear and/or restrictions to entry. There were warning signs that the ‘supply’ 
was being ‘fished out’. Today, of all the known commercial species being fished, 
only 15 percent are at a level that will allow for additional harvesting. This is 
not sufficient to keep up with demand. In fact, there has been little ‘new’ fish 
biomass extracted from our oceans since the 1980s.
In terms of global production volume, that of farmed fish and aquatic plants 
combined surpassed that of capture fisheries in 2013. In terms of food supply, 
aquaculture provided more fish than capture fisheries for the first time in 2014. 
By 2014, a total of 580 species and/or species groups were farmed around the 
world.1 In 2014, 73.8 million tonnes of aquatic animals were harvested from 
aquaculture (Table 1).2
1 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (fao), The State of the World Fisher-
ies and Aquaculture (Rome: fao, 2016), 22, http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5555e.pdf.
2 Id., p. 5.
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As the supply of wild caught fish/seafood has plateaued, the world population 
growth in absolute numbers is at a point where protein demand will greatly 
exceed supply. We have reached a critical juncture in history, where the world 
needs to find alternative food sources that can be supplied and increased in an 
environmentally sustainable manner.
 Sustainability Requires Change
All food production requires inputs such as food, water, energy, and physical 
space. The key is to find food production systems that have the highest yields 
of output for the least amount of inputs (resources), i.e., are the most efficient 
in terms of resource use.
The art of culturing fish for consumption began in China over 3,000 years 
ago. Today, China is the world’s leader in fish production in terms of biomass, 
with most of this production based on the culture of freshwater fish (carp). The 
majority of this production is consumed locally. Carp are an excellent fish for 
culture as they are largely herbivores and can be grown without the need for 
fish-based protein diets.
Why does this matter? Fish feed is widely regarded as becoming a major 
constraint to the growth of aquaculture production in many developing 
countries. The culture of non-fed animal species in 2014 represented 30.8 
percent of world production of all farmed fish species. The most important 
non-fed animal species include (i) two finfish species, silver carp and bighead 
carp, typically in inland aquaculture, (ii) bivalve molluscs (clams, oysters, and 
mussels, etc.), and (iii) other filter-feeding animals (such as sea squirts) in 
marine and coastal areas. Growth in production, however, has been faster for 
fed species than for non-fed species.3
3 Id., 25.
Table 1 Breakdown of aquatic animals harvested from aquaculture








The Western world has, over the last decades, focused its seafood diet on 
primarily four seafood types, namely shrimp, tuna, salmon, and cod. Shrimp 
and salmon have been widely cultured for over 40 years now. With the loss 
of the commercial cod fishery stocks, aquaculture of this species has begun 
in several countries driven by existing demand. The culture of tuna (bluefin) 
has only recently ‘cracked the technology’ enabling the entire lifecycle to be 
replicated in captivity. There has always been a strong market for tuna, and 
the culture of it will relieve the pressure on wild stocks. But is the culture of 
these species ‘sustainable’? All of these species require a diet that incorporates 
a protein that is presently derived from fish, primarily in the form of fishmeal. 
If aquaculture is to expand and fill the protein supply gap for the world then it 
cannot depend on fishmeal-based diets that are dependent upon the catch of 
wild fish. The answer lies in the production of fish that can be grown on plant-
based diets, i.e., herbivorous/omnivorous fish or finding suitable fish protein 
replacements that can be derived from sustainable sources.
Initiatives have been undertaken to replace fishmeal in fish diets with soy 
and other plant-based proteins. Those fish that have evolved to utilize fish-
based proteins for growth can withstand various levels of protein replacement, 
but ultimately growth and fish health is threatened when levels are exceeded. 
Commercial initiatives have recently begun for the culture of insect larvae, 
namely soldier fly larvae for the production of a larval meal. The soldier fly 
larvae are produced by growing soldier flies on pre-consumer food waste 
collected from urban centers. Thus, a ‘waste’ product is being used as a food 
source to produce what becomes a food source for a product (fish) that we 
can then consume. A 2014 review of insect feeding trials by the Food and 
Agriculture  Organization of the United Nations found that fish common to 
aquaculture, like tilapia, could safely have between 25 and 100 percent of the 
soymeal or fishmeal in their diets replaced with insect meal with no negative 
consequences to fish production. Even when cooked, the fish showed no 
changes to aroma, taste, or texture.4 There has also been preliminary research 
done on the use of other marine organisms at a lower trophic level, which are a 
direct replacement for fishmeal proteins and can be grown on organic wastes.
Changes to fish feed protein supplies are not the only change that will 
be required to allow aquaculture to expand. The world must examine its 
eating behaviors which not only impact resource use but also overall health 
of societies. In addition, food production systems, including the production 
of aquatic foods, must be examined in light of long-term sustainability and 
4 M. Glassman, “Feeding 2050: Sustainable Aquaculture and the Future of Protein,” The 
Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 7 June 2017, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/blog/
global-food-thought/feeding-2050-sustainable-aquaculture-and-future-protein.
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‘production efficiency’. Some aquaculture practices use the label ‘sustainable’, 
but not all of the resources used are accounted for, especially if wastes are 
being absorbed by the local environment. Life-cycle analysis takes a broader 
view and can be used to assess and rank the sustainability from a more holistic 
viewpoint.
In order for the benefits of aquaculture to be realized, it must be sustainable 
from both an environmental and economic perspective. This will undoubtedly 
mean that the world will have to change its dietary habits and begin to con-
sume proteins that are more efficient in their resource use. However, a bal-
anced diet includes other foods than just proteins.
There has been a growing interest in the integration of agriculture and aqua-
culture. When these two food production systems are combined, the result is a 
food production system that is extremely efficient in terms of its resource use. 
In Asia, rice farmers are integrating freshwater fish culture into their irrigation 
systems to reduce predatory snails. The result is a gain in fertilizer nutrients 
from fish wastes and harvesting the fish to add income to their crop. The waste 
from fish production has been found to be an excellent source of nutrients for 
plant production.
Production systems that combine aquaculture with hydroponic plant cul-
ture are termed ‘aquaponics’. Aquaponics can be done at any scale and is one 
of the most efficient uses of land and water when producing fish and food 
crops. Aquaponic systems use 90 percent less land and water than traditional 
field crops. In addition to being efficient resource users, aquaponic systems 
are ‘natural’ by design and do not use insecticides or antibiotics. Aquaponic 
systems produce higher yields than field crops and greenhouse hydroponic 
production systems. It can be said that the integration of fish and plant pro-
duction is the most efficient food production system on the planet. These same 
levels of efficiency are also realized in water usage.
When examining food production systems one must examine production 
parameters such as food and water conversion ratios, i.e., how efficiently the 
animal being produced converts its food and water into edible protein. In addi-
tion, to curtail practices that contribute to global warming one must consider 
the greenhouse gas emissions related to the production system being used.
Fish process energy more efficiently than mammals such as cows and 
pigs because they are cold-blooded (so less calories are needed for warming 
themselves) and live in water (so relatively more of the body converts to 
muscle than bone). Cultured fish score a ‘low’ rating with respect to relative 
greenhouse gas emissions.5





Aquaculture began with the development of fish/plant culture in earthen 
ponds with flow-through or tidal water exchange from rivers and/or oceans. 
Because fish farming involves the active and daily input of humans, we tend 
towards developing them in areas where human access is easier, i.e., nearshore, 
but with the continued growth of the aquaculture sector, the utilization of 
nearshore sites for cage culture has resulted in ‘conflict of use’ and environ-
mental pollution issues. Both of these have resulted in private and public op-
position to the expansion of aquaculture.
This has led to the speculation that aquaculture growth will occur increas-
ingly either offshore6 or onshore (inland and land-based facilities). Land-based 
facilities (especially those practicing recirculation) have a reduced risk for dis-
ease exposure and are not exposed to varying temperatures and/or predators. 
Land-based facilities are easily monitored, do not require sea-going vessels to 
transport product, and can have a high degree of predictability that favors in-
vestment and market penetration. For these reasons and others, a strong case 
can be presented that will see expansion of the aquaculture sector taking place 
on land. Technologies exist that will permit the production of both freshwa-
ter and marine species independent of water sources. This allows aquaculture 
production facilities to be located in close proximity to urban centers, thereby 
further reducing the carbon footprint by avoiding extensive transportation 
routes.
Land-based fish farms require a continuous supply of energy to produce 
oxygen and run pumps and other equipment. To be truly sustainable this en-
ergy supply must come from renewable sources. A good fit for land-based fish 
farms would be operation of air compressors on solar power, with compressed 
air stored and used to generate electricity continuously. Compressed air is also 
used as a source to generate the oxygen requirements for the farms.
 Conclusion
In 2015, the United Nations member states adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sus-
tainable Development. The Agenda includes a set of seventeen Sustainable 
Development Goals (sdgs). sdg 14 expressly focuses on the oceans, underlin-
ing the importance of the conservation and sustainable use of the oceans and 
seas and of their resources for sustainable development, including through 
their contributions to poverty eradication, sustained economic growth, food 
6 See Soto and Wurmann’s essay on offshore aquaculture in this volume.
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security, and creation of sustainable livelihoods and decent work.7 Sustainable 
aquaculture can play an important role in achieving sdg 14.
Aquaculture has the ability to supply the world’s protein, but it will require 
shifts in our patterns of resource use, eating habits, and continued development 
of technologies that allow for improvements in production efficiencies. 
Sustainable aquaculture will not only feed the world, but offer the needed 
protection and conservation of the world’s ocean resources.
7 fao, fao and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (Rome: fao, 2015), http://www.fao.org/3/
a-i4997e.pdf.
<UN>
Offshore Aquaculture: A Needed New Frontier  
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 Offshore Aquaculture and Its Potential Relevance
Aquaculture continues to be the fastest growing food producing sector in 
the world and it is expected to bridge the future global supply–demand gap 
for aquatic food.1 However, this is a great challenge considering that a large 
proportion of current aquaculture for food is produced in fresh water and this 
resource is bound to be very scarce and even scarcer under climate change.2 
Today, practically all marine production takes place by the coast or not far 
from it. Yet, coastal zones are becoming increasingly limiting for aquaculture. 
 Therefore, use of open ocean sites can be a solution for future aquaculture 
activities.
There is no single universally accepted definition of offshore aquaculture, or 
equivalently, open ocean aquaculture. In many cases these terms are used for 
any farming off the coast.3 Here, the definition proposed in a special publica-
tion by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (fao) for 
offshore mariculture will be used.4 That is, farming occurring away from the 
coastline (> 2 km), in waters deeper than 50 m and fully or partially exposed 
to stronger wave and wind action. The concept opposes that of coastal aqua-
culture, in as far as coastal refers to nearshore sites, mainly in sheltered places 
and those located off the coast but in waters not deeper than 40 m and with 
1 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (fao), The State of World Fisheries 
and Aquaculture 2016: Contributing to Food Security and Nutrition for All (Rome: fao, 2016).
2 C.M. Duarte et al., “Will the Oceans Help Feed Humanity?,” Bioscience 59 (2009): 967–976.
3 H.E. Froehlich et al., “Offshore Aquaculture: I Know It When I See It,” Frontiers in Marine 
 Science 4 (2017): 154, doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2017.00154.
4 A. Lovatelli, J. Aguilar-Manjarrez, and D. Soto, eds., Expanding Mariculture Farther Offshore—
Technical, Environmental, Spatial and Governance Challenges, fao Technical Workshop, 22–25 
March 2010, Orbetello, Italy, fao Fisheries and Aquaculture Proceedings No. 24 (Rome: fao, 
2013), 4, http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3092e/i3092e00.htm.
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easy access. Under such a definition, currently the commercial or experimen-
tal production of offshore aquaculture is still minimal.
Most countries cannot expect to develop much further their nearshore 
marine farming industry because (1) world competition for coastal sites and 
conflicts over use of space has increased, (2) coastal farming operations have 
seen their densities increased over the years, often becoming the cause of se-
vere sanitary and environmental disruptions, economic losses, and instability, 
(3) water quality in those locations is generally getting worse, (4) the cost of 
coastal marine sites is becoming prohibitive, (5) and coastal communities are 
increasingly opposing nearshore aquaculture. Therefore, it is certain that in 
the coming decades, a large portion, if not most, marine aquaculture activi-
ties will have to move to open-ocean locations or, alternatively, be done land-
based, with pumped water, with or without recirculation.
However, even if offshore aquaculture might have some theoretical ad-
vantages, it is yet to be explored in terms of its technicalities, economic ef-
ficiency, and environmental and social sustainability.5 Currently, there are no 
well-established or standardized offshore aquaculture production methods for 
marine finfish or other species, which is why offshore farming has very limited 
coverage thus far. Not many industry players are willing to lead the way, pos-
sibly due to the large initial investments, extra costs, and more complicated 
logistics related to moving offshore, which will require larger production to 
offset increased outlays.
 Where Is the Potential to Develop Offshore Aquaculture?
An fao publication in 2013, provided a global assessment of the status and po-
tential for offshore mariculture development from a spatial perspective, with 
an indication of near-future global and national potential for its expansion.6 
Kapetsky et al. concluded that offshore mariculture was limited spatially by 
the need to tether cages and longlines to the seafloor, and thus, the exclusive 
economic zone (eez) area was either too deep (88 percent), or too shallow 
or showed stronger currents. With such considerations, only about 1.4  million 
km2 (0.87 percent) of the eez area was suitable for offshore cages and longlines. 
5 Id.
6 J.M. Kapetsky, J. Aguilar-Manjarrez and J. Jenness, A Global Assessment of Potential for Off-
shore Mariculture Development from a Spatial Perspective, fao Fisheries and Aquaculture 




However, they did not discuss the increasing number of solutions currently be-
ing developed for vessel-type devices and self-positioned cages, which do not 
require mooring, thus amplifying spatial solutions immensely.
Kapetsky et al. also explored the potential production for fed fish in tropical 
ecosystems (e.g., cobia), in temperate ecosystems (salmon), and blue  mussels, 
a non-fed species also from temperate environments. They showed, for 
example, that salmon production could be increased by more than one million 
tonnes using only 5 percent of the offshore aquaculture estimated suitable 
area (122 km2), while cobia could increase by 48 million tonnes in 5 percent 
(48,000  km2) of this area. These production numbers are very conservative 
since some technical restrictions will disappear due to rapid technology 
advances, e.g., tethering cages deeper than 100 m or not mooring them at all, 
and even considering floating cages in areas beyond national jurisdiction. 
Such farming systems may gain acceptability if they prove to be profitable and 
manageable from a logistics standpoint.
 Investment, Technologies, Human Resources, and Research Needed
Most current offshore aquaculture production systems are submergible de-
vices, particularly in the case of fish, mainly salmon and cobia. It has been 
concluded that underwater farming devices such as cages, longlines, etc., can 
perform better and survive even strong force, category 4 hurricanes. Other 
non-submergible equipment is also being devised and/or conceived, such as 
boats of different types (fixed or untethered), and cages and cage-like contain-
ers of different sizes and conditions.
The economics of offshore farming has not been well-studied, although it 
is commonly argued that offshore aquaculture farming devices will require 
more investment per unit of production than conventional coastal systems. 
Furthermore, they will be more expensive to operate and maintain. Indeed, 
it is expected that farms will cost more to run, as they require more sophisti-
cated and expensive equipment and procedures, and correspondingly, highly 
trained personnel. It is likely that the latter expertise—fewer but very special-
ized jobs—will not necessarily be drawn from nearshore communities, a fact 
that might complicate offshore aquaculture’s acceptance, though the possible 
provision of additional fish food in the future at more affordable prices may 
counter such concerns. Additionally, there is a need for much more research 
and development along the production process and value chain.
To offset higher investment costs and more complicated logistics, the aver-
age size of an offshore farming operation would likely exceed that of coastal 
Fisheries and Aquaculture382
<UN>
farms. This fact limits for now the idea of small-scale offshore farming units, 
and makes large-scale operations the only ones with probable feasibility (eco-
nomically, technically, and otherwise) in the near future.
 Offshore Aquaculture: Environmental Implications
Compared with nearshore aquaculture, environmental risks associated with 
offshore aquaculture can be smaller, especially those associated with nutrient 
and organic enrichment of sediments and modification of benthic communi-
ties, eutrophication of water bodies, release of chemicals used to control water 
conditions and diseases, and competition for and, in some cases, depletion 
of resources (e.g., water).7 Indeed, considering much deeper sites with higher 
currents, it is unlikely that organic matter will significantly affect the seabed, 
generate local eutrophication, or cause other cumulative impacts. However, 
appropriate oceanographic modeling to forecast potential impacts to the sur-
rounding ecosystem and to the farm itself is essential, as well as close environ-
mental monitoring to follow up on potential impacts. Offshore aquaculture 
operations could increase the danger of generating local conditions that could 
trigger phytoplankton blooms or attract/foster jellyfish outbreaks.
Risks that could increase from offshore aquaculture might relate to biodi-
versity and ecosystem losses due to escaped fish.8 Even if fish cages are much 
more resistant today, weather conditions in offshore and open seas could be 
very rough, and escape risks will always be present. Considering much larger 
cages, as will be the case, massive numbers of fish could escape under extreme 
conditions. Given that cages will be comparatively far from the coast, chances 
for fish species such as salmon or mussels to interact with local biodiversity 
and/or establish a population could be low, but there is not enough informa-
tion to ascertain the same for other species such as cobia, considering that 
species in this genus (Rachycentron) spawn in open seas.
Clearly, any offshore aquaculture development requires adequate risk-
based spatial planning.9 In an open-sea environment it is much more difficult 
7 See Duarte et al., supra note 2, and Lovatelli et al., supra note 4.
8 E.B. Thorstad et al., Incidence and Impacts of Escaped Farmed Atlantic Salmon Salmo salar in 
Nature, Report from the Technical Working Group on Escapes of the Salmon Aquaculture 
Dialogue, nina Special Report 36 (World Wildlife Fund, 2008), http://oldsalmon.ca/docs/
uploads/impacts-escapes-2008.pdf.
9 J. Aguilar-Manjarrez, D. Soto and R. Brummett, Aquaculture Zoning, Site Selection and Area 
Management under the Ecosystem Approach to Aquaculture: A Handbook, Report ACS18071 
(fao, Rome, and World Bank Group, Washington, DC, 2017), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6834e.pdf; 
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to establish boundaries of impacts, and there is as well a need for very carefully 
designed and implemented monitoring systems for environmental conditions 
and biotic interactions in the farm’s estimated area of influence.
 Governance Issues and Needs
The poor image of aquaculture in many places, the fact that there is no previ-
ous or well-established history of offshore farming, and the likelihood that its 
initial development will involve huge projects, suggest that it will be resisted by 
many. Therefore, contacts with authorities, local communities, fishers and oth-
er ocean users will be necessary to make this new production system  accepted 
and well-established.
In general, there is no special legislation regarding prerequisites to install 
and run new offshore fish farms, or to address the ways they should relate to 
local fisheries and traditional fishing grounds, ports, local communities, and 
tourism, etc. This is also the case regarding potential conflicts in areas where 
wild fish stocks, whales, and other marine mammals are known to forage, mi-
grate, reproduce, or where it is believed that farming might put fragile ma-
rine environments at risk. In most cases, all new aquaculture activities are 
framed by national norms and regulations that tend to be more relevant to 
coastal aquaculture. Also, there is a legal vacuum over regulating mariculture 
operations in areas beyond national jurisdiction (abnj), leading to a series of 
 potential controversies that could arise from such activity.10 Further, according 
to Lovatelli et al., coastal states are entitled to legislate in order to protect facili-
ties and installations within the territorial sea, and they must properly inform 
about their laws and regulations under the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea.11 International law does not impose other general restric-
tions on how coastal states manage mariculture within their territorial seas. 
Most of the above-mentioned matters could benefit from an international ap-
proach to develop the main framework within which offshore farming should 
conform, especially if the activity is moved into abnj.
Safety at sea is and will be a matter of high priority for offshore fish farm 
operators. The same applies to fish escapes, predators, robberies, fish diseases, 
 fao, Aquaculture Development. 4. Ecosystem Approach to Aquaculture, fao Technical 
Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries No. 5, Suppl. 4 (Rome: fao, 2010), http://www.fao 
.org/docrep/013/i1750e/i1750e.pdf.
10 See Lovatelli et al., supra note 4.
11 Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 u.n.t.s. 3.
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and the use of antibiotics and other pharmaceuticals, while the environmental 
effects of unused feed and fish faeces also have to be addressed. Treatment 
of fish mortalities and maintenance and repair procedures will also have to 
be dealt with under appropriate management. Clearly, a full set of regulations 
is needed worldwide to get offshore farming established, well-organized, and 
able to receive social acceptance, an extremely relevant goal.
We are certain that open ocean aquaculture is bound to become one of 
the most used production procedures in the coming decades in many parts of 
the world, and more increasingly so, as freshwater resources become scarcer. 
Therefore, careful and more intense consideration should be given to this  novel 






 Ocean energy resources—not only petroleum and natural gas, but the untapped, 
in��nite, renewable, and non-polluting energy resources of the sea itself; the 
energy of tides and waves and currents, of thermal or salinity gradients, or of the 
huge and incredibly fast-growing biomass (kelp) of the sea—will make a major 
contribution to the satisfaction of the world’s energy needs. 
 Elisabeth Mann Borgese* 
 *  The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource (Tokyo: United  Nations University 




Elisabeth Mann Borgese believed that ocean renewable energy was “likely to 
considerably increase the ‘quantifiable’ contribution of the ocean to the global 
gdp,” and stated that methane hydrates of the deep seabed created “ fascinating 
futuristic scenarios” as an energy source in the twenty-first century.1 In that 
 context, her breadth of interests in the resource potential of the ocean is 
 reflected in this part on ocean energy, in a few thoughtful and forward- looking 
essays. Topics include tidal energy resource development, environmental 
 culture and regulation of the offshore petroleum development industry, and 
managing exploration risks of petroleum energy extraction.
1 E. Mann Borgese, The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource (Tokyo: United 
Nations University Press, 1998), 69.
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I must go down to the seas again, for the call of the running tide
Is a wild call and a clear call that may not be denied
john masefield, Sea Fever
∵
 Introduction
There should be little doubt that the world needs to diminish its dependence 
upon fossil fuels for electricity generation. Marine renewable energy (mre), 
in the forms of offshore wind, tidal, wave, or ocean thermal energy, remains 
the largest under-exploited energy source, with the potential to supply more 
than the total electricity demand in the world. It is estimated that the global 
wave energy resource alone is about 32,000 terawatt hours (TWh) per year, 
compared with the global electricity supply of ~24,000 TWh per year in 2014.1 
Global potential for tidal power could be up to 1,000 TWh per year.2 The vari-
ous mre technologies differ significantly in their readiness for large-scale ex-
ploitation. The most mature technology is that of offshore wind generation, 
which has evolved from extensive experience on land. The least mature is wave 
energy generation, numerous devices for which are still in early developmental 
stages. Mechanical energy from tides is a centuries-old technology based upon 
impoundment of tidal waters, and barrage-based installations (the tidal range 
approach) for electricity generation has been considered in Canada (the Bay of 
Fundy) and Europe for more than 100 years. One turbine installed in a dam at 
1 World Energy Council, World Energy Resources, Marine Energy (London: World Energy Coun-
cil, 2016). 1 terawatt hour (TWh) = 1,000 megawatt hours (MWh).
2 M. Hoogwijk and W. Crijns-Graus, Global Potential of Renewable Energy Resources: A Litera-
ture Assessment (Renewable Energy Policy Network, 2008).
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Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia, has been in operation since 1985. New technolo-
gies designed to convert the energy of flowing water (i.e., tidal stream), rather 
than impounded water, are rapidly developing and offer significantly fewer en-
vironmental effects than those based on barrages or tidal lagoons.
In Canada, significant opportunities exist for mre on all three coasts. Of 
the options, tidal stream energy is particularly attractive because its timing 
and scale are eminently predictable, and its development can be incremental, 
which is an important consideration when the environmental effects are 
uncertain. Large-scale tidal stream devices generating one to two megawatts 
of electricity offer considerable potential, especially for isolated communities 
on all three coasts where tidal flows exceed one to two meters per second. In 
addition, arrays of such large-scale devices could make valuable contributions 
to established electricity grids, especially where, as in the Bay of Fundy, a large 
tidal resource exists in a region of strong energy demand.
 Issues Affecting Progress
 Technological Issues
During the past decade, tidal stream energy conversion technologies have 
advanced from conceptual designs to the testing of full-scale devices. While 
this progress in engineering is encouraging, challenges remain. Unlike wind 
power, the industry is nascent and has yet to converge on a single design type. 
The most mature designs tend to utilize lift-based axial- or cross-flow turbines, 
with a wide variety of installation configurations (e.g., bottom-mounted or 
surface-piercing, gravity-based or pile-driven). To date, tidal stream device de-
ployments worldwide have been short-term (mostly less than one year), and 
have generally consisted of only one device, the largest thus far consisting of 
four. Deploying and operating large-scale arrays is therefore some time away.
Field testing to date has indicated that a major technological challenge to 
reaching commercial-scale arrays is in designing devices that can survive the 
extremely harsh environment in which they must operate. The fast currents 
that characterize tidal energy sites generate huge forces on any stationary 
structure.3 Furthermore, tidal energy sites tend to be extremely turbulent 
as water is pushed at high speeds through complex channels and around 
headlands. Turbines built to operate in bi-directional flow are subjected to 
forces from many directions, leading to more rapid turbine failure. In areas 




with sediment-laden water, devices may be ‘sand-blasted’ on each tide, which 
hastens corrosion of essential components. Failures of seals and connectors 
are a common problem in any marine undertaking, and the lifespan of under-
sea components can be shortened by constant motion due to currents and by 
fluctuating environmental conditions. In addition, device access is generally 
limited to periods of low flow between each tide, and calm weather conditions. 
Depending on device design, regular maintenance may require costly retrieval 
of the entire device.
Other technological obstacles are related to the supporting infrastructure 
rather than the devices themselves. Many of the areas identified for instream 
tidal energy development are remote, and manufacturing facilities or vessels 
large enough to transport and deploy full-scale turbines may not be available 
locally. Furthermore, electrical grids in remote areas generally must be 
redesigned and strengthened to deliver tidal energy to where it is needed. 
 Continued development and testing is expected to overcome many of these 
challenges in the near future.
 Environmental Issues
Development of any marine industry poses potential risk to the environment, 
and tidal energy is no exception. Previous environmental studies at estab-
lished tidal power stations, particularly the Annapolis Tidal Generating Sta-
tion in Nova Scotia, identified numerous environmental issues, many of which 
are attributable to the dam rather than the turbine. Consequently, stand-alone 
tidal stream technologies are now being demonstrated in Nova Scotia and 
elsewhere.
To address environmental effects in Nova Scotia’s high flow passages, 
 numerical models describing the energy resource, flows of water, mixing, etc., 
on both large and small scales have been developed, allowing more precise 
prediction of the physical effects of extracting energy from the tides. Video 
and sonar technologies have been used to examine benthic life in the passages, 
and field investigations have looked at changes in sediments and salt marshes 
that might arise from changes to tidal flows. Priority environmental issues 
relate to the behavior of fish, birds, and marine mammals in the vicinity of 
working turbines, the possible mortality and deterrent effects that an array of 
turbines might have on the normal migratory behavior of these animals, and 
the population level consequences of these.
The biggest challenges faced in sensing both fish and marine mammals 
at the Fundy Ocean Research Center for Energy (force) turbine test site in 
Minas Passage in the Bay of Fundy have been high flow-induced effects on 
noise and sensor mooring stability. These and other challenges experienced 
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in conducting effects monitoring have created much uncertainty for regulators 
concerned with the potential effects of tidal turbine installations on critical 
habitat and endangered and commercial species. Assessing the likelihood of 
marine animals encountering tidal devices and colliding with their moving 
parts has been attempted through acoustic detection of tagged fish (four species 
of concern), passive acoustic detection of marine mammals, and various sonar 
technologies to monitor the seasonal presence, distribution, and  movements 
of fish. Coupling of sensor technologies has recently aided understanding of 
the avoidance or evasive behavior of marine animals in close proximity to 
turbines, but the collection of sufficient data to address regulator concerns, 
even at the turbine demonstration stage (single device or small array), is 
expensive and the data sets are enormous. Automated detection software for 
many acoustic sensing technologies are in need of further development and 
will require validation via field sampling programs.
Research on environmental effects of tidal energy development will be in-
complete for some time yet. Ongoing efforts are required to enable assessment 
of risk and, where identified, development of risk mitigation strategies. Prior-
ity activities need to include advancements in sensing technologies and soft-
ware, high performance sensor moorings, field validation, and environmental 
monitoring guidelines for tidal energy developers and regulators.
 Socio-economic Issues
Even if the current testing programs confirm that tidal stream technologies are 
technologically feasible and environmentally acceptable, there remain signifi-
cant challenges toward their widespread development and application. First 
and foremost of these is financing. mre electricity is initially more expensive 
than that from fossil fuels, and, given the uncertainty in the performance and 
maintenance costs of tidal stream devices, private sector funds have not been 
very forthcoming. In fact, at the present time, risk assessments tend to encour-
age companies to delay investment,4 leaving the costs of research and demon-
stration to be met primarily from public funds. The more rapid development 
of mre in Europe than in Canada is reflective of the willingness and capacity 
of European countries to address the challenges of climate change, and greater 
public investments have been made. Potential conflicts with existing uses and 
users of tidal coastal waters remains a challenge. In 2008 and 2014, Nova Scotia 




conducted two strategic environmental assessments5 and a policy review6 in 
relation to tidal power development in the Bay of Fundy that included exten-
sive public and interest group consultations. These concluded that the pub-
lic was cautiously optimistic that tidal stream energy could materially assist 
the province to reduce its use of coal and bring economic and social benefits 
to coastal communities. Subsequently, however, some coastal resource user 
groups have resisted even the testing of large tidal stream devices, arguing that 
turbines will significantly affect their use of space, kill marine life, and place 
endangered species at risk. In spite of the considerable research carried out 
since 2009 to assess the real risk to marine organisms, misinformation is rife, 
and the reluctance of developers to release information promptly allows such 
misinformation to prevail regardless of its lack of basis in fact.
An additional cause of declining public confidence lies in the slow progress 
of testing. After eight years, two turbines only have been installed at the Minas 
Passage test site: one in 2009 that failed after three weeks, and a second in 
2016 that was removed after six months of operation. These short deployments 
result from the extremely harsh conditions encountered within the Minas 
Passage; an important consequence, however, is that answers to some of 
the  critical environmental questions cannot be obtained without prolonged 
monitoring with turbines operating on site.
In contrast to some negative views repeated in the media, there remains 
optimism in government and the scientific sector that environmentally 
acceptable, cost-effective means of capturing energy from Canada’s tidal 
waters can be found. If so, its predictability and potential use to support 
remote coastal communities that are currently dependent upon diesel fuel 
(e.g., in the Arctic) could benefit these communities and contribute to Canada’s 
national plan to deal with greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, the expertise 
developed in environmental assessment, monitoring, and deployment is a 
marketable asset as other countries around the globe attempt to capture their 
tidal energy resources. Already, the challenging environmental conditions of 
high flow tidal waters has stimulated major innovations and improvements 
in monitoring technologies by Canadian companies that have substantial 
markets worldwide.
5 Offshore Energy Environmental Research Association (oeer), Fundy Tidal Energy Strate-
gic Environmental Assessment Final Report (Halifax: oeer, April 2008); Jacques Whitford, 
Background Report for the Fundy Tidal Energy Strategic Environmental Assessment (Halifax: 
Jacques Whitford, January 2008); aecom Canada Ltd., Tidal Energy: Strategic Environmental 
Assessment, Update for the Bay of Fundy (Halifax: aecom Canada Ltd., 2014).
6 R.O. Fournier, Marine Renewable Energy Legislation: A Consultative Process, Report to the 
Nova Scotia Government (Halifax, 2011).
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 The Role of Governance
The faltering progress of device development, combined with continuing 
questions of feasibility, true operating costs and benefits, and environmental 
effects, leave tidal power electricity generation in an uncertain position in 
Canada. In some ways, this is a repetition of past experience: electricity from 
the tides of Fundy has been considered numerous times over the last 106 years. 
Part of the cause lies in the extremely dynamic conditions at the site(s) chosen 
for testing. A second factor is the limited development of marine spatial 
 planning in Nova Scotia’s coastal waters, where important fisheries, aqua-
culture, transportation, recreational, and tourism-related activities already 
exist. Addition of renewable energy developments inevitably raises issues of 
conflict, particularly with fisheries in the Bay of Fundy.
Two things are clearly required: 1) an effective marine spatial plan for each 
location suitable for marine renewable energy development; and 2) a long-
term vision for marine renewable energy at all levels of government. This vision 
needs to encourage systematic and achievable developments in science and 
engineering that will assist coastal communities and the nation to minimize 
dependence on fossil fuels.
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Environmental Culture and Mitigation Criteria  
for Offshore Oil and Gas Activities
Elizabeth A. MacDonald
Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
 Background
While considered a frontier exploration area, offshore petroleum activities be-
gan in eastern Canadian waters in 1943, when the first offshore well was drilled 
off Prince Edward Island.1 There have been substantial changes to the industry 
since the 1940s, most notably with changes in technology, the Canadian regula-
tory regime, and in philosophies and culture.
The most important advancement in the offshore petroleum industry, not 
just within Canada but worldwide, has been the development and continu-
ous improvement in fostering a safe workplace mentality or ‘safety culture’ by 
industry professionals. Inherent within safety culture lies the lesser discussed, 
and even lesser understood, environmental culture. People, like other living 
things, have natural survival instincts; they want to work safely because life and 
limb may be at risk if they do not. It is relatively easy to convince employees, 
government officials, and executives that safety is important, especially in a 
high-risk work environment like the frigid Northwest Atlantic.
People appreciate the importance of working safely and maintaining a safe 
work place; their own lives and the lives of people they work with depend on 
it. So, how does environmental culture fit into all this? While environmental 
culture has not yet been elevated to the forefront of the minds of the general 
public when they consider day-to-day workings in the offshore, what lives 
beneath the waves is, however, at the forefront of the minds of offshore 
employees, regulatory bodies, and industry executives.
This essay discusses the established protections required when working 
in the offshore petroleum industry on the east coast of Canada, particularly 
offshore Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador.2 Mass media typically 
focuses on extreme events, such as major explosions and spills. The typical 
1 P. McKenzie-Brown, G. Jaremko and D. Finch, The Great Oil Age: The Petroleum Industry in 
Canada (Calgary: Detselig Enterprise, 1993).
2 The information provided is publicly available online at http://www.cnsopb.ns.ca/environ 
ment or http://www.cnlopb.ca/environment.
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day-to-day life on an offshore installation is not well-understood by the general 
public. Aversion to offshore activity is typically the norm, regardless of existing 
protections that help to ensure the norm is relatively uneventful. This essay 
summarizes information from hundreds of regulatory documents prepared 
over the past seventy years.
 General Offshore Landscape
Offshore petroleum activity is divided into two broad categories: exploration 
and development. Major offshore exploration projects typically involve 
either seismic data acquisition or exploration drilling. Other technologies 
exist, such as aerogravity surveying,3 Marine Vibroseis,4 and electromagnetic 
surveying, but are infrequently used. This essay focuses on well-established 
mitigation measures for seismic data acquisition and exploratory drilling, as 
well as development and production of resources in the Canadian Northwest 
Atlantic.5
 Regulatory Regime
It is important to assess the potential effects of offshore petroleum activity 
on marine wildlife during an activity application review. This assessment is 
conducted by regulatory authorities for populations of species anticipated to 
occur within or adjacent to project areas, and at an enhanced level for species 
at risk listed on Schedule 1 of the federal Species at Risk Act.6 Consideration and 
mitigation are typically required for the following:
– marine mammals
– turtles
– marine and migratory birds
– fish
– species at risk and critical habitat
– commercial fisheries and other oceans users
– prevention of accidents and malfunctions
3 A form of gravimetry incorporating real-time aerial navigation.
4 Marine Vibroseis is quieter than seismic airguns and does not use sharp pulses, which are 
known to be quite damaging for marine life.
5 See the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers website for information on how activi-
ties in Atlantic Canada are conducted at http://atlanticcanadaoffshore.ca.
6 S.C. 2002, c. 29.
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Activity applications are reviewed by the respective Offshore Petroleum 
Boards whose jurisdiction contains the proposed activity (presently Nova Sco-
tia or Newfoundland and Labrador), in conjunction with other federal depart-
ments, including, but are not limited to, the Canadian Environmental Assess-
ment Agency, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and Environment and Climate 
Change Canada. A myriad of acts, regulations, and guidelines apply, including 
the following:
– Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation 
Act and Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act
– Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (2012)
– Oceans Act
– Fisheries Act
– Canadian Environmental Protection Act
– Species at Risk Act
– Nova Scotia Offshore Drilling and Production Regulations and Newfoundland 
Offshore Petroleum Drilling and Production Regulations
– The Statement of Canadian Practice with Respect to the Mitigation of Seis-
mic Sound in the Marine Environment (Seismic Statement of Practice)
– Offshore Waste Treatment Guidelines
– Offshore Chemical Selection Guidelines
– Geophysical, Geological, Environmental and Geotechnical Program Guide-
lines (2012)
An environmental assessment is the main component of the activity applica-
tion that considers potential effects on the marine ecosystem. Environmental 
assessment takes anywhere from six to eight months (typical for seismic appli-
cations) to two years (some exploration and development applications).
 Seismic Exploration
Seismic exploration has been a fairly regular occurrence in the Canadian 
Northwest Atlantic this past decade (2006–2016), occurring every year or 
two. Arguably the least understood in terms of potential effects on marine 
species, seismic programs nonetheless have a comprehensive list of mitigation 
requirements. The precautionary approach is the primary established philo-
sophy. It is a world of unknowns within the scientific community; therefore 
caution is exercised regardless of a lack of physical or observed evidence to 
support concerns of significant negative effects on marine wildlife. Published 
research has been, and continues to be, conducted on the topic; however, it 
would be remiss to claim scientific certainty in the form of statistically significant 
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evidence of negative effects caused by seismic programs conducted offshore. 
Nonetheless, every living thing has intrinsic value regardless of whether or not 
there are interactions with anthropogenic activities, and mitigation is required 
and implemented during offshore petroleum exploration to help safeguard 
against adverse environmental effects on marine wildlife.
With respect to the potential effects of seismic activity, the main concerns are 
noise effects on marine life, vessel presence, and ship strikes on large cetaceans, 
especially species at risk like the North Atlantic right whale. Although no 
known evidence exists demonstrating that any large marine mammal in Nova 
Scotia or Newfoundland waters has been harmed through hearing damage or 
otherwise by a seismic program, the implemented mitigation measures are 
considered the regulatory standard. Adherence to mitigation measures within 
the Seismic Statement of Practice includes, but is not limited to the following:
– Implementing an exclusion zone for monitoring and shut-down require-
ments, such as shutting down in the case of species at risk entering the ex-
clusion zone. Marine mammal observers have the ability to immediately 
shut down a seismic program if a species at risk comes within the exclusion 
zone of the program.
– Prescribed marine mammal detection measures such as visual and acoustic 
monitoring.
– ‘Ramping up’—starting with the smallest volume outputs and working to 
full sound outputs when beginning programs, after shut downs and in poor 
visibility (fog) or darkness to give any wildlife a chance to leave the area 
should they wish to do so.
– Zero activity within known spawning grounds and during known spawning 
times.
The above mitigation measures are the major themes detailed within the 
Seismic Statement of Practice. Adherence to the Statement is considered a 
minimum standard for protection from seismic noise. Each seismic program 
 application is reviewed with specific mitigation requirements assigned based 
on the spatial and temporal boundaries of the program, and the results of the 
environmental assessment. Other required mitigation measures may include 
the following:
– avoidance of species at risk and/or their critical habitat areas
– specific speeds at which vessels may travel
– limiting activity within or adjacent to marine protected areas or critical 
habitat areas
– no ballast water exchanges in sensitive areas
– minimizing hydrocarbons on board vessels and seismic equipment
– protocols for stranded birds
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– communications protocols with other oceans users
– on-board fisheries liaison observers
– minimizing flaring
– spill prevention plans, procedures, and response equipment on board
These mitigation measures are not meant to be comprehensive lists because 
every activity application is unique.7
 Exploratory Drilling and Development Activity
Exploratory drilling occurs less often than seismic programs in the Canadian 
Northwest Atlantic, and is a much less regular occurrence than in established 
areas, such as the Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea. Development activity 
is rare; less than half a dozen operations are currently in place as of 2017. 
Nonetheless, the potential effects of exploratory drilling and development 
are much better understood than the potential effects of seismic exploration 
because they are clearly observable. The potential impacts can also leave a 
larger ecological footprint. Required mitigation measures may include, but are 
not  limited to the following:
– temporal and spatial restrictions for sensitive areas, such as marine pro-
tected areas and critical habitat
– minimizing discharges and emissions
– bird handling protocols
– reporting of wildlife observations
– use of specialized equipment to remove potential hydrocarbons or toxic flu-
ids from entering the ocean
– use of water-based drilling muds where technically feasible and shipping 
cuttings to shore for disposal rather than at-sea disposal
– avoiding sensitive benthic habitat
– minimizing disturbance to the seabed
– appropriate ballast water control
– onshore disposal of hazardous wastes
– appropriate communication and coordination with other oceans users
– chemical screening for selection of least hazardous chemicals for use
– spill prevention plans and procedures, and proven, effective spill response 
plans, including exercising these plans to demonstrate effectiveness
7 For complete lists of current typical mitigations, see strategic environmental assess-
ments produced by the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board and the Canada- 
Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board online at http://www.cnsopb.ns.ca/ 
environment and http://www.cnlopb.ca/environment/.
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Of these mitigation measures, arguably the most discussed is spill  preven tion. 
It  comes as no surprise, as a major spill has potential tragic consequences 
to both human life and wildlife, as well as to the ecosystem and other ocean 
 users. For these reasons, there are numerous protections in place. One  major 
 protective measure is the coming into force in 2015 of the ‘polluter pays’ 
principle within the federal Energy Safety and Security Act, which outlines 
the  liability regime that is applicable to spills and debris in the offshore areas. 
The Act’s Summary states:
(a) …the “polluter pays” principle, which is consistent with the notion that 
the liability of at-fault operators is unlimited;
(b) increases to $1 billion the limit of liability, without proof of fault or 
negligence, to which certain operators are subject in the event of a spill 
or damages caused by debris;8
These requirements eliminate under-experienced operators from conducting 
exploration drilling in the offshore Canadian Northwest Atlantic. Regardless, 
spills remain a recognized risk. To minimize the risks and impacts of spills, 
prevention, preparedness, and response are key requirements. Applications 
must include assurances that a well is properly designed and controlled. 
Hazards must be identified and mitigated against. Applications are reviewed by 
regulatory authorities who are experts in the fields of engineering, technology, 
geology, geophysics, ocean sciences, and environmental protection.
In addition to the required environmental assessment, activity applications 
must include a spill response plan and an environmental protection plan. Au-
dit and inspections of these plans and their contained processes are conducted 
on rigs and in-office several times per year. Spill response plans must include 
a spill risk assessment relevant to the project, detailed descriptions of how op-
erators plan to prevent spills, and how they would respond to a variety of spill 
scenarios. It must be demonstrated that the necessary equipment is available 
and trained personnel are prepared to respond to a spill, should one occur. 
Drills and training exercises are required on a regular basis. The majority of 
spills is minor in nature (less than 100 ml), dissipating naturally and requiring 
no response. Every spill must be reported and investigated regardless of vol-
ume. Trends are analyzed and maintenance programs must be adapted when 
necessary to safeguard against incidents. Best available preventative practices 
are expected and enforced. In the rare case of a major spill, however, technolo-
gies available for use are evolving and improving. Examples of currently best 
available technologies include
8 S.C. 2015, c. 4.
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– capping stacks and relief wells;
– use of barriers (floating boom);
– mechanical recovery using clean up equipment such as skimmers;
– burning oil gathered at sea; and/or
– dispersant use, if approved.9
 Conclusion
In review, existing and well-established protections required when working 
in the offshore petroleum industry in the Canadian Northwest Atlantic have 
been discussed. Hopefully, the reader’s understanding of how the environment 
is protected during the day-to-day norm of offshore operations has been 
enhanced. Accidents do happen, and they can and have been tragic. However, 
this is not the norm for the offshore petroleum industry in Atlantic Canada, or 
anywhere in the world. The Canadian offshore regulatory regime is designed 
to be fair, efficient, and safe, to hold environmental protection paramount. It’s 
a cultural mindset.
9 An excellent resource for detailed information on spill response technologies is Oil Spill Re-
sponse Limited’s website at https://www.oilspillresponse.com.
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 Introduction
Risk analyses entail a multi-dimensional matrix that considers scalable 
political, economic, social, technical, environmental, and safety factors. Risk 
is the probability of an event occurring multiplied by the magnitude of its 
adverse consequences. The risk of offshore exploration is addressed through 
development and implementation of mandatory safety management systems 
(sms) vetted by regulatory bodies and third-party certifying agencies. Risk 
 management processes within the sms are employed throughout all stages in 
exploration projects, from the conceptual planning stage down to each work 
shift on deck. This essay considers risks to frontier and offshore oil and gas 
exploration, as opposed to the risks of oil and gas exploration. The issue is 
considered in a Canadian context.
Meaningful commentary on exploration risk requires an outlook on glob-
al energy demand and socio-economic trends. Today, there is uncertainty as 
most major energy players are looking inward, re-assessing and adjusting their 
business models and re-baselining their market projections in response to the 
steep market downturn. The risks to conducting oil and gas exploration pro-
grams are always dynamic, but particularly complex under depressed market 
conditions.
 Global Energy Outlook
According to a United Nations report, the current world population of 7.3 
billion is expected to reach 9.7 billion in 2050.1 Projected gains in global 
1 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World 
Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables, Working Paper 
No. ESA/P/WP.241 (New York: United Nations, 29 July 2015), http://www.un.org/en/develop-
ment/desa/news/population/2015-report.html.
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productivity will lead to increasing prosperity and rising standards of living, 
with more than two billion people lifted from low incomes.2 Nearly two-thirds 
of the increase in global energy consumption will be for power generation.3 
Although there is an ongoing, gradual, and steady transition from combustible 
fuels to ‘clean’ energy sources, fossil fuels account for over 75 percent of 
present energy demand. The fuel mix transition will continue with growth in 
renewables, nuclear, and hydroelectric power, together accounting for half the 
growth in energy supply over the forecast; however, oil, gas and coal will remain 
the dominant sources of energy, especially in developing nations where fossil 
fuels are more affordable than renewables. According to Enerdata, virtually all 
growth in world energy demand will come from emerging economies, with 
China and India accounting for over half the increase.4
Under this demand forecast, one would expect businesses involved in ex-
ploring for hydrocarbons and exporting them to developing economy states to 
do well. Conservative estimates of global ‘proved’ oil reserves have more than 
doubled over the past thirty-five years. Thus, for every barrel of oil consumed, 
more than two new barrels have been discovered. The abundance of known oil 
resources today dwarves the world’s likely consumption of oil out to 2050 and 
beyond.5 Cumulative global oil demand amounts to less than half of today’s 
technically recoverable oil resources.6
This abundance of hydrocarbon reserves, combined with the prospect of 
slowing oil demand, has prompted competitive change in global oil supply. 
Low-cost producers are leveraging their competitive advantage to increase 
market share. Although costs vary significantly within resource categories (i.e., 
coal, oil, and gas), the majority of low extraction-cost reserves are located in 
large, conventional onshore oilfields, particularly in the Middle East and Rus-
sia, followed by tight oil prospects in the United States. The extent to which 
supplier behavior changes is a key source of uncertainty.7 Behavioral change 
2 Id.
3 “World Energy Outlook 2017,” International Energy Agency (iea), 14 November 2017, http://
www.iea.org/weo2017.
4 “2020 Global Energy Forecasts,” Enerdata, 1 April 2007, https://www.enerdata.net/publi 
cations/reports-presentations/2020-global-energy-forecasts.html.
5 “BP Energy Outlook 2035: Focus on North America,” BP plc, March 2015, https://www.bp.com/
content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/energy-outlook-2016/energy-outlook-2015-focus 
-on-north-america.pdf.
6 “BP Energy Outlook: 2017 Edition,” BP plc, 2017, https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/
energy-economics/energy-outlook-2017/bp-energy-outlook-2017.pdf.
7 Statoil, Energy Perspectives 2017: Long-term Macro and Market Outlook (Stavanger: Statoil asa, 
31 May 2017), https://www.statoil.com/content/dam/statoil/documents/energy-perspectives/ 
energy-perspectives-2017-v2.pdf.
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will depend on (1) the ability of low-cost producers to increase their supply, 
(2) the extent to which prices respond to increased supply, and (3) the ability 
of higher-cost producers (e.g., oil sands and offshore production) to compete 
by varying their tax and royalty regimes.8
What does this mean for oil and gas exploration in Canada? Market adjust-
ments and environmental concerns have already led to short-term postpone-
ment or outright cancellation of infrastructure, exploration, and low- efficiency 
production projects. An estimated 185,000 direct and indirect jobs were lost in 
Canadian oil sands production over the past few years.9
 Policy and Social License
Before hydrocarbon exploration can begin, the proponent must obtain social 
license to conduct offshore activities. Getting and sustaining social acceptabil-
ity is fundamental to a project’s approval process. The loss of social license 
or community trust by one offshore operator typically has ramifications for 
other exploration firms, even for other ocean sector users. The rise in public 
consciousness to the socio-economic and environmental implications of ex-
ploration projects, Indigenous rights to lands and resources and the global 
social justice movement are factors impacting the approval of exploration per-
mits. This is exemplified by the recent cancellation of the Canadian Energy 
East pipeline project. There are moratoria against hydrocarbon exploration on 
Canada’s Georges Bank and the Beaufort Sea, and against hydraulic fracturing 
in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.
Part of the challenge to proponents is the evolving policy framework, in-
cluding international, federal, provincial, and territorial jurisdictions. The 
 Canadian federal government recognized that to achieve high standards for 
risk and safety management, effective environmental protection, industry 
investment, and economic development, a more efficient regulatory regime 
would have to be developed and aligned with existing international standards, 
such as in Norway.10 However, the Frontier and Offshore Regulatory Review 
8 iea, supra note 3.
9 T. McMillan, “McMillan: Grow the energy industry, don’t just tax it,” Commentary to 
Calgary Herald, Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, 10 July 2015, http://www 
.capp.ca/media/commentary/grow-the-energy-industry-do-not-just-tax-it.
10 Canada Senate, Standing Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources, 
Facts Do Not Justify Banning Canada’s Current Offshore Drilling Operations: A Senate Re-




Initiative has stalled, with little meaningful progress since the Canada Oil 
and Gas Drilling and Production Regulations were completed in 2009.11 Issues 
include the following: regulatory boards have yet to resolve gaps in areas of 
environmental risk, mitigation and response; coordination between federal, 
provincial, and territorial agencies has been ineffective; transition from pre-
scriptive to performance-based regulation is incomplete; and the unsatisfac-
tory use of strategic environmental assessments to identify concerns.12 As a 
result, social pressure has deterred resource development prospects in British 
Columbia, Quebec, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Nunavut.
 Seismic: Not a Four-Letter Word
Seismic exploration is the first phase in the search for oil and gas reservoirs. A 
total of 401,651 km of two-dimensional seismic data and 48,864 km2 of three-
dimensional seismic data has been acquired offshore Nova Scotia.13 To date, 
environmental monitoring programs conducted on seismic sound effects have 
not found dead cetaceans, sea turtles, or fish as a direct result of seismic ex-
ploration. Nonetheless, due to knowledge gaps and variability in research find-
ings, speculation remains, and risk perception is heightened. Suspicion and 
mistrust sustain the impression that geophysical operations pose a high risk to 
marine mammals, crustaceans, sea turtles, and fisheries. Meanwhile, over the 
last four years on the Canadian east coast, there has been considerable scien-
tific and public concern and media coverage attributing deaths of numerous 
large cetaceans to dense sea ice, entanglement with fishing gear, and alleged 
ship collisions. A New England Aquarium study by Kraus et al. in the Bay of 
Fundy found that between 2010 and 2015, 85 percent of North Atlantic right 
whale deaths were due to fishing gear entanglement.14 Ship strikes have 
decreased with mitigation measures to relocate shipping lanes and reduce 
11 A.L. Hanson, “Offshore Drilling in the United States and Norway: A Comparison of Pre-
scriptive and Performance Approaches to Safety and Environmental Regulation,” George-
town International Law Review 23, no. 4 (2011): 555–576.
12 G. Caron, “National Energy Board on the Latest Developments in Northern Oil and Gas 
Regulation,” Speech to the 14th Annual Arctic Oil and Gas Symposium, 11 March 2014, 
https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/bts/nws/spch/2014/nrthrnlgsrgltn/index-eng.html.
13 “Geoscience Overview, Data Compilations, Seismic Offshore NS,” Canada-Nova Scotia 
Offshore Petroleum Board, last updated 2004, https://www.cnsopb.ns.ca/sites/default/
files/pdfs/seismic_offshore_ns.pdf, pers. comm., updated to 2017.
14 S.D. Kraus, et al., “Recent scientific publications cast doubt on North Atlantic right 
whale future,” Frontiers in Marine Science 3, no. 137 (17 August 2016), doi.org/10.3389/
fmars.2016.00137.
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speed. This study concluded that efforts to reduce cetacean and sea turtle 
deaths from fishing gear entanglement are largely unsuccessful. Approximate-
ly 40 percent of all animals caught in fisheries are discarded as trash.15 The risk 
to cetaceans from harvest fishery practices has not been formally assessed by 
any government, or debated in the public arena. One may ask why equivalent 
mitigation and monitoring programs are not consistently applied across all 
ocean resource industries.
In many countries, including Canada, commercial fisheries practice mass 
removal of fish to the brink of population decimation. There seems little pub-
lic opposition to harvest fishing practices, at least to the degree seen against 
seismic exploration. Fishing communities protest exploration primarily over 
concern for reduced catches, though there is no evidence that modern seismic 
methods cause mass death of fish. This year, the Supreme Court of Canada de-
nied seismic exploration in the seas around Baffin Island. Meanwhile, new har-
vest fishery ventures (e.g., surf clams) face little risk of cancellation, regardless 
of how disruptive the seabed extraction method may be to the environment.
 Spills, Media, and Fear
We usually think about accidental oil spills arising from well blowouts, pipeline 
breaks, derailments, and tanker collisions. With respect to exploration drilling, 
the direst consequences envisioned are from a blowout and the resultant im-
pact of released hydrocarbons. sintef’s offshore blowout database, current to 
2014, indicates the risk of blowouts to be very low relative to tens of thousands 
of wells drilled. Then, only a fraction of blowouts last long enough to cause a 
significant spill. Canada’s offshore exploration is nascent, with few exploration 
wells compared to the Gulf of Mexico, North Sea, and other mature jurisdic-
tions. To date, 352 wells have been drilled in offshore Atlantic Canada, so it is 
necessary to look beyond our borders for a robust assessment of the likelihood 
of a blowout. acona predicted the overall probability for an exploratory well 
blowout in 1,000 meters of water to be once in every 8,488 wells drilled.16 Sta-
tistics clearly indicate the risk to be very low.
15 “Turtle Threats: Fisheries Bycatch,” see Turtles, last accessed 23 January 2018, http://www 
.seeturtles.org/fisheries-bycatch.
16 acona Flow Technology AS, “Technical Report: Blowout Risk Evaluation in the Labrador 




The US National Research Council estimated nearly 48 percent of oil 
 entering the oceans is from spills and illegal discharges from ships.17 Another 
21 percent is carried by runoff from urban centers. In all, 18 percent of petro-
leum products entering the oceans originate from industrial accidents. Of this, 
hydrocarbon extraction accounted for six percent. So why the disproportion-
ate scrutiny of oil and gas exploration?
We become captivated when a large spill or blowout occurs, partly because 
they are such rare events. Large oil spills like the Exxon Valdez in Alaska and 
the Macondo blowout in the Gulf of Mexico are considered catastrophes be-
cause they fulfill three criteria: a catastrophe must be big; it has to happen all at 
once; and something about it has to be calamitous, disastrous, and really bad. 
There is a place in our psyche for fear of big, unlikely catastrophes. Media cov-
erage is undeniably excessive. Major news networks report tragedies because 
they know the public will pay attention, and that means increased viewership 
and revenue. It is the unforeseen events close to home, brought daily into our 
living rooms, as was the Deepwater Horizon incident, that sensitize and make 
us fearful. Was the ‘No Rigs’ movement born of such fears?
 A Canadian Perspective
According to the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, Canada is 
among the top ten global oil producers, and the preferred supplier to many 
nations lacking domestic oil resources.18 Sustaining that ranking will require 
continued innovation to improve the efficiency of production and delivery of 
all forms of energy. It will mean public education programs to ‘de-risk’ seismic 
exploration, drilling, and pipeline projects to attain informed social approval. 
Failing that, exploration investment in Canada will remain risky, our energy 
portfolio will become unbalanced, and our energy forecast will be bleak.
17 Transportation Research Board and National Research Council, Oil in the Sea iii: In-
puts, Fates, and Effects (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2003), doi.
org/10.17226/10388.
18 “Canada’s Petroleum Resources,” Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers,  last 
accessed 23 January 2018, http://www.capp.ca/canadian-oil-and-natural-gas/canadas 
-petroleum-resources.
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 The daily acts of violence and terrorism we witness in both developing and 
developed countries dramatically demonstrate the changed nature of the 
problem of “security.” What we are living (or dying) through today is not a war 
fought between nations or superpowers, but waged by a combination of poverty 
and despair, fanaticism and the insanity of deranged minds. 
 Elisabeth Mann Borgese*
 *  Ocean Governance and the United Nations , (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie 




Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s vision of maritime security was pacem in maribus—
peace in the ocean—which became the thematic title of a series of interna-
tional conferences beginning in 1970. Although the themes varied widely over 
more than four decades, the first such event was security-focused and titled 
“Pacem in Maribus: Quiet Enjoyment: Arms Control and Police Forces for the 
Oceans.” Although Elisabeth was, by her own admission, a utopian idealist, 
and forceful advocate of naval disarmament, she was sufficiently pragmatic 
to recognize that until humanity becomes perfect, a perfectly peaceful, global 
ocean remains an aspirational vision. To enjoy peace, people must feel secure 
and, as the authors of this part will show, achieving security on the ocean and 
along its coasts is much more than having naval and police protection, or liv-
ing behind well-defended walls. In addition to defense against all kinds of hu-
man perversity, pacem in maribus also requires an interdisciplinary approach 
to addressing economic insecurity, and the risks of natural, technological, and 
human-caused disasters. That, in her own words, requires the ‘comprehensive 
security’ approach reflected in the essays which follow.
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Security Dimensions of Ocean Governance
David Griffiths
International Ocean Institute-Canada, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
Security is like oxygen—you tend not to notice it until you begin to lose 
it, but once that occurs there is nothing else that you will think about.1
⸪
One would suppose that spending 36 percent of the entire world’s military 
budget would keep a nation secure from a missile attack on its iconic symbols 
of commercial and military power; but one would be wrong. On 11 September 
2001, nineteen young men, all but four being citizens of one of its trusted allies, 
armed only with dollar-store utility knives and dysfunctional ideology, did just 
that; turning four commercial airliners into guided weapons, killing almost 
3,000 people, and triggering events which no one could have foreseen. This is 
not to say that military expenditure is a waste—far from it—but it is a vivid 
reminder that security is not just a problem for military, police and intelligence 
professionals.
Security is not the same as defense; that is, the capability to resist an attack. 
Rather, security is a state of being; confidence in freedom from danger or fear. 
Defense is part of the security equation and is, indeed, primarily a military and 
constabulary issue, but security is a broader, collective responsibility. What, 
then, is the place of maritime defense forces—navies—in ocean governance? 
What are the security roles of the ocean and coastal governance community?
 Armed Conflict: Inconvenient Truths
Unpalatable as it may sound to safe, secure, and idealistic ears, the core func-
tion of a navy is its ability to fight. Of course, warships can, and do, deliver hu-
manitarian aid and contribute to scientific research. Submarines can, and do, 
track criminals covertly and catch illegal fishing in the act. But while  warships 
1 J. Nye, “The Case for Deep Engagement,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 4 (July/August 1995): 90–120, 
96.
© David Griffiths, ���8 | doi:�0.��63/9789004380�7�_070
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC 4.0 License.
411Security Dimensions of Ocean Governance
<UN>
can do such peaceful things, other government vessels cannot, for example, es-
cort merchant ships safely through conflict zones, clear naval mines, or remove 
the threat of a submarine poised to launch a nuclear-tipped missile ashore. 
Nonetheless, possessing specialized combat capabilities does not mean a 
 desire to use them. No responsible firefighter yearns for a disastrous mass-
casualty fire, but still spends a lot of time preparing for one. No responsible 
police officer aspires to a life-threatening shoot-out with a criminal, but is still 
appropriately equipped and trained. Similarly, no responsible sailor aspires 
to war at sea with its deadly implications and inevitable unintended conse-
quences. But wishful thinking will not make the world safer. “Virtuous motives, 
trammelled by inertia and timidity,” said Winston Churchill, “are no match for 
armed and resolute wickedness.”
 Disarmament Myth and Experience
Informed advocates of naval disarmament are rare these days, not least be-
cause it has been tried before with notable lack of success. Far from making 
the ocean more secure, a decade of negotiations in Washington, Geneva and 
London following World War One served, if anything, to encourage warship 
construction to reach negotiated ceilings, and to hasten development of air-
craft carriers to compensate for restrictions on battleships. The former head of 
the League of Nations Disarmament Commission later observed that “nations 
don’t distrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they 
distrust each other.”2 This suggests a potential contribution which the inter-
national, multidisciplinary ocean governance community can make in build-
ing trust, enhancing mutual understanding, and perhaps reducing the risk of 
armed conflict.
 The Rule (and Role) of Law
Unsurprisingly, attempts to legislate violence out of existence have yet to be 
successful, but at least contemporary international law no longer condones 
war as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy, and the value of more than 
a century’s evolution of international humanitarian law on the conduct of 
military operations and treatment of person should not be underestimated. 
Today all nations at least pay lip-service to the United Nations Charter provi-
sions that “that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest” 
and be limited to the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence.” 
As with any system there are violators, often attempting to justify aggression as 
 self-defence, but we do not abandon laws and governance institutions  simply 
2 S. de Madariaga, Morning Without Noon: Memoirs (Saxon House, 1974), 48.
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because some people abuse them. As a former Secretary-General observed, 
“the United Nations was not created in order to bring us to heaven, but in order 
to save us from hell.”3
The centrality of our admittedly imperfect body of international law is pre-
cisely why responding to the 2001 Al-Qaeda attacks by declaring a so-called 
‘Global War on Terrorism’ (with its unlovely acronym ‘gwot’) was so misguid-
ed. Elevating a fringe non-government organization to the status of an enemy 
state played directly into the narrative of criminals from a culture that prizes 
honor and status. Small wonder that Al-Qaeda in Iraq spawned the preposter-
ous pretensions of a so-called ‘Islamic State’ that is neither Islamic nor a state. 
Equally disturbingly, leaders of some otherwise advanced nations are now 
resurrecting retrograde notions like ‘great powers’ and ‘spheres of influence’. 
Clearly this is no time for complacently taking security for granted.
 Terrorism
Terrorism is not warfare: it violates every norm of the international law of 
armed conflict. Rather, it is a law-enforcement issue; albeit one in which 
armies, navies, and air forces have significant roles to play at the international 
level. It might equally well be approached as a public mental health issue be-
cause, in the words of one analyst, “terrorism is not an activity that attracts the 
well-adjusted.”4 No matter what the metaphor, terrorism, like disease, cannot 
be managed by focusing on symptoms while ignoring causes.
Despite dramatic headlines—which is precisely its objective—terrorism 
remains a small threat on a global scale compared with poverty, ignorance, 
inequality, and climate change. Whereas the official death toll from the 2001 
Al-Qaeda attacks was 2,996, the US Institute of Medicine reported a year later 
that 18,000 Americans were dying annually from lack of health insurance—
that represents six 9/11s.5 Noting that two world wars and eighty million 
deaths in the twentieth century were triggered by an assassination in Sarajevo, 
 Ronald Wright observes that the “first lesson of 1914 is the risk of overreacting 
to terrorism.”6 We must remain level-headed, cleansing the contaminants of 
injustice, inequality, and ignorance from the soil in which the roots of terror-
ism grow, rather than simply lopping off noxious shoots whenever they sprout.
3 Address by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld at University of California Convocation, 
Berkeley, California, Thursday, May 13, 1954, at 10:00 a.m. (Pacific Coast Time).
4 B.M. Jenkins, quoted in D. Saunders, “When Troubled Young Men Turn to Terror, Is It Ideology 
or Pathology?,” The Globe and Mail, 24 October 2014.
5 D. Gardiner, Risk (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 2008), 331.
6 R. Wright, What is America? A Short History of the New World Order (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2008), 180.
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 Comprehensive Maritime Security
The 1987 Brundtland Report (the origin of contemporary ‘sustainable devel-
opment’ policies) suggested that “a comprehensive approach to international 
and national security must transcend the traditional emphasis on military 
power and armed competition.”7 ‘Comprehensive’, according to Elisabeth 
Mann Borgese, extends “from the local level of the coastal community through 
the levels of provincial and national governance to regional and global levels.”8 
While comprehensive security policy may originate at the higher levels, it 
must be grounded locally, where potential trouble-makers live, are educated 
and work. What, then, might the ocean and coastal governance community 
contribute?
 Collegiality
Compartmentalization of professional cultures is a bane of ocean and coastal 
governance. Navies, for example (at least in democratic countries) are not se-
cretive competitors for a disproportionate share of scarce resources; they are 
one of many elements of national governance capability. Navies have three 
broad functions. Defense is obvious, and the diplomatic roles of warships are 
generally well understood, whether as floating embassies during port visits 
abroad or demonstrating presence or resolve in waters of interest to their gov-
ernments. The third function is much more diverse, however, and can best be 
described as supporting other government departments. This can include all of 
the topics discussed in this book: law enforcement; fisheries patrol; humanitar-
ian relief and disaster response; search and rescue; support to marine science; 
and so forth. In the latter case, examples have ranged from scientific research 
by submarines under arctic ice, to post-Cold War use of the once highly classi-
fied sosus (Sound Surveillance System) to track whales, detect illegal fishing, 
and monitor underwater seismic events. All stakeholders in ocean and coastal 
governance need to understand each other, work together, and strive for com-
mon goals. The ocean governance whole thus becomes greater than the sum 
of its parts.
 Engagement
In his book Why Nations Go to War, John Stoessinger identified a number of 
factors, chief among them that “the beginning of each war is a misperception 
7 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), c 11, s. III-4.
8 E. Mann Borgese, The Oceanic Circle (Tokyo: UN University Press, 1998), 133.
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or accident.”9 Unfortunately, in an age of weapons of mass destruction and 
hair-trigger response, we can no longer afford such luxuries. At least twice dur-
ing the Cold War, only a judgment call by a relatively junior officer prevented 
a nuclear exchange, and only sheer luck prevented several disastrous nuclear 
weapons accidents.10
Our greatest enemies are therefore not so much other nations (or, more 
precisely, the governments of other nations) as misunderstanding, miscom-
munication and misperception; all of which marine scientists, scholars, 
 environmentalists, educators and practical mariners are well equipped to 
reduce. Scientific dialogue brings people from even hostile states together as 
 individuals. Environmental issues span human boundaries which are irrel-
evant to fish, winds, and currents. Navies and coast guards build confidence 
through joint operations, dialogue, or at very least agreements to prevent unin-
tended incidents. Even retired officers, diplomats, and policy-makers contrib-
ute discreetly to confidence and co-operation through what is known as ‘Track 
Two’ diplomacy. The ocean transcends boundaries; so does ocean governance.
 Affinity
There is evidence that our instinct to divide humanity into ‘us’ versus ‘them’ 
is genetically ingrained. But while a tribal mentality may explain, it does not 
excuse letting such thinking influence policy. It may have been appropriate 
when a few million primitive hunter-gatherers roamed the planet, but is dys-
functional when more than seven billion individuals share the globe, a tiny 
minority of which is able to exterminate most, if not all the others. The idea 
that ‘we’ are a group of unique individuals, while ‘they’ are a homogeneous 
mass with common faults is simply nonsense. Effective global governance 
cannot be based on denigrating or demonizing others based solely on lines 
drawn on maps, religion, race, ideology or any other generalization. The crew 
of Spaceship Earth needs to stop arguing about who is best, or who is respon-
sible for letting the oceanic life-support system degenerate, and start thinking 
like global citizens. The maritime community is better placed than most to set 
the example.
 Conclusion
Generations in the developed world have enjoyed unprecedented affluence, 
safety, and security since the end of World War Two, and even most of the 
9 J.G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001), 260.
10 For example, see E. Schlosser, Command and Control (New York: Penguin Books, 2013).
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world’s poorest societies are materially better off in absolute terms, if not 
 relatively. But it is by no means certain this trend will continue. At the mo-
ment, the military threat to security is not so much inter-state war as local-
ized conflict, along with the privatized violence lumped under the label of 
 terrorism. Today, our enemies are not so much hostile states as the risks of 
misunderstanding, miscommunication, and misjudgment. Our physical secu-
rity cannot be taken for granted, and is a collective responsibility in which we 
all have a role to play. It can never be absolute or guaranteed, but the risks can 
certainly be reduced and mitigated. To give Ronald Wright the last word, “If we 
fail—if we blow up or degrade the biosphere so it can no longer sustain us—
nature will merely shrug and conclude that letting apes run the laboratory was 
fun for a while but in the end a bad idea.”11
11 R. Wright, A Short History of Progress (Toronto: Anansi Press, 2004), 31.
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Intelligence Gathering and Espionage in the 
Exclusive Economic Zone: Peaceful or Not?
Hugh Williamson
Marine Affairs Program, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
Those fortunate enough to know Elisabeth Mann Borgese were well aware of 
her deep lifelong commitment to peace. For her, inclusion of ‘for peaceful pur-
poses’ and ‘exclusively for peaceful purposes’ in the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (unclos) were intended as operational, not merely 
dressing up an otherwise highly practical convention. Her long association 
with the international law of the sea community developed many long and 
enduring friendships, often culminating in social gatherings at her home in a 
small fishing village outside Halifax, Nova Scotia.
One such gathering took place after a Law of the Sea Institute annual meet-
ing at Dalhousie University in the early 1980s. Elisabeth gathered an eclectic 
group of friends, including leading scholars, diplomats, lawyers, neighboring 
fisherfolk and a few fortunate students to share food, drink, and lively discus-
sion. The director of the Institute at the time was Dr. John P. Craven, a widely 
respected legal scholar, engineer, scientist, and amateur musician.1 That eve-
ning, he entertained by singing operatic arias while accompanying himself on 
Elisabeth’s grand piano, but these were not his only hidden talents.
While Dr. Craven’s legal scholarship and musical talent were openly dis-
played, details of his previous role as chief scientist for the United States Navy’s 
Special Projects Office would remain hidden for many years.2 He had, in fact, 
been the US Navy’s ‘ocean spy chief ’, involved in many intelligence-gathering 
and espionage operations, including recovering lost ships, submarines, and 
weapons systems, and electronic ‘bugging’ of Soviet Navy telecommunications 
cables under the Sea of Okhotsk.3 He was also an international lawyer, deeply 
committed to the principles of unclos as he saw them. Had the clandestine 
1 W.J. Broad, “John P. Craven, 90, Pioneer of Spying at Sea, Dies,” The New York Times, 18 Feb-
ruary 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/us/john-p-craven-90-scientist-who-shaped 
-cold-war-spying-at-sea-dies.html.
2 J.P. Craven, The Silent War: The Cold War Battle Beneath the Sea (New York: Simon and Schus-
ter, 2002).
3 C. Morris, “Operation IVY BELLS: Lessons Learned from an ‘Intelligence Success’,” Journal of 
the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers 20, no. 3 (2012): 17–29.
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part of his life been public knowledge at the time, one can only imagine lively 
discussions which could have taken place around the table in the presence of 
so many leading international experts on intelligence gathering and espionage.
While the media tends to sensationalize collection of intelligence at sea as 
‘espionage’ or ‘spying’, referring to any intelligence-gathering vehicle as ‘spy 
ships’ or planes, there is considerable divergence of legal opinion as to whether 
any particular event could be defined as research, intelligence collection, or 
espionage.
Within the intelligence community, ‘data’ refers to individual facts, such as 
a name, or sea temperature and salinity in a particular location. ‘Information’ 
is a collection or coalition of data related to a specific subject such as time, 
location, oceanographic conditions, ships in the area, or other facts related to 
a particular noise source. ‘Intelligence’ is the analysis and significance of in-
formation; in this example an assessment that the noise information might 
identify a new class of submarine. ‘Espionage’, or spying, is the illegal obtaining 
or possession of any of the foregoing.
For purposes of discussion, the most inclusive and neutral term is probably 
‘information’. This can be applied in scientific, economic, or strategic contexts, 
requiring further clarifications on the means or purpose of collection to de-
termine its status and legitimacy. Moreover, information itself is inherently 
neutral but, when gathered for one purpose, may still be utilized for a variety 
of others.
It is worth noting that the act of espionage itself is not a violation of inter-
national law.4 Virtually every country has provisions in its national security, 
criminal, and other statutes that make espionage against the state, private 
companies, or individuals an offense. National espionage law may also include 
various categories of sensitive information, including those related to national 
security, economic, political, scientific, military, or personal privacy. However, 
the offense can only be prosecuted where the state has jurisdiction. In the case 
of intelligence gathered at sea, whether a state can take action will depend on 
whether it is in compliance with international law, particularly unclos.
Maritime military activity remains a problem area, presenting a serious 
potential threat to peace on a regional and global scale. The increased capa-
bilities of current weaponry and the nature of naval operations have led to a 
number of confidence-building measures, notably incidents at sea agreements 
(incsea), to avoid accidents or limit the unintended use of force when oppos-
ing naval forces are operating in close proximity. While an incsea may govern 
4 G.B. Demarest, “Espionage in International Law,” Denver Journal of International Law and 
Policy 24 (1996): 321–348, 325–326.
Maritime Safety and Security418
<UN>
the use of weapons and associated active sensors, and vessel or aircraft ma-
neuvering, it specifies surveillance of other vessels, not intelligence-gathering.
The issue of control or restriction of intelligence gathering by ships and 
 aircraft operating in the maritime domain remains unclear. Whether units 
are engaged in a lawful collection of intelligence or in espionage against an 
opposing state remains, in most cases, a matter of opinion and perspective. 
 Intelligence gathering at sea was common during the Cold War and has contin-
ued subsequently, arguably with an increased number of players.
Within the territorial sea, intelligence gathering is an act incompatible with 
the right of innocent passage. This may be the only specific provision in inter-
national law prohibiting intelligence gathering or espionage. On the high seas, 
in areas beyond national jurisdiction, states are free to engage in activities un-
der the regime of freedom of the seas, provided that they do not interfere with 
or threaten other states. While surveillance and intelligence gathering are not 
a specifically enumerated freedom, they are not specifically prohibited and are 
customary practices of naval forces, a point which is used to support a right of 
intelligence gathering at sea.
Within the exclusive economic zone (eez), however, there are two major 
divergent schools of thought regarding control of intelligence gathering by 
 foreign vessels. The major traditional naval powers, led by the United States, 
take the view that the eez is strictly a resource and environmental manage-
ment jurisdiction and other activities, including military, are governed by the 
high seas regime. Some newer naval states, led by China and India, increasingly 
emphasize that military activities in the eez may only be conducted subject 
to the approval of the coastal state. This has led to a number of confrontations 
between coastal state naval forces and naval units presumed to be gathering 
intelligence within a clearly recognized or contested eez. In 2017, however, a 
Chinese naval intelligence-gathering vessel (agi class) undertook active sur-
veillance of naval exercises in the Australian eez, possible denoting a shift 
China’s position.
Broadly speaking, information gathering within the eez falls into five 
main categories: academic scientific research, natural resource research, hy-
drographic research, military related research, and intelligence gathering. 
 Information may be obtained actively, such as coring, or passively, such as 
acoustic recording. Information gathering or research may be conducted by 
naval vessels, naval auxiliaries, public and private oceanographic and scientific 
research vessels, or other commercial vessels of opportunity. Warships and na-
val research ships are considered sovereign territory and beyond the jurisdic-
tion of a foreign coastal state. While they may be involved in passive or covert 
information-gathering, a coastal state cannot determine if this is so by going 
aboard to make a direct examination.
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Academic scientific research is generally to advance scientific knowledge of 
the ocean environment and is conducted by universities, scientific institutions 
and other bodies pursuing scientific knowledge, not usually for economic gain. 
It is largely regulated by unclos Part xiii and carried out in the eez and on 
the continental shelf with prior notification and approval of the coastal state, 
which is normally granted. Research by private or government oceanograph-
ic vessels, including naval auxiliaries, would all be subject to this regime of 
consent.
Natural resources research in the eez and on the continental shelf are cov-
ered in unclos Article 246(5) and may only be undertaken with full prior con-
sent of the coastal state. Under the eez and continental shelf regimes, coastal 
states have sovereign rights for exploration and exploitation, conservation and 
management of living resources, as well as jurisdiction with regards to marine 
scientific research. The coastal state may withhold consent if it has a direct 
significance for the exploration or exploitation of natural resources, involves 
drilling into the shelf, the use of explosives, or the introduction of harmful sub-
stances into the marine environment. This regime also applies to both private 
and government (including military) research vessels.
Hydrographic research is more problematic. Hydrography is considered by 
many states as a survey activity for navigational purposes. As it is conducted 
in support of navigation it may be considered distinct from marine scientific 
research carried out to expand scientific knowledge or resource-related pur-
poses. Since unclos does not define ‘marine scientific research’, ‘survey ac-
tivities’, ‘hydrographic survey’, or ‘military survey’ some countries view these as 
distinct, and include hydrographic survey as a freedom of the seas ancillary to 
freedom of navigation. Recently this has led to diplomatic protests and more 
kinetic actions, notably in the South China Sea between vessels of the People’s 
Republic of China and United States naval auxiliary research vessels. There 
have also been protests from India involving survey vessels from the United 
States and the United Kingdom.
Military scientific research, which can include military surveying, can also 
involve the collection of hydrographic, oceanographic, marine geological, geo-
physical, chemical, biological, and acoustic data. However, military-focused 
research may be of limited commercial value, for example, oceanographic 
data related to acoustic transmissions used for submarine tracking. While the 
data gathered may be the same as for marine scientific research, the resulting 
information may be considered highly sensitive or classified, and usually not 
intended for public release to the scientific community.5 Since it is obtained 
5 S. Bateman, “Hydrographic Surveying in Exclusive Economic Zones: Jurisdictional Issues,” 
International Hydrographic Review 5, no. 1 (New Series) (2004): 24–33.
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for strategic or tactical support to military operations and has not been specifi-
cally addressed in unclos, many states consider it to be outside coastal state 
regulation as part of freedom of the high seas and may be exercised in the eez 
as well.
One further consideration is whether surveillance or intelligence gathering 
by a vessel could be considered a legitimate peaceful use of the sea. The cus-
tomary interpretation of ‘peaceful use’ is ‘non-aggressive’ as opposed to ‘non-
military’.6 Espionage is the illegal gathering of intelligence and, while forbidden 
under national law, is not prohibited by international treaties or agreements. 
Covert or passive means of intelligence gathering are, by their nature, largely 
undetectable. Even during the Cold War, intelligence vessels were generally 
left alone, with a few notable exceptions. Some active means of intelligence 
gathering, however, may violate unclos or other international agreements, 
such as interfering or disrupting communications, disturbing living resources 
or persons, or causing environmental damage.
There is a further argument for the role of intelligence gathering and es-
pionage in promoting peace and security. While a state may be reluctant to 
accept the assurances of a potential adversary of a lack of hostile intent or 
purpose with any degree of confidence, an independent verification provided 
by a state’s own intelligence sources may have more credibility, especially if it 
is based on intelligence gained through trusted covert means.
Intelligence gathering and espionage are often used to advance a state’s 
strategic and military objectives, and may be prejudicial to the security of oth-
ers. To say that surveillance and intelligence-gathering in a coastal state’s eez 
is always prejudicial to the coast is an oversimplification. Since intelligence 
gathering also fulfills the necessary role of ‘trust but verify’, its utility as a 
 confidence-building measure cannot be underestimated. Intelligence gather-
ing and espionage are an important component of global security.
Undoubtedly both Elisabeth Mann Borgese and John Craven would agree 
that using the telescope on her deck for surveillance of the nearby nudist beach 
before walking her dogs might be considered ‘spying’ by some, but would defi-
nitely be ‘a peaceful use’ if it avoided future conflict with sunbathers.
6 A.S. Skaridov, “Naval Activity in the Foreign eez: The Role of Terminology in Law Regime,” 
Marine Policy 29, no. 2 (2005): 153–155.
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Marine Piracy: A Continuing Challenge
Mark Sloan
Centre for the Study of Security and Development, Dalhousie University, 
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
 Introduction
Since the peak of the Somali piracy outbreak between 2010 and 2011, piracy has 
been on the decline. Nevertheless, the problem has not gone away, the figures 
for the first half of 2017 showing 87 incidents of piracy and armed robbery re-
ported to the International Maritime Bureau (imb) Piracy Reporting Centre.1 
Furthermore, piracy is not only a crime in its own right, but also destabilizes 
economic, social, and political structures. Countering piracy therefore remains 
an important challenge, particularly off Indonesia and the Philippines, in the 
Gulf of Guinea, and in parts of the Indian Ocean. This short essay can only 
skim this complex subject, but considers the nature of piracy, and some of the 
factors that can help contribute to its prevention.
 Definition
The definition of piracy needs to be established at the outset in order to provide 
a baseline for subsequent discussion. That most widely accepted  definition is 
enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos), 
which states that piracy is “illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation committed for private ends, on the high seas,” committed “in a 
place outside the jurisdiction of any State”, and includes “inciting or intention-
ally facilitating (such) an act.”2
In the context of this essay, three important facts emerge from this defi-
nition. The first is that piracy is ‘committed for private ends’. Attacks con-
ducted or sponsored by terrorist groups are therefore excluded from the 
definition, and from this discussion. The second is the fact that the acts are 
only  considered piracy if they are conducted ‘on the high seas’ and ‘in a place 
1 International Maritime Bureau (imb), icc-imb Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships—
Report for the Period 1 January–30 Jun 2017, available on request from International Cham-
ber of Commerce Commercial Crime Services at https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/piracy 
-reporting-centre/request-piracy-report.
2 Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 u.n.t.s. 3, art. 101.
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 outside the  jurisdiction of any state’. Acts committed inside territorial waters 
are, therefore, not considered to be piracy, but would fall instead under the 
heading of armed robbery. The third is in sub-paragraph (c) of the unclos 
definition, which includes those ‘intentionally’ facilitating the crime, so that 
those supporting the activity could be prosecuted as pirates.
Studying piracy, but ignoring attacks not perpetrated on the high seas, ad-
versely affects the ability to gain a true understanding of the problem. Notably, 
it fails to examine and quantify the totality of the threat to seafarers, and there-
fore hampers the development of appropriate response strategies whether on 
land or at sea, nationally, regionally, or internationally. Nor does it contribute 
to the identification of potential precursors to outbreaks of piracy, which are 
equally threatening to mariners even though they occur in waters that are un-
der a state’s jurisdiction. From the maritime perspective, this prevents the de-
velopment of comprehensive maritime security strategies. This shortcoming is 
recognized by organizations such as the imb, Oceans Beyond Piracy (obp), and 
the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships in Asia. The imb, for example, not only collects reported incidents 
that meet the unclos definition of piracy, but also includes those that meet a 
definition of armed robbery occurring in a state’s “internal waters, archipelagic 
waters and territorial sea.”3 This wider perspective more fully captures the ex-
tent of the challenge, and both piracy and armed robbery will therefore be ad-
dressed here under the heading of piracy. However, incidents must be reported 
to be recorded, and there is general recognition that many incidents are still not 
reported, which means that the full extent of the problem is not exposed. Com-
paring the total number of incidents gathered through a recently established 
‘Community of Reporting’ with those reported through formal channels, the 
imb assessed that 63 percent of incidents in the Gulf of Guinea region between 
January and June 2017 were not reported through official channels.4
 Motive, Means and Opportunity
Now, as historically, piracy occurs where the drivers of motive, means and op-
portunity combine to the extent that the potential private ends outweigh the 
perceived or actual risk of arrest, injury, or death. The basic motive is generally 
the same as for any financially related crime—greed and the ability to achieve 
material gain more easily than through lawful means and at an acceptable de-
gree of risk. Nevertheless, other factors may also drive motive, including gang 
3 imb, supra note 1.
4 Id., p. 12.
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or tribal loyalties, revenge, and social retribution. Means includes the avail-
ability of the organization, finances, materiel, information, and personnel 
necessary to support the activity. Opportunity arises from a flawed security 
environment on land and at sea, which reduces the risk taken by pirates, and 
contributes to an increase in the availability of potential targets.
Where attacks do occur, they can be graded on a scale of complexity. At 
one end of the scale, subsistence-type piracy is simple, often opportunistic, 
requires limited organization, and provides low levels of economic gain. This 
category can be found around the world where the outcome is simple theft of 
stores and personal possessions, for example. In contrast, in its most devel-
oped form, piracy is transnational organized crime requiring a complex web 
of enablers. Any effort to prevent piracy should, ideally, therefore address the 
drivers on both the land and at sea, rather than either in isolation. In addition, 
such efforts will require a multi-agency approach that almost certainly extends 
beyond national boundaries to include regional and international partners.
 So What?
Breaking piracy down into its drivers (motive, means, and opportunity), makes 
it easier to identify the main elements of each. Once these are identified, de-
cisions can be made about those efforts to counter them that will be most 
effective.
To counter motive, if alternative means of income generation can be in-
troduced, this will go some way to removing the motive of economic gain. 
 However, although easily said, it can be very difficult to achieve. This is espe-
cially so in failed states where there is minimal rule of law and little likelihood 
of alternative, legal ways of earning a living being established until there is 
a will to succeed and it is safe to act. Although the driver identified by the 
 unclos definition of piracy is ‘private ends’, these are not always econom-
ic gain, even if that is the most common motive. The International Contact 
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia stated that “piracy is symptomatic of 
the overall situation in Somalia including the prevalence of illegal fishing and 
toxic waste dumping off the coast of Somalia, which adversely affects the So-
mali economy and marine environment.”5 It can be argued from this that the 
initial motive in this case therefore included grievance as well as material gain.
Identifying ways to counter the means to conduct piracy can be helped by 
considering the network of activities needed to support the pirates’ business 
5 International Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, “Communiqué from the 
First Plenary Session,” (New York, 14 January 2009), last accessed 8 August 2017, http://www 
.lessonsfrompiracy.net/files/2015/03/Communique_1st_Plenary.pdf.
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model. Even the simplistic, generic business model at Figure 1, shows the com-
plexity of support required when piracy has evolved from the subsistence level 
to organized crime. However, looking globally, although there are elements of 
the model that are common to any of the more complex outbreaks of piracy, 
specific outbreaks will have unique characteristics. Each therefore requires a 
tailored rather than generic solution.
Considering the business model in use allows identification of those parts of 
the model that are most vulnerable, or that will have most effect on the opera-
tion of that model if disrupted. Such disruption may be short term, allowing 
more permanent measures to be put in place in order to counter any or all of 
motive, means, and opportunity, or they may be longer term solutions in them-
selves. However, pirates are able to adapt their operations, whether as a natu-
ral process or in response to external pressures. Forcing changes to the pirates’ 
mode of operation will result in changes to the business model, in the same way 
that forcing changes to the business model may require the mode of operation 
to be adapted to fit the changed circumstances or, preferably, cause it to fail. 
Strategies developed to counter piracy must therefore be equally adaptable.
Historically, many efforts to counter piracy have focused on the sea-borne 
element of the model, and paid less attention to the land-based supporting 
and enabling functions, without which piracy could not be sustained. This may 
be born of necessity if it is not possible for national, regional, or international 
bodies to tackle the problem ashore. Such was the case in much of Somalia at 
the height of the Indian Ocean piracy outbreak, when the lack of government 
and law enforcement meant that it was often not possible for outside agencies 
to operate safely or effectively. Once again it is clear that, without action on 
land, the problem can only be contained and not solved.
As with countering motive and means, reducing opportunity, including in-
creasing risk to the perpetrators, must also look across both the land and sea. 
Figure 1
Illustrative piracy business model
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A coastline subject to limited or no rule of law, provides opportunity for pirates 
not only to launch their operations, but also to hold ships and crews hostage 
pending completion of ransom arrangements. This was the situation in much 
of Somalia for a period. Likewise, corruption can create opportunity, as seen 
in the Gulf of Guinea where it is a contributory factor to the pirates’ ability to 
sell stolen cargos of oil products. At sea, opportunity can be reduced by low-
ering the number and/or vulnerability of potential targets and/or increasing 
the level the risk posed to pirates when conducting an attack. In the Straits 
of Malacca, the pirates’ ability to find vulnerable targets has been reduced by 
improving maritime security both nationally and regionally. In many piracy 
areas, implementation of self-protective measures derived from best manage-
ment practices have also had a positive effect. The embarkation of privately 
contracted armed security personnel (pcasp), heightened international mili-
tary presence, and improved mechanisms for prosecuting those captured, were 
further significant factors in reducing opportunity in the Indian Ocean. In the 
Gulf of Guinea, the use of pcasp has not been as widespread because many 
of the attacks occur inside territorial waters, where coastal states control the 
use of civilian armed teams. However, adoption of best management practices, 
combined with improved maritime security capabilities of coastal states has 
achieved a significant reduction in the number of attacks. Nevertheless, as 
pointed out by obp, “there are still no piracy convictions that can be cited to 
support an effective Rule of Law solution,”6 both willingness and ability to pros-
ecute being important factors in the risk versus gain balance for pirates. There 
are, therefore, a wide range of means by which opportunity can be reduced.
 Conclusion
Preventing piracy and armed robbery is a multi-faceted task. It first requires 
information about the nature and extent of the problem, regardless of whether 
it is present in its precursor or more developed forms. Thereafter, willingness 
and the ability to act against motive, means, and opportunity on land and at 
sea, across the full spectrum of agencies nationally, regionally, and internation-
ally, supported by the necessary legal processes, are essential. Such actions are 
having an effect, as evidenced by the significant reduction in the number of 
attacks over recent years. However, there is no room for complacency, and les-
sons learned from recent outbreaks must not be forgotten.
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 Deadly and Desperate Crossings
In April 2015, over 1,000 would-be migrants drowned in a single week while 
trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea.1 Most had started their journey in Sub-
Saharan Africa, where gross human rights violations and civil break-down 
were, and remain, rampant. Because Turkey had enhanced its border control 
measures to try to quell the flow of asylum seekers fleeing from Syria, it had be-
come harder to reach the safety of European states via a land corridor. Oppor-
tunities for smugglers and traffickers increased, who routed tens of thousands 
of displaced people to the coastal state of Libya. Here, many migrants found 
themselves sold to criminal gangs or to other traffickers. They were subjected 
to torture, to sexual abuse by armed forces, and to forced labor and long incar-
cerations underground.2 In short, they found themselves enslaved or subsist-
ing in conditions of extreme vulnerability, and ultimately directed onto large 
wooden boats by the smugglers and traffickers. Once well into the Mediterra-
nean, the people were often forced onto small rafts or dinghies, to (hopefully) 
be picked up by European coastal patrols or otherwise make it to shore alive.
In the first half of 2015, one in 16 persons drowned trying to make the cross-
ing. This was due to the poor condition of the boats, the lack of safety equip-
ment, overcrowding, and the inherently perilous character of ocean crossings. 
It was also due to the decision by the European Commission and Italian gov-
ernment to end funding for the humanitarian initiative Mare Nostrum. This 
initiative, launched due to mass drownings of trafficked migrants trying to 
reach Europe in 2013, had been effectively co-ordinating search and rescue 
operations near Libya during 2013 and 2014. The program was cancelled be-
cause of concerns that the increase in safety which it offered was incentivizing 
displaced people to take to the sea, as well as the refusal of other countries 
to contribute to its costs despite—or perhaps because of—having rescued 
1 Human Rights Watch, Europe’s Refugee Crisis: An Agenda for Action (December 2015), 5.
2 Amnesty International, “Refugees and Migrants Fleeing Sexual Violence, Abuse and 
 Exploitation in Libya” (1 July 2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/07/
refugees-and-migrants-fleeing-sexual-violence-abuse-and-exploitation-in-libya/.
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over 100,000 people during its year of operations.3 It was replaced by Frontex’s 
 Operation Triton, which focused on Italian coastal border protection. With 
this refocus on coastal security change came a modest decrease in the number 
of migrants arriving in Europe from the Libyan coast, and a nine-fold increase 
in known deaths at sea.4
 The Scope of Humanitarian and Legal Obligations to Rescue
Seas are unpredictable and dangerous, and have long taken lives. The vulner-
ability of anyone who is out on the water—from fishermen to pleasure-craft 
sailors to cargo ship crew—has since time beyond memory been recognized 
as triggering a moral duty to aid those in distress. In the last one hundred years 
or so, this humanitarian imperative came to be written into international laws 
that almost all coastal nations have agreed to. One such law states:
The master of a ship at sea which is in a position to be able to provide 
assistance, on receiving information from any source that persons are in 
distress at sea, is bound to proceed with all speed to their assistance.5
After a rescue, such laws commonly require the rescuer to ensure that those 
who they have assisted are taken to a place of safety. The obligation to pro-
vide assistance to those in distress at sea would seem complimentary to the 
key obligation under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(Refugee Convention), which is to assist those who are fleeing persecution. 
Both obligations are essentially ones of offering salvation, through responding 
to a person’s actual situation of risk, and apply regardless of the nationality, 
sex, or race of the person in need. These are humanitarian laws grounded in 
fundamental principles about promoting human security, and are triggered by 
externalized threats to individual lives.
But in practice their relationship is more complicated. The Refugee Conven-
tion has a very narrow definition for who qualifies for assistance. For example, 
the only persecution that counts is that motivated by religious, political, racial, 
ethnic, or social group membership, and there must be no place in the person’s 
3 Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm: The Failure of European Policies in the Central Medi-
terranean (London: Amnesty International, 2017), 10.
4 A. Denti, “Hundreds Drown Off Libya, EU Leaders Forced to Reconsider Migrant Crisis,” 
 Reuters, 19 April 2015.
5 International Convention for the Safety of Life At Sea, 1 November 1974, 1184 u.n.t.s. 3, as 
amended, Chapter v, Regulation 33.
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home state where it is reasonable to believe they could be safe. And refugees 
have more and more often come to be swept into larger flows of would-be mi-
grants, on the move because of some combination of human rights violations, 
gut-wrenching poverty, and environmental degradation. This description 
certainly covers those who have been and continue to flee from Sub-Saharan 
 Africa, where life has become grossly unsafe due to on-going violent civil un-
rest and the presence of warlords, coupled with drought and famine. However, 
international law does not, generally speaking, impose an obligation on states 
to accept and shelter such displaced individuals. Instead, it sanctions viewing 
them as migrants who are trying to evade being held to a state’s normal immi-
gration policies and practices.
There are also gaps in maritime law that leave room for vulnerability. It re-
quires that ship masters rescue, but does not require states to send boats to 
waters where they suspect unseaworthy boats may be being launched. It re-
quires that rescued persons be brought to safety, but is not explicit about the 
obligation of states to permit disembarkation. Historically, when the rescued 
people were largely shipwrecked sailors, there seems to have been no dispute 
that the rightful course of action was to permit disembarkation at the next safe 
port of call. States have taken a more narrow reading in recent years, because 
if a rescuee claims refugee protection, the state becomes obliged to shelter the 
person while the protection claim is determined, and may be required to per-
mit the individual to remain if they cannot be safety returned to their state of 
citizenship. And so we witness states refusing to allow the landing of rescued 
asylum seekers, with the most famous being the ‘Tampa Affair’ of 2001 when 
Australia refused to allow a Norwegian boat to disembark 438 Afghan refugee 
claimants. And we witness intentional interceptions in international waters by 
state agents, where the intercepting state denies they are bound to any of the 
obligations set out in refugee law while in international waters, and so return 
the claimant to their home state. The United States Supreme Court has found 
that this is a permissible interpretation of international and maritime law,6 
and so validates their practice of forcibly returning Haitian asylum seekers to 
Haiti without determining their protection needs. This practice is roundly con-
demned as violating international law by others, who argue that upon a state 
intercepting a boat and taking control of its passengers, that state has assumed 
de facto jurisdiction over the people on board, and must ensure that their pro-
tection claims are heard.7 And so the generosities, limitations, and vagaries of 
6 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
7 J. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2005), 337.
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both maritime and international humanitarian law, especially when coupled 
with state concerns about migration control, may result in a rescue ultimately 
returning a person to vulnerability, cycling them back into the hands of traf-
fickers, or to the desperate situation that made them decide that risking death 
at sea was safer than staying on land.
 Coastal Border Security Is a Dangerous Substitute  
for Human Security
After the massive drownings in the Mediterranean in the spring of 2015, the 
European Union responded by increasing resources for rescuing migrants at 
sea and putting measures in place to facilitate safe and quick disembarka-
tion of the migrants in Europe, where their protection needs were assessed. 
These immediate humanitarian acts, however, came to be overshadowed by 
national security interests and concerns about managing migration. In June 
2015, the European Union established eunavfor Med (‘Operation Sophia’). 
Operation Sophia’s primary mandate was to disrupt traffickers’ and smugglers’ 
ocean-based operations by arresting the smugglers and destroying the boats. 
Operation Sophia was also to train the Libyan coast guard in rescue operations, 
so that unseaworthy crafts would be intercepted before they left territorial wa-
ters. With these two shifts in emphasis—each entirely consistent with mari-
time law concerning rescue, and international law which condemns smugglers 
and traffickers—came consequences that ironically increased human insecu-
rity both on the water and on land.
Operation Sophia proved quite successful at intercepting boats, rescuing 
the trafficked or smuggled occupants, and then destroying the boats. Recog-
nizing that ship masters could not determine if a person met the terms of the 
Refugee Convention, all rescuees were transported to Europe to determine 
whether they could be returned or if they were at risk of persecution. By June 
2017, over 452 boats had been destroyed.8 Business as usual had indeed been 
disrupted. But once again the smugglers and traffickers adapted and, in par-
ticular, adopted riskier tactics for getting their human cargo into European 
hands. With most of the large wooden boats that had been used to get migrants 
close to Italy’s shore gone, they were largely replaced by small inflatable boats. 
These boats could not be expected to actually make the crossing— passengers 
 became effectively in need of rescue quickly after they set out. In 2016 this 
8 House of Lords, European Union Committee, Operation Sophia: A Failed Mission, 2nd Report 
of Session 2017–19, HL Paper 5, 12 July 2017, para. 18.
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translated both into 52 percent more rescues than 2015 and a 42 percent in-
crease in recorded casualties. The numbers from 2017 threaten to show further 
increases. On top of this, the migrant flows trying to escape to Europe did not 
decrease, because the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa remained, and remains, 
grossly violent with the threat of starvation ever present.
Efforts to train the Libyan coast guard to intercept and rescue potential 
migrants while still in Libyan territorial waters have drawn considerable criti-
cism. Reports were published in The Times in February 2017 of coast guard 
 officers whipping and threatening to kill the migrants they had rescued, con-
sistent with UN reports from 2016 of Libyan coast guard members engaging 
in gross human rights violations of intercepted migrants. Not surprisingly, the 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees has rejected designating Libya 
as a state that meets the criteria for being a place of safety for disembarking 
following a rescue at sea.9 So while it would violate international law for the 
European Union to return any migrants they rescue to Libya for disembarka-
tion, or even shipwrecked sailors, such a fate awaits those who are intercepted 
by the EU-trained Libyan coast guard.
Refugees at sea—and others fleeing gross human rights violations and en-
vironmental disasters by ocean routes—find themselves caught in an incom-
plete legal regime. Their security turns not just on whether the ocean is kind to 
them, but also on the ever shifting relationship between funding, state security, 
and border interests. It is these relationships which permeate the gaps in the 
legal regime, inserting policies and programs that shift with political interests. 
Responding to a refugee crisis by trying to manage ocean transiting routes is 
bound to fail, with this failure being highlighted by waves of predictable mass 
drownings. Ironically, it is these mass drownings that trigger the humanitarian 
high points, points which seem to be held until too many people are rescued at 
sea, and then other political interests rise to the surface.
9 United Nations Support Mission in Libya and United Nations Human Rights Office of the 
 Office of the High Commissioner, Detained and Dehumanized: Report on Human Rights Abus-
es Against Migrants in Libya (13 December 2015), 8.
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One Hundred Years of Certitude? Disaster Response 
and Recovery since the Halifax Explosion
Adam Rostis
Nova Scotia Health Authority, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
In 1917, a collision between two ships in Halifax Harbor resulted in the largest 
human-made explosion before the bombing of Hiroshima. SS Mont Blanc was 
loaded with munitions, and when the Imo collided with it, the resulting explo-
sion destroyed 22 percent of the city, killed 1,963 people, and injured 9,000.1 
In 1920, Samuel Prince published a sociological analysis of the response. His 
was one of the first explorations of disaster and community recovery and set 
the tone for the modernist view of disaster response, relief, and recovery.2 The 
Halifax Explosion was a maritime disaster that devastated a coastal commu-
nity, and on the 100th anniversary this essay takes stock of the prevailing and 
emergent views of disaster response, relief, and recovery.
It is variously claimed that the frequency of disasters is increasing, that this 
is happening naturally, or that there is some inherent process of disaster cre-
ation that is rapidly accelerating.3 Alarming suggestions are made that rapid 
technological revolution, globalization with attendant interconnectedness of 
events, increasing terrorist and subversive activities, climate change causing 
new weather patterns, increasing mobility of humans heightening the risk of 
mass epidemics, and exponential population growth resulting in use of mar-
ginal land have all contributed to the growing number of disasters and crises.4 
No longer, it is claimed, can organizations and governments hope for stable 
and predictable patterns of continuity.5
These claims often begin arguments for an increased need for organiza-
tions and experts able to understand and manage these events. In other words, 
1 J. Scanlon, “Rewriting a Living Legend: Researching the 1917 Halifax Explosion,” International 
Journal of Disasters and Mass Emergencies 15, no. 1 (1997): 147–198.
2 S. Prince, “Catastrophe and Social Change, Based upon a Sociological Study of the Halifax 
Disaster” (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1920).
3 G. Bankoff, “Rendering the World Unsafe: ‘Vulnerability’ as Western Discourse,” Disasters 25, 
no. 1 (2001): 19–35.
4 D. Alexander, “Globalization of Disaster: Trends, Problems and Dilemmas,” Journal of Inter-
national Affairs 59, no. 2 (2006): 1–22.
5 A. Farazmand, “Introduction: Crisis and Emergency Management,” in Handbook of Crisis and 
Emergency Management, ed., A. Farazmand (New York: Marcel Dekker, 2001), 1–10.
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the number and intensity of disasters has been increasing, together with the 
number of people affected, and this has been met by a technical and orga-
nizational response. An example of this approach, and the flaws with it, can 
be seen in the 2005 Hurricane Katrina disaster.6 On 29 August 2005 it dev-
astated the Gulf Coast of the United States, precipitating a scene that could 
barely be believed: the complete evacuation and near-complete destruction 
of an entire US city. According to a 2006 report commissioned by the White 
House, the storm caused 1,330 deaths, resulted in about US$96 billion in direct 
damage, destroyed or made unlivable 300,000 homes, forced the evacuation 
of 1.1  million people, and created a huge pool of internally displaced people.7 
President George W. Bush admitted that Katrina was the worst natural disas-
ter in US history, and the federal government admitted its failures.8 Katrina 
is a well-known example of a major disaster exposing the underlying logic of 
the  current approach taken by formal organizations in managing disasters. 
The popular media has presented the decisions made by government leaders 
during the Katrina response as being confused and irrational. However, gov-
ernment officials were all operating under laws and policy that limited their 
ability to take decisive action. Further, individual decision-makers all worked 
within formal response organizations such as the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (fema). When approaching the management of a disaster, these 
organizations take a highly rational, positivistic approach in that they attempt 
to understand and diagnose the problem, rely upon pre-defined rules and poli-
cies, adopt formal roles for individuals involved in the response, and utilize a 
centralized decision-making system.
Understanding that response organizations are structured this way, it then 
seems reasonable to suggest that the disaster management system did ex-
actly what it was expected to do. In this light, the much-discussed failure of 
the response to Katrina can therefore be recast as a success. It is the logical 
outcome of a bureaucratic, rational approach to the management of a chaotic 
and ambiguous environment.9 In the Katrina disaster, fema behaved as it was 
6 A. Rostis and J. Helms-Mills, “A Pedagogy of the Repressed? Critical Management Education 
and the Teaching Case Study,” International Journal of Management Concepts and Philosophy 
4, no. 2 (2010): 212–223.
7 Government of the United States, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned 
(Washington, DC: The White House, 2006), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
reports/katrina-lessons-learned/index.html.
8 Id.
9 M. Takeda and M. Helms, “Bureaucracy, Meet Catastrophe: Analysis of Hurricane Katrina 
Relief Efforts and their Implications for Emergency Response Governance,” International 
Journal of Public Sector Management 19, no. 4 (2006): 397–411.
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designed; that is, to be intolerant of rapid change, to seek approval of author-
ity before making decisions, and to apply rules rigidly when making decisions. 
Therefore, the failure of the response to Katrina was not of the organization, 
or even of the leaders, but rather of the organizational structure given the 
unstable and chaotic environment in which it was asked to operate. fema is 
one example of a disaster management organization that is a machine bureau-
cracy. It has a hierarchy of authority, a high division of labor, and centralized 
decision-making. It is best suited to an unchanging environment; however, in a 
disaster the environment is unstable and chaotic.
In contrast, other organizational structures may have resulted in a differ-
ent outcome. For example, the loosely integrated regional structure of the US 
Coast Guard is an alternative model for disaster response. In the Katrina re-
sponse, individual responders and ships from the Coast Guard worked more 
independently than other response agencies. Rather than waiting for orders 
from the top, Coast Guard responders were given leave to search and rescue 
on their own. This example is sometimes cited as being one of the few success 
stories in the Katrina response.10 The Coast Guard model’s organic structure is 
ideal for chaotic environments as it exhibited elements of an adhocracy and 
a divisional structure. Decentralization allowed for greater decision-making 
ability in those closer to the problems. The Coast Guard empowered individual 
employees to make decisions based on the environment in which they were 
operating. This is an example of what Bigley and Roberts call the incident com-
mand system (ics) of team response to crises.11 Under ics, the team is formed 
dynamically and rapidly. Technical competence is a factor in disaster team se-
lection as individuals need to be qualified to perform their specific team task. 
However, consideration is not given to the level of an individual’s potential fit 
on a team. Teams formed using ics methodology seem to have high levels of 
performance, as measured by their ability to solve complex tasks. The com-
bination of a hierarchical structure and flexible individual roles within that 
structure contribute to performance. Thus, taking a contingency approach to 
organizational design, such as the Coast Guard model, would enable organiza-
tions to make decisions in an uncertain environment.
Humans, throughout their history, have faced disasters such as Katrina. 
It is not surprising then that much of the organizing behavior for disaster re-
sponse is deeply rooted in our human past and has evolved into an ability to 
10 A. Ripley, “How the Coast Guard Gets It Right,” Time (23 October 2005).
11 G.A. Bigley and K.H. Roberts, “The Incident Command System: High-Reliability Organiz-
ing for Complex and Volatile Task Environments,” The Academy of Management Journal 
44, no. 6 (2001): 1281–1299.
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organize and respond. Over time, community resilience in the face of disaster 
emerged, only to be replaced later by formal organizations and plans to con-
front disasters. The objective of organizations has been to seek a return to pre-
disaster conditions, unseating a natural, latent ability within people to survive 
disasters.12 This reflects a larger, totalizing process of modernization in which 
institutions replace tradition.13 Take for example two floods that occurred in 
England: one in the 1950s and the other in the 1990s.14 The 1950s floods were 
devastating to the population but were met with a sense of stoicism and re-
siliency. They were characterized as part of the natural flow of life, and the 
population adapted and moved on. In contrast, a flood in the 1990s saw the 
population characterized as vulnerable and traumatized, even though fewer 
people died. A rhetoric of vulnerability has usurped a rhetoric of resiliency, 
and that this has been driven by the sudden emergence of the psychological 
evaluation of survivors as fragile, traumatized, and in need of care.15 It is not 
surprising to find modernity’s influence in the creation of disasters that never 
used to exist; in other words, there has been an erosion of the border between 
disaster and normality.16 Through science and technologies of observation and 
communication such as satellite imagery and the Internet, disasters can be dis-
covered in remote places and with a rapidity that allows them to feed into the 
news cycle and become disaster events.
Therefore, disasters have become institutionalized: they have been removed 
from the personal and made organizational. Why did this happen? Perhaps, 
as Rebecca Solnit reflects on the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, disaster af-
fords people the opportunity to be free: free from institutions, free from laws 
that assume that society tends to disorder in the absence of rules.17 In disaster, 
Solnit argues, people see the unimportance of organization. This may be why 
order is often imposed violently in the face of mass informal organizing in the 
aftermath of disaster. For example, in post-earthquake San Francisco, military 
authorities who were put in charge of keeping order perceived their job “as sav-
ing the city from the people, rather than saving the people from the  material 
12 A. Kirschenbaum, Chaos Organization and Disaster Management (New York: Marcel 
Dekker, 2004).
13 M. Foucault, Security, Territory, and Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977–1978 
(New York: Picador usa, 2009).
14 F. Furedi, “From the Narrative of the Blitz to the Rhetoric of Vulnerability,” Cultural Sociol-
ogy 1, no. 2 (2007): 235–254.
15 Id.
16 Kirschenbaum, supra note 12.
17 R. Solnit, A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities that Arise in Disasters 
(New York: Viking, 2009).
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city of cracked and crumbling buildings.”18 This impacted upon emergent 
helping behavior of citizens. In the fire that followed the earthquake, citizens 
attempted to save what they could using their own means while the organized, 
formal structures of helping were convinced that neighborhoods had to be de-
liberately dynamited or burned down to stop the spread of fire.
How then has the approach to disaster response and recovery changed 
since the Halifax Explosion? At one end of the spectrum, in 1917 disasters were 
viewed as exceptional events beyond the daily societal background noise of 
tragedies and avoidable mortality. A disaster was an abnormal and easily rec-
ognizable event that resulted in a temporary setback to progress. After almost 
100 years of experience, we now recognize that disaster responses can be cat-
egorized into informal, emergent, and co-ordinated responses.19 The latter two 
are centered within organizational structures, while the former is characteris-
tic of citizen or individual responses. Since 1917, the management of disaster 
by organizations has evolved into an all-hazards approach; that is, while each 
has unique features, it is believed that the effects and impact are similar and 
require a standard arsenal of response activities including search and rescue, 
evacuation, and relief. However, disaster is now more and more enmeshed 
within political and economic systems, to the point where it becomes impossi-
ble to distinguish disaster from everyday existence. Disaster scholars now rec-
ognize the tension between emergent versus organizational responses to crisis, 
so that a managed, organized response should not impede improvisation.
18 Id., 34.
19 E. Quarantelli and R. Dynes, “Response to Social Crisis and Disaster,” Annual Review of 
Sociology 3 (1977): 23–49.
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Women, Communities, Resilience: What’s Not  
to Understand?
Murielle Provost
Cape Breton University, Sydney, Nova Scotia, Canada
 Introduction
Zeinab Mokalled in Lebanon and Sanumaya Kumal in Nepal live 4,600 kilo-
meters apart in very different places, cultures, and circumstances, so what 
can they possibly have in common? The late poet Maya Angelou would have 
called them ‘women warriors’. They understood hardship, and overcame chal-
lenges with wisdom, creativity, and fortitude. Armed with a secret weapon— 
resilience—their courageous actions have triggered a social tsunami of 
 progressive change within their own communities and beyond—much needed 
and welcome given that the ‘Blue Marble’, which we affectionately call ‘Mother 
Earth’ or ‘Mother Nature’, has been increasingly showing her displeasure as she 
“groans in travail”1 to restore equilibrium after decades of human neglect and 
irresponsible activities. In the Americas alone in 2017, hurricanes Harvey, Irma 
and Maria, earthquakes in Mexico, and California wildfires have been just a 
few examples of her artful rebukes.
Masses of women like Zeinab and Sanumaya recognize that they can be, 
and are, key agents of change in addressing Mother Nature’s wrath. But despite 
this knowledge—which will come as no surprise to the more than 1.5 billion 
women who constitute half of today’s coastal dwellers—being less visible in 
their work also makes them less likely to have access to decision-makers, to be 
consulted on how to better safeguard community assets and resources, or to 
be engaged in reconstruction of their living environment following a disaster. 
Underscoring the foresight and resolve that women everywhere are contribut-
ing to creating better communities—whether inland or coastal; urban, rural, 
or remote—this essay portrays two stories of “women developing resilience to 
manage vulnerability” in their own communities.2
1 The Bible, Romans 8:22.
2 B. Leipert, “Rural and Remote Women Developing Resilience to Manage Vulnerability,” in 
Rural Nursing: Concepts, Theory, and Practice, eds., H.J. Lee and C.A. Winters (New York: 
Springer, 2005), 79–95, 79.
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 Mother Earth’s Difficult Children
Out of a total landmass of almost 37 billion acres, Mother Earth houses 58 
people per square kilometer atop the 16,000,000,000 acres that are habitable. 
Sixteen billion acres—how large is that? If it were dollars, it would mean the 
equivalent of saving $10,000 every single day for 4,384 years. Or buying 80,000 
houses at $200,000 each. Or, if you like travelling and think in terms of miles, 
flying around the world 642,544 times, or even taking a round trip to the Moon 
33,487 times.
On that habitable terrain, approximately three billion people or about 40 
percent of the world’s population live within 100 kilometers (62 miles) of a 
coast—that’s the equivalent of just over two consecutive 42.2- kilometer 
 marathons. And by 2025, that population is anticipated to double.3 Our per-
sistence in developing diverse societies in coastal areas—defined by the 
UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization as the “interface or transition areas 
 between land and sea”4—results in increasing and unremitting challenges to 
all facets of human activity that hamper “the ultimate purpose” of emergency 
management, disaster risk reduction, and resilience-building, which is “to save 
lives, preserve the environment and protect property and the economy” from 
natural, technological, and human-caused events.5
In addition to their status in the community, women confront another de-
terminant in how they contribute to that ‘ultimate purpose’, and that is the 
type of community in which they live. Factors such as geographical size, de-
mographic composition, availability of critical infrastructure, governance, 
emergency response resources, cultural ideologies, and beliefs are just some 
of many influences that play a role. In an attempt to offer clarity with respect 
to different coastal community types, Professor Tim Smith classifies them into 
five kinds: cities (including megacities, which typically have populations ex-
ceeding ten million, such as Tokyo-Yokohama, Japan or New York City and its 
surroundings); peri-urban areas (the transition zones between urban and non-
urban areas); regional centers (smaller than cities); regional settlements (small 
3 L. Creel, “Ripple Effects: Population and Coastal Regions,” Population Reference Bureau, last 
accessed 10 September 2017, http://www.prb.org/Publications/Reports/2003/RippleEffects 
PopulationandCoastalRegions.aspx.
4 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (fao), Integrated Coastal Area 
Management and Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (Rome: fao, 1998), Part A, s. 1.1.
5 Government of Canada, Ministers Responsible for Emergency Management, An Emergency 
Management Framework for Canada—Third Edition (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, Emer-
gency Management Policy and Outreach Directorate, 2017), 7.
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clusters of villages and hamlets); and rural areas.6 While there are abundant 
opportunities to advance the greater good, a novel approach is required to en-
gage women fully in preventing or mitigating, preparing for, responding to, and 
recovering from emergencies that threaten the ‘ultimate purpose’ as well as in 
affecting change, and overcoming long-standing political, social, and environ-
mental challenges.
Regardless of their type, coastal communities are increasingly vulner-
able to threats of cascading anthropogenic activities. Climate change (caus-
ing unprecedented volatile weather patterns), rising sea levels (is it possible 
that some coastal communities will become ramshackle floating ‘atolls’ as 
portrayed in the 1995 movie Waterworld?), coastal erosion and degradation, 
decline in ecosystems, unmanaged development, growing urbanization, poor 
resource management, and other kind of threats from human activities—all 
are well documented. And although the alarm bells have been ringing for 
several decades now, implementing effective measures remains difficult for 
many public and private bodies since they rely primarily on the certainty of 
facts for decision-making. To this end, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction 2015–2030, agreed upon at the UN World Conference on Disaster 
Risk Reduction in 2015, is notably encouraging. It outlines targets and priori-
ties aiming “to achieve the substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in 
lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and 
environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries over 
the next 15 years.”7
Despite these efforts, Mother Nature is no longer waiting for us to get our 
act together. As she continues to go about her business, we must become bet-
ter at developing hazard-resilient communities and enhancing the ability of 
coastal communities to absorb and recover from impacts. That requires ev-
eryone’s effort; and yet almost 50 percent of coastal dwellers are underuti-
lized.  Women—100 of them for every 102 men8—can help, as Zeinab’s and 
 Sanumaya’s stories will illustrate.
6 T. Smith, Climate Change Impacts on Coastal Communities, CoastAdapt Impact Sheet 13 
(Queensland: National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility, Gold Coast, 2016), 7.
7 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion 2015–2030 (18 March 2015), http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/43291.
8 United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision Key Findings and Advance 




When the regional governor asked why she cared—after all, “We are not Paris” 
he had told her—81-year-old Zeinab Mokalled from Arabsalim, Lebanon es-
tablished a community collection team in the mid-1990s to address the rubbish 
that was piling up on the streets of her village. At the time, southern  Lebanon 
had been occupied by Israel for 15 years and waste collection had ceased. 
 Refused assistance by the regional governor, Zeinab “called on the women of 
the village to help, not the men—partly because she wanted to empower them, 
and partly because she thought they would do a better job.” Today, her commit-
ment to “ensuring that Arabsalim is clean and tidy” has inspired women in the 
nearby villages of Kaffaremen and Jaarjoua to establish their own initiatives, 
as well as the creation of an organization named ‘Call of the Earth’ where a 
stream of visitors is learning more about how “caring for the earth is our re-
sponsibility in this part of the world. Whether we do it or not, our politicians 
won’t care. It’s down to us.”9
Unknown to Zeinab, her modest efforts have far-reaching implications in 
our contemporary world. In 2012 alone, Derek Thompson wrote, the world 
would generate “2.6 trillion pounds of garbage—the weight of about 7,000 Em-
pire State Buildings”10 and that was predicted to reach “approximately 2.2 bil-
lion tonnes per year by 2025.”11 As the world population continues to balloon, 
getting a handle on safe management of daily garbage disposal is increasingly 
critical for public health, and even more so during an emergency.
Not only will existing collection and disposal systems be disrupted, but 
there will be extra waste caused by the emergency itself. Initially, for 
camps of displaced people or refugees and similar new sites, there will 
be no arrangements in place at all. If solid waste is not dealt with quickly, 
serious health risks will develop which will further demoralize the com-
munity already traumatized by the emergency.12
Thank you, Zeinab Mokalled from Lebanon, for your insight.
9 N. Abou Mrad, “The 81-year-old Woman Inspiring a Nation to Recycle,” bbc News, 8 June 
2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-40191270.
10 D. Thompson, “2.6 Trillion Pounds of Garbage: Where Does the World’s Trash Go?,” The 
Atlantic, June 7, 2012, https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/06/26-trillion 
-pounds-of-garbage-where-does-the-worlds-trash-go/258234/.
11 D. Hoornweg and P. Bhada-Tata, What a Waste: A Global Review of Solid Waste Manage-
ment (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012), 8.
12 J. Rouse and B. Reed, Solid Waste Management, Technical Notes on Drinking-Water, Sani-
tation and Hygiene in Emergencies No. 7 (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2013), 7.1.
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 Sanumaya
At the time of the devastating earthquake on 25 April 2015, almost half the 
households in Nepal had at least either one migrant abroad or a returnee, with 
nearly 88 percent of those being male.13 Consequently, after the disaster, wom-
en in rural communities found their contributions toward recovery efforts 
particularly gratifying. With so many men working abroad, reconstruction was 
slow as Nepal was facing “a lack of manpower at a crucial time.”14 Two years 
later it was still estimated that 60,000 skilled workers were needed to build 
earthquake-resistant houses in fourteen districts.15
That is when Sanumaya Kumal, her friends, and others broke with their 
cultural tradition of household chores to become trained in construction by 
national and international organizations to help rebuild damaged houses, and 
make them more earthquake resistant in a severely affected district north-west 
of Kathmandu. From carrying sand and bricks, to digging foundations, build-
ing walls, roof-fitting, and plastering, Sanumaya, who used to work on a farm, 
was thrilled with her new-found skill sets, now capable to “do everything that 
a male mason can do.”16
Today, over two years later, “the women say they are earning a decent living, 
as well as being happy that they are taking part in important national work” 
such as rebuilding schools and health centers as well.16 If this isn’t an exem-
plary story of what An Emergency Management Framework for Canada calls a 
“valuable opportunity to develop and implement measures to strengthen resil-
ience,” then what is?
Thank you, Sanumaya Kumal from Nepal, for your determination and 
courage.
 Women Warriors
We are accustomed to it by now. Every day, every single day, we hear disas-
ter stories of some sort—whether human-caused, technological, or natural—
13 S. Sharma et al., State of Migration in Nepal, Research Paper vi (Kathmandu: Centre for the 
Study of Labour and Mobility, 2014).
14 S. Tamang, “How Nepal Quake Turned Women into Builders,” bbc News, 24 April 2017, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39694171.
15 R. Samachar Samiti, “Shortage of Skilled Workers Affects Reconstruction Work,” The 
Himalayan Times, 7 January 2017, https://thehimalayantimes.com/nepal/shortage-of 
-skilled-workers-affects-reconstruction-work/.
16 Tamang, supra note 14.
441Women, Communities, Resilience
<UN>
and each one validates decades of reflection by competent authorities that 
 commitment, actions and enforceable policies are no longer optional, they 
are an urgent imperative. The human race will not stop getting innovative in 
creating chaos and Mother Earth is unlikely to calm down, so, isn’t it time we 
do things differently? There are 50 percent of adult humans—women—who 
are more than willing to become full participants in disaster-related activities. 
By empowering them, we are ensuring a prerequisite for success in building 
better, sustainable resilience for their family and community. “Whatever her 
role, she achieves greatness by standing her ground and pushing for change. 
Women warriors possess as much strength, determination and fortitude as any 
man.”17 The time has arrived—now what?
17 “Are You a Woman Warrior?,” Keen, last accessed 31 January 2018, https://www.keen.com/
articles/spiritual/are-you-a-woman-warrior.
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In Search of Relief with Development
Ian McAllister
International Ocean Institute-Canada, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
From Bangladesh and Myanmar to Syria, Mexico and Puerto Rico—today’s 
world is fraught with crises. Some are people-made, some are ‘natural’. Many 
are some combination—underpinned by the earlier symptoms of global 
warming or widening gaps between rich and poor.
Since at least the earlier post-World War ii years, international development 
agencies, not least the World Bank and European Investment Bank, sought to 
balance ‘structural adjustment’ strategies with fostering efforts ‘to oil’ econo-
mies through a reduction of impediments to freer flowing markets: ‘perfect 
competition’ remained a theory to be cited, if not a practice to be pursued ‘in 
one’s own backyard’. Principles and procedures needed to be articulated and 
infused into legal systems. Among two such examples are the various efforts to 
codify ‘human rights’ (tracking back to the initial Geneva Convention triggered 
by Henry Dunant, founder of the International Red Cross movement) and the 
law of the sea (much supported by the life work of Elisabeth Mann Borgese).
This short essay, and more particularly the brief book that it draws upon, is 
much influenced by both. The experience of working within, and exposure to, 
Henry Dunant’s legacy of the International Red Cross Federation led the author 
to write a small booklet Projects for Relief and Development.1 The  subsequent 
use of that work as part of course materials by the author for International 
Ocean Institute (ioi) courses, at the request of Elisabeth Mann Borgese, led 
in part to the writing of the ‘more cautious’ book that is addressed in this es-
say, Projects in Search of Relief with Development.2 That work comprises six 
main chapters, incorporating a number of planning and management frame-
works, as well as drawing upon a variety of case studies and ‘lessons learned’ 
critiques. These case experiences range from the 2015 earthquake in Nepal to 
challenges that have been encountered by Newfoundland, Canada, from a vari-
ety of  African and South-East Asian events, to reflections on a sample of North 
 American and European Union approaches.
The introductory chapter opens by challenging the reader to define a ‘good 
project’ and just how its potential impacts are indeed to be assessed. So-called 
‘relief ’ and ‘development’ projects are introduced: issues such as community 
1 I. McAllister, Projects for Relief and Development (Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, 1991).
2 I. McAllister, Projects in Search of Relief with Development (New York: Linus Learning, 2016).
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strengthening, environmental sustainability, and the biases of particular pro-
fessional groups, be they engineers, economists, or international development 
bankers and medical personnel, are raised, as well as (for example) the kinds 
of approaches that might be anticipated from institutions at varying levels 
of evolution/maturity. A critique by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross about Somalia experiences provides a ‘reality check’ annex.
The second chapter probes further into the identification and design of 
projects. It draws initially on the World Bank’s project cycle approaches and 
then moves into a cross section of private sector and non-governmental or-
ganization frameworks. The influences of core themes, including ‘new towns’ 
and ‘national parks’, on public sector strategies are examined, with examples 
of some of their apparent strengths and limitations. The chapter then moves 
into project preparation phases, including participation issues that are so im-
portant for both relief and recovery processes. How are gender and ethnic is-
sues responded to, not to mention corruption and the behavior of rival power 
groups? Thence, the discussion introduces several design and feasibility frame-
works and, too often neglected in relief project planning, the spelling out of 
coherent exit options. “Exit strategies,” it is emphasized, “are not to be viewed 
as ‘escape mechanisms’, but rather as avenues for planned capacity-building…. 
In many cases, the best exit strategy will incorporate a long-term partnership 
agreement.” This philosophy it might be noted, also underpinned the emphasis 
Elisabeth Mann Borgese placed (in many conversations with the author) on 
the evolving ioi training courses.
Chapter 3 explores aspects of the appraisal and financing of projects. The 
challenges of both identifying and also quantifying the costs and benefits 
of projects are delved into—over time and taking into account alternative 
kinds of potential risk and insecurity scenarios. A proposed international as-
sistance project for a West African university is used as one model, with care 
taken to note that donor agencies are frequently pressured by their financial 
units to focus too narrowly on the more readily quantifiable cost and revenue 
 dimensions—thereby downplaying critical but less-measurable environmen-
tal and social costs/benefits. Chapter 3 then draws on a review the author un-
dertook on the manner Canadian Treasury Board officials had been responding 
to a maze of project proposals that were fraught with political and other, dubi-
ously presented, alleged ‘rates of return’. Those findings, to put it mildly, were 
 provocative—not least in the context of coastal zone management impacts.
Donor-driven relief and development projects are then discussed, as well 
as a cross section of issues encountered within federal-provincial systems and 
also after war situations. Oxfam’s experience with the British government’s 
reading of the Charity Act is referred to, as well as unicef’s enlightened study 
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of some of the impacts of the International Monetary Fund’s understandable, 
yet heavy-handed, ‘structural adjustment’ approaches in quest to reduce waste 
in a number of developing countries, not least targeting, sometimes corruptly 
managed, state corporations.
The chapter concludes with (as an annex) a follow-up framework, written 
immediately after the 2015 Nepalese earthquake. As important as the author 
argues the shorter and longer-term suggestions of ‘what to do’ might be, equal-
ly important can be the framework lists of ‘what not to do’. In each case, both 
short-term and longer range approaches are suggested. Insights were not only 
drawn from more recent Haitian earthquake experiences, but also from tsuna-
mis (among other examples) in Southeast Asia.
Chapter 4, on project implementation and management, introduces basic 
emergency management models such as those designed by Erik Auf de Heide. 
Next, a model developed for the International Red Cross at the time of the first 
Gulf War is discussed, followed by critical path and decision tree frameworks 
for agency intervention (the last by Mary Anderson and Peter Woodrow). From 
such earlier design phases, the chapter leads into project work structures, in-
cluding critical approaches to project supervision. This section is followed by 
a discussion of monitoring and operations that includes details of three case 
studies: a university teaching hospital in a poverty-stricken region of Africa, a 
cyclone shelter on the Bangladesh coast, and a school in rural Canada. Among 
the concluding remarks to this fourth chapter is:
Responsible project management builds not merely on the kinds of me-
chanical skills that can be routinely acquired in the engineering or busi-
ness oriented programs of urban universities, but it necessarily draws 
heavily upon social skills, cultural understanding, and (above all) a com-
mitment to achieving results within ethically responsible community 
frameworks.
Project evaluation, follow-up and institutional memory-building is the next 
main theme (Chapter 5). Starting with a discussion of challenges encountered 
by government auditors, especially when questions of efficiency spill over into 
issues of effectiveness (not least on foreign aid projects), the chapter cites a 
number of findings from World Bank project reviews. These range from a tech-
nical paper on lessons from the Tennessee Valley Authority to audits in Bosnia/
Herzegovina and Indonesia. In the last, for but one example, a physical au-
dit of a World Bank-financed (community-driven development program that 
constructs roads) found that a full quarter of expenditures were ‘lost to theft’, 
 probably orchestrated by village heads who oversaw projects.
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Evaluations, it is noted, can obviously vary in scale and approaches from 
in-house reviews to sometimes complex and extended procedures on contro-
versial projects, such as a major Olympic Games complex or international port. 
An entire academic industry, now, it is also observed, appears to be evolving 
around measurements of ‘well-being’ and the reader is referred to the thought-
ful work on universities by Derek Bok, a former Harvard president.
‘What happens to the findings?’ is next discussed. This leads into a critique 
on ethical values and projects, including the findings of a review of the British 
Public Service, Just and Honest Government. One question that recurs, not least 
in peacekeeping settings, is ‘can ethical values appropriately change?’ Issues 
relating to media, political, business, and non-governmental organizations are 
raised. The chapter concludes with a critique of codes of conduct and their 
apparent effectiveness (and otherwise) at the project level—especially in the 
context of large organizations under financial pressures, not least including 
banks and international fishing corporations.
Chapter 6 brings together a cross section of the key points raised in earlier 
sections, under the heading ‘The Project in a Policy Cauldron’. This takes the 
reader from issues linked to mosquito nets and malaria to a bridge project in 
Croatia, from changes to a school curriculum in Zimbabwe to the political re-
routing of national airlines. ‘Good projects’, it is argued, may indeed be Trojan 
horses for ideas that bring in societal change, but they cannot be viable substi-
tutes for the changes themselves. The chapter is followed by an extensive an-
nex that hinges back to the author’s early experiences, cited in the preface, in 
Bangladesh. Drawn from a World Bank report, the annex concludes on a cau-
tiously optimistic note, “Bangladesh shows [in the context of cyclone impact 
reductions] how even poor countries can prevent disasters, thereby nourishing 
[community strengthening] institutions.”
The closing sections of the book comprise a select bibliography,3 a series 
of follow-up discussion and research questions, as well as the detailed outline 
for a workshop that leads directly back to (but also extends beyond) the core 
themes of the main book itself.
3 This ‘outline for a workshop’ includes elements of workshops that have been used by ioi, 







 The globalization of the shipping industry, just like globalization in other 
sectors, has, on the whole, not contributed to human security, the protection 
of the environment, and the fortunes of the poor. Su���ce it to remember that 
about 70 percent of the globalized �leet is registered in open registries issued 
in Panama, Liberia, the Bahamas, Cyprus, and half a dozen other states, often 
with loose standards, if any, for labor conditions and for the environment. 
Globalization has contributed to the plight of seamen from poor countries and 
to the marginalization of weaker economies and countries o�f the mainstream of 
shipping and transport developments. 
 Shipping requires a huge capital investment. … The best laid company plans 
can be made to look foolish by sudden collapses in the market. (Vassilis 
Constantakopoulos) 
 Shipping is in its own knowledge crisis. Recognition and understanding of 
the industry is low. In many cases, the shipping community itself is growing 
disheartened. Professionals quit the industry, taking their precious knowledge 
with them. (Vassilis Constantakopoulos) 
 And, as Edgar Gold points out, the number of well-trained seafarers is also 
dwindling, for a variety of reasons, thus contributing an additional dimension 
to the “crisis of knowledge.” 
 Elisabeth Mann Borgese* 
 *  “Preface,” in  The Crisis of Knowledge: New Directions for Learning and In formed Decision-
making for Oceans and Coasts, Proceedings of Pacem in Maribus  xxvi , Halifax, Canada, 29 
November-3 December 1998 , ed. S.J. Rolston (Halifax: International Ocean Institute, 1999), xii. 
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Introduction
Editor: Mary R. Brooks
Historically, control of international shipping was the foundation of interna-
tional power and economic development, from the days of the Greeks and 
Phoenicians (and their control of the Mediterranean), to the dominance of the 
British Empire in more recent centuries. After World War ii, many developing 
nations saw shipping as a means to control their economic destiny, and their 
efforts were supported by Elisabeth Mann Borgese. So while very little of her 
work on ocean governance related to shipping, she has inspired a vessel named 
after her!1
Elisabeth would be surprised to see that there are eight papers in this part, 
as only seafarers’ rights and port state control were close to her heart. The 
thought that a Polar Code to govern the Arctic Ocean has materialized would 
delight her; the introduction of autonomous ships to confound that gover-
nance would definitely be of interest. She recognized shipping as a truly global 
industry, and that it was one with serious capital requirements that do not 
incent the best in human behavior. Each of the eight papers in this part would 
be received with enthusiasm by her as her mission of good ocean governance 
for the benefit of the planet, as a whole, and the prosperity of its citizens were 
a key driver in each of the topics covered in this part. Enjoy!
1 The research vessel Elisabeth Mann Borgese, imo no. 8521438, was built in 1987 and is reg-
istered in Germany, see http://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:152735/ 
mmsi:218601000/imo:8521438/vessel:ELISABETH_MANN_BORGESE#cmJKM69AwyzrrsFv.99.
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National Shipping Policies and International  
Ocean Governance
Mary R. Brooks
Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
The spokesman for the Group of 77, recalling the statement made by the 
President of the Ivory Coast that the path to economic liberation passed 
across the sea, said that, for the third world, the question of shipping was 
not just one aspect of general economic life, as it was in many developed 
countries; it was one of the basic foundations … He went on to say that 
while developing country exports accounted for 61 per cent of world sea-
borne cargo, the developing countries owned only 8 per cent of world 
tonnage.1
⸪
Thus, in the late 1970s, the question of shipping was seen as critical to the aspi-
rations of the developing countries that made up the Group of 77.
As an ardent supporter of the Group of 77, Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s work 
on ocean governance reflected two primary beliefs relevant to shipping. One 
was the right of the nation state to ensure the quality of shipping that took 
place within its territorial waters, and she was a strong advocate of port state 
control as a means of ensuring that (a) the environmental costs of shipping 
did not fall on port states, and (b) seafarers were protected by relevant Interna-
tional Labour Organization and International Maritime Organization conven-
tions. The second belief was that the nation state should be able to share in 
the benefits of shipping, and that those benefits should not just accrue to the 
developed world countries that owned shipping.
Two essays in this section address her interests in port state control and 
seafarer protection; therefore, this essay explores the second of her beliefs 
1 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (unctad) (1981), Proceedings of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Fifth Session, Manila, 7 May–3 June 
1979, Volume i, paras. 195–196.
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in a modern context. It begins by identifying the current state of beneficial 
ownership of shipping, flag of registration and location of shipbuilding activ-
ity, raising questions about where the true value of shipping resides: Is it with 
the beneficial owners of vessels (as she thought) or is it found in other parts 
of the industry, for example, by serving the trading interests of the countries 
involved? There is a common assumption that it is the former, and this essay 
challenges that assumption. It examines what developing countries can do, in 
terms of shipping policies, to ensure that the benefits and costs of this most 
global of international businesses are equitably distributed and that develop-
ing countries have the opportunity to acquire some of those benefits. It then 
provides a checklist of shipping policies for nation states to review in their 
efforts to increase their participation in the benefits of shipping before  closing 
with some thoughts on the future of developing country shipping policies.
 Beneficial Ownership and the Value of Shipping to Nation States
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(unctad), as of January 2017, the top five ship-owning nation states (in terms 
of deadweight tonnage [dwt]) were Greece, Japan, China, Germany, and 
 Singapore; these five countries beneficially owned half (49.5 percent) of the 
world’s tonnage.2 Most important, the unctad data demonstrate that more 
than 50 years after the founding of the Group of 77, developed countries con-
tinue to own the majority of vessels; developing country participation in own-
ing vessels still does not reflect their share of the population as Elisabeth had 
hoped.
On the other hand, the top five countries for vessel registration at the begin-
ning of 2017 were Panama, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Hong Kong (China), 
and Singapore, flagging 57.8 percent of the world’s dwt. Developing countries 
play a significant role in vessel registration, flagging 76.2 percent of the ships 
registered in the world.3
A third means of participating in the industry is by building the ships. Only 
three countries are significant suppliers of ship hardware, as ship building 
takes place predominantly in China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, ac-
counting for 91.9 percent of gross tonnage constructed in 2016.4 That China and 
2 unctad, Review of Maritime Transport 2017 (Geneva: unctad, 2017), Table 2.3.
3 Id.
4 Id., Table 2.9.
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Korea have significant presence in this component of the industry would have 
appealed to Elisabeth.
The questions that should be asked are: How does shipping create value for 
a nation state? Is it through the ownership function that value is created? What 
are the best policies for nation states to ensure that they benefit from value 
creation in the industry?
In the 1970s and 1980s, there was a firm belief that participation in the business 
of shipping would bring benefits to developing countries through the  reduction 
of freight payments internationally, a drain on the foreign currency reserves of 
these countries. The crews of a nationally owned fleet could presumably be 
paid in local currency, assuming that there was a requirement to use national 
citizens; the fallacy of this belief caused considerable consternation as the 
reality was that most shipping companies wished to be paid in the industry 
standard of US dollars (or other hard currencies in more recent years) and 
would have to pay expenses like fuel and foreign port charges in a hard currency. 
This means that the residual value of revenue minus expenses is positive only 
when the ship makes a profit in hard currency, that the revenue is received 
in a hard currency, and that the costs as, as much as possible, are in the local 
currency. This is not, and has not, always been the case, and the  impacts on 
developing countries have been particularly destructive in those years when 
the industry is unprofitable, and this industry is notoriously cyclical.
 National Policies to Acquire Value from Shipping
Given the above statistics, many developing countries clearly decided that 
participation in the industry is easiest and quickest through offering a flag of 
registry to foreign owners. Simply, charging a registration fee brings in foreign 
exchange from developed country owners, although not substantive levels of 
income tax, as corporate tax on shipping needs to approximate zero in order 
for the particular flag to be attractive.
If developing country value creation is not through ownership, and only 
minimally through registration, does it come from shipbuilding (or shipbreak-
ing)? The argument is positive so long as the local government does not feel it 
must subsidize the industry to generate vessel orders or scrapping activities. 
Again, many countries have allowed subsidy policies to destroy that means of 
creating value.
Finally, can value be created through the offering of ship management 
activities? This question was investigated by Canadians to explore how Canada 
might benefit from shipping without necessarily subsidizing or protecting a 
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 national flag fleet.5 Canada supports its national flag fleet through a cabotage 
policy,6 but is there more to be gained? The report concluded that the valuable 
jobs in shipping are those created by ship management companies. Countries 
that serve as ship management locations, i.e., Cyprus, Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Malta, generate employment for professional shipping jobs (accounting, crew 
management, marketing, operations planning, and the like) and then acquire 
the personal income tax revenue from those jobs rather than the corporate 
income tax from the ship owning company. Changes in 1992 to Canada’s tax 
laws created the opportunity for Canada to serve as a ship management center 
with significant revenue for government generated from employee personal 
income tax.7 Today, Vancouver is one of the top maritime capitals in the world 
(ranked 24th) by dnv/gl.8
For the most part, vessel ownership is a more expensive option for trading 
interests than buying shipping services on the open market. A 1985 study ex-
amined the fleet development initiatives of five developing countries and con-
cluded “the ability to gain increased control of shipping through government 
measures designed to promote private sector investment is tied to the ability of 
companies to engage in such an investment.”9 In other words, success in devel-
oping country investment in shipping needs strong capital market access, the 
very thing many developing countries lack. In seeking greater prosperity, four 
of the five developing countries examined only found greater debt.
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that shipping creates value at the 
port, as it not only creates shore-based cargo-handling employment, but also 
serves to connect exporters and importers to world markets and suppliers. 
It is here, as the 2017 Council of Canadian Academies study found, that the 
true value of shipping accrues; the value of connectivity to world markets was 
nine times the economic value (gdp) found in traditional economic impact 
5 Jonathan Seymour and Associates, Vancouver: An International Centre for Maritime Com-
merce Final Report (Vancouver: Asia Pacific Initiative Transportation Task Force, 22 Decem-
ber 1988).
6 The requirement to use a vessel of national flag vessel for domestic marine traffic.
7 M.R. Brooks and J.R.F. Hodgson (2005), “The Fiscal Treatment of Shipping: A Canadian Per-
spective on Shipping Policy,” in Shipping Economics: Research in Transportation Economics, 
Vol. 12, ed., Kevin Cullinane (2005), 143–171.
8 E.W. Jakobsen et al., The Leading Maritime Capitals of the World (Norway: dnv/gl & 
Menon Economics, 2017), https://www.dnvgl.com/maritime/publications/leading-maritime 
-capitals-2017.html, last accessed 13 August 2017.
9 M.R. Brooks, Fleet Development and the Control of Shipping in Southeast Asia, Occasional 
 Paper 77 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), 89.
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 studies.10 The true value of shipping, therefore, is in its role as a generator of 
trade-related economic development for a country.
Brooks, Sánchez and Wilmsmeier (2014) evaluated national shipping poli-
cies in six Latin American countries in order to identify impediments to the 
provision of efficient regional shipping, updating the earlier framework of 
shipping policies11 to include: (1) domestic cabotage policies (and any excep-
tions for foreign-flagged vessels), (2) shipbuilding requirements for vessels ac-
cessing regional cargo, (3) existing bilateral cabotage agreements, (4)  foreign 
 ownership restrictions on national flag shipping, (5) shipping taxation, 
(6)  crewing requirements, (7) carbon-pricing for fuels and/or existing emis-
sions control areas, (8) pro-national flag incentives, and (9) any other require-
ments/rules or special treatment of cabotage services/ships.12 This is a good 
checklist for any country wanting to understand why it may or may not attract 
shipping services with a net gain for the local economy. Non-tariff barriers to 
shipping operations in any geographic region (at the national or regional level) 
can impact on the ability of the shipowner to provide fully efficient and effec-
tive shipping services at a price the market will bear. Without such efficien-
cies, the trade routes and markets a developing nation seeks to secure may 
be(come) inaccessible.
 Final Thoughts
Elisabeth Mann Borgese would be very surprised to see the world of ship-
ping today as not having greater developing country beneficial ownership. In 
her view, the passage of the unctad Convention on a Code of Conduct for 
 Liner Conferences 1974 was supposed to assist in securing that participation 
by promising them a 40 percent share of liner conference traffic (Article 2). 
Even though the convention came into force, the participation outcome never 
materialized because it was economically unrealistic and not supported by the 
cargo owners paying for the services.
Today, many developing nations see shipping as producing value by sim-
ply serving as flag states for a truly global industry, collecting a minimum for-
eign registration income that has little loyalty. Owners of poor quality vessels 
10 Council of Canadian Academies, The Value of Commercial Marine Shipping to Canada 
( Ottawa: The Expert Panel on the Social and Economic Value of Marine Shipping to 
 Canada, Council of Canadian Academies, 2017).
11 Brooks (1985), supra note 9.
12 M.R. Brooks, R. Sánchez and G. Wilmsmeier, “Developing Short Sea Shipping In South 
America: Looking Beyond Traditional Perspectives,” Ocean Yearbook 28 (2014): 495–525.
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 continue to migrate to flags where there is the least amount of government in-
terference, while those seeking a premium quality business image choose from 
reputable flag states that offer significant tax advantages without the damage 
to reputation that comes from a neglectful government bureaucracy. The value 
in shipping today continues to come, as it did in Elisabeth’s day, from its role 
in facilitating trade and the resulting wealth creation that accrues from trade 
participation. This means that unctad’s current trade facilitation initiatives 
and its liner connectivity focus are of highest priority in securing economic 
prosperity for developing countries.
Globally, the way national shipping policies have evolved, and with today’s 
world concerns about the oceans and our planetary future, we can expect to 
see the ownership and flag decisions taken by multinational shipping com-
panies monitored by governments. They will find participation in strong port 
state control intervention, international labour conventions, and a climate 
policy agenda that seeks safer ships, cleaner seas and responsible shipping as 
the paths to follow, all approaches that would have appealed to Elisabeth.
<UN>
Growth in the Shipping Industry: Future 
Projections and Impacts
Peter Noble
Noble Associates, Inc., Katy, Texas, United States
 Introduction
Since earliest times, ships and shipping have shaped civilization. Ships have 
been used for discovery, war, and leisure, but most of all for cargo transport. 
In his poem ‘Cargoes’, the British poet laureate John Masefield describes such 
activities through the ages, from the “Quinquireme of Nineveh from distant 
Ophir, ... With a cargo of ivory, and apes and peacocks ...” through the “ Stately 
Spanish galleon coming from the Isthmus …” to the “Dirty British coaster with 
a salt-caked smoke stack, butting through the Channel in the mad March 
days,  ….”1 While recognizing the past, this essay will focus on the potential 
growth in the shipping industry with a focus on commercial cargo shipping, 
and will exclude sectors such as cruise ships, ferries, offshore drilling and 
production units, tugs, barges, and related vessels.
Since the end of World War ii, the world has seen an explosive growth in 
trade. Globally the sum of export and import values as a percentage of the total 
world gross domestic product (gdp) grew from around 20 percent in the late 
1940s through early 1950s to close to 60 percent in 2011, with the shipping in-
dustry as the backbone of global trade.2 This growth is likely to continue. In its 
report, 2017 Outlook for Energy: A View to 2040, ExxonMobil projects a two bil-
lion increase in world population, a 130 percent increase in the global economy, 
and a 35 percent increase in energy demand.3 Further information developed 
by BP plc for its 2017 Energy Outlook report suggests a base case where world 
gdp almost doubles by 2035, driven by fast-growing emerging economies, as 
more than two billion people are lifted from low incomes.4
1 J. Masefield, “Cargoes,” Ballads (Elkin Mathews, 1903).
2 R.C. Feenstra, R. Inklaar and M.P. Timmer, “The Next Generation of the Penn World Table,” 
American Economic Review 105(10) (2015): 3150–3182, available for download at http://www 
.ggdc.net/pwt, Penn World Tables, version 8.1, University of Groningen, The Netherlands (re-
lease date 13 April 2015).
3 Available at http://cdn.exxonmobil.com/~/media/global/files/outlook-for-energy/2017/2017 
-outlook-for-energy.pdf.
4 Available at https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/energy-outlook 
-2017/bp-energy-outlook-2017.pdf.
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Looking specifically at commercial marine transport, we have seen a steady 
increase over the past decade or more. Growth in cargoes transported by ship 
has risen from around 30.5 trillion ton-miles in 2000 to approximately 52.5 
trillion ton-miles in 2014. The United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment (unctad) reported that in 2015 total cargoes transported by ship 
exceeded 10 billion tons for the first time, with a fleet size of over 50,000 ships, 
and that 62 percent of these cargoes were unloaded in developing countries as 
compared to only 41 percent in 2006.5
All this suggests that marine transport will continue to be an important part 
of the global economy for many years into the future.
 Current Fleet
Three main types of cargoes, dry bulk, liquid bulk and containerized, largely 
describe the commercial marine transport industry. Within these broad sec-
tors there are a number of sub-divisions. The dry bulk trade is dominated by 
three types of cargo: iron ore, coal, and wheat; the liquid bulk cargoes also 
split into three main segments: crude oil, gas (liquefied natural gas (lng) and 
liquefied petroleum gas), and refined hydrocarbon products. Containerized 
cargo is primarily manufactured or semi-manufactured goods and can be split 
into transoceanic liner trade and small regional feeder trade segments. Using 
figures for 2015, dry bulk cargoes accounted for 44 percent of the total global 
marine trade measured by tonnage, while oil and gas accounted for 30 percent 
and containers for 16 percent, with the remaining 10 percent being general car-
goes of various types.
 Future Growth
Looking to the future, it is likely that dry bulk cargoes will continue to rise, with 
steady growth in the wheat and iron ore segments, but with perhaps a smaller 
growth or even a decline in thermal coal for power generation. The demand 
for metallurgical coal for steel making is likely to remain strong over the longer 
term. Similarly, we may expect changes in the oil and gas sector where oil may 
see limited growth while natural gas in the form of lng will continue to see the 
substantial growth we have witnessed in recent years.
5 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (unctad), Review of Maritime Trans-
port 2016 (New York and Geneva: unctad, 2016), 6 and Figure 1.4(b).
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Containerized cargoes have seen rapid growth over the last 25 years, grow-
ing from approximately 90 million twenty-foot equivalent units (teus) in 
1990 to nearly 700 million teus in 2015. The container trade is likely to remain 
strong although we have seen occasional disruptions such as the financial cri-
sis around 2008 and 2009.6
 Factors Affecting Growth
The future growth of shipping will be driven by the abovementioned growth in 
global trade, but will be impacted by a number of factors, which may put some 
limits on this growth or may lead to increased innovation to satisfy demand.
 Ship Efficiency and Environmental Impact
In terms of emissions per ton of cargo, marine shipping is the most efficient 
form of commercial transport. However, due to the sheer scale of the industry, 
shipping contributes to about 3 percent of the world’s emissions. In order to 
minimize air pollution from ships, the International Maritime Organization 
(imo) has established sulfur emission control areas (secas) or emission con-
trol areas (ecas).7 The emission limit requirements are being addressed by use 
of low sulfur fuels, using post-combustion treatment of the exhaust, and by use 
of alternative fuels, such as lng.
Further, in 2011, the imo addressed the overall efficiency of ships when it 
adopted an Energy Efficiency Design Index (eedi), which is aimed at promot-
ing the use of more energy efficient (less polluting) equipment and engines.8 
The eedi requires a minimum energy efficiency level per capacity mile (e.g., 
ton-mile) for different ship type and size segments.
Another concern with shipping has been the potential for the transport 
of invasive species in ballast water. The imo International Convention for 
the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments,9 which 
6 unctad, Trade and Development Report, 2015: Making the International Financial Architec-
ture Work for Development (New York and Geneva, 2015).
7 See “Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships,” imo, http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Envi 
ronment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/Air-Pollution.aspx, last accessed 14 Febru-
ary 2018.
8 See “Energy Efficiency Measures,” imo, http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/
PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/Technical-and-Operational-Measures.aspx, last ac-
cessed 14 February 2018.
9 London, 13 February 2004; see “bwm Convention and Guidelines,” imo, http://www.imo.org/
en/OurWork/Environment/BallastWaterManagement/Pages/BWMConventionandGuide 
lines.aspx, last accessed 14 February 2018.
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 entered into force in September 2017, marks a significant step towards halting 
the spread of invasive aquatic species, which can cause problems for  local eco-
systems and lead to substantial economic loss. Under the Convention, ships 
are required to manage their ballast water to remove, render harmless, or avoid 
the uptake or discharge of aquatic organisms and pathogens within ballast wa-
ter and sediments.
 Ship Size
One of the ways in which the shipping industry has sought to enhance overall 
efficiency has been through increasing ship size and capacity. However, we 
have seen limits to ship size already occurring with crude oil tankers and large 
lng carriers. The largest crude oil tanker, built in 1979, was over 560,000 ton 
deadweight capacity; since that time, however, the industry has seen ships 
of around 350,000 dwt ton capacity as the most useful maximum. Similarly, a 
number of very large lng carriers were built in the late 2000s with capacities 
up to approximately 265,000 cubic meters. More recent ship orders have been 
in the 170,000 to 185,000 cubic meter range.
Part of the problem with these very large ships is the limited access to ports. 
The sheer physical dimensions are hard to handle at many berths, and also 
draft/depth limits in many commercial ports do not allow for such mega-ships, 
restricting where they may be deployed.
To date we have not seen these technical size limits reached for container-
ships, with recent orders for 22,000 teu ships. Again, port facilities and shore-
based cargo handling and infrastructure systems are being stretched, so we 
may see a de facto reduction in the size of such ships before long.
 Port Size and Infrastructure
Port infrastructure, including shore facilities in terms of cargo handing or stor-
age, will limit the rate of growth in ship size. One of the dimensions that most 
impacts design options and operations as ship size increases is water depth in a 
port. Many of the world’s most significant ports, like New York and  Rotterdam, 
have had to invest in channel and berth dredging to increase water depths but 
the economics of initial and continuing maintenance dredging must be com-
pared to the improved transport efficiency in using larger ships. Ultimately, to 
participate in global trade, water depth matters.
One way to overcome port draft restrictions is to develop offshore ports 
where larger ships can discharge and temporarily store cargoes prior to de-
livery. One example of this is the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (loop), which 
is a deep-water port designed for unloading crude oil cargoes from deep-draft 
tankers unable to access existing Gulf coast ports. The loop Marine Terminal 
Maritime Transportation460
<UN>
is located in open waters of the Gulf of Mexico approximately 29 kilometers 
(18 nautical miles) offshore from the State of Louisiana. Other concepts for 
offshore ports for container and other types of cargo offloading and distribu-
tion are being examined, and we may see future developments of this type as 
cargo volumes rise.
 Panama and Suez Canal Improvements
Both the Suez Canal, opened in 1869, and the Panama Canal, opened in 1914, 
have had a major impact on global shipping for a century or more in terms 
of both routing and vessel design. Over the last few decades, ships have been 
specifically designed to optimize cargo capacity given canal size limitations. 
Both canals have added capacity with a new, wider Panama Canal now in ser-
vice and the expansion of the Suez Canal to allow for two-way traffic. These 
projects will no doubt result in further opportunities for creating new classes 
of ships to take advantage of the increased capacity.
 Potential Future Changes
Over the past two decades, we have seen a shift in cargo patterns with develop-
ing countries no longer being predominantly exporters. unctad notes that 
the balance of developing country traffic was more than three times loaded to 
unloaded in 1970, but by 2016 had shifted to a more balanced trade.10 This trend 
is likely to continue.
In addition, we will see expansion of routes supplying raw materials and 
food imports from Africa and South America to China. The New Silk Road, 
which will provide an overland connection between China and Europe, is like-
ly to have a moderating effect on marine transport.11 This will most likely be in 
the form of reducing the rate of increase rather than in diminishing the actual 
volume of marine cargo.
We are also likely to see less oil transported to Europe and North America as 
demand stabilizes. However, we will see increased trade in lng, with signifi-
cant increases in imports into Asia. Finally, a major change in marine trans-
port could occur as the world moves to reduce the use of fossil fuels. At the 
present time approximately 40 percent of all seaborne cargoes are fossil-fuel 
10 unctad, Review of Maritime Transport 2017 (Geneva: unctad, 2017), Table 1.4(b).
11 See P. Tae-Woo Lee et al., “Research Trends and Agenda on the Belt and Road (B&R) Ini-
tiative with a Focus on Maritime Transport,” Maritime Policy & Management (November 
2017), 1–19, doi.org/10.1080/03088839.2017.1400189.
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related, namely, oil, gas, and coal. As the world reduces the use of such fuels, 
it seems likely that the demand for their marine transport will also diminish 
substantially.
 Conclusion
Demand for commercial marine transport will continue to grow with innova-
tions being brought to the market to satisfy increased demand. Developments 
already underway point to increased efficiency and reduced environmental 
impact; to the lowering of manning levels on ships, maybe even unmanned 
ships in the not too distant future; and to improvements in marine and port in-
frastructure. For the foreseeable future there is no other system that can match 
the overall efficiency of commercial shipping in providing transoceanic move-
ment of freight.
<UN>
Port State Control: An Important Concept in the 
Safety of Life at Sea, the Protection of the Marine 
Environment, and of Goods in Transit
Alan Knight
Transport Canada, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
Historically, the power to regulate merchant ships resided with the nation 
where the ship was registered. When seaborne trade was geographically lim-
ited, this method of control was somewhat effective. With the expansion of 
the European empires, the ability of nations to regulate ships flying their flag 
was diminished by distance, and they would appoint consuls, or merchants, to 
represent them in distant ports, and they would advise masters on commer-
cial matters, and on local ship-repair facilities. Lloyd’s of London, which, as 
insurers, had a financial interest in arranging reliable repairs to damaged ships, 
began in the 1740s, to hire shipwrights to represent their interests in overseas 
ports, and to appoint surveyors at major ports along the trade routes of the 
British Empire. Other nations, such as France, Germany, Norway, and the Unit-
ed States adopted this system, which worked fairly well for 200 years. However, 
in 1967, the Arab-Israeli War resulted in the closure of the Suez Canal, length-
ening oil supply-lines of the Western industrial nations, as ships were forced 
to travel from the Middle East using the longer route past the southern tip of 
Africa. As a result, freight rates increased dramatically, prompting the order-
ing of hundreds of ships to take advantage of these increased rates. When the 
Suez Canal re-opened in 1975, too many ships were chasing too few cargoes, 
and freight rates plummeted. Many shipowners went bankrupt, and those who 
survived had to drastically cut their costs.
Most of a shipowner’s costs are ‘hard costs’ (mortgage, insurance, fuel, spare 
parts) over which there is little control. The only ‘soft costs’ are registration 
and crewing. Many shipowners removed their ships from the high-cost in-
dustrial nations, and re-registered them with lower-cost ‘flags of convenience’ 
(FoC). By registering with a FoC, the shipowner was able to replace the high-
wage unionized workforce of industrialized nations with crew from nations 
with low wages. This labor outsourcing came at a hidden cost as many of the 
‘new’ crews were inexperienced, and inadequately trained. This led to several 
accidents, many involving serious oil-pollution, such as Torrey Canyon (1967) 
and Argo Merchant (1976), and an awareness that safety standards in merchant 
shipping were in serious decline. In a related development, the classification 
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societies, which had acted on behalf of flag states, were faced with compe-
tition from newly-formed classification societies who were anxious for busi-
ness and  prepared to drop their standards in order to get it. Some shipowners 
moved their ships to classification societies with lower technical and ethical 
standards.
In 1978, the Liberian-flag tanker Amoco Cadiz, laden with 200,000 tons of 
crude oil, was approaching northwest France when its steering gear failed. The 
ship drifted ashore, and disintegrated, polluting hundreds of miles of beaches 
and fishing grounds. The coastal ecosystem was devastated. The French gov-
ernment convened the Regional European Conference on Maritime Safety 
at Paris in order to devise a plan to prevent a re-occurrence of Amoco Cadiz-
type events. The Conference decided that the existing regulatory regime, un-
der which flags were given exclusive authority over ships flying its flag, either 
directly, or through authorized classification societies, was not providing an 
adequate level of safety to their crews, or to the coastal states whose waters 
the ships were transiting. The Final Declaration of the Conference, adopted on 
2 December 1980, underlined the need to improve maritime safety, to protec-
tion the marine environment, and to improve living and working conditions 
on board ships, and the need for a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to 
guide future action.1
Subsequently the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Con-
trol (Paris MoU) was signed in January 1982.2 Following the Final Declaration, 
the Paris MoU states:
Convinced of the necessity, for ... an improved and harmonized system of 
port State control and of strengthening co-operation and the exchange 
of information;
have reached the following understanding:
Section 1: Commitments
1.1 Each Authority will give effect to the provisions of the present Mem-
orandum and the Annexes thereto.
1.2 Each Authority will maintain an effective system of port State con-
trol with a view to ensuring that, without discrimination as to flag,  foreign 
1 For a more detailed review of the history and timeline of port state control agreements, see 
“35 Years of Paris MoU on Port State Control,” Paris MoU (12 September 2017), https://www 
.parismou.org/35-years-paris-mou-port-state-control.
2 For the text of the Paris MoU, see https://www.parismou.org/inspections-risk/library-faq/




merchant ships calling at a port of its State, or anchored off such a port, 
comply with the standards laid down in the Relevant Instruments listed 
in Section 2.
…
2.3 Each Authority will apply those relevant instruments which are in 
force, and to which its State is a Party. In the case of amendments to a 
relevant instrument, each Authority will apply those amendments which 
are in force, and which its State has accepted. An instrument that is so 
amended will then be deemed to be the ‘relevant instrument’ for that 
Authority.
2.4 In applying a relevant instrument, the Authorities will ensure that 
no more favourable treatment is given to ships of non-Parties and apply 
the procedures specified in Annex 1. In the case of ships below conven-
tion size [less than 500 Gross Tons] the Authorities will apply the proce-
dures in Annex 1.
The Paris MoU sets out an agreed upon an inspection mechanism to ensure 
that ships calling at the ports of members of the Memorandum are inspect-
ed, and if found to be non-compliant, forced to correct those faults. The MoU 
Secretariat is in The Hague, and the thetis database resides at the European 
Maritime Safety Agency in Lisbon, Portugal.
When members of the Paris MoU inspect a ship calling at their ports or 
anchorages, they record the findings of the inspection and send them elec-
tronically to the database, thus making it available to all members of the MoU. 
An unscrupulous shipowner can no longer ‘promise’ to repair an identified de-
ficiency, or deficiencies, at the next port, but not actually do the repairs, as the 
next port would already be aware of those deficiencies. Now the performance 
of the ship’s flag and classification society was open to scrutiny by all mem-
bers of the Paris MoU. It was a major advance in the fight against sub-standard 
ships.
The Paris MoU decided that for the inspection regime to have credibility 
with the marine community, Port State Control Officers (pscos) must have 12 
months experience as a flag state inspector, and hold one of the following quali-
fications: Master Mariner (stcw II/2), First Class Motor Engineer (stcw III/2), 
or a degree in naval architecture and five years relevant industrial experience. 
When a psco inspects a ship, he/she will board the ship, present their iden-
tity document to the gangway guard, be escorted to the master, and ask to see 
the ship’s statutory certificates. The dates, of issue, expiry, and annual endorse-
ment by flag or class will be noted on the psc Form A, for onward  transmission 
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to thetis. The Maritime Labour Convention, 2006  documentation will be ex-
amined to check that wage rates are clearly stated, and that each crew member 
has a copy of his/her contract of employment. The officers’ certificates of com-
petency, and records of training will be checked. The crew’s medical certifi-
cates will be examined for validity. The psco will examine the record of safety 
drills, the oil record book, and the garbage  management plan.
The psco will tour the ship in order to ascertain the level of maintenance. It 
is customary to ask crew members to operate equipment, in order to ascertain 
their knowledge of their duties, and to verify that the equipment functions 
in a satisfactory manner. Should crew knowledge, or maintenance, be found 
inadequate, the psco’s report will list the deficiency or deficiencies, on Form 
‘B’, and a copy will be given to the master. The deficiency codes allow for a va-
riety of remedies: ‘fix at the next dry-docking’, ‘fix at next port’, and ‘fix within 
two weeks’. If the deficiency(s) is/are more serious, and constitute a danger to 
safety of life, or the marine environment, a ‘fix before departure from this port’ 
will be issued.
A serious deficiency, or a multiplicity of small deficiencies, gives evidence 
of an inadequate safety management system, and may lead to the ship being 
detained. This will have serious consequences, as the ship will no longer be 
able to maintain its schedule, and may lose its charter. Additionally, there will 
be serious consequences for the ship’s insurance, and protection & indemnity 
coverage.
The International Maritime Organization (imo), realizing that port state 
control was a valuable technique, passed Resolution A.682(17) (1991), “Regional 
co-operation in the control of ships and discharges,” to create a framework on 
which regional psc MoUs could be created. Subsequently eight other regional 
MoUs have been formed (Tokyo, Caribbean, South America, West and South-
ern Africa, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, Black Sea, Persian Gulf). The United 
States operates its own psc system, as does Iran. The various MoUs have an-
nual meetings, and participate in exchanges of personnel and information. 
Because of frequent changes to regulations, personnel training is a major on-
going commitment, however all MoUs are constrained by budgetary concerns. 
The adoption of a future ‘world MoU’ has been postulated. Whilst this would 
be desirable, integrating MoUs that are separated by large distances and their 
databases would be a difficult and expensive task. The question of how such a 
body would relate to the imo has yet to be defined. Nonetheless, the future will 
involve ever-closer liaison between the MoUs, the active participation of the 




Whilst the vast majority of shipowners endeavor to maintain high stan-
dards, there will always be a small minority of owners who, through ignorance 
or greed, try to cut corners, and a small minority of flag states, and  classification 
societies who, through lack of knowledge, or for other reasons, fail to live up 
to regulated standards. For such organizations, port state control is a powerful 
adversary, and protector of the safety of life at sea, the marine environment, 
and goods in transit.
Annex 1: List of Relevant Instruments as of 1 July 2017
1. The International Convention on Load Lines, 1966
2. The Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention on Load 
Lines, 1966
3. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974
4. The Protocol of 1978 to the International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea
5. The Protocol of 1988 to the International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea, 1974
6. The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 
1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, and as further 
amended by the Protocol of 1997
7. The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978
8. The Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Colli-
sions at Sea, 1972
9. The International Convention on the Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 
1969
10. The Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976
11. The Protocol of 1996 to the Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) 
Convention, 1976
12. The Maritime Labour Convention, 2006
13. The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 
1969
14. The Protocol of 1992 to amend the International Convention on Civil 
 Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969
15. The International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling 
Systems on Ships, 2001
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16. The International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution 
Damage, 2001
17. The International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ 
Ballast Water and Sediments3
3 See “40th Amendment Paris MoU (English)—Effective 1 July 2017,” Paris MoU, https://www 
.parismou.org/inspections-risk/library-faq/memorandum.
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Seafarers’ Human Rights: Compliance 
and Enforcement
Peter B. Payoyo*
The Graduate Institute, Geneva, Switzerland
The governance of the world’s seas and oceans requires new ways of thinking 
and new ways of doing things that are fundamentally different from the estab-
lished modes of terrestrial governance that have been built on the traditional 
foundation of state freedom and sovereignty. This ‘oceans perspective’, initially 
given voice by Professor Elisabeth Mann Borgese beginning in the late 1960s 
on the eve of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, be-
came the hallmark of her efflorescent advocacy. Both a vision and an evolving 
action-oriented programme, the oceans perspective was vigorously pressed by 
Elisabeth as only the gentle and caring ‘Mother of the Oceans’ that she was 
could have done.
The oceans perspective was a novel and altogether intriguing proposition, 
articulated at a time when the entire international community was about to 
embark on its most ambitious regime-building exercise on record, i.e., to revise 
and codify all international sea laws and establish a new order for the oceans. 
Could it really be that the new legal order of the oceans can be founded on 
principles, norms, and imperatives other than sovereignty? Is there a ratio 
maris above and beyond mare liberum and mare clausum circumscribing the 
scope of freedom or sovereignty of states to do as they please in, and to, the 
oceans?
The continuing relevance of the ‘oceans perspective’ is confirmed by recent 
developments relating to the protection of human rights at sea. An exami-
nation of the process and prospects of human rights regime-building in the 
ocean domain, specifically in the field of seafarers’ rights, will at once reveal 
that it is possible and desirable to redefine or recalibrate the well-entrenched 
freedom of states to navigate the seas in order to achieve human rights objec-
tives at the global level.
On both land and sea, the relationship between state sovereignty and hu-
man rights has always been a problematic one. In a setting where the rights of 
human beings have been recognized, catalogued and legalized, there remains 
the outstanding issue of what else must be done to realize those rights when 
* Former Chairman, The International Committee on Seafarers’ Welfare, London.
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sovereign states, as the duty bearers to these rights, are unable or else unwilling 
to comply with their obligation to uphold these rights. Historically, the inter-
national supervision of states’ compliance with human rights norms by the 
United Nations (in relation to the post-World War ii human rights movement) 
or by the International Labour Organization (which preceded the UN, in rela-
tion to seafarers’ rights) has leaned in favor of the sovereignty principle: there 
is not much that the international community can do if a state chooses not to 
ratify a human rights treaty, or otherwise decides to implement widely-agreed 
human rights norms only partially and on its own terms.
In the maritime context, the creation of an impressive treaty infrastructure 
governing seafarers’ rights supervised by the ilo had taken place side-by-side 
with ongoing and widespread abuses committed against seafarers. Notwith-
standing the ‘International Seafarers’ Code’, a compendium of some seventy 
ilo conventions and recommendations on maritime labor developed over a 
period of more than 70 years, the oceans remained a poor home for human 
rights and human dignity. Throughout the twentieth century, the oceans 
were theatre to dehumanization and labor exploitation. The international 
shipping industry’s race to the bottom in the (non-) observance of seafarers’ 
rights was exacerbated further by the proliferation of flags of convenience or 
‘open registries’. Fierce and intensely protracted competition in this industry, 
coupled with low treaty ratification rates, and the haphazard and fragmented 
implementation of maritime labor standards globally, inexorably led to the 
marginalization of seafarers and their rights. The free-for-all situation in the 
 observance and implementation of international maritime labor standards 
finds its ultimate justification in the principle of flag state sovereignty, which 
treats ships as extensions of national territory and gives primacy to national 
regulatory frameworks in the governance of social matters, including labor 
conditions on board.
Convinced that this system had become increasingly and intolerably dys-
functional for the industry as a whole, the shipowners’ and the seafarers’ group 
representatives at the ilo joined in an unprecedented call to rationalize the 
international regulatory infrastructure governing maritime labor. This was the 
historic ‘Geneva Accord’ of January 2001, an urgent plea for radical reform by 
the ilo Joint Maritime Commission, which demanded no less than an inter-
national regulatory response that would apply global standards to the entire 
industry. For the seafarers group, the time had come for an ‘international bill 
of rights for seafarers’. On the part of shipowners, there was a pragmatic rea-
son for the more assertive international regulation of maritime labour: in the 
absence of a level playing field on maritime labour standards, shipowners 
that drive labour costs and conditions down will continue to enjoy an unfair 
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 competitive advantage over quality operators. Fair competition in the industry 
can only happen with a drastic reworking of the global regime of maritime 
labour standards. Attracting unanimous support from governments at the ilo, 
the catalytic Geneva Accord paved the way for the negotiation and eventual 
adoption of the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (mlc, 2006).
The mlc, 2006 is a signal achievement of the ilo for several reasons. First, 
it neatly consolidates the numerous conventions and recommendations ap-
plicable to maritime labor and updates these in a single instrument following 
a novel format combining hard law and soft law elements. All aspects of sea-
farers’ working and living conditions are covered under five subject titles (viz., 
minimum requirements for seafarers to work on a ship; conditions of employ-
ment; accommodation, recreational facilities, food and catering; health protec-
tion, medical care, welfare and social security protection; and compliance and 
enforcement), each of which identifies in detail the rights and entitlements of 
seafarers. Secondly, the mlc, 2006 as a standard-setting instrument delivers 
not only an essential social justice objective but also, perhaps more crucially, 
a political-economy objective of securing fair competition in the international 
shipping industry. The mlc, 2006 is uniquely ambitious in the sense that it is 
a direct regulatory intervention in the business of international commercial 
navigation, directly impacting on the operation of global markets. Finally, the 
mlc, 2006 injects a heavy dose of verifiable flag state obligations in the realiza-
tion of its objectives, putting to task the flag state in its role as the principal 
duty bearer in the mlc, 2006 regime of seafarers’ rights. Such redefinition of 
flag state supremacy is most clearly seen in the Convention’s pioneering ap-
proach to compliance.
The novel system of enforcement and compliance of mlc, 2006 stems 
above all from the consolidation of (almost) all ilo maritime labor standards 
into a single ‘package deal’ instrument, leaving little room for flag states to 
pick and choose the seafarers’ rights or labor norms they wish to implement. 
While flag states are given a certain scope of flexibility in their implementa-
tion with mlc, 2006 standards, such as the allowance for them to adopt ‘sub-
stantially equivalent’ national provisions, the seafarers’ rights enumerated in 
the mandatory parts of the Convention are not subject to selective flag state 
waiver. Consequently, any country that ratifies the mlc, 2006 must put in 
place the appropriate national infrastructure to ensure its compliance with 
the Convention as a whole, including setting up an effective system of inspec-
tion and certification, bearing mind that the mlc, 2006 encompasses the full 
spectrum of global labor standards across 68 ilo instruments that have been 
consolidated. At the international level, the consolidation of standards in the 
mlc, 2006 also reinvigorates the supervisory role of the ilo, raising the profile 
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of flag state accountability in the organization’s ‘decent work’ agenda in very 
substantial ways. One new mechanism for this is the Special Tripartite Com-
mittee created by the ilo Governing Body, which keeps under continuous 
review the workings of the mlc, 2006. Another notable enhancement is the 
prescription of more rigorous and detailed periodic reports for submission to 
the ilo not only by flag states but also by port states, such reports providing 
information about methods used to assess the effectiveness of national sys-
tems of inspection.
The most innovative and perhaps most far-reaching feature of the mlc, 
2006 to address the issue of flag state accountability regarding seafarers’ rights 
is without doubt the wholesale recruitment of port state control (psc) in the 
Convention’s framework of enforcement and compliance. Since the 1980s, 
 regionally-coordinated assertions of port state jurisdiction have been key in 
compelling ship operators and flag states to comply with a host of imo tech-
nical standards covering maritime safety, environmental protection, and on-
board working and living conditions/‘human element’ concerns. Today, psc 
has become an inseparable feature of the regulatory landscape for interna-
tional navigation and shipborne trade. Review of certificates, detailed ship 
inspections, ‘no more favorable treatment’ controls, correction of deficien-
cies on-the-spot, and sanctions, such as ship detention, naming and shaming 
underperforming ships, and banning, are some of the salient procedures de-
ployed by port states to encourage and enforce compliance. The decades-long 
experience of psc in addressing the central issue of sub-standard shipping 
have yielded sophisticated techniques and methodologies in enforcement and 
compliance, e.g., differentiation of inspection types, development and deploy-
ment of computer information systems, calculation of ‘ship risk profiles’ and 
‘company performance’, consideration of objectively-determined ‘overriding’ 
or ‘unexpected’ factors justifying inspections, reporting obligations of ships, 
and the methodical use of white-grey-black lists to track performance of flag 
states and recognized organizations.
With the entry into force of the mlc, 2006 in August 2013, psc authorities 
have as a matter of course incorporated its standards into their ship inspection 
protocols such that mlc, 2006 compliance by shipping companies and by flag 
states are now routinely tested and verified against a standardized checklist of 
psc deficiencies. From all indications, it appears that psc is making much head-
way in the monitoring, enforcement and compliance of mlc, 2006 standards. 
Notably, authorities in the Paris MoU psc region carried out a three-months 
long ‘Concentrated Inspection Campaign on the mlc’ in 2016; the  campaign 
involved a total of 3,674 inspections and resulted in 42 ship detentions, or a 
satisfactory rate of 1.1%, which were directly linked to  non-compliance with 
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mlc, 2006 requirements.1 These bare figures reveal that port state control is 
complementing flag state implementation remarkably well and that flag states 
across the board are taking their obligations under the mlc, 2006 quite seri-
ously. On the whole, seafarers’ human rights under the mlc, 2006 are being 
upheld and respected.
The mlc, 2006 therefore repays attention as an endeavor and as an experi-
ment in realizing human rights at the global level. Once again, as Elisabeth 
observed, the oceans are a great laboratory of ideas and initiatives on global 
governance. On this score the mlc offers an interesting ‘oceans perspective’ to 
international regime building that may prove valuable and instructive to the 
mainstream international human rights movement. This movement, under the 
auspices of the United Nations, continues to grapple with the sovereignty co-
nundrum, or the basic problem of effectively implementing universally agreed 
human rights norms in a decentralized world order of autonomous sovereign 
states.
The contrasting approaches to the realization human rights at sea and on 
land cannot be more telling. In 2006, the very same year the mlc was adopted, 
the UN General Assembly established the UN Human Rights Council, a turn-
ing point in UN history, marking the culmination of decades-long efforts to 
cement the greater involvement of international institutions in the effective 
realization of human rights worldwide. Without one referring to the other, the 
mlc, 2006 and the unhrc are two human rights regimes born at the same 
historical juncture, one applicable to seafarers and the other applicable to all 
citizens, both enmeshed in the grand narrative of globalization. Both regimes 
demonstrate the warrant of direct international intervention in the sover-
eign affairs of states, challenging the principle of sovereignty as the bedrock 
of human rights protection. Both aspire for accountability and universality, 
but follow disparate implementation trajectories and governance techniques. 
Ten years on after their adoption, a complex picture of compliance and en-
forcement of human rights standards have emerged, providing contrasting 
 approaches to legitimacy and effectiveness under each of these regimes.2
1 Paris mou on Port State Control, “Results of cic on mlc, 2006 in 2016,” 28 July 2017, https://
www.parismou.org/results-cic-mlc2006-2016.
2 Cf. UN Human Right Council’s approach, see “Organigramme of the Human Rights Council,” 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspx, last accessed 26 No-
vember 2017 vis-à-vis the psc approach using binomial calculus, e.g., Tokyo mou Secretariat, 
“Explanatory Note on the Black–Grey–White Lists,” Annual Report on Port State Control in the 
Asia-Pacific Region 2016 (Tokyo: Tokyo mou Secretariat), 55, http://www.tokyo-mou.org/doc/
ANN16.pdf.
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Maritime Emergency Preparedness and 
Management
John Dalziel and Ronald Pelot
Department of Industrial Engineering, Dalhousie University,  
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
a large body of men … in constant readiness to risk their own lives for 
the preservation of those whom they have never known or seen, perhaps 
of another nation, merely because they are fellow creatures in extreme 
peril.1
⸪
Since time immemorial humans have had beneficial interactions with the 
sea—for food, transport, and pleasure. However, these interactions have not 
always been without cost—the risk of death has always been present. In the 
maritime fraternity, we tend to think of this risk in terms of ship incidents: 
capsizing, foundering, grounding, collision, fire, man-overboard. Over the past 
century improvements in technology, safety standards, enforcement of regu-
lations, and education have reduced these risks for commercial vessels, and 
concurrently tremendous improvements have been made in rescue response. 
This article will focus on the improvements, past, present and future, in rescue 
response to maritime incidents.
In the 1820s there were about 1,800 shipwrecks each year around the British 
Isles alone. Amongst maritime folk the risks of going to sea were understood; 
significant loss of life was expected. Often in sight of a coastal community, a 
sailing ship would be blown aground, the crew would take to the rigging to 
try to survive, townsfolk would see the plight of the hapless sailors and of-
ten would put to sea, in whatever craft they may have at hand, at significant 
risk to their own lives. These occurrences eventually led to the first purpose- 
designed lifeboat, the Original, built on the northeast coast of England in 1789. 
1 Quote of Sir William Hillary, founder of the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (rnli), 1823, 
in “1824: Our foundation,” rnli, https://rnli.org/about-us/our-history/timeline/1824-our 
-foundation, last accessed 13 September 2017.
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 Similar  tragedies led Sir William Hillary to call, three decades later, for the es-
tablishment of a national organization to perform rescue around the coasts 
of the British Isles. The Royal National Lifeboat Institution (rnli) was fol-
lowed during the nineteenth century by similar organizations in many other 
countries, many private charities like the rnli and some government funded 
organizations.
In the nineteenth century, lifeboats were propelled by sail and oar (with 
a few experimental steam-powered craft built in the latter years of the cen-
tury). Shore-based apparatus, such as the ‘breeches buoy’ were developed and 
stationed with rescue crews. In some remote locations emergency huts, with 
supplies, were provided by the authorities for the shelter of shipwreck survi-
vors who made it to shore. During this period the rescue of seafarers generally 
depended on visual contact with their rescuers. If a ship was grounded near a 
harbor, flares could be used to signal distress, but rescue depended on these 
flares being seen from shore. If the ship was in distress on the high seas, or near 
a remote shore, the odds of rescue were much smaller, and many ships were 
simply posted as ‘Missing at Sea with All Hands’.
In the early years of the twentieth century, things started to improve dra-
matically. Some experimental internal combustion engine powered lifeboats 
were built. In the period between the World Wars, most rescue lifeboats were 
fitted with engines, taking over from sail and oar, but speeds remained slow 
(approximately 8 knots, about 15 km per hour). Radio was used in the rescue of 
passengers and crew from the rms Republic in 1909; more famously three years 
later it played a significant role in saving lives from the Titanic. After the Titanic 
disaster, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (solas) was 
introduced, improving both ship safety and rescue response.2
Dramatic strides have been made in safety technologies since the Second 
World War. The Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (gmdss) and 
emergency position indicating radio beacons (epirbs) allow the rapid alerting 
of shore-based rescue resources and other ships in the event of an emergency. 
Dedicated rescue resources have improved dramatically. The modern rescue 
lifeboats, and larger sea rescue cruisers, have speeds up to 25 knots, extended 
range, modern electronics for searching, navigation and communication, 
excellent sea-keeping for operation in heavy weather, and can operate in 
conjunction with other rescue resources. Aircraft can fly in extreme weather 
2 International Maritime Organization (imo), “International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea (solas), 1974,” imo, http://www.imo.org/en/About/conventions/listofconventions/
pages/international-convention-for-the-safety-of-life-at-sea-(solas),-1974.aspx, last accessed 
13 September 2017.
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 conditions, travel great distances to provide oversight, and possibly drop life-
rafts. Helicopters can provide rescue over reasonable distances (potentially 
being refueled in flight), and in areas where it may be risky to attempt a rescue 
by ship, such as near shore. Search and rescue (sar) technicians, an elite group 
of primary care paramedics, can provide on-scene medical aid and evacuation: 
they can parachute from aircraft or be lowered from helicopters to assist 
survivors until recovery is possible.
The regulatory regime affecting maritime safety and emergency response 
also continues to improve. The International Maritime Organization (imo) has 
continually updated solas. In addition to improving ship safety, requirements 
mandate ships to render assistance to persons in distress when safely feasible 
to do so. The International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (the 
sar Convention3), which entered into force in 1985, developed an internation-
al sar plan, such that the rescue of persons in distress anywhere at sea will 
be co-ordinated by a sar organization and, when necessary, by co-operation 
between neighboring sar organizations. Concurrently with the revision of the 
sar Convention, imo and the International Civil Aviation Organization jointly 
developed and published the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search 
and Rescue (iamsar) Manual, with three volumes covering organization and 
management, mission co-ordination, and mobile facilities.
The International Maritime Rescue Federation (imrf) represents over 100 
of the world’s sar organizations—some private charities, others government 
organizations.4 The imrf is focused on the prevention of loss of life in the 
world’s waters. To achieve this mission, it works with its members, local gov-
ernments, imo and others to encourage and promote the formation and devel-
opment of maritime search and rescue services throughout the world.
Despite these advances, new maritime risks are emerging. In the developed 
countries, pleasure craft have increased the demand on sar management and 
rescue resources. For instance, in Britain only about 10 percent of the rnli’s 
sorties involve commercial vessels.5 Some offshore races have required com-
plex rescue responses. For example, the 1979 Fastnet Race (England to Ireland) 
resulted in the loss of 15 lives and five yachts; numerous vessels and aircraft 
3 imo, “International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (sar),” imo, http://www 
.imo.org/en/About/conventions/listofconventions/pages/international-convention-on-mar 
itime-search-and-rescue-(sar).aspx, last accessed 13 September 2017.
4 “International Maritime Rescue Federation: An Overview,” International Maritime Rescue 
Federation (imrf), http://www.international-maritime-rescue.org/about-us, last accessed 13 
September 2017.
5 rnli, “Annual Report and Accounts: Operational Statistics,” rnli, https://rnli.org/about-us/
how-the-rnli-is-run/annual-report-and-accounts, last accessed 13 September 2017.
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were involved in the rescue efforts and a significant load was placed on the 
rescue co-ordination resources.6
Terrible commercial shipping disasters have continued over the past de-
cades. The world’s worst peacetime sea disaster took place in December 1987; 
the Philippine passenger vessel Dona Paz sank after colliding with a small 
tanker carrying gasoline.7 Only 26 people survived from the two vessels, while 
over 4,300 died. When the Senegalese ferry Le Joola capsized in heavy weather 
in 2002, nearly 2,000 died. The Worldwide Ferry Safety Association lists over 
160 ferry incidents in the developing world during the first fourteen years of 
this millennium, resulting in 18,000 deaths. In general, there were common 
emergency response shortcomings in these tragedies, namely, lack of, or late, 
notification of the emergency, poor shipboard emergency planning and man-
agement, and lack of rescue response due to lack of resources and/or lack of 
rescue organization.8
Modern ferries have introduced another dimension to rescue require-
ments—large vessels, with significant numbers of persons onboard, which 
may rapidly require assistance due to fire or capsize. This is called a ‘mass res-
cue operation’ (mro), where the size of the rescue overwhelms the resources 
available. In 1994 the 15,000 ton ferry Estonia sank in a storm in the Baltic Sea; 
out of nearly 1,000 persons onboard only 138 survived.9 The ship rapidly cap-
sized and then sank half an hour after the first distress message was broadcast. 
Although numerous vessels were at hand, it was difficult for them to rescue 
survivors from the liferafts in the water; about 40 were rescued by ship, the 
remainder by helicopter (often working in conjunction with ships). As a re-
sult of the Estonia disaster, the imrf held a series of exercises to help rescue 
organizations plan for national and international mros; imo updated solas 
requirements so that ships have plans and procedures to recover persons from 
the water.
In addition to passenger-carrying vessels, fishing vessels and commercial 
ships continue to suffer losses, some disappearing without notification thus 
6 J. Rousmaniere, Fastnet Force 10: The Deadliest Storm in the History of Modern Sailing (New 
York: WW Norton, 2000).
7 “Flashback in history: Philippine ferry MV Dona Paz collision, sinking and death toll of 4,386 
people—December 20, 1987,” Maritime Cyprus (3 January 2016), https://maritimecyprus 
.com/2016/01/03/flashback-in-history-philippine-ferry-mv-dona-paz-collision-sinking-and 
-death-toll-of-4386-people-december-20-1987/, last accessed 13 September 2017.
8 J. Dalziel et al., “Domestic Ferry Safety in the Developing World,” presentation to World Mari-
time Rescue Congress, Bremerhaven, Germany, 2 June 2015.
9 Joint Accident Investigation Commission of Estonia, Finland and Sweden, “7: The Rescue Op-
eration,” Final Report on the MV ESTONIA disaster of 28 September 1994 (Estonia, December 
1997), http://onse.fi/estonia/, last accessed 13 September 2017.
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hampering rescue efforts. When the 260,000-ton Korean bulk carrier Stellar 
Daisy sank in the South Atlantic in early 2017, the two survivors were picked up 
by fortuitous circumstance; a fruitless air and sea search continued for weeks 
for the other crew over thousands of nautical miles.10
Not all rescues end in failure, as management capability and resources can 
alter the outcome. In 1980 the Dutch cruise ship Prinsendam caught fire 120 
nautical miles off the coast of Alaska. The US Coast Guard quickly mobilized 
and co-ordinated American and Canadian air and sea rescue resources, as well 
as commercial ships; all 520 passengers and crew were rescued without loss of 
life or serious injury.11
In coming years, many emergency response improvements will be an evo-
lution of initiatives already in place. The imrf and imo, along with other 
agencies, are working to improve international co-operation. This is particu-
larly important in areas such as the Arctic and Antarctic where the following 
can impact sar response: large distances, harsh weather conditions, few local 
rescue resources, restricted sar response management capability, limited fa-
cilities to receive (potentially thousands of) survivors, and increasing marine 
vessel traffic due to climate change. Ferry safety, and the associated lack of 
rescue response, in the developing world is recognized as an ongoing concern. 
The imrf and imo are promoting the development of regional emergency 
 response capabilities.
New technologies may also bring about significant improvements, both for 
the persons being rescued, and for the rescuers. The imrf Future Technology 
Panel is investigating the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (uavs) to assist in 
maritime search and rescue, particularly in situations where direct human in-
tervention may not be wise or possible. The application of unmanned marine 
vehicles (umvs) to maritime sar is still in its infancy, however it is easy to en-
visage their future application, ranging from small craft dropped from aircraft 
and remotely piloted, to stand-alone craft prepositioned in remote locations. 
Numerous hurdles remain; acceptance and understanding of the strengths 
and limitations of these technologies is needed (for instance, can a robotic 
vessel rescue someone who is incapacitated?). Other technologies, such as in-
frared cameras and improved satellite surveillance may assist with the search 
function.
10 “Update: Search Continues for Missing Stellar Daisy’s Crew,” World Maritime News 
(10 April 2017), http://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/217281/update-search-continues 
-for-missing-stellar-daisys-crew/, last accessed 13 September 2017.




Emergency preparedness and management requires an ongoing investment 
in training and resources. Simulated and live exercises develop skills and iden-
tify potential problems, and solidify working relationships with partners. This 
is particularly significant for mass rescue operations, which may overwhelm 
the resources normally available, and emphasizes the importance of manage-
ment communication and co-ordination capabilities. Education, particularly 
for recreational boaters, is important. The usefulness of new technologies 
needs to be investigated on an ongoing basis.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, are the competent and capable per-
sonnel who have the courage and dedication to be willing to assist their fellow 
human beings:
The loss of the Solomon Browne was in consequence of the persistent 
and heroic endeavours by the coxswain and his crew to save the lives of 
all from the Union Star. Such heroism enhances the highest traditions of 
the Royal National Lifeboat Institution in whose service they gave their 
lives.12
12 Quote concerning the loss of the Penlee lifeboat Solomon Browne with eight crew, 19 De-
cember 1981, in “The Penlee Lifeboat Disaster,” rnli-Penlee Lifeboat Station, http://www 
.rnli-penleelifeboat.org.uk/About%20us/PenleeDisaster, last accessed 13 September 2017.
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The Pacing of Progress as the Secret to Success  
for the International Ballast Water  
Management Regime
Adnan Awad
International Ocean Institute-Southern Africa, Cape Town, South Africa
The human-facilitated transfer of marine organisms between coastal ecosys-
tems has become one of the more concerning issues hindering our hopes of 
“living with the ocean and from the ocean in a sustainable relationship.”1 Inva-
sive species are impacting marine and freshwater ecosystems, especially areas 
already stressed by anthropogenic disturbance, causing irreversible changes, 
often with significant ecological, economic, and social impacts. Hundreds of 
marine species have migrated between oceans and seas following the opening 
of major canals around the world; furthermore, numerous species have been 
introduced, either intentionally or unintentionally, from fisheries, aquaculture 
practices and the aquarium trade. However, international shipping has come 
into focus as the primary vector responsible for most of the recorded marine 
species invasions. Commercial ships can be effective at transferring living or-
ganisms across large distances, through two equally significant mechanisms: 
as plankton carried in ballast water (water taken on board to stabilize the ves-
sel at sea, an essential process for the safety of modern vessels), and as biofoul-
ing, or the species attached to the immersed parts of the vessel. Each of these 
vectors presents an interesting set of management challenges; however, the 
fact that ballast water is taken into and contained within the vessel made it the 
‘low-hanging fruit’ that has been tackled first in response to heightened inter-
national awareness of threats from marine invasive species.
On 8 September 2017, the International Maritime Organization (imo) 
International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast 
 Water and Sediments (bwm Convention) came into force without much 
fanfare, and with a long list of proposed amendments awaiting submittal and 
consideration. After three decades of dedicated activity by technical experts 
from many concerned member state delegations, this much-anticipated 
milestone signaled a turning of the tide in the broader context of effective 
1 The working definition of the ‘blue economy’ coined by Dr. Awni Behnam in his book Trac-
ing the Blue Economy, Lumen Monograph Series, Vol. 1 (Valletta, Malta: Fondation de Malte, 
2013).
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maritime  biosecurity. It is likely to be one of the more effective UN conventions 
at the time of its entry into force, due to the cross-sectoral nature of the issue 
at hand and the stimulating effect its lengthy development process has had 
in forging a meaningful partnership-based foundation for its implementation. 
Twenty-five years earlier, however, when member states agreed at the 1992 
UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro to work 
through the imo to consider “the adoption of appropriate rules on ballast 
water discharge to prevent the spread of non-indigenous organisms,”2 few 
could have imagined how complex the road ahead would become and how 
catalytic an issue this would prove to be.
The imo had already begun work to address ballast water concerns through 
its Marine Environment Protection Committee (mepc), which had adopted 
voluntary guidelines to reduce species transfer by ships’ ballast water in 1991, 
an effort that unfortunately lacked buy-in and subsequent adoption by the 
industry and member states. In response to the Rio Conference, the mepc 
Guidelines were quickly upgraded to an imo Assembly Resolution in 1993, 
which were further strengthened in 1997. The effective management mea-
sure recommended in the guidelines was the use of open ocean exchange of 
the ballast water, on the premise that mid-ocean water presented less risk to 
coastal areas, in terms of species composition. Despite ongoing resistance to 
increased regulation of ballast water, the practice of open ocean exchange was 
trialed by some countries, but ultimately proved less than ideal. It soon be-
came clear that a mandatory international instrument would be necessary to 
achieve the desired penetration of regulatory measures through both flag and 
port state control processes. Furthermore, it was evident that such a regulatory 
regime must target ship-board treatment of the ballast water, to the extent that 
organisms are removed or deactivated to below densities that could result in 
viable species introductions.
In 2000, the imo partnered with the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (undp) and the Global Environment Facility (gef) to launch the 
GloBallast Programme, designed to support developing countries in prepar-
ing for an international ballast water management convention. Countries such 
as Australia and the United States, where national concerns regarding species 
invasions had already prompted significant research and experimental regula-
tions, were quick to collaborate and contribute lessons learned through the 
growing nexus of ballast water related activity at the imo. Regional  approaches 
2 “United Nations Sustainable Development, Agenda 21,” Division for Sustainable Develop-
ment, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, https://sustainabledevel 
opment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf, last accessed 7 October 2017.
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and challenges in areas such as the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas emerged as 
countries generated momentum and support behind the drive to solve the co-
nundrum of realizing viable, effective systems of ballast water management 
that could be standardized for implementation across the shipping industry. 
In 2004, the bwm Convention was adopted through a diplomatic conference of 
member states,3 the same year that the GloBallast Programme came to an end. 
The bwm Convention had set a timeline for the phasing out of open ocean 
exchange, regarded as an interim measure, and established a set of standards 
for water quality to apply to discharged ballast water. The treatment standards 
represented a level of organism removal or deactivation that could not be 
achieved by available technologies at the time, as applied in ship-board en-
vironments (e.g., pumping rates exceeding 3,000 m3/hr). Setting such a high 
bar through an international instrument effectively created a new market, pre-
sumably attainable, and a research and development race to meet it.
On the back of the momentum surrounding the adoption of the bwm 
Convention, the gef announced it would be reinvesting in the established and 
successful partnership with undp and imo, and that a second phase of the 
GloBallast Programme would be supported globally to focus specifically on the 
development of strategic partnerships at national, regional and international 
levels. This simple development would prove to be the gel that connected and 
catalyzed functional partnerships, associations and collaborations between 
industry and management sectors, and more significantly continued to 
strategically advance the development of technical capacity, particularly 
in developing regions, to prepare for on-the-ground implementation. As 
new ballast  water treatment technologies emerged and were approved (the 
imo established a comprehensive set of testing guidelines and a process for 
approval vetted by the Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of 
Marine Environmental Protection), institutional capacities were strengthened 
throughout the northern and southern hemispheres to accommodate the 
demand for quality and compliance testing. The 16 guidelines developed by 
the imo to assist member states with implementation of the Convention,3 
were put into practice, tested and validated through the involvement and 
commitment of administrations around the world.
In the face of the mounting groundswell of support and progress towards a 
binding international ballast water management regime, the resistance from 
industry and heavyweight flags of convenience had to be channeled through 
3 “bwm Convention and Guidelines,” International Maritime Organization (imo), http://www 
.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/BallastWaterManagement/Pages/BWMConvention 
andGuidelines.aspx, last accessed 14 October 2017.
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the last remaining weapon at their disposal: to delay the process of national 
ratifications necessary to bring the Convention into force (the bwm Conven-
tion required ratification by at least 30 member states representing at least 
35 percent of registered global shipping tonnage). This manifested through the 
undermining of the confidence in the shipboard treatment technologies avail-
able, their applicability in real-world scenarios, and the vetting and certifica-
tion processes in place for quality assurance. Potentially pivotal flag states cited 
uncertainties regarding the diversity of technological options for ships, a gen-
eral lack of available facilities for fitting and servicing new technologies on ex-
isting vessels, and a sense of immaturity about the relevant testing  procedures 
and international facilities involved, to justify their reluctance to move ahead 
with domestication of the provisions of the bwm Convention. Nonetheless, 
many coastal and island nations, especially those where robust ocean-based or 
‘Blue Economy’ strategies were being pursued, had already recognized the 
risks to their national interests stemming from marine invasions and forged 
ahead to integrate ballast water management into domestic biosecurity, mari-
time and environmental management frameworks.
By the time the ratification threshold of 35 percent of global tonnage was 
met, 52 countries had ratified or acceded to the Convention, as was necessary 
given that not all of the big flag states had plans to act on ballast water un-
til such time as it was commercially more favorable to be a contracting party. 
It was indeed telling that, immediately following the deposition at the imo 
of the instrument of ratification by Finland on 8 September 2016, the action 
which satisfied the entry into force conditions (to be effective 12 months after 
that date), the government of Panama, the largest flag state in the ship registry, 
announced that it would be next to ratify the Convention. Four other heavy-
weights followed suit within the subsequent year. Now it was all happening. 
Convinced or not, the shipping world would be coming on board with the un-
derstanding that a standardized set of regulations would be progressively and 
uniformly enforced.
Of course, once in force the bwm Convention is susceptible to the proposed 
amendments that shall be considered at the imo. It is, however, unlikely that 
any severe changes will be made in the short term, due to the extensive capac-
ity in place for its implementation in its current form. There is a broad sense of 
calm readiness as administrations go about their day-to-day routines with bal-
last water management procedures now integrated into long lists of manda-
tory actions on the plates of port and flag state control authorities. Awareness 
of the issue at political and practical management levels has long been estab-
lished, and ongoing training has evolved to focus on more detailed and practi-
cal aspects of operations and service delivery. Guidelines and tools to support 
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policy development and technical measures have not only been applied, but 
have had adequate time to be tested, customized and strengthened. In many 
cases, co-operation agreements between states and within governments have 
established roles and responsibilities, facilitating ongoing collaboration from 
scientific, technological, environmental and maritime sectors. At the business 
end, commercial arrangements and supply chain developments are being put 
in place to ensure the provision, installation and servicing of ballast water 
treatment technologies to accommodate every type of commercial vessel, with 
over 60 type-approved technologies available on the market.
As much as global investments in ballast water management are contribut-
ing to the ever-expanding interests in ocean-based economic opportunities, 
concerns are growing that vulnerabilities and risks associated with marine 
species invasions may manifest in ways that significantly limit potential for 
further blue growth. Within this context, the seeds for more forward-looking 
and robust maritime biosecurity regimes are being sown. As such, attention is 
pivoting to less regulated pathways of species transfer, including the biofoul-
ing on ships, recreational crafts and all manner of ocean-going platforms. The 
imo has already adopted guidelines for the control and management of ships’ 
biofouling,4 and the gef-undp-imo partnership has recently followed on to 
announce the approval of the imminent GloFouling project. Of course, ship 
and vessel operators of all kinds are inherently incentivized to prevent or limit 
marine growth on hulls and submerged areas, given that biofouling significant-
ly decreases vessel efficiency and speed through water due to increased friction 
and blockages. Promising developments in hull coatings,  in-water cleaning 
technologies, and ship design are already emerging as an indication that this 
management sector may advance expeditiously. However, experience from 
the ballast water case suggests that a mandatory international instrument will 
be required for universal application and assimilation of best management 
practices. It is seemingly likely that the foundation laid over decades of ballast 
water management preparations will have broad overlap with the biofouling 
issue, and therefore significantly expedite its further evolution and adoption.
4 “Biofouling,” imo, http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Biofouling/Pages/default 
.aspx, last accessed 14 October 2017.
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Arctic Shipping: Future Prospects and  
Ocean Governance
Jackie Dawson*
University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
 The Last Frontier
The Arctic, despite centuries of speculation, remains one of the world’s last 
potential shipping frontiers. The maritime potential of the region is alluring 
as it offers a number of shorter, and potentially more prosperous, trade routes 
 between Europe and Asia. Proving the viability of these routes, however, has 
not been straightforward; rather it has been the story of few triumphs among 
many disasters, the most famous of which is the ill-fated Franklin expedition 
of 1845. The shipwrecks, grave sites, and human remains that now paint the 
Arctic landscape and ocean floor are proof of the region’s natural prowess 
and strong  will to remain pristine and unconquered by human pursuits of 
globalization.
Thick multi-year ice and a harsh and unpredictable climate have been the 
major factors limiting development, however this is now changing. Because of 
natural and human-induced climate change, the Arctic is warming at twice the 
rate of the global average and with this warming has come a positive feedback 
loop of melting sea ice—additional black space among a traditionally white 
landscape—causing enhanced absorption of solar radiation and subsequent 
warming with continued ice retreat. The open water season has increased by 
more than five days per decade in the Northwest Passage and by up to 19 days 
per decade in other regions of the Arctic.1 Being that thick and unpredictable 
sea ice has historically been the dagger that slayed even the most decorated 
of Arctic explorers, and the strongest of ships, its retreat would seem to fa-
cilitate the long awaited opening of the region for global maritime trade and 
transport—the shifting of global trade patterns and with that the potential for 
altered global power dynamics.
1 J.C. Stroeve et al., “Changes in Arctic Melt Season and Implications for Sea Ice Loss,” Geo-
physical Research Letters 41, no. 4 (2014): 1216–1225, doi.org/10.1002/2013GL058951.
* Written on Adventure Canada’s Ocean Endeavour while transiting the Northwest Passage.
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 Shipping in a Changing Arctic
The link between climate change and Arctic shipping has captured popular 
imagination, prompting hundreds of media articles and now dozens of high 
profile studies in journals such as Nature Climate Change and Geophysical 
Research Letters. Most speculate a rapid and potentially momentous increase 
in Arctic shipping activity related to climate warming by the end of the twenty-
first century, but the relationship between ice and ships is long-standing and 
complicated. Less ice could mean more opportunities, but it could also mean 
increased risk. Thick multiyear sea ice of the Arctic Ocean that used to be intact 
is now melting, calving apart, traveling south and choking up fundamental 
shipping routes, particularly in the Northwest Passage.
Just because travel routes through the Arctic may become more physically 
viable does not mean we will see an immediate or even future shift toward Arc-
tic routes over existing southern routes, where infrastructure, tradition, and 
global dependence has already been established. Despite much speculation, 
commercial container shipping in the Arctic is still not a commercial reality, 
in large part because shorter distances do not always equate to quicker ship-
ping times. In an industry where timeliness and reliability are a necessity, it 
is unlikely that Arctic routes, which remain plagued with uncertainty due to 
unpredictable ice and weather conditions as well as freezing spray that can 
cause delays, will emerge as a preferred route in the near-term future.2 There 
are also countless other factors influencing commercial ship operations such 
as commodity prices, insurance structures, infrastructure needs, ship design, 
technology development, and regulatory regimes that will continue to limit fu-
ture maritime trade in the region. In fact, until we can control the weather, the 
price of natural resources, and maybe even the stock market, it is improbable 
that climate change will itself catalyze Arctic maritime trade and commercial 
shipping in Arctic Canada to the extent that is often speculated.
There is, however, a class of vessels that has already increased in intensi-
ty as a direct result of changing Arctic conditions. Tourism ships, including 
 passenger vessels (cruise ships) and pleasure craft (yachts), have increased by 
75 and 400 percent respectively in Arctic Canada since 2005. Svalbard, Norway, 
and Greenland now attract between 20,000 and 50,000 cruise visitors annu-
ally and additional growth, especially among private yachters is anticipated. 
2 Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Safe Navigation in the U.S. Arc-
tic: Summary of a Workshop, October 15–16, 2012, Seattle, Washington, Conference Proceedings 




These vessels can more easily adapt to changing conditions by altering itin-
eraries and planned shore excursions, and in fact they often seek out versus 
avoid icebergs and ice flows to view ice dependent wildlife and stunning  Arctic 
 scenery. Compounding these growth factors is a new niche tourism market that 
has been labelled ‘last chance tourism’, which is a phenomena whereby tour-
ists are visiting the Arctic with increased intensity to explicitly see the  region 
before it disappears, melts or becomes irreversibly changed.3
 From Ship to Shore: Regional Risks and Opportunities
In large part due to the rapid increase in cruise tourism traffic, but also because 
of increases in fishing ships, community re-supply vessels, and government 
and research activities, total ship traffic by kilometers traveled in the Canadian 
Arctic has almost tripled over the last 25 years. Most of the increase has oc-
curred in the Northwest Passage, Hudson Strait, and along the eastern coast 
of Baffin Island (see Figure 1).4 These trends reflect growth patterns in Arctic 
shipping activity that is occurring globally. For example, traffic through Russia’s 
Northern Sea Route increased by 33 percent in 2016; non-Arctic nations such 
as China and South Korea are building and operating ice breakers for research 
and trade exploration; cruise operators are for the first time investing in and 
constructing purpose built ice-strengthened luxury cruise liners; and advances 
in technology could mean autonomous (crewless) vessels traversing Arctic sea 
routes within the next 30 years. Through expected technological change, po-
litical will, and under the right economic conditions we will see commercial 
traffic opportunities across the Arctic, and in particular through the Northwest 
Passage of the Canadian Arctic.
All of Canada is highly reliant upon maritime trade and transport, an in-
dustry that was valued at CA$205 billion in 2015,5 but it is the Arctic that is 
perhaps the most dependent since it consists of large island chains and remote 
continental shoreline that in many areas is only accessible by sea or by air. 
3 R.H. Lemelin, J. Dawson and E.J. Stewart, eds., Last Chance Tourism: Adapting Tourism 
 Opportunities in a Changing World (London: Routledge, 2013).
4 L. Pizzolato, et al., “The Influence of Declining Sea Ice on Shipping Activity in the 
Canadian Arctic,” Geophysical Research Letters 43, no. 23 (2016): 12,146–12,1541, doi.
org/10.1002/2016GL071489; J. Dawson, et al., “Temporal and Spatial Patterns of Ship Traffic in 
the Canadian Arctic from 1990 to 2015,” Arctic (In press).
5 Council of Canadian Academies (cca), The Value of Commercial Marine Shipping to Canada: 




 Increased shipping opportunities in Arctic Canada could be highly advanta-
geous given the potential for enhanced economic development in mining, 
tourism, and fisheries, and for re-supply services. However, there are signifi-
cant risks, including the potential for vessel incidents, safety issues and secu-
rity threats, environmental disturbances, degradation of historic or culturally 
significant sites, and negative outcomes for local residents, especially Inuit, 
who continue to use the marine environment for subsistence and livelihoods. 
Compounding these risks are a lack of maritime infrastructure or salvage capa-
bilities, insufficient availability of bathymetric charts, and limited search and 
rescue capacity.
 Collaborative Governance for a Sustainable Future
Global effort is needed to establish effective governance regimes for safe 
and sustainable Arctic shipping that involves infrastructure investment and 
enhances economic and sovereignty-related opportunities while mitigating 
Figure 1 Shipping activity trends in Arctic Canada from 1990 to 2015.
Source: Dawson et al., supra note 4.
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 impacts related to safety, security of the environment, and protection of  local 
culture. What makes the potential development of effective and innovative 
Arctic shipping governance so promising right now is the pace at which Arctic 
maritime trade is currently evolving and the urgency with which society has 
treated this challenge. Thus far, we have been afforded time and political 
attention in order to work together as a global community towards shared 
initiatives and approaches to Arctic shipping governance.
For example, in response to the 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment,6 
the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (amsa),7 for the first time attempted 
to comprehensively examine global shipping tends across Arctic regions and to 
identify governance needs for the changing patterns in Arctic transportation 
trends. Many of the amsa recommendations have already come to fruition in-
cluding the establishment of joint search and rescue and oil spill response and 
preparedness agreements,8 envisioning of an integrated Arctic shipping corri-
dors framework for marine traffic support and management,9 and importantly, 
the development and implementation of the Polar Code.10
The Polar Code is a mandatory international regime adopted by the Inter-
national Maritime Organization (imo) that sets out regulations for shipping in 
polar regions, principally relating to ice navigation and ship design. The Code, 
established to support safe and environmentally friendly shipping in Arctic 
and Antarctic waters, goes beyond existing imo conventions (marpol, solas, 
stcw)11 and can be utilized to create a certain level of regulatory consistency 
among Arctic nations that complements, and in some cases extends, national 
level regulation. Implementation of the Polar Code is a major milestone and 
6 Arctic Council, Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, acia Over-
view Report (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
7 Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report (Arctic Council, April 
2009).
8 “Agreements,” Arctic Council, last updated 25 May 2017, http://www.arctic-council.org/
index.php/en/our-work/agreements.
9 See R. Chéniér et al., “Northern Marine Transportation Corridors: Creation and Analysis of 
Northern Marine Traffic Routes in Canadian Waters,” Transactions in gis (2017): 1–13, doi.
org/10.1111/tgis.12295; The pew Charitable Trusts, The Integrated Arctic Corridors Frame-
work: Planning for Responsible Shipping in Canada’s Arctic Waters (April 2016), http://
www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2016/04/the-integrated-arctic-corridors-framework 
.pdf, accessed 21 November 2017.
10 “Shipping in Polar Waters: Adoption of an International Code of Safety for Ships Oper-
ating in Polar Waters (Polar Code),” International Maritime Organization (imo), http://
www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/hottopics/polar/pages/default.aspx, accessed 21 Novem-
ber 2017.
11 “List of imo Conventions: Key imo Conventions,” imo, http://www.imo.org/en/About/
Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx, accessed 22 November 2017.
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represents an excellent foundation as the first mandatory and internationally 
implemented requirement for ships operating in polar waters. However, more 
work is needed to strengthen the Code in areas where consensus among flag 
states was not found, to enhance enforcement capabilities, and to deal with 
emerging issues such as heavy fuel oil and black carbon among other environ-
mental protection provisions. One particular criticism of the Code is that the 
consensus-based nature of its development has led it to be ‘watered down to 
the lowest common denominator’. Some already existing national level ship-
ping governance regimes are more stringent than the Polar Code leading some 
proponents to question the utility of the Code generally. Regardless, the world 
is making significant steps forward to the safe and sustainable management 
of shipping in Arctic waters via collaborative initiatives and shared visions for 
governance.
It is incumbent upon all of us to put in the necessary time and sustained 
effort to making sure the Arctic marine environment does not become an ex-
ample of how integrated and shared leadership frameworks for Arctic shipping 
governance have failed, but instead as an analogue for innovative and adaptive 
governance in the face of rapid global environmental and economic change. 
Much of the world has been explored and discovered but the Arctic remains 
a frontier in many regards and as such presents us with the opportunity to 
establish effective, innovative, and tailor-made governance approaches. Com-
mercial ship traffic is increasing in Arctic regions albeit at a pace that is much 
slower than many have speculated. Yet, there is no doubt that the commercial 
Arctic traffic will, at some point and through a variety of influencing factors 
beyond just climate change, increase in the future. We need to be ready for this 
eventuality.
<UN>
Autonomous Vessel Technology, Safety,  
and Ocean Impacts
Donald Liu
American Bureau of Shipping (retired), Seattle, Washington, United States
 Introduction
In this age of automation and robotics, it is not surprising that maritime ship-
ping, one of the oldest and most conservative of industries, is looking to mod-
ernize and transform itself by applying autonomous technology to ships much 
like the automobile industry with self-driving cars and trucks, and the com-
mercial aircraft industry with its aircraft drones. There are two types of autono-
mous vessel technology currently being explored by various research projects 
in Europe. One is a vessel operated remotely by a shoreside operator, and the 
other a vessel operated completely independent of human control; the second 
has advanced decision support systems onboard undertake all the operational 
decisions independently.1
The primary driving forces for autonomous ships are twofold: (1) to reduce 
operating costs as a result of increased operating efficiency, decreased crew 
and shipbuilding costs that reduce the cost per ton mile of cargo carried, and 
(2) to reduce potential accidents due to human error, as about 75 to 96 percent 
of marine casualties are caused, at least in part, by some form of human error.2 
The motivation is not to just reduce operating costs and human error but to 
create a real transformation in the industry. Without humans being physically 
onboard, the deck house, crew quarters and related ventilation, heating, and 
sewage systems can be eliminated. Ships can be lighter and more aerodynamic 
thereby reducing fuel and construction costs and increasing cargo capacity. 
Those developing autonomous designs anticipate that the remote operations 
of ships will occur initially, and eventually move towards full autonomy of 
ships.
1 H.C. Burmeister, “Autonomous Navigation Results From the Munin Testbed,” Autonomous 
Ship Technology Symposium, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 21–23 June 2016, https://www.cml 
.fraunhofer.de/content/dam/cml/de/documents/Sonstiges/MUNIN - 160621 - ASS - MUNIN 
- final.pdf, last accessed 8 September 2017.
2 A.M. Rothblum, “Human Error and Marine Safety,” Bowes-Langley Technology (undated), 
http://bowles-langley.com/wp-content/files_mf/humanerrorandmarinesafety26.pdf, last ac-
cessed 8 September 2017.
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Although the technological building blocks are all in place for the adoption 
of a new technology of autonomous ships, the maritime industry is not yet 
ready to accept such ships. There remain a number of significant and unre-
solved challenges to be dealt with before such ships can ply the high seas with 
their cargo. These challenges, although non-technical in nature, offer perhaps 
greater impediments to autonomous ships than the development of the au-
tonomous technology itself. Of the many challenges, three critical ones rise to 
the top of a long list: operational, regulatory, and safety considerations.
 Operational Challenges
Every ship has to comply with the International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea (colregs), which sets out, among other things, the ‘Rules of 
the Road’ or navigation rules to be followed by ships and other vessels at sea 
to prevent collisions between two or more vessels. The rules are predicated 
on having persons on board to make sure these regulations are adhered to. 
With autonomous ships a critical issue in avoiding possible collision is how 
manned and unmanned vessels interact with one another, especially when 
operating in congested traffic areas or in confined waters where the environ-
ment can change abruptly due to unexpected events. Verbal communications 
between manned and unmanned ships are critical and mutual agreement on 
the course of action to be taken between ships may be necessary to manage 
traffic.
A remotely operated ship will be limited in the situational awareness need-
ed for making appropriate decisions based only on the information presented 
on displays. Accuracy of information on displays on a manned ship is validated 
by actual visual observation. In a remotely operated ship this primary means 
of validation of the information displayed does not exist. In fully autonomous 
ships, which are dependent on algorithms for ship detection and classifica-
tion to obey maritime traffic rules of the road, avoid obstacles, and support 
decision- making, will the artificial intelligence always make the ‘right’ deci-
sions in possible collision events? Limited situational awareness concerns also 
apply to the weather and sea state and their impact on the ship.
Displays on screens do not fully characterize or simulate the motions and 
physical forces of the sea acting on a ship’s hull, which can be critical for safe 
ship handling in heavy weather and rough seas.
Operations such as docking and undocking are also problematic for autono-
mous ships. These and other issues related to the operational safety of naviga-




Not only are there operational impediments, the current international mari-
time laws, rules and conventions under which ships and crew operate at sea 
such as colregs, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
( unclos), the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (solas), 
the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping (stcw), and the International Safety Management (ism) Code 
do not even recognize the existence of autonomous ships.
These regulations presuppose that a master, officers, and crew are oper-
ating a ship. With no humans onboard, autonomous ships are effectively 
 prohibited. International law stipulates that the master has command of the 
ship. Who is the commander of the ship when it is an unmanned ship? The 
remote operator? The programmer who designed the computer system that 
runs the autonomous ship? In the event of a shipping accident, where does 
liability fall?
The stcw for example sets qualification standards for masters, officers, 
and watch personnel and applies only to ‘seafarers serving on board seagoing 
ships’. What are the standards of training and competency for a remote con-
trol operator and other shore-based personnel if they are considered to be in 
command of the unmanned ship? The ism Code, which already imposes ob-
ligations relating to the shore-based personnel of shipping companies, would 
need revision so that the work, responsibility, qualifications and certification 
of shore-based controllers are properly included in a company’s safety man-
agement system. An important and needed change to be made in colregs is 
to insure that all autonomous vessels be identified as a specific ship type so as 
to be readily identifiable by other ships in night and day conditions, such as by 
some characteristic lighting and daytime visual display marks or shapes.
In addition to the abovementioned international regulations that need re-
vision, coastal states have national regulations that regulate the operation of 
manned, but not unmanned, vessels in their waters, which add another layer 
of regulatory impediments to autonomous ships. Clearly significant steps must 
be taken to revise and create new regulations that include autonomous ships. 
Some small steps are being taken to address these regulatory gaps related to 
autonomous ships. The International Maritime Organization (imo) as a spe-
cialized agency of the United Nations is responsible for promulgating the regu-
lations for ships and their safety, security, and pollution prevention. In 2018, 
the imo will begin to address the regulatory gaps by exploring how existing 
international regulations can be applied to autonomous ships and maritime 
technologies. Because of the number and extent of regulations involved, it 
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is anticipated that the imo effort of revising existing regulations, as well as 
 adding new regulations to address autonomous ships will require at least eight 
to ten years to complete. With such a long timeframe it is likely that autono-
mous ships will face the same fate as has occurred with driverless cars and 
unmanned commercial aircraft drones: the autonomous technology for ships 
will mature much faster than the development of sufficient safety regulations. 
Compounding the problem is the fact that not all international conventions 
and regulations that come into force are adopted by all maritime countries. For 
example, the United States has not adopted unclos. Even when regulations 
that come into force are adopted by all countries party to the regulation, there 
may be delays in enforcement, such as with stcw.
 Safety Challenges
Safety challenges related to conventional manned ships include ship safety, 
cargo safety, maritime traffic safety, environmental safety, human safety, and 
security. These sectors can be particularly challenging for autonomous ships. 
For example, solas regulations require that a master or person in charge of a 
ship is to respond to persons who are in distress at sea and is bound to proceed 
with all speed to their assistance. It is questionable whether an autonomous 
ship can render assistance as effectively as a manned ship, either in search or 
rescue situations.
While autonomous ships will keep seafarers safely out of harm’s way, there 
are other safety risks that will increase as a result of having no crew. In the age 
of unmanned shipping, it would be naive to expect that pirates and terrorists 
will disappear from the high seas. They may even think that such ships will be 
new and softer targets. Without a crew, an autonomous ship is likely at greater 
risk of being hijacked with the purpose of stealing the cargo or kidnapping the 
vessel for ransom or terrorist purposes. Vessels carrying explosive, inflamma-
ble or toxic substances could be used as weapons by terrorists. Because of their 
dependence on automation systems and artificial intelligence, autonomous 
ships are much more susceptible to hijackers of another form: hackers. Even 
as conventional ships become increasingly connected and reliant on software-
dependent systems, cybersecurity is already receiving increasing attention by 
shipping companies. With autonomous ships, cyberattacks will pose an even 
greater risk to safety and require new and innovative ways to defend against 
such attacks.
The cybersecurity vulnerability of global shipping was recently highlighted 
by the cyberattack on container-shipping giant AP Moller-Maersk in June 2017 
when a cyberattack downed its online booking and other internal platforms, 
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forcing it to halt operations at some container terminals. The  cyberattack 
caused a loss of up to US$300 million and disrupted operations for two weeks.3
 Conclusion
Rolls Royce, one of the companies at the forefront of development of remote 
controlled and autonomous ships, envisions that a remotely controlled vessel 
operating in local coastal waters (the first stage of autonomous ships) will be 
in operation by 2020. By 2025 the company hopes to have a remotely oper-
ated autonomous ship in international waters, and by 2035 a fully autonomous 
unmanned ocean-going ship.4 Once autonomous shipping becomes a reality, 
there will always be manned vessels as not all ship types lend themselves to 
autonomous operations (e.g., large passenger ships, ships carrying highly haz-
ardous cargos) so it is essential that autonomous ships be able to co-exist and 
safely interact with manned ships.
Although the shipping industry’s adoption of autonomous ships may be in-
evitable, the uncertainty regarding the safety of autonomous ships compared 
to conventional ships will be tested over time. The common wisdom is that 
autonomous ships must be at least as safe as conventional ships. One of the 
greatest risks faced by autonomous vessels will be cyber risks. Cybersecurity 
will be critical to the safe and successful operation of remote and autonomous 
vessels. Because of the uncertainty and unknown risks associated with ships 
having no crew aboard, public sentiment may demand that autonomous ships 
be even safer than conventional ones.
Even if the technology is perfected, companies are not going to use remote 
and autonomous ships unless the laws are changed to allow them to operate. 
Regulations will have to be revised; rules will need to be rewritten. Until that 
happens, the timeline when these ships will be permitted to operate in ocean 
trades remains uncertain. Autonomous shipping will happen; it is just a ques-
tion of when, where, and how.
3 J. Leovy, “Cyberattack Cost Maersk as Much as $300 Million and Disrupted Operations for 
2 Weeks,” Los Angeles Times, 17 August 2017, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-maersk 
-cyberattack-20170817-story.html.
4 Rolls Royce Advanced Autonomous Waterborne Applications Initiative, “Remote and Au-
tonomous Ships—The Next Step,” White Paper, Autonomous Ship Technology Symposium, 





 Although I was not conscious of it until much later, my father’s love a�fair with 
the ocean must have in�luenced me powerfully. Rereading his works in my mature 
years, when I myself become [sic] so deeply involved with the oceans, I ��nd his 
analysis of the human relationship to nature, and specially the sea, the most 
profound I have come across. 
 Elisabeth Mann Borgese* 
 *  The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource (Tokyo: United Nations University 
Press, 1998), 54–55. 
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Introduction
Editors: Paul R. Boudreau and Ian Porter
Good communication is an essential ingredient for responsible ocean gover-
nance, as governance is informed by and relies to a great extent on public en-
gagement and support for formulating law, plans and actions, and for making 
decisions. In that context this part deals with the public from different points 
of view to explore how processes of communication, engagement, and nego-
tiation contribute to the exchange of ocean-related knowledge and the realiza-
tion of sustainable ocean benefits. For many of us, engagement is based by 
and large on intangible and often literary or philosophical connections. In the 
first two essays, writers are conveying the human ‘sense’ or ‘experience’ of the 
ocean and ocean activism to their readers. For others our connection comes 
through formal and informal education or exposure in the course of profes-
sional activities. In recent years, important communication and engagement 
tools are classed as social media. The final essay in this part deals with the 
very formal negotiation process as a tool to resolving ocean conflicts. Together, 
these essays show the different ways that non-experts and experts connect to 
the ocean and relate to the complexities of ocean governance.
© Paul R. Boudreau and Ian Porter, ���8 | doi:�0.��63/9789004380�7�_086
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Sing to Me of the Oceans, Muse:  
The Poetry of the Sea
Harry Thurston
Tidnish Bridge, Nova Scotia, Canada
The sea and poetry have always gone together.
The earliest epic poems take us on long sea voyages. The first of these in 
classical literature is The Odyssey. Dating to the sixth or seventh century bce, 
it is attributed to the blind Greek poet Homer who wrote down the minstrels’ 
tales of the hero Odysseus on his ten-year-long voyage from Troy to his home 
island of Ithaca. He sails through ‘the wine-dark sea’, encountering many 
 obstacles and temptations along the way. The word ‘odyssey’, in English, as de-
fined by Webster, means “a series of adventurous journeys usually marked by 
many changes.”
And so the poet sets the stage for this tale, this voyage he is about to take 
readers on as virtual crew:
Sing to me of the man, Muse, the man of twists and turns
Driven time and again off course…1
Other epics and epic poets followed in Homer’s wake. In the waning years bce, 
the Latin poet Virgil penned The Aeneid, which traces the Trojan hero Aeneas’ 
voyage on his “seven long years [of] unhappy wandering … tossed by storms, 
and scattered through the main,”2 en route to the founding of Rome.
Far to the north, at the end of the first millennium, in The Icelandic Sagas, 
poets recorded the voyages of the Vikings across the North Atlantic, giving us a 
first glimpse in literature of what became known as The New World. We marvel 
with these early voyagers at the long white beaches and the marine bounty of 
this new land where they found “no lack of salmon … larger than they had ever 
seen before.”3
Finally let me mention, in this very brief survey of epic poetry and its 
watery origins, The Lusiads by the Portuguese poet Luis Vaz de Camoes. 
1 Homer, The Odyssey. Translated by R. Fagles; introduction and notes by B. Knox (New York: 
Viking Penguin, 1996).
2 The Works of Virgil. Translated by J. Dryden (London: Oxford University Press, 1906).
3 The Sagas of Icelanders, A Selection. Preface by J. Smiley (New York: Penguin Group, 2000).
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First  published in 1572, it recounts the voyage of Vasco da Gama around the 
Cape of Good Hope to India in 1497–1498. Camoes, the one-eyed poet—like a 
Homeric Cyclops—was well qualified to imagine this epochal voyage because 
he did it himself over half a century later, making it as far as the Mekong delta 
where he was shipwrecked. He is the first of the southern European poets to take 
us out of the Mediterranean, as well as the first to take us across ‘the burning line’ 
of the Equator—into the southern Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific.
It is Vasco da Gama’s voyage “from Portugal’s far western shores/ By oceans 
where none had ventured… Among far distant peoples, to proclaim/ A New 
Age….”4 that signals the beginning of the Age of Discovery and the revelation 
that we live on a planet that is largely watery—and salt.
These last two, more ‘modern’ epics span the North Atlantic and the two 
places I call home: Atlantic Canada, the Vinland of the sagas, where I was born 
and have lived most of my life, and Portugal where I have spent winters dur-
ing the last decade near Cape St. Vincent “where the land ends and the sea 
begins.”5 This cold tempestuous ocean has been a major influence on my life 
as a poet and environmental journalist and nature writer. And it is through 
the prism of this first-hand experience and practice that I view the subject of 
ocean literacy and literature—how we understand the sea through words.
With this in mind I want to briefly consider two classic texts that take the 
oceans and their impact on the planet and its living things as their primary 
subject.
The first, of course, is Charles Darwin’s Voyage of the Beagle,6 the record of a 
five-year-long voyage by a twenty-something-year-old man, suffering from the 
common malaise of young people, then as now, of what to do with one’s life. In 
his autobiography, he wrote that “the voyage of the Beagle has been by far the 
most important event in my life and has determined my whole career.” That 
experience would not only change Darwin’s life, convincing him to give up the 
notion of entering the ministry for a career in science, but change our funda-
mental understanding of how life on Earth came to be what it is, and how it 
continues to change and evolve through the process of natural selection.
At the end of his life he wrote that the success of “my first literary child  always 
tickles my fancy more than that of any of my other books,”7 among them On the 
Origin of Species. What is striking to me as a poet and nature writer is his use 
4 L. Vaz de Camoes, The Lusiads. Translated with an introduction and notes by L. White 
( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
5 Id.
6 C. Darwin, Voyage of the Beagle. Edited and abridged with an introduction by J. Browne and 




of the term ‘literary child’ to describe his writing. It is an accurate description 
of the text, which was received enthusiastically by Victorian readers when it 
was first published in May 1839, as it still is today, nearly two centuries later. It 
is eminently readable in the great tradition of nineteenth-century naturalists, 
a tradition that lamentably has less contemporary currency.
Darwin was first a naturalist, so on landing on the Galápagos Islands, where 
the seeds of his theory of natural selection will be sown, he describes their 
geology (“The constitution of the whole is volcanic”), their climate (“Consid-
ering that these islands are placed directly under the equator, the climate is 
far from being excessively hot; a circumstance which, perhaps, is chiefly own-
ing to the singularly low temperature of the surrounding sea”), and their flora 
(“The dry and parched surface, having been heated by the noonday sun, gave 
the air a close and sultry feeling, like that from a stove; we fancied even the 
bushes smelt unpleasantly. Although I diligently tried to collect as many plants 
as possible, I succeeded in getting only ten kinds; and such wretched-looking 
little weeds would have better become an arctic, than an Equatorial Flora”). It 
is figurative flourishes that mark this text as something more than a mere ac-
curate and plodding record of place.
This question of literary style leads me to a consideration of the next great 
book about the oceans, excepting Herman Melville’s Moby Dick Or, The Whale, 
that hybrid fiction-natural history masterpiece, Rachel Carson’s The Sea around 
Us, first published in 1950, more than a century after Darwin’s classic.
Like Darwin, Carson was a biologist first, though she was also a professional 
editor for the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and she would write four 
books, three about the sea and seashore, and her last, Silent Spring, in 1962. 
Her meticulously researched, damning critique of the chemical industry and 
its indiscriminate use of pesticides would birth the modern environmental 
movement, and like Darwin’s Origin of Species would change forever the 
public’s view of our role in the natural world. However, it was her first book 
(and her favorite), Under the Sea Wind that brought her to public attention 
and established her as a writer who could combine science and poetry, a new 
aesthetic to raise awareness about the power and beauty of the natural world.
From that book, here is a sample from her essay “Undersea,” which first ap-
peared in The Atlantic Monthly in 1937:
The ocean is a place of paradoxes. It is the home of the great white shark, 
two-thousand pound killer of the seas, and of the hundred-foot blue 
whale, the largest animal that ever lived. It is also home of living things 
so small that your two hands might scoop up as many of them as there 
are stars in the Milky Way… Drifting endlessly, midway between the sea 
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of air above and the depths of the abyss below, these strange creatures 
and the marine inflorescence that sustains them are called “plankton”—
the wanderers.8
Carson has been called “the twentieth century’s science-enchanter par 
excellence.”9 In her acceptance speech for the National Book Award for 
nonfiction, given to The Sea around Us, she elucidated how poetry is the agent 
of science, and how these two seemingly incompatible disciplines are in fact 
complementary to each other and indispensable to her worldview as a writer:
The winds, the sea, and the moving tides are what they are. If there is 
wonder and beauty and majesty in them, science will discover these 
qualities. If they are not there, science cannot create them. If there is 
poetry in my book about the sea, it is not because I deliberately put it 
there, but because no one could write truthfully about the sea and leave 
out the poetry.10
Even in her last book, Silent Spring, with its unrelenting expose of how pes-
ticides were insidiously accumulating in organisms, including humans, and 
altering whole ecosystems in the process, she protested that “I myself never 
thought the ugly facts would dominate. The beauty of the living world I was 
trying to save has always been uppermost in my mind…”11
In a prescient way, Carson put her finger on the nature writer’s dilemma in 
the modern age, in the Anthropocene, when we are experiencing a sixth mass 
extinction due to human activities and the very biosphere is threatened by 
anthropogenic-induced climate change. It raises the question, as Moira Farr 
did in her essay, “The Death of Nature Writing”—“whether the genre is still 
legitimate in the face of the kind of destruction humans are visiting upon the 
Earth?” Or are we witnessing “the passing of a way of seeing.”12
While we can no longer write about nature as if it were whole and unsullied, 
the British Columbia nature writer Peri McQuay offers this counterargument: 
“Recognizing our despair over the ravages to the biosystem is necessary. How-
ever, when we become paralyzed by despair, we opt out of the organism which 
8 R. Carson, “Undersea,” Atlantic Monthly 78 (1937): 55–57.





12 M. Farr, “The Death of Nature Writing,” Brick 47 (1993): 16–27.
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is our proper home and become part of the destructive force.”13 That is why, 
she says, we still need ‘the poets of ecology’, perhaps more than ever.
It is that special way of seeing—in a word, literature—that makes us aware 
of the ocean as a place of adventure and discovery, and of wonder and mystery, 
and ultimately makes us want to conserve and care for it.
As a nature writer who was first a poet and later wrote a number of science-
based books on the sea and the seashore, I try to honor the legacy of Carson 
who found the poetry in science, and who argued vigorously that there could 
be “no separate literature of science,” since science and literature had the same 
aim, “to discover and illuminate the truth.”
Unlike Darwin in his day, or Carson in hers, few scientists now have the lux-
ury of writing for the public about their discoveries. It falls to nature/science 
writers. In doing so, I am always aware of Carson’s example. But I also remem-
ber old Homer who begins his epic poem with the charge—‘Sing’!
Singing the poetry of the sea is a bearing we need more than ever—as the 
oceans are emptied, acidified, and fill with plastics—if humankind, like Odys-
seus, is to find its way back to its true home.
13 P. McQuay, “Seizing the Strawberry,” in Living in Harmony: Nature Writing by Women in 
Canada, ed., A.P. Leibowitz (Victoria, BC: Orca Book Publisher, 1996), 215–224.
<UN>
Journalistic Challenges in Speaking for the Ocean: 
A Personal Acquaintance with Elisabeth Mann 
Borgese
Paul Kennedy
IDEAS, cbc Radio, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
I’m a journalist.
In that context, almost twenty years ago, it was my enormous pleasure to 
savor many dozens of precious hours in the illuminating presence of Elisabeth 
Mann Borgese. At the time, I was working on a seven-part radio documentary 
series called ‘Learning from the Oceans’. I knew that Elisabeth hadn’t exactly 
written ‘the book’ about oceans, although she had written at least three books 
on oceanic subjects, and there was a broad consensus that she’d been a major 
force behind the ‘Law of the Sea’. In my imagination, I cultivated the delusional 
dream that I might somehow become her ‘Boswell’, while she would be my 
‘Johnson’.
Our first face-to-face meeting occurred on 6 April 2001, in Halifax, Nova 
Scotia. I had agreed to moderate a public forum featuring fisheries experts, 
marine biologists, and ocean scientists from all parts of Atlantic Canada. Simi-
lar sessions were subsequently scheduled for Victoria, on the Pacific coast, and 
Iqaluit, on the Arctic coast, thereby covering all three of Canada’s oceans, and 
theoretically giving me a kick-start introduction to the topic at hand.
My notes from that Halifax session are characteristically vague. To tell you 
the truth, it feels like a miracle to me that those notes still exist. Journalists 
are hacks. They tend to forget everything about whatever they are doing al-
most as soon as they accept their next assignment. Mostly I recall that there 
were two men and two women on the Halifax panel. Gender parity was good. 
I felt vaguely uncomfortable in my role as ‘chair’ of what almost seemed like 
a roving Royal Commission about Canada’s oceans. My biggest memory from 
the entire evening was being blown away by Bernadette Dwyer, who was then 
the Director of the Fogo Island Cooperative Society, on the biggest island 
off the coast of the island of Newfoundland. Since then, after something like 
several dozen visits to that province—including at least six or seven excur-
sions to Fogo itself—I have come to consider ‘da Rock’ as something of a sec-
ond home. The connection seems almost genetic. The amniotic fluid in every 
human womb apparently resembles the chemical composition of ancient sea 
water. Mother Ocean has been calling me.
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In any event, Elisabeth reigned supreme that evening in Halifax. All the pan-
elists automatically deferred to her, even though she didn’t actually say very 
much. My almost illegible notes indicate that all the other people on the panel 
looked in her direction whenever anything controversial (or even interesting) 
was mentioned. She got a lot of attention. At the end of the evening, I sought 
her out, and modestly suggested we should spend some serious time together, 
and probably plan a feature interview for some point further along in the pro-
cess. Elisabeth invited me for dinner the following night.
Her place was on the ocean, south of Halifax, not far from the spot where 
the first trans-Atlantic communications cable came to shore. We walked that 
gorgeous coastline with her dogs, and we watched the sun set over the North 
American continent. I was way too shy to mention that I knew she was the 
daughter of the German writer and Nobel Prize winner Thomas Mann. We 
talked instead about her husband, who had been a world-famous World Feder-
alist, before his death in 1952. Giuseppe Antonio Borgese probably prompted 
Elisabeth’s later lifelong interest in the oceans. It was his consuming commit-
ment to ‘the commons’, and his passion for international governance, that ulti-
mately and inevitably led Elisabeth to the law of the sea.
Over dinner, we discovered our mutual love for single malt Scotch whisky. 
We discussed the magical ways that the waters of the North Sea infuse the fla-
vors of our favorite drams. We probably drank too much. Before the night was 
over it was agreed that there was iodine in the ocean air that ultimately made 
its way into each whiff of ten-year-old Laphroaig. By the end of the evening, 
we were swearing that it was even possible to smell and taste the essence of 
Hebridean kelp in every sip of sixteen-year-old Lagavulin. A tentative connec-
tion was established.
Our next meeting took place on International Oceans Day, in Vancouver, 
British Columbia, that June. Canada’s federal Minister of Fisheries and Oceans 
had invited me to attend a very special meeting of the National Oceans Ad-
visory Group. Elisabeth was part of an elite assemblage of Ocean Ambassa-
dors, including whale biologist Jon Lien and sustainable development expert 
Art Hanson, who were automatically part of the group. The Minister himself, 
The Honourable Herb Dhaliwal, acted as host and chair, with other high-level 
federal officials, as well as various provincial politicians and bureaucrats filling 
out the roster. Because I was nothing more than a mere journalist, I had com-
pletely forgotten the name of the hotel where the opening cocktail party was 
supposed to convene. Being a complete hack, I made the mistake of calling a 
press officer at the ministry in Ottawa.
Our conversation was polite and personable until I mentioned the meeting. 
I was asked how I’d learned about it. I replied that many of the people I had 
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been interviewing were expecting to attend, and hoping to see me there. I was 
told that the meeting was being held in Vancouver. I replied that I was already 
at Toronto Pearson International Airport, waiting to board a westbound plane. 
At that point, I was automatically and authoritatively informed that journalists 
were absolutely forbidden from attending the meeting. There were no excep-
tions. It was suggested that I should cancel my flight. When I protested, that 
the Minister himself had invited me, I was informed that there must be some 
mistake.
I boarded the plane.
On arrival in Vancouver, I checked into my hotel and called a local friend 
whom I suspected might be on the list. She told me where the meeting was, 
and when it was supposed to start. When I arrived, only a few minutes late, 
Elisabeth saw me at the door and came running from across the room. She 
grabbed me by the elbow and took me immediately to meet the Minister. It 
suddenly felt like we three were allies, although I alone understood that I was 
not supposed to be there, because I was a mere journalist.
My closest (and longest) encounter with Elisabeth was scheduled for several 
months later, in New York City. She invited me to ‘shadow’ her at a meeting 
of the Ad Hoc Working Group for the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea. Plenary sessions were scheduled for every afternoon, over a three-
day period. I met Elisabeth for lunch, just before noon on the first day, and we 
walked to UN Plaza together. People started to recognize her even before we 
approached the main building. This was immediately prior to the September 11, 
2001 attack on the World Trade Centre, but security seemed exceptionally tight. 
There were numerous metal detectors and repeated pat-downs.
Elisabeth walked right through. The guards seemed to know who she was, 
and automatically granted some form of super-diplomatic immunity, just 
for her. By the afternoon of the second day, with five or six security gauntlets 
behind us, it felt almost like I was being granted a form of reflective respect. 
For the guards, I was becoming the Canadian guy who is shadowing Elisabeth 
Mann Borgese. There were fewer pat-downs; then briefer and more perfunc-
tory pat-downs; and then none. I guess nobody told them I’m a journalist.
Once through the security, inside the actual ‘Law of the Sea’ meetings, Elisa-
beth and I sat near the back of a huge room, but at the front of a bunch of 
non-governmental organizations and other interested participants. People all 
over the room, from all corners of the ocean continent, turned around to try 
and make eye contact with Elisabeth. Whenever the discussion—which was 
simultaneously translated into all six UN official languages—progressed to-
wards any sort of vote, each member nation expressed its franchise in alpha-
betical order … Afghanistan … Albania … Algeria … Andorra… Many of the 
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national representatives would stand and turn towards Elisabeth before they 
voted. There was something about her particular smile that told them every-
thing they needed to know.
If I learned anything about the United Nations, on that particular visit, it 
was that most votes were usually foregone conclusions almost as soon as the 
alphabet arrived at the Chinese delegation. China wasn’t just China. China 
was ‘China and the Un-Aligned Nations’, and many if not most of the member 
nations were mysteriously aligned to China, although officially somehow ‘un-
aligned’. However China voted, so went the majority, 99 percent of the time. 
The Chinese representative turned and looked at Elisabeth, who smiled her 
special smile. The representative voted, knowing that Elisabeth approved. As a 
non-governmental organization she never got her own vote. But she often got 
her way.
At the end of the meetings, after the third day, Elisabeth was flying to Geneva 
and I was returning to Toronto. We found a bar, somewhere east of Broadway 
on 42nd Street. She ordered an Ardbeg. I asked for a Bowmore. We toasted the 
oceans, and went our ways.
In the end, as a journalist and documentary maker, I do not remember us-
ing anything much from the many hours I spent with Elisabeth Mann Borgese. 
She gave me all that time, in so many extremely different but fascinating con-
texts, because I was in the process of making a seven-hour radio series called 
‘Learning from the Oceans’. We never did sit down to record the substantial, 
face-to-face, profile interview that we had been discussing from the very begin-
ning. When everything went to air, Elisabeth ultimately got something like a 
47- second sound bite, buried somewhere in the third hour of the series:
I want to conclude with a fish story. It is a true story that occurred some 
fifty years ago, when I was studying in Austria. A biologist was doing re-
search about where the feeling for social responsibility was located in the 
brain of a fish. He proceeded to surgically remove that part of the brain, 
and then put the fish back into the school from which it came. The fish 
was immediately and automatically declared to be the leader.
That was all the airtime she ever got from the hundreds of hours that we spent 
together. But I’m happy to tell you that the essential spirit of emb was deeply 
infused into every nanosecond of my work on oceans—certainly in all seven 
hours of the ‘Learning from the Oceans’ series, and in fact in everything that 
I’ve done ever since.
Elisabeth taught me that the beauty and the power of the ocean is inside 
each and every person on the ocean planet.
I will never forget it. Even though I’m only a journalist.
<UN>
Oceans Day: A Personal Reminiscence 
of Its Initiation
Peter MacLellan
Raeberry Communications, Smiths Cove, Nova Scotia, Canada
“How’s your Portuguese?” I was asked on the way out of the office.
“Non-existent,” I replied looking back over my shoulder.
“Well, better brush up on some rudimentary conversation, I think we’ll be 
taking you with us.”
The voice belonged to Dr. Judith Swan, an internationally respected figure 
in marine law circles and at the time the Executive Director of the Oceans 
Institute of Canada (oic).
We had just met in the oic office sequestered away on the fifth floor 
Dalhousie University’s heating plant building on Henry Street, Halifax, Nova 
Scotia. It wasn’t a familiar spot for me. I really didn’t have much to do with 
oceans management, policy studies or anything related to academic inquiry 
in that regard.
I was a senior executive at the region’s largest public relations and strategic 
marketing agency and I had been directed to meet with the oic folks by my 
president after he had received a request for possible communications services.
“You teach at university, and enjoy that scene,” he said as he dropped the 
phone message slip on my desk, “Drop by and see what they need and what we 
can do for them.”
So here I was.
It was March, 1992 and we had been discussing the upcoming United 
 Nations Conference on Environment and Development (unced), also known 
as the Rio Conference or Earth Summit, depending on your level of gravitas or, 
in my case, scientific sophistication; a major global event scheduled to be held 
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 3 to 14 June 1992.
The Earth Summit was going to examine and discuss a number of emerging 
and important global issues including biodiversity, deforestation, desertifica-
tion, and, yes, climate change. It would produce benchmark conventions and 
declarations including Agenda 21, the United Nation’s environmental and sus-
tainable development plan for the twenty-first century.
But the Government of Canada wanted the oic to get a heightened profile 
for the oceans at unced, because they knew we were facing a crisis of sustain-
ability. I was there to suggest ways to get that visibility and build international 
‘buy-in’ at the event for the Canadian agenda. Somehow I was convincing on 
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the tactical approach, and displayed at least an informed understanding of the 
issues; so our firm was retained to develop that strategy.
And I was invited to join the team on their way out the door.
Now, when I say that I hadn’t any knowledge of oceans issues and strategic 
imperatives, it was not entirely true.
Over the past few years I had come to know the redoubtable Elisabeth 
Mann Borgese, defender of the oceans, internationally recognized expert on 
maritime law and policy, and founder of the International Oceans Institute 
(ioi), while she was a professor at Dalhousie University. She and I were regular 
guests at weekly soirees hosted by our mutual friend Dr. John Godfrey when he 
was president of the University of King’s College, Halifax, Nova Scotia, and we 
would often chat about her work and the issues she was addressing.
I was also happy to work with the Mayor of Halifax to infer special civic 
citizen status upon Elisabeth while she was with us.
She was a brilliant and engaging person and I really liked her. And I would 
listen intently as she discussed and delineated legal and environmental marine 
issues, and her global role with Pacem in Maribus (‘Peace in the Oceans’).
Because of Elisabeth Mann Borgese, through meeting her and most all 
through listening to her, I was able to acquire a sufficient understanding of the 
issues and challenges facing the oic mandate to take part in their Rio mission.
After leaving that first meeting with Judith Swan and some of her team 
members, I waited by the elevator to head back to the office. On the bulletin 
board was a poster that promoted the upcoming Earth Day, April 22nd.
A light went on.
I turned and went back into the oic office.
“Is there an Oceans Day?” I asked Dr. Swan.
“No, why?” she replied.
“I think it’s something we should discuss,” I said.
And we did, many times, as we prepared to go to Rio, until it became a center-
piece of our strategic agenda.
We accepted the idea to declare an Oceans Day and present it for global con-
sideration. It was well received by the federal government. The federal Minister 
of Fisheries and Oceans loved it, and told me so on a number of occasions 
when we were doing media work at the Earth Summit. We were encouraged to 
put it out there as a focus of Canadian concern and commitment.
But when? What would be the day?
Over a couple of social libations and discussing a possible date for the 
Oceans Day activities, Judith Swan and I discussed the activities planned for 
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the two weeks in Rio and I said that I was available to assist the delegation for 
the entire time, I just had to take time to call my wife on June the 8th because 
it was our wedding anniversary.
“Can you repeat that date again?” she asked.
“June 8th,” I repeated, “Why?”
“Because that’s my birthday as well,” she said.
Judith Swan had a respected background as a legal scholar in the field of ma-
rine affairs, and an impressive knowledge and grasp of international oceans 
issues. I assumed that’s why she was awarded the position she currently 
held.
But I also came to learn that she had a mystical side that appreciated appar-
ent karmic confluence.
“Well that’s got to be it then,” she declared as if it was meant to be.
The date was subsequently proposed and accepted, and the launch of the 
Oceans Day proposal was written into the agenda.
It would take a lot of work and planning by a superb team of scholars and 
policy experts assembled as part of the oic team. And it was done over an in-
credibly short period of time. Focus and realistic expectations were essential. 
Personal, pedantic, and organizational agenda were to be set aside.
The progress and planning towards what became Oceans Day perhaps 
 received its best summary in a recent comment article posted in the Victoria, 
British Columbia, Times Colonist on 7 June 2017, the day before Oceans Day, 
by Dr. Carol Amaratunga, one of the leading Canadian delegates to the 1992 
unced conference and a key member of our team.
Dr. Amaratunga is a freelance writer and social-policy researcher who 
served as the Director of the Inter-regional and Cooperative Activities Divi-
sion, International Centre for Ocean Development (icod), in Halifax, Nova 
Scotia, between 1986 and 1992 and with oic between 1992 and 1994.
Her submission was entitled “Comment: Keeping True to the Spirit of World 
Oceans Day,” and she stated, in part:
A quarter of a century ago, on June 8, 1992, at the Earth Summit in Rio de 
Janeiro, a dedicated team from Canada’s International Centre for Ocean 
Development and the Ocean Institute of Canada launched the first World 
Oceans Day … Oceans Day 1992 called upon world governments to reme-
diate the early signs of global warming and climate change. Our objective 
was to move the oceans from the fringe to the centre of intergovernmen-
tal sustainable-development discussions and policy. …
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In planning Oceans Day 1992 our subject was simply: The Blue Planet 
and the Earth Summit. Our goal was to engage the public and support 
scientists, community leaders, and decision makers to affirm the world 
ocean as a global engine that drives and supports life on this planet.1
On Monday, 8 June 1992, a day-long Oceans Day at the Global Forum semi-
nar entitled ‘The Blue Planet: Oceans and the Earth Summit’ was held. The 
seminar was planned and hosted by the oic team and chaired by Dr. Swan. 
The agenda featured a long list of internationally renowned speakers, and was 
fully attended by oceans policy-makers, researchers, educators, politicians, 
and media from around the globe.
The focus of the agenda was to address a ten-point ‘Call for Commitment’ 
drafted by the organizers. Those ten points were listed under a series of lofty 
and inclusive sub-headings that included management of the high seas, global 
institutional arrangements, global integrated actions, high seas fishing, land-
based sources of pollution, and coastal zone management.
But it was particularly the tenth, and final, point in that Call to Commit-
ment that I will always remember. That final sub heading was entitled ‘Annual 
Oceans Day’ and read as follows:
10. The international community should declare an annual Oceans Day, 
dedicated to directing global attention to the oceans, and monitoring 
post unced oceans agenda progress.
I can still remember reading and re-reading Article 10 of that statement, as 
I walked to the shore on that brilliant morning. All that week in Rio, and in 
the months before in Canada, I had been impressed, even humbled, by the 
 knowledge, experience, and tenacious commitment I witnessed in the people 
I met and with whom I worked on developing the Oceans Day agenda, and 
the seminar going on in the lovely facility behind me.
But Article 10, well, I was able to play a part in that one.
“The international community should declare an annual Oceans Day.” It had 
only been a few months since that day in March—but there it was.
And I had a part to play in its appearance at an international forum of such 
global import. I considered at the moment that I never had a chance to be 
part of any remotely seminal moment in history, and likely never would again. 
I smiled to myself.
1 C.M. Amaratunga, “Comment: Keeping True to the Spirit of World Oceans Day,” Times Colonist, 
7 June 2017, http://www.timescolonist.com/opinion/op-ed/comment-keeping-true-to-the 
-spirit-of-world-oceans-day-1.20453333.
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And it would take a while before the ‘international community’ would act 
on that recommendation, but finally, in 2008, World Oceans Day was formally 
acknowledged and adopted by the United Nations.
World Oceans Day has grown and gone on to become a major event in 
 celebrating our oceans heritage and dedicating efforts to preserve that  priceless 
potential.
Since that day in 1992 I was honoured to be asked to teach communica-
tions management as part of the Masters of Marine Management at Dalhousie 
 University, an assignment I loved and would perform for almost two  decades. 
I  still have the wonderful assignment of teaching the subject as part of the 
international summer programme conducted by the International Ocean 
 Institute-Canada at Dalhousie University.
Over that period of time I have looked forward to the opportunity to share 
with my students my peripheral perspective on the story of the genesis of 
Oceans Day. They always seem to find it interesting and, in my accounting, 
somewhat amusing. Occasionally I get anniversary greetings from former stu-
dents around the world. And, as on that wonderful day in Rio, I smile to myself.
<UN>
Cetaceans in the Media: A Right Whale of a Story
Ian Porter
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
 Introduction
It was like a multiple murder mystery. Who or what was killing North Atlantic 
right whales in the Gulf of St Lawrence? Why so many? And—in the summer 
of 2017—what were so many whales even doing in the Gulf?
By September, 12 whales had been found dead and news of each tolled like 
a bell. Cetacean biologists say that barely 500 North Atlantic right whales re-
main. Hunted almost to extinction two centuries ago, their survival as a species 
is an issue of urgent concern for marine scientists and environmentalists. The 
deaths were a staggering loss for an endangered species and they caught inter-
national media attention.
In Atlantic Canada, the whales’ plight became the ‘Story of the Summer’. 
Print, broadcast, and online media had news about them almost daily. Reports 
told of observers’ surprise at their large numbers in the Gulf and of speculation 
about the effect of climate change on migration patterns. Environmentalists 
blamed some deaths on entanglement in fishing gear. Necropsies implicated 
‘ship strikes’—hit-and-run collisions with tankers, cruise ships and other 
large vessels. Chasing so many leads was a tough test of the capacity of the 
news media to cover events out of sight of land. For members of the ocean 
community—scientists and environmentalists—it was an opportunity to de-
ploy impressive media skills on behalf of animals they had come to know well 
through years of research and activism.
 As Told through a Lens
A stream of visuals sustained the momentum of the media coverage. Pictures 
of whales are compelling. They are elite mammals, enormous, smart, and talk-
ative. They travel in families and surface for photo ops. Pictures of whales, liv-
ing and dead, and of people looking at whales and the remains of whales told 
the story on television and in social media and drew readers to folio features 
in newspapers. By itself, a 60-tonne whale pulled up for a necropsy on a beach 
is an arresting image, especially when people in protective scrubs are slicing 
into the huge body and using the arm of a backhoe to roll back thick layers of 
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 blubber. Crowds of onlookers complete the impression of communities ener-
gized by wonder and pity.
Fresh images from many sources kept the story from fading. Without pic-
tures, reports of a whale floating lifeless at sea are worth, at most, a few lines 
of script. Newsroom budgets rarely provide for the boat or helicopter needed 
to shoot events out of sight of land. Increasingly, producers rely on outside 
sources for pictures to tell ocean stories.
The federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans (dfo) supplied one widely 
shared image, that of pathologist Dr. Pierre-Yves Dumont squatting precarious-
ly on a whale carcass awash in the Gulf.1 The Marine Animal Response  Society 
(mars) and the World Wildlife Fund (wwf) also provided the media with 
boat-based video. Environmental groups understand well the value of visuals 
as support both for advocacy and fundraising. As one reporter puts it, offshore 
video that tells a story is like ‘catnip’ to television programmers.
 Commitment and Complexity
A striking example of media reliance on outside sources came with the death 
of Joe Howlett, a fisherman from Campobello Island, New Brunswick, who 
was killed 10 July while freeing an entangled whale in the Gulf. News coverage 
 focused on his commitment and sacrifice. Tributes that showed him in  action 
on a whale-rescue boat used pictures from a promotional video posted on 
 YouTube the year before by the International Federation for Animal  Welfare. 
His death had an immediate impact. Authorities in both Canada and the 
 United States quickly suspended all further whale-rescue activity.
Across Atlantic Canada, local broadcasters, newspapers, and Canadian 
Press bureaus all scrambled to tell their own right whale stories. There were 
dead whales off northeast Newfoundland, necropsies on Prince Edward Island, 
and fears about the impact of conservation measures on the lobster and crab 
fishery in Cape Breton, Nova Scotia. Taken together, the stories were practically 
a lecture-hall illustration of the densely woven complexity of coastal ocean 
issues.
The media were hard put to connect so many dots. Marine beat  reporters—
specialists in ocean science or policy—always rare, are now almost extinct in 
news organizations. Journalism-schooled generalists are skilled at  assembling 





facts and making them accessible to readers and viewers. Few have the 
 experience and contacts within the ocean community to go much deeper. 
And in summer, veteran reporters go on vacation. For their replacements, 
the  discovery of yet another dead right whale was sometimes their first big 
 saltwater story.
 What the Sources Said
So it was that the credibility of the coverage became dependent on scientists 
who have invested their careers in right whale research. Shore-side reporters 
had few grounds to question their opinions about what should be done and 
none to challenge their urgency. A key source was Montreal-born Dr. Moira 
Brown, a senior scientist at the New England Aquarium in Boston, Massa-
chusetts. She was a veteran of a campaign fifteen years earlier to protect right 
whales endangered by shipping in the Bay of Fundy and south of Nova Scotia. 
She was someone who could tell the story of the right whales in words that 
reporters can use. “My job,” as she puts it, “is to be a scientist. A scientist who 
can interpret science.”
Others frequently in the coverage included Sean Brillant of the Canadian 
Wildlife Federation in Halifax, Nova Scotia, and, in dozens of news clips and 
interviews, Tonya Wimmer, a biologist at Dalhousie University in Halifax and 
the founder of mars. Her organization had reported the death of three whales 
in the Gulf two years earlier and had predicted more as migration routes 
reached colder waters. Her concern was the lack of a ‘top-down commitment’ 
by government to change fishery and shipping regulations to reduce entangle-
ments and ship strikes.
Canada’s species at risk law does prescribe intervention, but Ottawa cannot 
easily ignore its economic impact. Protected feeding grounds for whales could 
be off limits to snow crab fishermen and other inshore groups. Cutting cruise 
ship speeds would win no welcome in an industry that understands time as 
money.
Weighing against these concerns was a potential public relations disaster. 
Inquiries about whales from newsrooms across North America and Europe 
were flooding the dfo office in Moncton, New Brunswick, more calls—said 
one communications officer—than in the previous two years combined: “We 
would have our cell phones to our ears with our desk phones ringing and 
e-mails backing up on our screens.”
The impact of stories about dead whales in Canadian waters was the stuff 
of  a political nightmare. Never mind the message to tourists coming for a 
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whale-watching cruise. What if the stories triggered demands from American 
conservationists for sanctions against imports of Canadian crab and lobster?
 Fast Action at Last
Political hesitation ended on 11 August on a government wharf in Shediac, New 
Brunswick. “Canada takes the protection, conservation, and recovery of endan-
gered species very seriously,” declared Transport Minister Marc Garneau. “The 
recent deaths of several North Atlantic right whales in the Gulf of St. Lawrence 
are extremely concerning.”2
The minister announced new restrictions on vessel speeds in the Gulf. To 
reduce entanglements, dfo Minister Romeo Leblanc had already closed one 
snow crab fishery and now promised to limit or delay others. He also pledged 
to keep better watch on whales in the Gulf and keep mariners better informed 
of where they were feeding. For scientists and environmentalists, the federal 
commitment was a measure of success. Ms. Wimmer was pleased to concede 
“we’ve never had action that swift before.”
Moira Brown also looked back with satisfaction. She had done more than 
thirty media interviews. With many of her colleagues, she shares a perception 
that what you say to a reporter is rarely how it will be reported. Still, she felt 
obliged to respond when they called about ‘the carnage in the Gulf ’. And in the 
end, she said, it worked out for the whales.
“I think the news coverage has been good for increasing awareness of right 
whales,” Brown said. “The media plays a role in public engagement for pro-
tection measures. This story went around the world and the politicians pay 
attention.”
The story, of course, was far from over.
In September, the cbc New Brunswick produced an in-depth podcast 
series entitled “Deep Trouble: North Atlantic Right Whales in Peril.”3 Ships in 
the Gulf quickly put the new speed limits to test and federal authorities fined 
four— including a Canadian Coast Guard vessel—for ignoring them. Rather 
than slow down, cruise lines opted to stay out of the Gulf, a painful setback for 
2 Government of Canada, “Statement by Ministers Garneau and LeBlanc on actions taken to ad-
dress the deaths of whales in the Gulf of St. Lawrence,” Transport Canada and Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada News Release, 11 August 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/transport-canada 
/news/2017/08/statement_by_ministersgarneauandleblanconactionstakentoaddressth 
.html.




shopkeepers in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, and the Port of  Gaspé, 
Quebec. The cruise industry argued it needed longer notice because tour 
schedules are set two years before sailing dates.
Four fatalities in American waters brought the death toll among North 
 Atlantic right whales to 16 for the year. In October, dfo and environmental 
agencies issued a joint report. Necropsies had identified at least seven fatalities 
as the result of industrial activity: four by ship strikes and three by entangle-
ment in fishing gear. Of the seven, five were males and two were females with 
ages ranging from two years to 37.4 As Ms. Wimmer observed, “This makes this 
pretty much the deadliest year we’ve seen since the days of whaling.”
 A Sad Story with Progress?
A sad story, then? A story of too little, too late? Not entirely, not if it includes 
the impact of media coverage on this complex ocean issue. One measure was 
the response to “Let’s Talk Whales,” a public consultation the dfo initiated in 
August. In three months, more than 20,000 people responded with 200-plus 
suggestions about how to help the survival of not only right whales in the Gulf 
but also belugas in the lower St. Lawrence River and southern killer whales 
on the west coast of Canada. At an international whale conference in Halifax, 
scientists agreed the survival of the right whale species will require a manage-
ment plan for the entire range through which the animals move rather than 
only the specific areas where they tend to congregate at different times of the 
year.
For government, the challenge was to translate this sense of urgency into 
action and to consolidate support for the measures announced in August. Early 
in 2018, well before a new snow crab season, dfo Minister Leblanc announced 
rule changes requiring fishermen to reduce the lengths of rope floating on 
the surface, maintain closer count of their traps and report any missing gear. 
Protecting endangered whales is, he said, “a responsibility that weighs heavily 
on all of us” and he described the rules as “meaningful action to address the 
threats to whales in a way that is also mindful of our partners.”5
4 P-Y. Daoust, E.L. Couture, T. Wimmer and L. Bourque, Incident Report: North Atlantic Right 
Whale Mortality Event in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, 2017 (Charlottetown, pei: Canadian Wildlife 
Health Cooperative, Marine Animal Response Society, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 
2017).
5 Government of Canada, “Minister LeBlanc announces new protections for whales,”  Fisheries 
and Oceans Canada News Release, 23 January 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/fisheries 
-oceans/news/2018/01/minister_leblancannouncesnewprotectionsforwhales.html.
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Complicating all plans, of course, were the right whales themselves. Acous-
tic monitoring of their calls had shown noticeable changes in migration 
 patterns between 2010 and 2014.6 In general, the places where they tended to 
gather had shifted further north along the Atlantic seaboard and for longer 
periods. In 2017, observers in the Gulf of St Lawrence counted 114 migrating 
right whales, the most ever, with some remaining in the area into October. 
Looking ahead, the story would be where they returned, in what numbers, and 
how well we learned to protect them.
6 US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, Northeast Fisheries 
 Science Center, “Shifting Presence of North Atlantic Right Whales Tracked with Passive 
 Acoustics,” EurekAlert!, 15 November 2017, https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2017-11 
/nnfs-spo111417.php.
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Social Media and Twenty-First Century  
Public Engagement
Paul R. Boudreau
International Ocean Institute-Canada, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
There are many competing ways for modern audiences to receive information 
and news of interest and importance to them. Researchers publish in scientific 
literature. Politicians and managers receive briefing notes from staff. The gen-
eral population continues to receive information from radio, television, news-
papers, and journals.
In 1998, in the foreword to Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s book The Oceanic 
 Circle, Ruud Lubbers wrote, “The new information and communication tech-
nology gives enormous possibilities to connect people and to empower people. 
Therefore the world is not any longer only a total of the nation-states; it is also 
about participatory democracy globally, and global sovereignty of peoples.” 
This statement predates the widespread development and use of the Internet 
and in particular the twenty-first century phenomena referred to as ‘social me-
dia’. I ask here whether we are in a position to see social media as addressing 
the possibilities envisaged by the Club of Rome in 1998.
At face value, social media is free to access, easy for individuals to contribute 
to and potentially more engaging than traditional sources, as it can be fine-
tuned to the specific interest of the reader. But there is a question about this 
relatively new phenomenon: Is it a help or a distraction in regards to expos-
ing and engaging the general public to the benefits and challenges facing our 
coasts and oceans? What roles might it play in responsible ocean governance?
One of the first issues concerning this question is the definition of social 
media. As a relatively new and quickly changing technology, it is difficult to 
strictly restrict the topic to present day online applications. Social media tru-
ly began to be a global communication tool with the launch and subsequent 
growth of Facebook, which started in 2004. Other common present-day tools 
include:
1) LinkedIn—launched in 2003
2) YouTube—launched in 2005
3) Twitter—launched in 2006
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But this is by no means a complete listing. Sina Weibo is a social media tool 
that functions primarily within the regulations and policies of China. Even 
Wikipedia (launched in 2001) can be considered social media as it is built on 
contributions from individuals, albeit with a rigorous peer review process.
New and slightly different applications/apps continue to be tested in the 
marketplace. Snapchat, launched in 2011 with its temporary posting of images, 
appeals to users who are not interested in providing a lasting record, but just 
sharing transient moments of their lives. It is reasonable to believe that this 
class of communication tools will persist and evolve beyond the present-day 
collection.
The key characteristic of social media is that users are able to contribute to 
the online content. This can be done relatively easily and without cost by click-
ing on a button to indicate their like or dislike, or by providing their own text, 
photo or video. All of the content, published by individuals and organizations 
to a system, becomes accessible by anyone else on the system. Search engines 
such as Google facilitate access by indexing and allowing users to find material 
of which they may not otherwise be aware.
The key to the general success of social media is the removal of a burden-
some review and approval process. In the case of the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2010, so-
cial media played a role in circumventing the intervention of the controlling 
political establishment by allowing direct communications with others of like-
minded aims and goals. Social media, along with the replacement of desktop 
computers with powerful hand-held cellular phones, showed how it could af-
fect the real change wished for by the people involved.
In regards to exposing society to critical information concerning the impor-
tance of the world’s coasts and ocean, there are several challenges for social 
media. The first is the sheer volume of material published on social media. As 
the ease with which users can publish material increases, so does the volume 
of information online increase. This ultimately makes it more difficult to get 
any attention amongst competing interests. The challenge of ‘big data’ is a key 
concern for the technology and algorithms of the Internet, and gives large cor-
porations and organizations the advantage in getting their message out. Indi-
vidual users likely need to sort through the advertisements and pop-ups to get 
information from friends and family.
A second challenge related to the manipulation of social media content by 
corporations is the uneven playing field presented by their financial resources. 
Dedicated commercial interests expend great amounts of money and effort 
to sell their products. They are professionals with commercial aims that can 
outcompete for users’ interest. Groups and organizations that are interested in 
promoting the various aspects of responsible ocean governance are not usually 
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so well financed. Social media presence often competes with the many other 
applications of resources.
A third challenge of using social media as a means of communicating about 
the ocean and engaging the public in its governance is that users are becom-
ing conditioned to be entertained, titillated, as well as informed. It is easy to 
raise a laugh with a video of a skateboarder crashing into a fence or to elicit 
a sigh from a kitten video, but for complex topics such as ocean  governance 
or difficult questions requiring scientific research, it is a challenge to provide 
the right level of detail. Subtle research results or complex socio-political 
situations might be summarized down into a 140-word Twitter post, but it 
will  certainly lose a lot in the translation. Yes, social media can present both 
sides of the story from pristine beaches to islands of plastic, but they exist 
amongst many more pet videos than informative and motivating oceans vid-
eos. With all of the published material from grandchildren photos to pornog-
raphy, it takes dedicated effort to get responsible ocean governance properly 
presented.
Another challenge of social media use is the emphasis on the negative. In 
much of the discussion of ocean governance, there are often two or more sides 
to a challenge or issue. A public and open discussion online often has a ten-
dency to trend towards the lower of the social interactions such as personal 
attacks. The anonymity of users is often seen as a mask behind which to hide 
the negative and derogatory comments that might never be voiced in face-to-
face interactions.
On the plus side, social media in support of ocean governance has the same 
benefits as other fields of interest. For those already predisposed to the issues, 
social media provides a way of connecting without having to be physically geo-
located. Now, interested individuals can establish, maintain and grow social 
connections wherever they live and work. For those who do not have the re-
sources or inclination to travel to a scientific or policy conference, YouTube 
and Skype provide a means of participation. For those who can travel, social 
media tools may allow participants to maintain links beyond the end of the 
meetings.
As mentioned above, a reader’s view of information on social media can be 
tailored to their interest. Thus, rather than relying on news editors and pro-
ducers to select what information is to be presented in standard formats, the 
individual can ensure that the relevant information is being accessed. Addi-
tionally, Internet search tools such as Google can facilitate the identification 
and selection of new and additional useful sources of information that can be 
added to a user’s portfolio. All of this helps those interested in the ocean and 
its governance keep in touch with the latest issues.
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So, in the twenty-first century, what role can social media play in effective 
ocean governance? At the base of governance, is the interest and engagement 
of people. In democratic situations, including the shared resources of the 
world’s oceans, it is critical for people to be aware of and interested in the 
costs, benefits, and sustainability of the services and resources that the oceans 
and coasts can provide. The basis of ocean governance is a knowledgeable 
population, making informed decisions and choices.
Social media provides an effective method for such engagement and pro-
vides a mechanism for sharing information broadly through simple and inex-
pensive tools such as the ubiquitous mobile phone. For illiterate populations, 
social media can provide information in audio and video forms—the latter 
being very effective when presenting scenes of dying, blood-soaked sharks or 
dying whales on a beach.
But the application of social media requires attention, awareness, and prac-
tice. These tools are constantly changing and effective users need to take full 
advantage of the changes. Users need to be aware that their efforts can be 
 filtered and sorted so as to be less of a distraction to the other more power-
ful users. Social media requires the skills of translators who can communicate 
complicated and timely information in a fashion that will be recognized and 
picked up by users.
In summary, the relatively modern development of online electronic social 
media tools has to play a role in supporting responsible ocean governance, but 
it is unclear how it may be most effective. Social media can provide accessible, 
understandable content and engage broader audiences in a free and easy-to-
use format, but it is not a simple task.
<UN>
The Marine People Partnership: Building a 
Workforce for Our Ocean Industries through 
Ocean Literacy
Sherry Scully
Centre for Ocean Ventures and Entrepreneurship (cove) and Marine People 
Partnership, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, Canada
The announcement in 2010 of the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strat-
egy1 triggered murmurs of excitement across the broader marine industry in 
Canada. Embedded in this contract was a promise of meaningful contribu-
tion, beyond Canada’s navy, to amplify benefits across the tiers and sectors 
of the marine industry. It also signaled a concomitant investment in the de-
velopment of a present and future workforce to support these burgeoning in-
dustries. The announcement soon triggered ripples of additional federal and 
provincial investment and attention to ocean activities relating to research 
and observation, ocean technology innovations and entrepreneurship, and 
marine renewable energy. As the ripples of interest amplified across secondary 
and tertiary ocean sectors, optimism swelled at the possibility of establishing 
an integrated, modern, and sustainable national marine industry. But infusion 
of funding could only breath air into the lungs of the industry. It needed to be 
animated with people.
The need for an experienced and available workforce quickly became a 
much-debated topic that sparked predictions of skills shortages and com-
petency gaps. These shortages and gaps were as much related to succession 
interruptions arising from a long prelude of relative inactivity in the central 
industry (i.e., shipbuilding), as they were to the reticence of employers or 
 potential employees to pursue the type of deeply marinized training and spe-
cialization required to elevate workforce skill to the vanguard of the industry. 
Challenges of looming mass retirements were predicted, while entry level roles 
went ignored by a young cohort of new talent lured to higher profile industries. 
A robust national workforce strategy for the broader industry would have had 
1 The National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy was announced by the Canadian govern-
ment for a new fleet of naval and Coast Guard ships. It is now referred to as the National 
Shipbuilding Strategy.
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to consider roles ranging from new apprentices and Red Seals2 on the skilled 
trades side, as well as the engineering technicians, engineers, and other tradi-
tional professional roles on the design and innovation side. Add to that list the 
numerous operational, management, supervisory, business development, and 
project management roles that sustain these sectors and, finally, the research 
and observation roles that carve the academic anchors to the industry. In other 
words, just about every role that can conceivably be done in, on, or around our 
oceans. Perhaps because of this complexity, a robust national workforce strat-
egy has yet to be launched.
With so much opportunity, it was hoped, and perhaps expected, that re-
cruitment would present the lowest hurdle. But, for an industry that has been 
beset by disheartening cycles of boom and bust, repatriation of experienced 
workers from more stable or lucrative industries presented a daunting and im-
mediate challenge. Any optimism in the ease of recruitment was doused by the 
reality that the industry, lacking visibility and prominence, was simply not on 
the career radar of our next generation of workers.
The Marine People Partnership (mpp) was formed in 20143 to examine these 
workforce challenges, focusing research and program development on build-
ing national workforce pipelines for the future. What became evident early in 
the project was the critical role that ocean literacy and career literacy would 
play in both re-orienting experienced domestic talent towards marine careers, 
and in cultivating sustainable succession by attracting new young talent. mpp 
activities, with an eye on the future workforce, have focused primarily on the 
latter group. The principal query being, how to engage future workforce in an 
industry that is prolific and yet invisible?
A study of more than 14,000 youth across the province of Nova Scotia 
 challenged several prevailing assumptions, including that young people have 
(a) ample exposure to, (b) high levels of awareness of, (c) strong interest in, 
and (d) positive attitudes towards our oceans and their industries; all com-
mon prerequisites for career consideration.4 Surprisingly, the study found that 
youth in the region do not have much exposure to oceans. Indeed, during the 
2 The Interprovincial Red Seal Program was established to help harmonize training and certi-
fication requirements for skilled trades across Canada.
3 The Marine People Partnership was formed with support from Irving Shipbuilding as part of 
their value proposition commitment to strengthen the Canadian marine industry under the 
National Shipbuilding Strategy.
4 S. Scully, Student Intentions and Perceptions Study: Findings, Analysis and Recommendations 




pilot study conducted in Antigonish, Nova Scotia, a disproportionate number 
of students indicated that they had not visited the ocean in the past year, and 
most students could not recall the last time they had had an ocean encounter. 
Correspondingly, in the Primary to Grade 12 school system, few ocean concepts 
are included in the curriculum. Apart from an optional, non-academic science 
course offered in grade 11, there are limited opportunities to explore ocean sci-
ences in the public-school system. These findings underscore the point that 
our youth have had limited opportunities for planned or spontaneous learning 
about our oceans from the two most obvious channels to do so.
The study also revealed low levels of awareness of the myriad marine sectors 
and careers, many of them operating literally in the students’ backyards. Data 
from surveying more than 14,000 students indicated highest levels of aware-
ness for traditional marine careers such as the Navy (87 percent), shipbuilding 
(64 percent), and commercial fishing (75 percent), but little  awareness of  other 
newer, non-traditional ocean careers such as ocean robotics (32 percent), 
ocean technologist (35 percent), and marine fitter (underwater  welder—16 
percent). This data suggested that public understanding of what comprised 
the region’s marine industry had not progressed much beyond the turn of the 
century—the other century!
In a region surrounded by water, it is easy to assume that youth interest 
in oceans is both inherent and unavoidable. However, the study showed that 
only 13 percent of youth indicated they would be interested in a career in the 
marine industry. Even more disheartening were their explanations. Nearly 40 
percent of open-text responses conveyed apathy or lack of curiosity towards 
oceans. The responses included:
– Grade 7 male, “because I don’t have enough interest in the sea and stuff that 
has to do with that job”
– Grade 8 female, “I do not care about the ocean or anything that it inhabits. 
If jobs in the marine industry is all Nova Scotia has to offer, then I won’t be 
living here”
– Grade 7 female, “because I don’t have any interest in marine science”
Perhaps even more alarming was the 37 percent of youth who provided dispar-
aging or fearful responses:
– Grade 9 female, “fish are gross and I don’t care about whales”
– Grade 7 male, “because I hate fishing and getting dirty”
– Grade 6 male, “because I don’t like being around the water where it’s really 
cold”
– Grade 7 male, “because I don’t like water its spooky”
Such fear, apathy or disdain for a resource that should inspire inquisitiveness 
and adventure must give pause to those of us tasked with educating the next 
generation.
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Overall, open-text responses revealed that perceptions and intentions were 
subject to early bias formed from lack of information or misinformation:
– Grade 8 female, “because I am interested more in jobs that involve math and 
science”
– Grade 6 male, “because I would like to be an engineer when I grow up and I 
don’t really like marine jobs in general”
Not only did these responses express opinions that were misinformed, they 
demonstrated that perceptions of ocean careers among this cohort remain 
anchored to stereotypes of traditional, brawn-oriented versus contemporary, 
brains/high tech-oriented careers. A second 2017 study, with Indigenous youth 
from Mi’kmaq community schools found similar results, demonstrating that 
these biases, in addition to being formed early, are pervasive across regional 
cultures.5
In addition to lack of exposure, awareness, misinformation, and lack of 
curiosity-born interest, another surprising factor at play was the region’s ma-
rine heritage. A common assumption was that the region’s long history of 
marine activities would work to favor attitudes and interest. Heritage seemed 
to work counterintuitively, reinforcing negative and narrow stereotypes and 
assumptions, and denigrating ocean careers rather than legitimizing them. 
Some youth indicated that they were directly coached by parents to not pur-
sue ocean careers:
– Grade 9 male, “A large amount of my family has had a job related to the ma-
rine industry so I am aware that it would not be in my best interest to pursue 
one.”
This revealed additional hurdles: (1) negative narration and (2) parental influ-
ence. Both point to a stark need for ocean literacy and career literacy for youth 
and their parents.
Formal ocean education has typically focused on life science and eco-
logical concepts, as these present compelling and accessible curricular entry 
points. Ocean literacy is necessary to build awareness of other concepts and 
disciplines within the ocean domain, including marine engineering, technol-
ogy, ocean economics, and other career themes. Several marine sectors lend 
themselves to an integrated curriculum that can include concepts relating to 
engineering, ecology, economy, and sustainability, as well as culture and soci-
ety, and innovation and entrepreneurship. Where teachers themselves might 
not be well informed about regional ocean industries, several groups exist, like 
5 S. Scully and A. Naylor, Student Intentions and Perceptions Study: Mi’kmaq Schools. Report of 




mpp, OCEANS-NS, and Techsploration to provide the professional develop-
ment and resources to support teachers in delivering experiential instruction.
We also need to look to extracurricular activities and programs like those of-
fered through Nova Scotia Sea School to contribute to the ocean literacy offer-
ings with experiential and hands-on opportunities.6 A robust ocean education 
in school, coupled with extracurricular programs, can have expanded reach 
and impact, particularly to under-represented workers, including First Nations 
youth, females, new immigrants, and African Nova Scotians.
But a focus on ocean literacy in schools will only solve half of the prob-
lem. Studies have found that parents are the strongest influencers in young 
peoples’ career decisions. Their influence is irrefutable and constant, from 
extra- curricular choices, to course selection, to spontaneous experiences and 
conversations at home, and of course, to post-secondary and career pathways. 
As the adage goes, a little information can be a dangerous thing, and in this 
case, it may inform negative narration that explicitly or implicitly steers young 
people away from emerging and fascinating marine industries. Ocean literacy 
initiatives must be augmented to have a dual focus that includes parents to 
help them build awareness, overcome bias of traditional industries, dispel per-
ceptions of more privileged pathways, and to provide the endorsement that 
our young people need to consider an ocean career.
For some, interest and curiosity in the ocean is born from some exceptional 
experience that sparked a desire to know more. For some, their involvement in 
oceans has been serendipitous and uncalculated. Indeed, this has been true for 
many entrepreneurs in ocean technology and marine energy sectors who had 
a good idea that took off once applied to a marine environment. For others, it 
was the absence of direct experience that generated intrigue, letting imagina-
tion turn vicarious two-dimensional experiences into pivotal career deciding 
occurrences. This reminds us that the opportunity to engage youth does not 
require coastal access. Experiential learning is not reliant on ‘sand between 
the toes’. It requires ‘hands on’ and ‘heads on’ exploration that can occur in any 
classroom or region.
Perhaps the most disheartening finding from the study discussed here, was 
that so many youth were dismissing an entire industry of potential career op-
tions for themselves because of lack of awareness, misinformation, and bias. 
Opportunities to cultivate engagement and curiosity had gone unexploited. 
Ocean literacy coupled with career literacy can address these issues and build 
awareness of the ‘new’ ocean careers and pathways. It can highlight the in-
novative and high-tech reality of modern-day ocean careers, unite previously 
6 “Our Programs,” The Nova Scotia Sea School, http://www.seaschool.org/programs.
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polarized sentiments relating to ocean ecology and ocean economy, and le-
verage curiosity and cultivate it into passion. Marine careers aside, our youth 
simply need to be more informed about a key resource that covers 70 percent 
of the planet, of which less than 5 percent has been explored! Ocean industries 
generate C$4.5 billion for Eastern Canada’s regional economy,7 and provide 
approximately 35,000 jobs to families in the region.8 We owe it to our youth to 
give them an opportunity to understand this resource and this industry better, 
so that even if they choose not to explore a marine career—it will at least be 
an informed ‘no’.
7 Halifax Partnership, Halifax Investment Profile (2016).
8 “Halifax: Canada’s Ocean City,” Halifax Partnership, 2017, http://CanadasOceanCity.com.
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Towards Ocean Peace: Resolving Disputes 
Cooperatively and Empathetically  
through Negotiation
Nayha Acharya
Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
 Introduction
Oceans have immeasurable value. They are replete with natural resources and 
food sources; they enable transportation and recreation; they regulate earth’s 
climate. In sum, they make invaluable contributions to our physical, econom-
ic, and political well-being. And wherever there is something valuable, there 
are disputes over how that value should be maintained, grown, owned, and 
distributed. Internationally, disputes over maritime boundaries, access routes, 
drilling rights, and resource exploration are prolific. A sizeable bulk of inter-
national litigation is generated by ocean disputes. In the domestic context, 
disagreement among stakeholders as to environmental quality and pollution, 
natural resource management and conservation, geo-engineering, and ocean-
based research and technology, are just some arenas of ocean-related disputes. 
Given the inevitability of such conflicts, it is prudent to consider how we ought 
to resolve our disputes when they arise. In this essay, I offer some reflections on 
the utility of informal dispute resolution through cooperative negotiation as a 
means of resolving ocean-based disputes responsibly and peacefully.
I note at the outset, though, that formal processes of dispute resolution, that 
is adjudication through a court or tribunal, are necessary for effective gover-
nance.1 Formal processes produce binding outcomes and set legal precedents, 
their outcomes are public, and the procedural safeguards that characterize 
formal dispute resolution can help prevent abuses of natural justice and en-
sure the rule of law. Without formal dispute resolution mechanisms in place if 
needed, negotiated outcomes are less likely to be fair and equitable— absent 
any formal oversight, a more powerful party can easily force an  agreement 
1 Part xv of the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 
1982, 1833 u.n.t.s. 397 [unclos], contains complicated dispute resolution stipulations. It 
includes a formal, mandatory process for dispute resolution, while anticipating that states 
will pursue consensual, informal methods of disputes resolution, with an emphasis on diplo-
matic negotiation; see N. Klein, Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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upon a less powerful party. But the necessity for robust formal processes 
should not be taken to mean that they are the most preferable means of re-
solving disputes. Formal processes tend to be expensive, slow, adversarial and 
antagonistic. Moreover, they are limited in terms of remedies, because deci-
sions tend to be of an ‘all or nothing’ nature—one side will win and the other 
will lose. Resolving disputes through negotiations, on the other hand, offers 
faster decision-making, a more cooperative and empathetic process, and the 
possibility of jointly crafting creative win-win solutions. As such, the relation-
ships between parties to the dispute, be they international or domestic, have 
a better chance of remaining amicable, mutually beneficial, and peaceful for 
the long term.
 Theoretical Approaches to Negotiation
Negotiation strategies and their underlying theories can be divided into two 
categories: distributive models and cooperative models. Distributive models 
are sometimes referred to as competitive, positional, or adversarial. They are 
characterized by the idea that negotiation involves a fixed amount or benefit, 
so the more one side loses, the more the other gains. Given this basic assump-
tion, negotiators focus on getting the biggest piece of the pie. Negotiators may 
employ tactics and strategies including opening with a strong position that is 
likely higher than their estimate of what they can realistically achieve; they 
may give very small concessions to the other side; they may withhold certain 
key information. Such a negotiator may come across as tough, demanding, ad-
versarial, and perhaps unempathetic to the other party. That negotiator may 
seem ideal to her own constituents because of her commitment to maximiz-
ing her gains. But there are risks associated with this negotiation style: it may 
cause an early impasse and prevent a settlement, it may result in exploitive 
behaviour, or it may damage important relationships.
Cooperative negotiation, sometimes called integrative negotiation or problem- 
solving negotiation,2 is foundationally different. This model has become 
widely popular through Fisher and Ury’s classic best-seller Getting to Yes.3 In 
this model, negotiation involves parties seeking to cooperatively maximize 
joint gains. It encourages participants to move away from seeing negotiation 
as positional and competitive, and seeing it instead as interest-based and 
2 C. Menkel-Meadow, “Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem 
Solving,” ucla Law Review 32, no. 4 (1984): 754–832.
3 R. Fisher, W. Ury and B. Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1991).
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 cooperative. That is, parties should try to understand one another’s interests 
and brainstorm mutually beneficial solutions that are objectively advanta-
geous for everyone. That underlying approach to negotiation sets the stage for 
negotiators aiming to achieve principled outcomes rather than seeking to ‘win’ 
a negotiation.
One of the central features of integrative negotiation is that participants 
 focus on the interests at stake rather than the positions of the parties. Fisher 
and Ury provide a classic example to illustrate the difference between posi-
tions and interests: two sisters are fighting over a single orange. Ultimately, 
they decide that the best solution is to cut the orange in two with each receiv-
ing half. One sister then squeezes the orange for a juice and discards the peel. 
The other sister grates the peel for her baking and discards the pulp. Both sis-
ters took the position that they wanted, and were entitled to, the entire orange. 
But if they had discussed their interests in the orange, i.e., why they wanted 
the orange, both could have benefitted more—one sister could have had all 
the pulp, and the other could have had the entire peel. This simple example 
illustrates one of the central messages of cooperative negotiation: when we fo-
cus on interests instead of positions, we have a better chance at maximize the 
value of the resource being sought. This is sometimes referred to as ‘expanding 
the pie’. It is not difficult to imagine a similar, albeit very simplified, example in 
the ocean’s context: one state may be interested in sovereignty over waterways 
for political advantage, while another may prioritize its interest in resources. 
Understanding differences in the interests that underlie the party’s positions 
paves the way for creative, mutually beneficial solutions.
Uncovering interests is best achieved through an empathic probing into 
why a party takes a position, and determining what needs are being satisfied 
through that position. There are a variety of interests and associated needs. 
Naturally, economic needs are prevalent, but there are others. Some disputes 
involve process interests, where parties have a stake in ensuring that disagree-
ments are resolved in a manner they consider fair. This was the case during 
policy negotiations around the type of dispute resolution process that should 
be stipulated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (unclos). 
In some disputes, parties may have a special interest in preserving an ongoing 
relationship. This may be relevant in ocean-use agreements between neigh-
boring states, or disputes involving the federal government and aboriginal 
groups in a fishing related dispute, for example. Disputes may even involve 
personal interests, where a party needs to feel respected, or feels they must 
preserve their reputation. Some such personal interests may have cultural nu-
ances, which could be especially relevant in international ocean negotiations, 
so increasing one’s cultural intelligence can be a key part of achieving effective 
53�Resolving Disputes through Negotiation
<UN>
negotiation as well as maintaining positive relationships. Ultimately, coopera-
tive bargaining demands an astute awareness of the interests and needs of all 
parties, and views negotiation as an opportunity to create value through un-
covering interests that may be complementary to each other. The bottom line: 
the more effort we make to understand each other, the more likely we are to 
get to effective settlements.
To some, this may seem idealistic. The theory of cooperative negotiation 
has been criticized as being descriptively inaccurate because it downplays the 
prevalence and even the benefits of distributive bargaining.4 Critics suggest 
that no matter how much one ‘expands the pie’, eventually the pie must be 
divided up. Sometimes, negotiations simply come down to a zero-sum game 
in the sense that the more one party loses, the other party gains. For instance, 
in an ocean boundary dispute, one mile gained is one mile lost for the other 
side. In that context, critics ask, what is the place of cooperative bargaining? 
Would it not be beneficial to take a competitive stance and maximize one’s 
own gains?
It is undoubtable that settlement of disputes will involve some distributive 
elements.5 But proponents of cooperative negotiation would suggest that even 
in situations that are purely distributive in substance, parties do have at least 
one significant joint interest—an interest in resolving the difference quickly 
and amicably to settle the dispute and preserve the relationship between par-
ties, if possible. As such, the parties must cooperatively engage in a process 
that will enable a quick and fair solution. And although the substantive issue 
may be distributive in nature, competitive, hard bargaining is not the only pos-
sible process for resolving the dispute. Perhaps parties appoint a facilitator 
or mediator to assist in their negotiation. Or perhaps they appoint a jointly 
 acceptable arbitrator and agree to be bound by the decision. Such processes 
may satisfy both parties’ procedural and relational interests and can ensure 
that the ultimate distribution of value will be fair. So, even in distributive situ-
ations, parties can still benefit from committing to a cooperative relationship.
Moreover, cooperative negotiating does not imply over-accommodation, 
nor does it advocate for prioritizing opposing interests over one’s own. Part of 
the cooperative negotiator’s tool kit is to rely, and insist, on objective criteria 
to justify the positions and interests they have, and to assess the legitimacy of 
4 For a well-known debate, see J. White, “Pros and Cons of ‘Getting to Yes’” and R. Fisher, “Com-
ment on White’s Review,” Journal of Legal Education 34 (1984): 115.
5 See D. Lax and J. Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Com-




the position and interests that other parties have. Such objective criteria may 
include opinions of scientific experts, jointly or independently obtained data, 
or the likely outcome of a formal dispute resolution process. Adopting such ob-
jective criteria to explain and evaluate positions taken can help to maintain le-
gitimate outcomes, which may even include walking away from a negotiation.
The fundamental point is that when parties adopt a cooperative approach to 
negotiation, they commit to the values and ideals that inhere in that  model—
like empathic listening, mutual problem-solving, avoiding exploitation of par-
ties or resources, and obtaining objectively legitimate outcomes. Adopting 
those principles makes for strong and responsible settlement of conflicts. It 
would also be in line with the spirit of the unclos, which was “promoted by 
the desire to settle, in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation, all 
 issues relating to the law of the sea…”6
 Final Comment
Humanity owes its existence to the oceans. In grateful recognition of that, we 
should strive to ensure that when we quarrel over the ocean, we do so graceful-
ly and peacefully. This requires solid formal procedures in place for when dis-
putes break out, but it equally requires that we learn to manage our conflicts 
cooperatively. The theory of principled, cooperative negotiation offers useful 
guidance. It highlights the need for a clear awareness of the shared interests 
we have in our oceans. It demands that we are empathetic to those whose in-
terests may compete with our own. It calls on us to be imaginative and creative 
to maximize the oceans’ value for all of us without abusing it. Embracing these 
demands as we work to resolve conflicts would best enable us to make a neces-
sary promise to preserve our oceans and maintain pacem in maribus, peace in 
the oceans.7
6 unclos, supra note 1, preamble.
7 Pacem in Maribus is the title of the series of 34 conferences focused on peaceful use of the 




Looking Ahead: Ocean Governance Challenges  
in the Twenty-First Century
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Moira L. McConnell, Ian Porter, Susan J. Rolston, and  Peter G. Wells
International Ocean Institute-Canada, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
In her career, Elisabeth Mann Borgese provided an eloquent and enduring 
analysis of ocean governance. This collection of over eighty essays endeavors 
to honor, update, and advance her exceptional contributions. The contents 
of this book also reflect, to a considerable extent, substantial elements of the 
International Ocean Institute’s long-standing training programs which she 
initiated. In this final chapter, we offer a synthesis of the essays, highlighting 
some of the most significant future challenges of ocean governance and, by 
implication, capacity development.
Our approach involves two basic steps. First, we identify major present-day 
pressures, problems, and concerns that are raised repeatedly in this book and 
link these concerns to fundamental and persisting ocean governance themes, 
originally highlighted by Elisabeth Mann Borgese. Chief among these are the 
progressive development of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (unclos); sustainable development of renewable and non-renewable 
ocean resources; conservation and protection of the marine environment; 
maritime security and transportation; enhancement of marine science and 
technologies; and addressing the interrelated problems of ocean space as a 
whole and their interactions.1 Finally, we point to key questions, challenges, and 
opportunities that are likely to confront practitioners of ocean governance and 
the development of capacity over the coming decades of the twenty-first century.
When considered in their entirety, the essays in this book reveal a significant 
number of overarching and frequently mentioned concerns with ocean 
governance, the marine environment, and human use and impacts on the 
ocean. We suggest that they fit broadly into four major categories:
1. The first category includes major environmental problems and popu-
lation pressures. As many scientific studies have clearly demonstrated, 
marine environments and ecosystems have been threatened for years 
1 E. Mann Borgese, Ocean Governance and the United Nations (Halifax: Centre for Foreign 
 
Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Revised Edition, August 1995), see p. 231, Article 20.
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and are facing daunting pressures from climate change, overfishing, 
and seemingly relentless urbanization and population growth in coastal 
areas.
2. The second category deals with institutional responses to these prob-
lems and pressures. The emergence of modern regimes of ocean gover-
nance and multi-faceted responsibilities since the implementation of 
unclos—a multilateral treaty advanced and emphatically supported 
by Elisabeth Mann Borgese—led to great advances in ocean governance. 
However, major challenges remain, particularly in seeking its effective 
implementation in a globalized world.
3. The third category includes modern technology, as almost all uses of the 
ocean and ocean-related knowledge generation depend on it. Technology 
can cause many problems, but it can also be a positive force considering 
the almost ubiquitous reach of communications and advances in marine 
navigation, safety, and ocean observation capabilities. The challenge is to 
maximize the benefits and minimize the problems.
4. The subject matter of the fourth category relates to the principle of re-
sponsible governance itself. Past failures in ocean governance, exempli-
fied by several high-profile fishery collapses, led to increasing attention 
to participatory approaches and the broad involvement of coastal com-
munities, and civil society as a whole. Achieving the right level of such 
engagement remains a challenge in many countries and within many 
 regional and global bodies.
Below, we provide a synthesis of the interrelated environmental, institutional, 
technological and societal issues that have a significant bearing on the future 
of ocean governance and, by extension, on the development of our capacity to 
advance its responsible application.
 What Are the Major Environmental Problems and Pressures 
Facing the Ocean Today?
The most significant pressure and impact on the marine environment over 
the coming decades will be exerted by an ever-expanding human popula-
tion from currently 7.5 billion people to an estimated 11 billion by the end of 
this century. Fundamental reforms in human society are needed if we are to 
shift the current trajectory based on outdated political and economic systems 
toward a future guided by the principles of a sustainable ecological civiliza-
tion. Problems will be amplified by the fact that major population centers and 
 related infrastructure will be further concentrated along coastal areas exposed 
to sea level rise in an age of global climate change. The science-related essays 
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in this volume have identified some of the challenges facing the oceans and 
how  leading-edge research, aided by rapid technological advances, can address 
them.  Understanding ocean health and regular state-of-the-ocean report-
ing through global ocean assessments are critical to policy formulation and 
decision- making for effective ocean governance. As the UN World Ocean As-
sessment Report for 2016 has shown, the value of science and communication 
for pinpointing the most pressing environmental problems is enormous.2
Climate change generates major pressures on ocean ecosystems with signif-
icant effects on marine biodiversity. It results in changing water temperatures, 
sea level rise, loss of polar (Arctic and Antarctic) ice cover, increased acidifica-
tion, stronger storms, and enhanced coastal erosion, amongst other impacts. 
This exacerbates the effects of many ocean uses. In particular, fisheries and 
aquaculture (especially small-scale) contribute greatly to food security in 
many nations. Some fisheries severely impact marine habitats and both target 
species and non-target bycatch species to the point where fishing is now rec-
ognized as the dominant and enduring driver of ecological change. Scientific 
studies have recognized other pressures as well. The ocean is too often a dump-
ing ground, with increasing levels of persistent and bio-accumulative chemical 
contaminants, excessive nutrients, plastics and microplastics.  Undersea noise 
from ships and industry is an increasing concern, as are deep-sea mining, and 
offshore wind farms. Coastal ecosystems will likely degrade further due to the 
cumulative effects of such pressures, unless more regulations are enacted and 
enforced under national legislation of coastal states and under established 
international law. Despite some progress, the human footprint remains huge, 
costly, and often permanent.
On the positive side, monitoring the state of the ocean using innovative 
tools and ecological indicators has added greatly to our knowledge of this 
footprint. Much of our knowledge of the above problems is gained through 
rapid advances in ocean technologies, such as tracking species of interest by 
satellite and applying genomics in marine ecotoxicology and aquaculture. 
Complementing the efforts of governments, educational institutes, and non-
governmental organizations, such monitoring activities should engage all 
parts of society,  allowing citizen science to play an increasingly vital role to 
observe and measure physical, chemical, biological, as well as ecological as-
pects of ocean health and coastal habitats. Notably, local communities world-
wide can be involved in both monitoring and action to improve marine and 
coastal environments, as well as in the oversight of marine protected areas and 




 marine spatial  planning processes, integrated coastal management, ocean as-
sessments, and marine problem resolution.
As more people live in coastal cities and on remote islands, recognizing the 
threats and benefits of the ocean related to public health and well-being will 
become a major imperative for marine environmental protection. In this cen-
tury, the ocean sciences, health professions, ocean technology, and citizen sci-
ence will increasingly be inter-connected and linked to the practice of ocean 
governance at all levels.
 Are Current Institutional Arrangements and Principles Robust 
Enough to Deal with Future Ocean Governance Challenges?
As Elisabeth Mann Borgese advocated, the ocean has been a focal point for 
achieving improved global governance. A pragmatist, she understood the im-
portance of compromise and the incremental pace of change with so many 
interests, institutions, and issues involved. It is positive news, therefore, that 
the international community has ‘edged forward’ in developing and integrat-
ing ocean governance principles in the legal order and related institutional 
arrangements, transcending the traditional concept of sovereignty. The pro-
gressive development and implementation of unclos provides a framework 
for examining ocean governance institutional arrangements and actions at the 
local, national, regional, and global levels—confirming the ‘commons’ nature 
of the ocean and its resources.
Despite decades of progress, numerous issues remain inadequately ad-
dressed or are only slowly emerging in the ocean governance system. Examples 
include climate change and the ocean, the protection of marine biodiversity 
in areas beyond national jurisdiction,  integrated bioregional coastal and ma-
rine spatial planning, and the Arctic regimes. Ocean renewable energy and 
offshore aquaculture hold great promise for addressing human  security needs 
but will require appropriate governance. Addressing the situation of coastal 
communities and small island developing states in the face of  climate change-
related events is a priority. Exploitation of the mineral resources of the deep 
seabed will trigger disputes involving states,  contractors, and the Interna-
tional Seabed Authority. Conflicting maritime boundaries and long-standing 
disputes, for example in the South China Sea, remain unresolved. Continuing 
problems such as piracy and the waves of human migration by sea illustrate 




There remains the imperative of applying the principle of common heritage 
in ocean management measures. A vehicle for this is Agenda 2030’s  Sustainable 
Development Goal 14 (sdg 14), “Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas 
and marine resources for sustainable development.” sdg 14 explicitly recog-
nizes the importance of oceans, and its related targets reaffirm the objective 
of implementing international law as reflected in unclos. At the same time, a 
key requirement is to link together the sdgs, so that Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s 
vision of the oceans as a means to improve social and economic justice is re-
flected in how sdg 14 connects to other sdgs on poverty reduction and food 
security, for example.
The ongoing challenge is to overcome the fragmented governance of the 
global ocean that has emerged. The rule of law (or rules-based order) is vital 
to the future stability of ocean governance. Legal institutions established un-
der unclos, such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, have 
helped to ensure effective dispute resolution and establishment of maritime 
boundaries. Key ocean governance issues for maritime transportation have 
been addressed through a more proactive International Maritime Organi-
zation (imo) resulting in, for example, emission control areas and the 2004 
Ballast Water Management Convention. The shipping industry has actively 
engaged in developing the necessary common environmental and security 
governance systems through entities such as the Global Maritime Forum and 
the imo.
Achieving security on the ocean and along its coasts will require the adop-
tion of a ‘comprehensive human security’ approach to governance. Improv-
ing enforcement and compliance, particularly on the high seas, will require 
inter-sectoral cooperation among governance bodies. The continuing struggle 
to implement modern management principles such as the precautionary ap-
proach in decision-making and the ecosystem approach affects sustainability 
of the broader marine ecosystem. Going forward, a coherent and integrated 
governance framework will be essential to achieving pacem in maribus.
The necessary conditions for responsible ocean governance go beyond legal 
and institutional arrangements and policies, although these are fundamental. 
Ethics and shared values are essential tools for the conduct of decision- making. 
Responsible governance requires the use of the best scientific knowledge, in-
cluding information from Indigenous knowledge systems, to improve our 
 understanding of ocean systems and to meet our responsibilities to all living 
beings and generations yet to come. Human capacity development, knowledge 
transfer, and enhanced public awareness are essential to broaden participa-
tion in governance institutions at all levels. Technological advancements and 
Looking Ahead538
<UN>
 innovation are further avenues to strengthen institutional arrangements for 
ocean governance and enhance cooperation among stakeholders.
 What Are the Technological Challenges and Opportunities?
Applications of science and technology are expanding in many marine do-
mains, becoming essential information infrastructure elements for society 
and the individual. They manifest themselves daily in the spread of Internet 
connectivity, more detailed marine environmental forecasts, transportation 
efficiency, and renewable and non-renewable resource exploitation capabili-
ties. Moreover, the spread of Internet connectivity offers opportunities for in-
creasing the scope and range of capacity development and training and for 
transcending gender barriers.
Widespread and timely access to data and information will be key to enhanc-
ing ocean governance. Information gathering and sharing via geospatial data 
infrastructures will be essential not only for synoptic marine- environmental 
observation, state-of-the-ocean reporting, and more detailed exploration of 
ocean space, but also for ensuring safety and security for the growing number 
of marine operators and improving fisheries management practices. Designing 
data and information products for the purpose of decision-making and compli-
ance monitoring will require good coordination among technology providers 
and users. Given the high stakes and far-reaching outcomes, they will also need 
political will, governance structures, and effective institutional environments. 
Cybersecurity will likely present critical challenges for marine operators; gps 
and ‘Internet of Things’ hacking are key vulnerabilities for which technological 
solutions are still needed. In maritime transportation, blockchain technology 
and cryptocurrencies will alter global trade transactions. The adoption of au-
tonomous shipping will be likely a niche opportunity for the industry, but this 
may change over the long term.
Spurred on by Agenda 21, Rio+20 and Agenda 2030, recognition of the so-
cietal benefits of the ocean has grown immensely, as they provide essential 
value to human beings, entire industries, nations, and indeed the world. How-
ever, although the reach of technology in this digital age is pervasive, the ben-
efits are not universal, their distribution is not equal, and they come at a price, 
presenting ongoing and increasing challenges for governance. In the future, 
broad-based and equitable access to the benefits of technologies will be even 
more important. Digital technologies can offer many opportunities; they play 
a supporting, even transformative, role in bridging the scientific and techno-
logical knowledge gap between developed and developing economies and 
governance systems. As a case in point, the development and deployment of 
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 underwater robotics and space-based observation and navigation technologies 
may be the domain of relatively few actors, but use of and benefit from these 
systems can be  realized by multiple stakeholders and broad-based communi-
ties of practice. The reach of technology will become even more pervasive, not 
only in spatial–temporal terms concerning frequent global and site-specific 
monitoring, but  importantly in terms of the proliferation of users—witness 
the development of two-way data mapping platforms for participatory geo-
graphic information systems to facilitate collaboration and communication 
among governments and citizens.
It remains unclear what the evolving technology situation will be. The 
shipping industry, among other ocean industries, needs transition time to 
incorporate new technologies. Transition time is also needed to protect ex-
isting investments. The adoption of autonomous shipping, robotics for un-
derwater observations and drones is already presenting opportunities for 
ocean industries, which will require new infrastructure to transfer large vol-
umes of data. Over the long term, increasing technological capacity will 
broaden the scope of how we monitor and utilize the ocean; it may even 
transform how humans relate to and interact with ocean space. Will tech-
nology resolve the mysteries of the deep sea? Likely not, but within the con-
fines of good ocean governance and adequate capacity development, it can 
illuminate them and should help to better protect and preserve the marine 
environment.
 Who Will Shape the Future of Ocean Governance?
Addressing all of the above challenges is no simple task. Ocean governance can 
be a ‘wicked problem’, demanding a transdisciplinary perspective and embrac-
ing holistic and innovative approaches to understanding problems and  finding 
solutions. Fortunately, there is—around the world—an ‘ocean community’ 
with the passion and ideas to take on the challenge, based on a commitment 
to the principle of the ocean as our common heritage and to the rule of law. 
The ocean community is itself made up of coastal communities, with their col-
lective desire to maintain healthy and productive ocean environments close to 
home, as well as ocean users dependent on and making a living from the sea. 
The ocean community also includes a diverse range of actors—researchers, 
educators, practitioners, managers, and the public—covering many research 
areas, professions, vocations, cultures, and interests. There are also all the re-
lated  governance institutions, funding agencies, and civil society organizations 




All of this complexity and diversity can create obstacles to as well as opportu-
nities for effective cooperation. But ultimately, we have confidence in the col-
lective action of people, their communities, and their institutions, to make the 
difference. There is no end to what can be achieved by a motivated coastal 
community, or a motivated nation.
Effective ocean governance at all levels, from the local to the global, requires 
identifying and agreeing upon priorities and goals. Globally, international 
agreements and institutions, based on unclos, are effective when they have 
support and advocacy from the diverse ocean community. Nationally, govern-
ments can, through determined political will, take the leadership needed to meet 
national commitments and targets.
These global and national initiatives draw strength and support from the 
ocean community—those engaged in ocean concerns worldwide. As the chal-
lenges of ocean governance continue to grow, so too can the strength and sup-
port of the ocean community—through engaging more people, more coastal 
communities, and more institutions. In order to develop this capacity, effec-
tive communication, networking, and partnerships are needed. On the one 
hand, effective communication needs clear expression of goals and alterna-
tives, and skillful storytelling by everyone in the ocean community—scientists, 
educators, Indigenous peoples, coastal residents, advocates and more. On the 
other hand, networking and partnerships build engagement and  strengthen 
the ocean community. This comes through participatory governance—
whether local, national, regional, or global—that is rooted in shared values 
that embrace human rights and gender equity. Such governance benefits 
from up-to-date connections of people and institutions, to identify and take 
advantage of opportunities, and to deal with threats. Particularly important 
are partnerships with, and learning from, Indigenous communities and orga-
nizations, which bring traditional knowledge, as well as proven approaches, to 
sustainability.
A final point, as we work to improve future ocean governance, is to keep in 
mind those who are most vulnerable among coastal residents and ocean users. 
This was, for Elisabeth Mann Borgese, a crucial imperative. The implication 
is that the impacts of ocean governance innovations must be  carefully 
examined. In seeking to broaden the ocean community, there is a need to 
engage and empower the vulnerable, so that they, too, have the  capacity to 
play their role in shaping the future of ocean governance. The  complexity and 
the global scale of ocean issues and conflicts are causes for humility. We live 
in an uncertain world, so there is no obvious path to success. There is, instead, 
a need to be adaptive and flexible, to cope with upcoming events and crises 
that we cannot predict. This will be a challenging way forward, but one that 
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the ocean community will undertake together to forge the future of ocean 
governance.
 Looking Ahead
Looking ahead, there are numerous uncertainties in dealing with the multi-
tude of challenges facing the ocean and advocacy for comprehensive security, 
sustainable development, and respect and dignity of marine and human life. 
Major pitfalls lie in further fragmentation of ocean governance, losing sight 
of the guiding principles of responsible governance, and weakening the con-
cepts of common heritage and environmental stewardship of ocean space. 
The ocean community would do well to remind itself of the advice offered by 
 Elisabeth Mann Borgese:
A vision of the future is our best defense. ... The disintegrative forces 
are powerful. But so are the integrative forces. Analyzing them, utilizing 
them, building on what they have already achieved, trying to contribute 
to a vision of the future ....3
These are tasks that we have to focus on. As an integrative force, the innova-
tions she initiated toward developing the necessary capacity, including pro-
fessional training, continuous knowledge exchange, and learning about the 
ocean, are in themselves essential conduits for building a successful future of 
ocean governance.




2030 Agenda for Sustainable Develop-
ment 76, 123, 280
“The future we want” 41, 122, 154–155, 171
Sustainable Development Goals 14, 
23–24, 59, 106–107, 123, 171, 206–207, 
225, 280, 377–378, 536–537
accountability 55–56, 270, 280, 314, 336, 362, 
371, 470–472
 See also governance principles and 
approaches
adaptive management 118, 121–222
 See also governance
Agenda 21 2–3, 7, 41, 121–122, 262, 368
























areas beyond national jurisdiction 361, 536
biodiversity conservation 12–14, 76, 
117–118, 145–155, 307–308, 536
governance principles 13–14, 117–118, 
128–133, 144, 145–150, 249–250, 383–384
benefit sharing 13–14, 148, 154
international legal regime 12–14, 76, 117, 
145–146, 151–155, 249, 307, 383
management tools 13, 154, 360
area-based conservation measures  
148, 150
marine protected areas 148, 152–154, 
250, 286, 291, 307–308, 365 
See also continental shelf, extended; high 
seas
arbitration 182–183 
See also dispute resolution; International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
archipelagic waters 422
Arctic:
and climate change 229–230, 484–485




governance 176–180, 477, 487–489, 536










Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 488
Arctic Ocean 229–230, 485
arms control and disarmament 411 
See also maritime security
artisanal fisheries See fisheries,  
small-scale
assessment See environmental impact as-
sessment; marine resource management, 
stock assessment; ocean assessment; risk 
management, assessment; strategic envi-
ronmental assessment
Atlantic Ocean 229–230, 403







international legal regime 458–459, 
479–483 




See also maritime boundaries
Bay of Fundy 388, 390–393, 404
Beaufort Sea 166, 403
Benguela Current Large Marine 
Ecosystem 226
biodiversity 234–241, 246–247, 248
conservation 61–62, 125, 152–154, 207, 
287, 291, 294–295, 340–341, 363–365
areas beyond national jurisdiction  
12–14, 76, 117–118, 145–155, 307–308,  
536
international legal regime 12–14, 76, 117–
118, 125, 145–148, 151–155, 171, 287–288
biogeochemical processes 221–223
biogeographic classification systems  
152–154, 251
Blue Economy 102, 207, 269, 273–274, 
319–320, 482, 527 
See also ocean economics
blue energy See ocean renewable energy
Borgese, Elisabeth Mann 1, 4, 6–16, 35, 40, 
64–65, 68–69, 71–72, 79, 83, 86, 106, 
114–117, 130–133, 180, 190–191, 216–217, 
220, 226, 232, 260–262, 274, 285, 
324–326, 386–387, 408–409, 413, 442, 
448–450, 454, 496, 533, 541
and G. A. Borgese 504
and Thomas Mann 504




personal tributes 46, 59, 85, 87–88, 93, 
175–176, 416–417, 468, 503–506, 508
The Oceanic Circle 12, 78, 142, 190–191, 518 
See also Center for the Study of Demo-
cratic Institutions; Committee to Frame a 
World Constitution
boundary delimitation See maritime 
boundaries
bycatch See fisheries, incidental captures
Canada 13, 140, 431, 527
Aboriginal rights 42, 47–48, 51




and St. Pierre and Miquelon 165
Arctic governance 166, 177–180,  
403, 488
Hans Island 176n2
Northwest Passage 176n2, 178, 
484–486
cabotage policy 452–453
Committee on the Status of  
Endangered Wildlife in Canada 
(COSEWIC) 295
extended continental shelf 177–180
First Nations 42, 46–51, 270, 525
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) 41–
43, 46–49, 334–335, 504, 516
ESSIM Initiative 43
Oceans Strategy 42




marine living resources management 29, 
334–337
marine protected areas 250




Energy Safety and Security Act 399
Fisheries Act 41–44, 294–295
Oceans Act 41–43, 294–295, 307, 
319–320
Species at Risk Act 294–295,  
395
National Shipbuilding Procurement 
Strategy 522–523





Ocean Management Research 
Network 32
ocean renewable energy 388–393





capacity development See education and 
training
carbon sequestration 169, 173–174, 227–228, 
305, 308, 319 
See also ocean fertilization
CCAMLR See Commission for the Conserva-
tion of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
Center for the Study of Democratic 
Institutions 77 
See also Borgese, Elisabeth Mann
China, People’s Republic 13–14, 154, 374, 418, 
451–452, 519
and the Arctic 178–179, 486
Belt and Road Initiative 63–64, 460
ecological civilization 7, 60–65
ocean policy 60–65
South China Sea activities 61, 63, 419
civil society See coastal communities; gover-












international legal regime 169–174, 
316




physical evidence 102–103, 169, 194, 232, 
248, 316–319, 534–535
extreme weather events 199–200, 
203, 313–314, 316
greenhouse gas emissions 170–171, 
318–319, 376
ocean acidification 169, 171, 194, 203, 
228–230, 248
sea ice 229–230, 484–485
sea water temperature 169, 200, 203, 
241–242 
See also sea level rise
Club of Rome 79
CO2 sequestration See carbon sequestration
coast guards 414, 429–430, 433, 477 
See also maritime security
coastal and marine spatial planning See 
marine spatial planning
coastal communities 31–32, 109, 121, 
205–206, 211, 254–255, 272, 317–318, 
349–350, 380, 389, 391–393, 431–432, 
434–441, 534–536, 539
coastal erosion 93, 194, 238, 316–317, 438
coastal management:
and climate change 103, 438
and human health 199–204
competing uses 54, 102, 266, 268–270, 
291, 377, 391–393






integrated 42, 54, 117, 122, 124–125, 
172, 260–267, 269, 320
participatory 263–264, 270, 272–273
infrastructure (built) 93, 199, 241, 312, 
316–317
population growth/density 3, 103, 196, 
199, 401, 437–438, 439, 533–534
urbanization 199–200, 260, 437–438, 533 
See also flooding; governance; marine 
spatial planning
coastal state rights See sovereign rights
cod fisheries 24, 30, 197, 325
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisher-
ies 123–124, 368 
See also Food and Agricultural Organiza-
tion of the United Nations




Commission for the Conservation of Antarc-
tic Marine Living Resources 172,  
 307–308, 354
Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf 133, 136, 161, 177, 185
Scientific and Technical Guidelines 157
Committee to Frame a World 
Constitution 77 
See also Borgese, Elisabeth Mann
common heritage doctrine 1, 9, 11–12,  
34–39, 64–65, 77–78, 87, 107, 109, 116, 
129–133, 136–137, 142–150, 154, 308, 536, 
539, 541 
See also governance principles and 
approaches
common property 77, 144, 146, 250, 307
communication systems See information and 
communications technology
conservation:
biodiversity 12–14, 61–62, 76, 117–118, 
125, 152–154, 207, 287, 291, 294–295, 
307–308, 340–341, 363–365, 536




See also maritime boundaries
continental shelf 240–241
extended 133–136, 157, 177–180, 185
coastal state payments or contribu-
tions 134, 136–141
international legal regime 133–141, 157, 
161, 177, 185, 419 
See also areas beyond national jurisdic-
tion; maritime boundaries
Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner 
Conferences 454
Convention on Biological Diversity 124–125, 
153, 243
Aichi Biodiversity Targets 152, 171, 
287–288
areas beyond national jurisdiction  
152–154
ecologically or biologically significant 
areas 152–154, 291
Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 125
Convention on the Continental Shelf 134–
135, 163
Convention on the International Regulations 
for Preventing Collisions at Sea See Colli-
sion Avoidance Regulations (COLREGS)
Convention on the Law of the Sea See United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pol-
lution by Dumping of Wastes and Other 
Matter 124, 173
Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees 427–428, 429
coral (reefs) 169, 171, 227, 239–240, 242, 244, 
246–247, 250
corporate social responsibility 312, 344, 346
crab fisheries 515–516
crabs 206, 227–228
cruise ships 477, 485, 486, 515–516 
See also tourism
cyberspace 216, 218–219
cybersecurity 4, 216, 493–494, 538
See also information and communications 
technology
Cyprus 448, 453
Dalhousie University 1, 21, 55, 275, 507
Ocean Tracking Network 207–212




developing countries 3, 10, 14, 63–64, 154, 
225–226, 231, 349, 365, 374, 402, 444, 538
and International Seabed Area 128–129, 
132–133, 139–141
and shipping 448–455, 457, 460–461, 480
capacity development 3–4, 11, 13–14, 75, 
78, 80, 90–91, 108 
See also small island developing states
digital technology See information and com-
munications technology
disaster management See emergency pre-
paredness and response
disasters (environmental) See marine pollu-
tion, oil spills; maritime safety, accidents
disasters (natural) See flooding; storm surges; 
tsunamis






international legal regime 133, 136, 161, 
177, 181–185, 532 
See also arbitration; International Court of 
Justice; International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea
dolphins 302, 344–345 
See also marine mammals
Earth Island Institute 344
Earth Summit See UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (1992); 
UN Conference on Sustainable Develop-
ment (Rio+20) (2012); World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (2002)
ecological change 232–237, 535
ecological civilization 7, 60–65, 534
ecological economics 303–308
ecological integrity 146–148, 171, 261, 265, 
305–306, 310
ecologically or biologically significant  
areas 152–154, 291
economic and social justice 24, 115–116, 
128–129, 131–133, 307–308, 346–347, 403, 
470, 537, 540 
See also equity; world order
economic security 107–108, 347, 349–350, 
408–409, 448
ecosystem approach 14, 109, 117–118,  
120, 122–127, 195, 221–226, 243–244, 
266–268, 274, 326, 338–343, 362–366, 
537
international legal regime 125, 215–216
regional/national implementation  
224–215, 320 
See also governance principles and 
approaches
ecosystem approach to fisheries manage-
ment See marine resource management, 
governance: ecosystem-based
ecosystem/ecological services 195, 207, 
221–223, 238–241, 246, 250–251, 269, 
274, 287, 305, 311





coastal marine 108, 238–243, 535
continental shelf 240–241
coral 169, 171, 239–240, 246–247
deep sea 233–234, 245–247, 249–250
hydrothermal vents and seeps 246, 247, 
249–250
large marine (LMEs) 43, 220–223, 226
mangroves 238
marine 108, 232–235





vulnerable marine (VMEs) 92, 171, 249, 
341, 362
education and training:
alumni networks 83–85, 90–92, 112
capacity development 1–4, 11, 13–14, 
54–55, 68–70, 72–76, 78, 80–85, 
89–93, 100–101, 104–105, 108–112, 148, 








simulations and scenario-based learn-
ing 69, 82–83, 91, 94–99
web-based 74–75, 82, 91–92, 97–98, 
108, 111
curriculum development 74–75, 80–83, 
90–91, 104–105, 111–112, 514–516
marine affairs professions 74–75
massive open online courses 82
professional development 54–55, 
69–70, 74–75, 80, 84–85, 90–91, 97, 111, 
525–526, 541
science translation 56, 279, 514, 520
See also ocean literacy
EEZ See exclusive economic zone
El Niño/La Niña 214
emergency preparedness and response 63, 
109, 431–441, 473–478








See also search and rescue
endangered species See species at risk
environmental impact assessment 13, 152, 
154, 206, 396 
See also strategic environmental 
assessment
environmental governance See governance, 
environmental
environmental protection See marine envi-
ronmental protection
environmental risk assessment See risk man-
agement, assessment
equity 1, 3–4, 24, 124, 142, 149, 163–164, 
303–305, 338, 351, 540
intra-generational 120–121, 261
inter-generational 120–121, 261 
See also economic and social justice
ethics 7, 34–39, 81–82, 89–90, 444 
See also governance
Europe 388, 391
European Union 13, 14, 19–20, 318
fisheries conservation and manage-
ment 339, 341–342, 357–358
migrations by sea 426–427, 429–430
exclusive economic zone 1, 136, 286, 291, 380
and information gathering 418–420
international legal regime 136, 418–420 
See also maritime boundaries
extreme events See flooding; storm surges; 
tsunamis
FAO See Food and Agricultural Organization 
of the United Nations
federalism 167, 404
Federated States of Micronesia 254–255
Fiji 318, 369–372
Finland 482
fish See by individual species














incidental captures 233, 363, 405
migratory stocks 362
sedentary species 233






See also by individual species; marine 
resource management
fishery data:
catch statistics 223, 232–233, 349, 
367–368, 370–371, 373




 See also marine resource management
fishmeal industry 136
flag states 359, 451–452, 454–455, 466, 482
flag state jurisdiction 185–186, 469
open registers 448, 462–463
under international law 186, 356–357, 
470–472 
See also ship registration
flags of convenience See flag states, open reg-
isters; ship registration, open registers
flooding 62, 93, 199–200, 312, 316–317 
See also coastal management
Food and Agricultural Organization of the 
United Nations 18, 354–355
IPOA-IUU 356
Port State Measures Agreement 356
Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries Guide-
lines 24, 32–33, 326, 348, 351, 353
Voluntary Guidelines for Flag State Perfor-
mance 357, 359 










freedom of the seas doctrine 9, 143–144, 
148–149
and duty of due regard 147
marine scientific research 131–132, 
418–420
navigation 419
gamification See education and training, cur-
ricula delivery methodology
gender 436–441, 443, 538, 540
genetic resources 12, 150
international legal regime 13, 154 
See also marine biotechnology
geoengineering 124–125, 173–174 
See also ocean fertilization
geographic information system 82, 97–98, 
160–161, 270–271, 284 
See also remote sensing









Global Ocean Forum, ROCA Initiative  
318–320
Global Ocean Observing System 210, 217
Ocean Tracking Network 207–212 
See Intergovernmental Oceanographic 
Commission
globalization 3, 11, 448–449, 456
governance:
and climate change 3–4, 13, 63, 102–104, 
169–174, 364–365, 438
and communications technology 4, 57, 
161, 255–256, 275, 277–281, 285, 314–315, 
406, 497, 518–521, 534, 538–539
and Indigenous peoples 42, 46–52, 
333–337, 403
and NGOs 7, 31–32, 53–58, 279, 345
and science 3–4, 7, 13–14, 23–24, 30–31, 
49–52, 56, 74, 110, 131, 145, 153–154, 169, 
171–172, 191, 195–196, 211–212, 215, 214–
226, 235–237, 251–257, 266, 269, 273, 
275–285, 327–332, 352–353, 363–364, 
391–392, 396–397, 414, 514–516, 520, 
534–537
and values 28–34, 50–51, 336, 352–353, 
537, 540
and ‘wicked’ problems 7, 23–24, 26, 
196–197, 539
definition 2, 6–7, 34–35, 73, 115
disaster response 431–435
environmental 89, 147, 149, 192–193, 
195–196, 206–207, 217–219, 250–251, 
275–280, 311–312, 319–321, 438
federalism 167, 404
fisheries 24–25, 27, 32–33, 47–52, 120, 
123–126, 178–179, 135, 307, 325–326, 
334–337, 351–366, 368–372
ocean 1–4, 7–8, 71–73, 79, 86–87, 100, 
109–112, 114, 117–133, 142–155, 250–251, 
325–326, 383–384, 450, 468, 487–489, 
533–541
definition 2, 28, 73, 80–81
polar regions 176–180, 477, 487–489, 536
rule of law 411–412, 425, 537, 539
See also adaptive management; coastal 
management; ethics; marine resource 
management; marine spatial planning; 
ocean management
 See also under individual conventions
governance principles and  approaches 14, 
24, 34, 44–45, 106–109, 117–127, 142–151, 
413–414, 472, 534, 537, 539–541
benefit sharing 13–14, 148, 154, 450–452
collaborative 3, 21–22, 110, 125–126, 198, 
235, 251, 256–257, 270, 272–273, 306, 
312–314, 321, 353, 413–415, 433, 480–481, 
483, 487–489, 539
co-governance 51–52, 333, 353
co-management 28–30, 42, 44, 260, 330, 
333–337
comprehensive security 409, 413–415, 
422, 537, 541
fragmentation 16, 17–22, 74, 89, 148, 
169–174, 176–177, 197, 537, 541
integrated 7, 11–13, 16, 25, 54, 59, 117–118, 
120, 122, 124–125, 142–150, 172, 223, 243, 








interdisciplinary 3, 11, 21, 26, 41, 45, 54, 
273, 409
land-based 71, 74
large marine ecosystem 43, 220–226
legitimacy 277, 333–337, 340, 353, 472
market-based 344–348, 355
multidisciplinary 74–75, 122, 226, 280
participatory 7, 13–14, 24–25, 28–33, 
40–45, 53–58, 75, 110–111, 117, 121, 148, 
252–257, 265–270, 272–273, 279–280, 
313–314, 340, 351, 353–354, 391–392, 518, 
520–521, 534, 537, 539–540
public engagement 7, 24, 29, 42, 
53–54, 57, 90, 97, 109–111, 169, 254–257, 
268–270, 278–280, 314, 358, 360, 
403–404, 406, 478, 507, 510, 515–516, 
520–521, 525–527, 534, 536–537, 539, 
540
partnerships 217, 273–274, 313–314, 341, 
354, 480–481
regional cooperation 44, 125, 176–180, 
273, 291, 357–359, 361–365, 369, 
426–427, 429–430, 465, 477, 480–481
transboundary diagnostic 
analysis 225–226
transdisciplinary 25–27, 352, 539 
See also accountability; common heritage 
doctrine; ecosystem approach; ocean 
management; polluter pays principle; pre-
cautionary principle; preventive principle; 
subsidiarity; transparency
Greece 451
greenhouse gas emissions See climate change, 




Group of 77 154, 450
Group of Seven (G7) 217
Gulf of Guinea 421–422, 425
Gulf of Maine 166
Gulf of Mexico 459–460
Gulf of St. Lawrence 230, 296, 512–517
Group on Earth Observations 217
habitat (marine) 124, 208, 233, 238–241, 244, 
245–247, 249, 287, 294, 299–302




high seas 119, 361–362, 418, 420–422 




human rights 24, 261, 346–347, 353, 
468–469, 540
international legal regime 468–469, 472
human security 107, 408–409, 426–430, 
448, 536
human trafficking See maritime security, 
transport of persons or goods
hydrocarbons See offshore oil and gas
hydrographic surveys 419
hypoxia 194, 223, 230–231, 234, 238, 248,  
306






indigenous knowledge systems 7, 46–51, 
272, 331, 334–335 
See also knowledge systems; local knowl-
edge; traditional ecological knowledge




baseline data 109, 234, 251, 299
data collection 50, 197, 207–210, 213–215, 
234, 266–267, 271–272, 281–284, 330, 
391, 417–420, 464–465
citizen science 218, 252–257, 284, 
335, 535
geospatial 213, 215–216, 266, 270–272, 
281–285, 538
management 3–4, 24, 30–31, 56–58, 
160–161, 195, 210–219, 268–273, 275–285, 
391, 414–415, 464–465, 497, 519–521, 
538–539
governance principles and approaches (cont.)
551Index
<UN>
science-policy interface 56, 110, 196, 
211–212, 215–216, 256–257, 268–272, 
275–280, 283, 327–332, 352–353, 
391–392, 406, 414, 520, 534–535
science translation 56, 279, 514, 520
state of the environment reporting 277–
278, 535
use and influence evaluation 277–280 
See also knowledge systems; monitoring
information and communications technol-
ogy 3–4, 57, 161, 215–217, 255–256, 275,  
  278–279, 283–285, 309, 314–315, 
493–494, 518–519, 534, 538–539
communication skills 82, 83, 497, 
512–515, 540
web-based learning 74–75, 82, 91, 92, 
97–98, 108, 111 
See also cyberspace; media; telemetry
innocent passage 418
integrated coastal and ocean management 




See also Global Ocean Observing System; 
International Oceanographic Data and 
Information Exchange; UNESCO
intergovernmental organizations See under 
individual organization
internal waters 422 
See also maritime boundaries
International Atomic Energy Agency 21
International Civil Aviation 
Organization 475
International Convention for the Control and 
Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and 
Sediments 458–459, 479–483
International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships, Annex VI 170
International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea 474–476, 492–493
International Convention on Maritime Search 
and Rescue 475
International Convention on Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping 
for Seafarers 492, 493
International Council for the Exploration of 
the Sea 341
International Court of Justice 135, 182
advisory jurisdiction
and maritime boundaries 155, 163–164
Black Sea (Romania/Ukraine) Case 164 
See also dispute resolution
international environmental law 2–3, 7,  
11, 41, 118–122, 125, 145, 169–171,  
174, 192, 262, 298, 316, 318, 368
international humanitarian law 427–430





and autonomous vessel technology  
492–493, 494
customary 119, 135, 163, 164
duty to cooperate 119–120
duty to prevent transboundary harm  
119
duty to render assistance 493
espionage 417
no more favorable treatment  principle  
464, 471
reparations 186
rule of law 411–412, 425, 537, 539
soft law 118
international law of the sea See Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea; 
United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea
International Marine Protected Areas 
Congress 287
International Maritime Bureau 421, 422
International Maritime Organization 18, 
301, 450, 458–459, 475, 537
















International Oceanographic Data and Infor-
mation Exchange 210 
See also Intergovernmental 
 Oceanographic Commission
International Ocean Institute 1, 7, 9–10,  
12–14, 60, 69–70, 78–80, 100–101, 
104–112, 144
IOI-Canada Training Program 1–2, 69, 
77, 79–85, 89–90, 92–98
Ocean Yearbook 7
World Ocean Review 111 
See also Pacem in Maribus
International Safety Management Code See 
International Maritime Organization
International Seabed Authority 11, 18, 
132–133, 137, 249, 250
and distribution of benefits 134, 138–141
Area 136–138
International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea 159, 181–187
advisory opinions (jurisdiction) 181, 
184, 186
and delimitation of maritime areas 185




Seabed Disputes Chamber 184, 186
vessel arrest and detention 183, 185–186 
See also arbitration; dispute resolution
International Union for Conservation of 
Nature 287, 293, 329
Internet See cyberspace; information and 
communications technology
INTERPOL 358
introduced species See marine biosecurity
invasive species See marine biosecurity









and governance 3–4, 29–31, 38–39, 
53–54, 56, 69–70, 73, 84, 111, 116, 118, 
264–266, 272, 326, 334–335, 341–342, 
540–541
integration 26, 111, 329–330, 338–339, 540
science-based 38–39, 49–50, 53–54, 56, 
69, 111, 118, 326–332, 341–342 
See also indigenous knowledge systems; 
information and data; local knowledge; 
traditional knowledge
Korea, Republic of 13, 451–452, 486
Kyoto Protocol See United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change
Labrador Sea 230
land-locked states 139–141, 261
law of the sea See Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea; United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea








local knowledge 253–257, 264, 272, 331, 
334–335, 342 
See also indigenous knowledge systems; 
knowledge systems
London Convention See Convention on the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dump-
ing of Wastes and Other Matter
LOS Convention See United Nations Conven-





See also Pardo, Arvid
mangroves 238
marine algal blooms 194, 200














marine biological diversity of areas beyond 
national jurisdiction See areas beyond 




See also genetic resources; marine science 
and technology
marine birds 233





nutrient overload 223, 231, 248, 306
plastics and microplastics 194, 205, 305
sulfur oxides 231 
See also marine pollution
marine defaunation 234









port state control 450, 463
safety zones 299–300
governance 192–193
international legal regime 119, 170, 192, 
298–299, 458–459, 463–467, 479–483
national legal regimes 294, 302, 395–396 
See also marine protected areas; ocean 
health; polluter pays principle; waste 
management
marine genetic resources See genetic 
resources
marine mammals 233, 390–391
and ocean noise 299–302, 390, 397, 404
endangered species 295–296, 512–517 
See also dolphins; marine resource man-
agement; whales
marine pharmaceuticals See marine biotech-
nology, pharmaceuticals
marine planning See marine spatial planning
marine pollution 193–194, 535
aquaculture 376–377, 379–380, 382–383
eutrophication 223 231, 241, 248, 382
hypoxic zones 194, 223, 230–231, 234, 238, 
248, 306




oil and gas activities 249, 396–399, 
404–406




vessel source 458–459, 479 
See also marine contaminants
marine protected areas 13, 196, 235, 
286–292, 300
and climate change 172, 286, 308
and scientific research 254
areas beyond national jurisdiction 148, 






ecologically or biologically significant 
areas 152–154, 291
governance 153, 287–289, 291, 535
networks 152–153, 243–244, 273, 290, 291 
See also marine environmental protec-
tion; marine spatial planning; ocean 
management
marine renewable energy See ocean renew-
able energy
marine resource management:
and climate change 172, 363–365, 512
and human rights 346–347
and Indigenous peoples 46–49, 334–337
and marine renewable energy 390–391
compliance and enforcement 125–126, 
218–219, 291, 326, 334–337, 354–360, 
369, 515–516
automatic identification system  
358–359
conservation measures 369–372
closed/protected areas 291, 307, 365
554 Index
<UN>
data collection and reporting  
355–357, 359
fishery closures 515









overfishing 61, 193–194, 197, 205, 235, 
242, 291, 305, 350, 362–363, 370–371, 
405, 533, 535
fishing gear 233–234, 242, 249, 340–341, 
344, 363, 371, 373, 404–405, 516
governance 24–25, 27, 32–33, 47–52, 





ecosystem-based 123–124, 222, 244, 
326, 338–343, 362–366
equity 338
fisheries improvement projects 
(FIPs) 345
fishery management plans 254–255, 
340–341, 369–372, 516
fishery system approach 325
fishing rights 351, 362, 364–365






participatory approach 54, 57–58, 
326, 342
precautionary approach 123, 125–126, 
172, 178–179, 244, 324, 362, 364–365, 
369–370
quota regulations 363, 365, 368, 
370–371, 373









maximum sustainable yield 327, 329, 
340, 342, 364, 368–369







See also fisheries; fishery science; gover-
nance; marine mammals; whales
marine science and technology:
and policy-making 56, 110, 196, 211–212, 
215–216, 256–257, 268–272, 275–280, 
283, 327–332, 352–353, 391–392, 406, 
414, 520, 534–535
citizen science 218, 252–257, 284, 335, 
535
data/information management 3–4, 
30–31, 50, 56, 160–161, 195, 207–219, 





international legal regime 12 419–420
military scientific research 418–420





transfer of technology 3–4, 13, 131–132, 
148 
See also marine biotechnology; remote 
sensing; telemetry
marine spatial planning 54, 198, 243, 
268–274, 382–383, 536
and ecosystem approach 266–267
and geospatial data 270–272, 281, 285
competing uses 54, 266–270,  
301, 393 
See also coastal management; gover-
nance; marine protected areas; ocean 
management


















three stage methodology 159n16, 164
disputes 162–168, 176n2




See also baselines; contiguous zone; con-
tinental shelf; exclusive economic zone; 
internal waters; territorial sea
Maritime Labour Convention 2006 470
compliance and enforcement 465, 
470–472
flag state obligations 470–472




international regulatory regime  
463–467, 474–477, 491–494 
See also navigation; search and rescue; 
ships
maritime security:




comprehensive security approach  
107–108, 408–409, 413–415, 422, 537, 541







navies 63, 410–411, 413–414, 418




terrorism 408, 412, 415, 421, 493
transnational criminal activity 354,  
358, 423
transport of persons or goods:




See also arms control and disarmament; 
coast guards; migrations (human) by sea; 
piracy; search and rescue
maritime transport:



















international legal regime 463–467, 
469–472, 474–475, 479–483, 488–489
security issues 63
traffic volumes 485–487, 488 
See also ballast water; navigation; ports; 
ship registration; shipbuilding industry; 
shipping industry; ships; ships’ operations
MARPOL See International Convention for 
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
Marshall Islands 451
media 512–517
social media 256, 279, 497, 518–521 




merchant ships See ships
migrant smuggling See maritime security, 
transport of persons or goods, human 
trafficking
migrations (human) by sea 426–430, 536
and human rights 427–428, 430
and search and rescue regime 427–430
international legal regime 427–429 
See also maritime security, transport of 
persons or goods




environment 195–197, 213–219, 382–383, 
535
fisheries 161, 330–331, 355–356
marine animals 210–212, 299–302, 397
oceanographic 210
state of the environment 195
vessels 357–359, 474, 477 
See also information and data; telemetry
monitoring, control and surveillance See ma-
rine resource management, compliance 
and enforcement; maritime security
Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in 
the Management of Fisheries of Common 
Interest 368
navies See maritime security
navigation safety 487–488, 491
electronic chart display 161 





New International Economic Order 10, 
115–116 
See also world order
non-governmental organizations 7, 31–32, 
53–58, 279, 345
North East Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission 341
Northern Sea Route See Russian Federation
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
Organization 341
Northwest Passage See Canada
Norway 165–168, 177–178, 485
ocean acidification 21, 169, 171–172, 194, 203, 
227–231, 242, 248, 305
ocean assessment 194–195, 220–223, 
234–235, 535
ocean carbon uptake See carbon 
sequestration
ocean dumping See marine pollution
ocean economics 101–102, 201–202, 207, 
274, 312–313, 320, 367–369, 381–382, 
391–392, 522–523, 527
ecological economic approach 304–308 
See also Blue Economy
ocean energy See ocean renewable energy; 
offshore oil and gas
ocean fertilization 124, 173 
See also carbon sequestration; 
geoengineering
Ocean Frontier Institute 21–22
ocean governance See governance, ocean
ocean health 3, 13, 24, 58–59, 72, 101–103, 
108, 145, 190–198, 205–206, 222–223, 232, 
307–308, 535
and human health 199–204, 536 
See also marine environmental protection
ocean information See information and data
ocean literacy 105, 108–109, 111, 499, 523–527 
See also education and training
ocean literature 496–502
poetry as agent of science 499–502
ocean management 53, 121, 195
and climate change 102–103
competing uses 54, 80–81, 102, 291, 301, 
365
integrated 41–45, 53–58, 110–111, 117, 122, 
125, 172, 261–262, 320, 365
large ocean management areas 42
management plans 43–44, 109–110,  
122
policy development 53, 55–56
regional ecosystem review boards 44
See also governance; governance prin-
ciples and approaches; marine protected 





deep sea (seabed) 128–130, 249–250
polymetallic manganese nodules  
128–129
governance 128–133, 250 
See also offshore oil and gas; seabed 
resources








offshore oil and gas 62, 166–167, 249, 386
and world energy demand 401–403
environmental culture 394–400
environmental impacts 249, 396–399, 
404–406
governance 395–400, 403–406
national/regional legal regimes 395–396, 
399, 403–404
seismic exploration 396–398, 404–405 
See also ocean mining
oil spill contingency planning See emergency 
preparedness and response, oil spills
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 102, 320
OSPAR Commission 341
Our Common Future See World Commission 
on Environment and Development
ownership (resource) See marine resource 
management, fishing rights
Pacem in Maribus 9–10, 46–47, 60, 78, 
130–132 
See also International Ocean Institute
Pacific Island states 367–372 
See also small island developing states






Pardo, Arvid 10–11, 35, 133, 142–144, 149–150
1967 UN speech 9, 39, 77–78, 107, 129–130
Ocean Space Treaty 132, 143–144 
See also Malta
Paris MoU on Port State Control 463–465, 
471–472
Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas 301
Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) See 
Nauru Agreement Concerning Coopera-
tion in the Management of Fisheries of 
Common Interest
pathogen transfer See marine biosecurity
peaceful use of the ocean 9, 39, 107, 109, 142, 
409, 416, 420
People’s Republic of China See China, 
People’s Republic
performance standards See accountability
Philippines 200, 421
phytoplankton 229, 382
piracy 421–425, 493, 536 
See also maritime security
planning See marine spatial planning
polluter pays principle 14, 118, 121, 399
See also governance principles and 
approaches; marine environmental 
protection
pollution response See emergency prepared-
ness and response
pollution See marine pollution
population growth See coastal  
management





port planning and development 63 
See also maritime transport
precautionary principle 2, 14, 24, 109, 
117–118, 120–125, 172, 178–179, 191, 244, 
250, 264, 295, 302, 324, 362, 364–365, 
369–370, 396, 537
See also governance principles and 
 approaches; risk management
predator prey interactions 233–234, 363
prevention principle 2, 118–119 




primary productivity 221–222, 229, 240, 247
public health See health (human)
recreation 201, 478
reefs See coral
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Com-
bating Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships in Asia (ReCAPP) 422
regional cooperation See governance prin-
ciples and approaches
regional fisheries management organiza-
tions 125–126, 291, 357–359, 361–365
performance reviews 362 
See also by individual organization
remote sensing 160–161, 213–219, 266, 
282–283, 534
global navigation satellite systems 160
satellite-based 213–219, 283
seismic 396–398 
See also geographical information system; 
marine science and technology
resilience 109, 171–172, 197, 286, 312, 319, 434, 
436–441
Rio+20 See United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development
Rio Declaration See United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development
risk management 437–438
assessment 125, 173, 271, 391–392,  
399, 401 







salmon fisheries 347, 375, 381–382
satellites See remote sensing
science-policy interface See information  
and data
sea ice 229–230, 484–485
sea level rise 169, 172–173, 200, 242,  
316–318, 438
and El Niño 214 
See also climate change
sea turtles 233, 300, 404–405
sea use planning See marine spatial planning
seabed mining See ocean mining
seabed resources 128, 132–133, 249, 387
governance 128–141, 144–154, 186, 
249–250 
See also ocean mining
seabirds See marine birds
seafarers 422, 448, 450, 492
employment standards 462, 470
fundamental rights 468–472





duty to render assistance 493
humanitarian concerns 427–430




rescue coordination operations 477, 488
technology 473–475, 477, 493 
See also emergency preparedness and re-
sponse; maritime safety; maritime security
seaweed See macroalgae
Secretariat for the Pacific Community 370
security issues See maritime security
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction 438
shellfish See crabs; lobsters; molluscs; shrimp
ship registration 451, 452–455
open registers 448, 454–455, 462–463, 
469, 481–482 
See also flag states; maritime transport
shipbreaking 452
shipbuilding industry 451–452 
See also maritime transport
shipping industry 448–455
and autonomous vessel technology 490, 
539














ship management companies 452–453 
See also maritime transport
ships:
autonomous vessels 490–494





pleasure craft 475–476, 483, 485
remotely operated vessels 477, 490–492, 
494
substandard 462–463, 464, 466,  
469
vessel size and capacity 459 
See also maritime safety; maritime 
transport
ships’ operations:




See also maritime transport
shrimp 227–228
Singapore 451, 453
small island developing states 14, 317–318, 
319–320, 367–372, 536
SAMOA Pathway 368 
See also developing countries; Pacific 
Island states
social justice See economic and social justice
social license 403–404, 406
socio-ecological systems 102–105, 262–267, 
331–332, 340
SOLAS See International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea
Somalia 423–425, 443
South China Sea 61, 63, 419
South Korea See Korea, Republic of
sovereign rights 135–138, 146–147, 163, 168, 
383, 418–420, 425, 428
sovereignty 143–144, 146–147, 149, 163, 
468–469, 472, 536
Soviet Union See Russian Federation
Spain 310
See also Canary Islands
spatial data infrastructures See information 
and data, geospatial
species at risk 293, 329, 512–517
national legal regimes 293–296




strategic environmental assessment 392, 
404 




See also governance principles and 
approaches
subsistence fisheries See fisheries
Suez Canal 460, 462
sustainability 2–4, 14, 17–18, 23, 59, 122, 
126–127, 142, 310, 367–372, 534




sustainable development 2–3, 7, 23–24, 
60, 64–65, 71–72, 74–76, 86, 106–109, 
120, 123, 149, 206–207, 221–226, 260, 
268–269, 280, 310–315, 319–321, 326, 
367–372, 377–378, 536–537, 541
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) See 





ocean observing systems 210, 217–218
satellite tags 208–209
vessel monitoring systems 355, 358,  
477
automatic identification systems  
358–359
Global Maritime Distress and Safety 
Systems 474 
See also information and communications 
technology; marine science and technol-
ogy; monitoring




territorial sea 418, 422, 425, 429 
See also maritime boundaries
Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea 9–10, 71, 129, 132, 136, 157
tourism 108, 231, 309–315, 485–486
environmental impacts 310–311
sustainable 310–315 
See also cruise ships
traditional knowledge 7, 49–52, 110, 118, 272, 
331, 540 
See also indigenous knowledge systems; 
knowledge systems
transfer of technology See marine science and 
technology
transparency 42–43, 45, 55–58, 118, 271–272, 
280, 314, 336, 341, 347, 364 











turtles See sea turtles
UNCED See United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development
UNCLOS See Third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea; United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNCTAD See United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development
UNDP See United Nations Development 
Programme
UNEP See United Nations Environment 
Programme
UNESCO See United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization







World Ocean Assessment Report 535 
See also United Nations General Assembly
United Nations Agreement on the Conserva-
tion and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and High Migratory Fish Stocks See 
United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement
United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development 11
and World Oceans Day 507–511
Rio Declaration 118, 120–122 
See also Agenda 21
United Nations Conference on Sustainable 
Development (Rio+20) 13, 275
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Develop-
ment 76, 123, 280
“The future we want” 41, 122,  
154–155, 171
Sustainable Development Goals 14, 
23–24, 59, 106–107, 123, 171, 206–207, 
225, 280, 377–378, 536–537
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development 451, 455, 457, 460
United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea 1–2, 10–11, 18, 71, 116, 119–120, 175, 307,  
 492, 536
and climate change mitigation 170
and other conventions 170, 173, 357
Annex VII/arbitration 182–183
areas beyond national jurisdiction 13, 
76, 134–141, 145–146, 151, 155
coastal state rights 135–138, 419–420
continental shelf 135–138, 419
deep seabed (Area) 132–133, 136
dispute resolution 181–187, 532
duty to cooperate 119–120
environmental protection 119, 170, 192
equitable sharing criteria 138–141
equity 1







marine resources (non-living) 134, 
136–141





Part XI Agreement 132, 138–139
peaceful purposes 107, 416, 420
piracy 421–423






United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples 121
United Nations Development Programme:
GloBallast Programme 480–481
GloFouling Programme 483
United Nations Economic and Social 
 Council 55, 112, 139
United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization 18
See also Intergovernmental Oceanograph-
ic Commission
United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme 18, 60, 196
United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change 169, 170–171, 174
Kyoto Protocol 171
Ocean Pathways Initiative 318
Paris Agreement 125, 171, 316
United Nations General Assembly 11–14, 174
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Develop-
ment 76, 123, 280
“The future we want” 41, 122, 154–155, 
171
Sustainable Development Goals 14, 
23–24, 59, 106–107, 123, 171, 206–207, 
225, 280, 377–378, 536–537
Ad-Hoc Seabed Committee 128
BBNJ Working Group 13–14, 151–152, 
154–155
First Committee
1967 Pardo speech 9, 39, 77–78, 107, 
129–130
Informal Consultative Process 12–13, 87, 
123, 151, 299
‘Ocean Assembly’ 86–87
oceans and law of the sea resolu-
tions 122–123, 298
Preparatory Committee (ABNJ) 117–118, 
155, 291, 307
UN Ocean Conference 198
Year of the Ocean 11 
See also United Nations
United Nations Human Rights Council 472
United Nations Open-Ended Informal 
Consultative Process on Oceans and the 
Law of the Sea (UNICPOLOS) See United 
Nations, General Assembly, Informal 
Consultative Process
United Nations Programme of Action for 
Sustainable Development See Agenda 21
United Nations Trusteeship Council 87
United States 13, 200–201, 217, 244, 317, 320, 
418–419, 459–460, 465, 480















urbanization See coastal management
use conflicts See coastal management, 
competing uses; ocean management, 
competing uses
vulnerability 24, 89, 92, 109, 143, 152, 171, 229, 
232, 241–242, 248–249, 312, 319, 341, 351, 
362, 425, 428–429, 434, 436, 438, 538
vulnerable species See endangered species
warships 413, 418–419
waste management 439 
See also marine environmental protection
watershed management 261
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission 367–368
whales:
and underwater noise 300–302, 397, 404









North Atlantic right 295–296, 397, 
404, 512–517
vessel collision 397, 404–405, 512, 
514–516
whale-rescue activity 513 
See also marine mammals; marine re-
source management
World Bank 443
World Commission on Environment and 
Development 40, 206, 413
World Maritime University 104
World Ocean Review See International Ocean 
Institute
World Oceans Day 507–511
world order 8–11, 115–116, 150, 175, 225–226, 
414–415 
See also economic and social justice; New 
International Economic Order
World Parks Congress 287
World Summit on Sustainable 
Development 122
World Tourism Organization 311
World Trade Organization 355
whales: (cont.)
